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Abstract
This thesis explores possible constraints on effective participation and the scope of 
alternatives considered by central policy makers, in a debate on the content of 
regulations to control pesticides. These aspects of the policy process were examined in 
a case study of the Food and Environment Protection Act (1985) and the Control of 
Pesticides Regulations (1986). Four issues affecting manufacture, marketing and use 
were examined in each of three chronological phases: pre-paiiiamentary, parliamentary 
and administrative. Interview data, interest group responses to two Government 
consultative documents and Hansard material were analysed. Key constraining factors 
framing die Current debate were seen to encompass "situational" factors, which were 
historical (existing structures, past debates and views of long-standing central 
participants in the control system) or current (present procedures, time available and 
views of newer central participants), substantive or procedural. The operation and 
effects of such framing in the contemporary debate on the diosen issues are discussed.
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1. Introduction
This thesis is a case study of participation in the development of policy for 
regulatory control. Its subject is a part of pollution control which affects the chemical 
and agricultural industries, namely the regulation of pesticides. Not aU G ovenun^ 
policies become the subject of legislation, but here the focus is on the development of 
the debate and decisions on a number of pesticide control issues which helped to shape 
pesticides policy during die legislative process. The statutes concerned are The Food 
and Environment Protection Act 1985 (Cap 48) (FEPA) and The Control of Pesticides 
Regulations 1986 (SI 1510) (COPR). Part in  of the FEPA, "Control of Pesticides etc." 
dealt with die production, distribution and use of pesticides in the UK, and placed the 
control of pesticides on a statutory basis, whereas before it had been largely voluntary.
This thesis investigates styles of decision making and the effectiveness of 
participation in the policy process, in an area which already boasted a large number of 
existing controls. The impetus to move to a statutory system arose as a reaction to the 
unacceptability of some of these existing controls, and the ineffectiveness of others. 
Central policy makers can incorporate a range of rationalities Or worldviews, (or - to 
depoliticize - alternatives) into their decision making, and therefore influence the 
effectiveness of participation by less central interests. Their capability to do so is in 
turn explained in terms of situational constraints or limitations on them. These consist 
of a number of substantive factors (to do with pesticides issues), historical or more 
proximate to the current debate; and concurrent non-substantive factors such as formal 
or informal procedures or strategies. These factors and their possible modes of 
operation are elaborated in Quarter 3, where the theoretical background is described, 
drawing on the literature on policy making and participatiorL Historical substantive 
factors are described in the background to foe current debate given in Chapters 2 and 
5, respectively. Procedural factors concurrent to the substantive debate are given a 
section of each of Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Chapter 2 introduces historical factors in terms of a chronology of past pesticide 
control debates and decisions, particularly the debate on the possibility of statutory 
controls up to 1979; and the participants in the latter. Chapter 5 deals with the 
immediate context of, and impetus for, change from voluntary to statutory controls, 
from 1979 to early 1984 when the decision to legislate was taken.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 constitute foe centre of the tiiesis, where foe evolution of 
debates (evidence, argument and decisions) on chosen issues are elaborated 
chronologicaUy. They are bounded by foe stages of the legislative process: foe pre- 
parliamentary phase, starting with the publication of the proposals for legislation, from 
May - November 1984; the parliamentary phase, starting with the publication of the 
Food and Environment Protection Bill, from November 1984 - July 1985; and the
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administrative phase, which includes the consultation on the regulations and is 
followed up to the publication of the first set of regulations, from July 1985 - October 
1986. These chapters deal with the evolution of policy objectives, the relevant evidence 
presented on the chosen issues, and policy developments and decisions on the latter.
The issues identified to illustrate differences in policy making and participation fall 
into four areas: the application of the pre-existing pesticides registration scheme to all 
suppliers and the rapid registration sdieme for identical imports; the data requirements 
of the registration process; the conditions on pesticide use set at registration, 
specifically as regards minor uses; and conditions on use set outside registration, 
specifically the training of users.
The first fiiree areas already had substantial but varying degrees of control, or 
practices, in place. The last had no controls associated with it  The development of 
debates and decisions on these issues was followed to ascertain the impact of such 
constraints on the range of alternatives entertained by central policy makers, and the 
range of views accommodated, the effectiveness of participation and fiie participative 
legitimacy of the policy process. The origin and fate of the issues could then be related 
to the degree of compatibility with previous controls.
The currency of "alternatives" is used in e?q}laining the relationships between 
situational factors, policy making style and participation (facilitated or constrained by 
policy making style, selectively or generally).
Explanations of fiie policy process draw on the decision making literature. Policy 
making is often generalised as policy makers formulating very small changes and 
considering a very limited number of alternatives (incrementalism) as a reaction to a 
complex problem (Lindblom, 1965). Infiuencing the numbers and kinds of alternatives 
considered by central policy makers must be the generalised unformulated aim of 
sectoral participants. Vfith reqxct to pre-existing situational factors, the alternatives 
favoured could range fiom a wish to conserve the status quo in its entirety with no 
additional controls, to a wish to include a large number of radical changes to the status 
quo, plus additional controls affecting all sectors. By die same token, central policy 
makers, acting under constraints (whidi may include sectoral favouritism or wider 
ideological principles) may adopt a position between conservatism and radicalism 
which selects certain alternatives for consideration. Their receptivity to other 
alternatives is thereby hampered.
The thesis investigates where the goals and alternatives considered arose from; 
why certain goals and alternatives inherited from the past were often unquestioningjy 
the focus of debate; how this set the tone of the debate; and the source and 
consequences of any tendencies to favour the interests of particular sectors.
In conclusion, the thesis attempts to evaluate what scope exists for politically 
"rational" decision making entailing wide participation in regulatory policy making 
(Chapter 9).
The timing of the pesticides legislation offered an ideal opportunity to study policy 
formation as it was taking place, and while details were still relatively fresh in the 
minds of key participants in the legislative process. An offer to work as a research 
assistant during the passage of the Bill in the House of Commons was accepted, and 
this served as an intensive introduction to the participants and issues involved, and the 
nature and scope of their interactions. Access to civil servants in Government 
departments was facilitated by a senior member of the \finistry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and FOod’s Pesticides and Infestation Control Division (MAFF; PICD). The 
time constraints of legislation and regulation, the limited opportunity for public 
participation, and the inscrutability and informality of many executive processes 
dealing with delegated legislation, delimit unrepresentative windows through which 
researchers may normally view policy making. In official documents which are made 
public and in parliamentary records certain issues may be elevated in importance for 
political reasons. Real and apparent concerns, policies, or implementation priorities 
may be confused with one another. Policy making may also be distorted by some 
issues being in a greater state of decidedness than is openly admitted.
Such problems can be alleviated to some extent by carrying out research as the 
legislation unfolds, although they can never be entirely resolved. However the intensive 
telescoped nature of the legislative process facilitates study by providing a higher 
degree of focus and contrast than is usually possible in other contexts. In the case of 
FEPA, resolution was particularly sharp in the absence of major party-political 
considerations, and because the times from the decision to legislate to primary 
legislation and firom primary to secondary legislation were relatively short.
As concerns the type of policy research, the thesis is a descriptive study of the 
policy process, rather than policy outcomes, and of policy design or shaping (up to the 
decision on the selection of alternatives) rather than policy implementation. It examines 
how policies are made throu^ focussing on the characteristics of issues, the political 
setting of issues, and the debate on issues involving die views of different participants 
at each stage. The thesis could be described as one type of "policy analysis". However 
this term is often reserved for prescriptive activities so a better classification is "policy 
studies", indicating an essentially descriptive or explanatory set of concerns (Hogwood 
and Gunn, 1984). As the study emphasises the complexity of policy making and some 
of the constraints on alternatives for making policy, it elucidates some constraints upon 
more prescriptive ventures, especially those which try to sqiproximate ideas of 
rationality (both economic and political). It does not however deal explicitly with 
models of rational decision making.
It is also not concerned widi the descriptive form of policy analysis found in 
political science (Mood, 1983), which focuses on the strategies employed by some 
participants in bringing issues to the attention of decision taking participants more 
central to policy shaping. In tiiat some of the constraints to participation are non­
substantive, the study has some links with procedure studies in public administration 
which conc^itrate on foe formal procedures of government in policy making. However 
more emphasis is laid here on the receptive access participants felt they bad, either 
formally or informally, and other informal Government arrangements affecting the 
quality of debate.
The thesis is case study based and qualitative. The main effort in primary data 
collection was foe conduct of open-ended semi-structured interviews with the civil 
servants involved (administrative and scientific), agricultural and agrochemical industry 
representatives, and envirorunental, consumer and developmental public interest groups. 
These data, plus private written representations on the proposals for legislation and for 
regulations comprise foe less generally accessible sources of information. In addition, 
analysis of parliamentary debates was very important for the presentation of a complete 
picture. The methods employed in data collection and the deployment of data are 
reported in Chapter 4.
2. Pre-Existing Substantive Factors: UK Pesticide Controls
In 1984 there was an apparently precipitate Government policy reversal. Having 
maintained a largely voluntary position on and system for the control of pesticide 
production, distribution and use since 1972 and reaffinmng this as a pohcy portion in 
1983, foe Government announced that it would introduce legislation at the earliest 
opportunity. The circumstances immediately surrounding this change are of central 
interest to this thesis, providing the context within which policy making for pesticide 
control took place, and will be dealt with in detail in Quq)ter 5. In this chuter the 
longer-term historical context which contributed to foe climate of change up to 1979 is 
described, helping to locate in time the contemporary policy debate dealt with in 
chapters 6 - 8 .  Such history allows causes and effects, continuities, discontinuities and 
sources of influence to be distinguished. Past events were therefore a crucial influence 
on pesticide control policy making at the time of the development of FEPA and 
COPR.
Section 2.1 of this chapter describes the history and evolution of controls over 
pesticides. The way in v/ïàch the voluntary agreements, when working effectively, 
were envisaged to maintain control is discussed in detail, as this both stimulated the 
perceived need for change and provided the operating framework for the later statutory 
system.
Section 2.2 deals at a greater level of detail with die historical debate on potential 
statutory control of pesticides (at this stage more "whether" than "what") and the 
timing of major events. The documentation of personal views and arguments, in foe 
historical context, also gives important insights into perceptions of the problem at the 
time of. the decision to implement major changes. Viewpoints irfoerited from the past 
are used as political tools in such debates. Likewise interpretations of the past are part 
of the stuff of contemporary political debate (Rhoades, 1986). Section 2.2 therefore 
attempts to describe the arguments and how they evolved, particularly within foe 
Government, the policy making centre of the pesticide control system. Other major 
participants in these debates are also considered. Since the 1950’s, there have been 
several brief periods when pressure for foe development of statutory regulations 
increased significantly. At such times events took place in a more public way and in 
quid: succession, and views and perceptions were most vocal and well documented. 
Particularly important in the debate were the years leading up to the 1972 decision not 
to develop a statutory system. Tire views of tiiose involved in this decision can help us 
to understand the opinions and arguments expressed in the more recent debate in 1984.
Figure 2.1 sets out key dates and decisions up to 1979.
Figure 2.1: Historical Chronology to 1979
1942 Crop Protection Products Approval Scheme established (CPPAS).
1945 Labour Government Elected (May).
1949 Government asks Advisoiy Committee on Science Policy (ACSP) 
to investigate controls on the use of toxic substances in 
consumer goods.
ACSP sets up Committee on Toxic Substances in Consumer Goods 
(CrSCG).
Gowers Committee Recommends legislation requiring 
agricultural workers to wear protective clothing.
1950 Labour Government re-elected.
MAF sets up Working Party on Precautionary Measures Against 
Toxic Substances used in Agriculture (Zuckerman Working 
Party; ZWP),
1951 CTSCG recommends voluntary co-operation between Government 
and industry.
1st ZWP Report recommends powers to enforce worker 
protection and manufacturer labelling requirements.
Conservative Government Elected (October).
1952 Agriculture (Poisonous Substances) Act ensures protective 
clothing for workers.
1953 2nd ZWP Report recommends (a) suppliers notify Government of 
intention to sell pesticide, providing toxicological data;
(b) standing committee of experts to collect data on 
pesticides, residues and risks to consumers; (c) statutory 
powers to make regulations to ensure the above.
1954 MAFF appoints Advisory Committee (ACPSUAFS).
Advisory Committee appoints a scientific sub-committee (SSC).
1955 Food and Drags Act
Trial notification scheme initiated.
Conservative Government re-elected.
3rd ZWP Report said statutory powers were not required now. 
Reconunended Advisory Committee additionally to advise on
(a) risks to wildlife (b) statutory powers if they became 
necessary.
1957 Notification of Pesticides Scheme (later called PSPS) 
formally introduced.
1958 Conservative Government re-elected.
1960 MAFF sets up Research Study Group (RSG) to look into effects
of the use of toxic substances in agriculture and food
storage.
1961 RSG Report recommends (a) residues surveys (b) review of
pesticide research. Says voluntary control measures 
following ZWP satisfactory.
SSC sets up Residues in Foodstuffs Panel.
1962 Animals (Cruel Poisons) Act
Research Committee on Toxic Chemicals set up.
Proposal for new bill with comprehensive powers extending to 
use fails to be introduced.
1964 Labour Government Elected (October).
Advisory Committee Report recommends (a) OC use restrictions 
(b) controls of non-agricultural uses of pesticides.
Advisory Committee remit now to include toxic substances 
other than agricultural pesticides (ACPOTS).
MAFF a.<dcs Advisoiy Committee to consider the desirability of 
pesticides legislation, specifically the ideas of
(a) approvals for only more safe and efficient products and
(b) fixed residue tolerances.
1966 Labour Government re-elected.
1967 Advisory Committee recommends comprehensive pesticides 
legislation.
Farm and Garden Chemicals Act can require identification 
of active ingredient on the labeL
1968 Pesticides Bill Drafted which would replace Farm and Garden 
Chemicals Act and Agriculture (Poisonous Substances) Act
Medicines Act
1970 Conservative Government Elected (June).
1971 Pesticides Bill Ready.
RCEP 1st Report supports statutory controls.
Advisory Committee and RCEP discuss legislation and change 
opinion.
1972 MAFF officially abandons Pesticides Bill.
Britain enters EEC
Robens Committee recommends legislation for worker health 
and safety especially toxic substances and labelling.
1973 Faim and Garden Chemicals Regulations bring Act into force.
1974 Labour Government Elected (March).
RCEP 4th Report affirms statutory scheme not justified 
because of industry co-operation and the decline in OC use.
But legislation should be considered if situation changed.
DoE (CDEP) recommends non-agricultural pesticides should be 
subject to same degree on control as agricultural
1976 Government suggests industry attempt self-regulatiorL
1978 BASIS set up with sanctions.
Consumer Safety Act
1979 Conservative Government elected (May).
BAA adds sanctions to BASIS scheme.
Advisory Committee affirms voluntary position
RCEP 7th Report says case for statutory control less 
pressing with BASIS introduction
2.1 Voluntary Controls Over Pestiddes
Before the FEPA (1985; Cap 48) there was no unified legal framework for the 
control of pesticides. Control of the core activities of pesticide registration and 
distributim had been tackled by establishing voluntary procedures. Other aspects of 
control were implicit in primary and secondary legislation dealing with chemicals 
generally or specific classes of chemical (See Appendix 2.1). Explicit pesticide-specific 
controls, legal or otherwise, are documented chronologically in section 2.1.1. The 
voluntary schemes for registration and distribution are described in detail against this 
background in section 2.12. These two sections provide the timescale and descriptive 
background necessary to understand the debate on a unified statutory scheme. The 
registration and distribution aspects of control, which remained voluntary, had been the 
main stumbling block to a unified legal system, and arguments about bringing the 
voluntary procedures into line were therefore the focus of debate.
2.1. J A Short History o f Pesticide Controls in the UK
Among those actively involved in the control of pesticides, the question of 
whether pesticides should be used or not has not been an issue. Pesticide technology 
has been regarded as essential and the issue has instead been the type and the degree 
of control to which it slreuld be subject
In the early 1940’s pesticides were entirely uncontrolled, and were sold directly to
fanners without safety testing/ In 1942, the voluntary Crop Protection Products 
Approval Scheme (CPPAS) was established. This dealt with approvals for active 
ingredients, based on efficacy and safety to the crop, including approval for a method 
of p lica tio n  (RCEP, 1979). The Agricultural Chemicals Approval Scheme (ACAS) 
was established in 1960 and this replaced the CPPAS.
In 1949 concern over possible toxic hazards associated with the new synthetic 
insecticides, as well as some new foods, beverages, drugs and cosmetics, prompted the 
Government to ask the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy (ACSP) to investigate 
the arrangonents within Government for the control of the use of toxic substances in ^  
consumer goods. The ACSP established a Committee on Toxic Substances in 
Consumer Goods (CTSCG) for this purpose (Gillespie, 1977). The CTSCG 
recommended that voluntary cooperation between Government and industry should be 
promoted for a trial period (Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, 1951).
Between 1946 and 1950, seven British farm workers had died from dinitro-ortho- 
cresol (DNOC) poisoning after spraying it as a selective chemical on cereal crops 
(Bates, 1965). Pressure to remedy this situation was b ro u ^  to bear by the Gowers 
Committee report to Parliament in 1949 which recommended the introduction of 
legislation enabling the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) to require the 
provision and wearing of protective dothing intended to protect agricultural workers 
from certain risks (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1949). In 1950, in 
response to a request from MAF, Professor Zuckerman agreed to chair the MAF 
Working Party on Precautionary Measures Against Toxic Chemicals used in 
Agriculture. Over the next five yems the committee produced three reports (the 
"Zuckerman Reports"), which established the basis of the British system of pesticide 
control for the next 30 years.
The first enquiry (MAF, 1951) was limited to the aromatic dinitro herbiddes (such 
as DNOC) and organophosphorous insectiddes, and the first recommendations were on 
the safety of agricultural workers using toxic or harmful substances. A list of 
protective measures for workers, and labdling requirements for manufacturers was 
produced, and it was recommended that power to enforce legal provisions diould be 
made available to agricultural dq)artments. This led to the Agriculture (Poisonous 
Substances) Act 1952 (Cap 60) whose purpose was to protect employees from 
poisoning by the more dangerous chemicals by ensuring the supply and use of 
protective equipment (Bates, 1965). Tire regulations under this Act have been revised 
on several occasions and are currently in force in the form of the Poisonous 
Substances in Agriculture Regulations (SI 1984/1114) made under the Health and 
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (Cap 37).
Lilerview. MAFF(PRSD), Westoning 11/1/88.
The Woildng Party’s second report (MAF, 1953) on the impact of toxic substances 
used in agriculture examined the impact of pesticides on the food produced. They 
found the existing state of affairs unsatisfactory in that: (a) laboratory facilities were 
inadequate to produce the necessary toxicity data; (b) compounds could be marketed 
and used without reference to official bodies; (c) officials had no means of obtaining 
information on the introduction of new pesticides or the extent of their use; and (d) 
there was little information on chemicals in imported food and a lack of satisfactory 
sampling and detection methods.
A number of recommendations followed from this investigatiorL One was that a 
standing committee of experts should be established to collect the necessary data, to 
advise hhnisters on maximum permissible limits for residues and on risks to 
consumers, and to consult with unofficial, official and international bodies (like WHO 
and FAO) with interests in this field. Sheail (1985) notes that the lack of scientific data 
and fire complexity of the issue may have been the most important reasons for the 
Working Party not recorrunending any further legislation. This led, in 1954, to the 
Government appointment of the Advisory Corrunittee on Poisonous Substances Used in 
Agriculture and Food Storage (ACPSUAFS), later the Advisory Committee on 
Pesticides and Other Toxic Substances (ACPOTS), and still later simply the Advisory 
Committee on Pesticides (AGP), to keep the incidence of residues in human foodstuffs 
under dose surveillance. One of its first acts was to appoint a Sdentific Subcommittee 
(SSC) to advise on problems relating to this. Another recommendation in the second 
report was fiiat manufacturers, irrqxrrters and distributors of agricultural pesticides 
should notify Government departments of their intention to sell new chemicals, and 
furnish toxicological and analytical data, fois to be administered by the hfinistry of 
Agriculture, Rsheries and Food (MAFF) as it was now called. This was intmded to 
ensure that only chemicals with sufficient data in these areas could enter foe market, 
and to enable officials to give advice on precautionary measures. The Laboratory of 
the Government Chemist and other departments were advised to seek methods of 
estimating microquantities of toxic substances in food. Over the next year the 
ACPSUAFS played a leading role for Government departments in negotiations over the 
form of the the proposed scheme with the Association of British Insecticide 
Manufacturers (ABIM), later foe Association of British Manufacturers of Agricultural 
Chemicals (ABMAC) and fiom 1969 the British Agrochernicals Association (BAA). A 
notification procedure was agreed and initiated for two years on a trial basis. Then in 
1957, fire voluntary "Notification of Pesticides Scheme", a two-page gentleman’s 
agreement, was formally introduced. This was later expanded and renamed the 
Pesticides Safety Precautions Scheme (PSPS), and formed the centre of the British 
system of pesticide control (MAFF, 1957).
The third report of the Working Party (MAFF, 1955) expressed a general concern 
about the effects of pesticides on wild birds and mammals and recommended that the
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terms of reference of the ACPSUAFS should be widened to include risks to wildlife 
and advice on the development of new legislation, should this prove necessary. At this 
time the concept of "environment" as something to be protected had not developed.^ In 
1959, the SSC set up a Wildlife Panel to consider wildlife data contained in the 
notification from industry (Papworth, 1969).
In 1960, a research study group under the Chief Scientific Advisor to the Minister 
of Agriculture was set up to study the need for further research into the effects of the 
use of toxic chemicals in agriculture and food storage. A major recommendation 
(MAFF, 1961) was that selective surveys should be carried out on the amounts of 
residues occurring where pesticides had been applied in commercial practice. A Panel 
on Residues in Foodstuffs was set up under the SSC to the ACPSUAFS. The 
ACPSUAFS report of 1964 reviewing the persistent OC pesticides (ACPSUAFS, 1964) 
showed fiiat these compounds were present in the groups of food examined, and 
recommended some restrictions in the use of aldrin and dieldrin. A recommendation on 
the withdrawal of the latter from fertiliser mixes, sheep dips and amateur use seemed 
likely to provide the biggest reduction in general environmental contamination (Bates, 
1965).
A number of incidents involving non-agricultural pesticides stimulated the 
Advisory Committee to endorse the need to regulate the non-agricultural use of 
pesticides. At a meeting following the 1964 report it was agreed to widen the Advisory 
Committee’s terms of reference to review all risks which might arise from (1) 
pesticides (2) potentially toxic chemicals on sale to fanners for veterinary medicines 
prescribed for use by veterinary surgeons (3) any other potentially toxic chemical 
referred to the committee by Ministers, and to make recommendations to the Ministers 
concerned. The Government accepted these proposals, and the new "Advisory 
Committee on Pesticides and Other Toxic Substances" (ACPOTS) became responsible 
to the Secretary of State for Education and Science. The scope of the PSPS remained 
unaltered (Sheail, 1985).
Another recommendation from the Research Study Group was that there was a 
need for continual review of research problems associated with pesticides. The 
Research Study Group also concluded that legal and voluntary measures taken 
following the three Zuckerman Working Party reports had in general been successful in 
ensuring the safe use of pesticides. A Research Committee on Toxic Chemicals was 
therefore set up in 1962, and its first report was produced in 1964 (Agricultural 
Research Council, 1964).
In 1962 legislation directed solely at pesticides was introduced in the form of the 
Animals (Cruel Poisons) Act 1962 (Cap 26), which provided that the use of any 
poison to destroy any mammal may be prohibited by regulation.
Interview, MAFF(PRSD), Westoning 11/1^8.
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From the early 1960’s until 1972, there was detailed debate on the possibility of 
statutory controls, and it became Government policy to support the statutory line. The 
period ended, however, in a policy reversal, and after 1972 the Government remained 
against statutory controls until 1984, leading to FEPA. This debate, from 1950, and 
especially from 1964, to 1972, is dealt with in the detail in the following section 2.2.
hi 1972 the Robens Committee on Safety and Health at Work reported to 
Parliament (Secretary Of State For Employment, 1972). It considered that the statutory 
provisions for the control of toxic substances was not comprehensive; that the system 
for coordinating information relating to regulatory activities within Government was 
inadequate; and they recommended the introduction of new legislation concerning 
worker health and safety with provisions for the prohibition of certain toxic substances, 
for precautionary measures, for labelling, and for instmctions in association with 
statutory provisions for safety testing. Most of these recommendations were 
implemented by the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (Cap 37) and subsequent 
regulations. Also in 1972, controls concerned explicitly with the disposal of toxic 
waste on land were instituted by the Deposit of Poisonous Wastes Act 1972 (Cap 21). 
This was replaced by the Control of Pollution (Special Waste) Regulations (SI 
1980/1709) under the Control of Pollution Act 1974 (Cz^ 40).
In 1973 the Farm and Garden Chemicals Regulations (SI 1971/729), which were 
pesticide-specific regulations made under the Farm and Garden Chemicals Act 1967 
(Cap 50), came into force. These stated that crop protection products might not be sold 
without a label bearing the name of the active ingredient.
In December 1976 the Government suggested that the industry should attempt self­
regulation with respect to safety of stores, transport, and the advice given on pesticide 
usage (BASIS, 1985a). This initiative was contained in a letter from MAFF to Mr 
M.H. Vaughan-A^llshaw, director of what is now the United Kingdom Agricultural 
Supply Trade Association (UKASTA). MAFF discussions with UKASTA (representing 
merchants), foe National Association of Agricultural Contractors (NAAC), representing 
contractors, and the BAA, representing manufacturers, over the next 15 months led to 
the fbimation of the British Agrochemical Supply Industry Scheme (BASIS), now the 
British Agrochemical Standards Inspection Scheme, in 1978. In 1978 the CSA included 
a Government amendment specifically designed to deal with the "loophole" where 
products not safety cleared could be placed on the UK market. The MAFF declared 
that they could now make regulations on foe control of pesticides. However the Act 
only allowed foe banning of specific chemicals.
2.7.2 The Voluntary Agreements and the Maintenance of Controls
The Agricultural Chemicals Approval Scheme (ACAS). The CPPAS (later ACAS) 
was set up at foe behest of Government in 1942, under pressure from the NFU. The 
ACAS was formally agreed between Government departments and trade associations
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representing notifiers. The scheme was concerned only with agricultural chemicals, 
only agriculture departments were involved, and the trade associations notifying the 
chemicals were the BAA, NAAC, UKASTA, BPCA and the NFU. The BPCA was 
included because its members use some agricultural chemicals for some pest control 
uses, and the NFU because of farmer-members proposing new uses for agricultural 
chemicals. The scheme was operated by the Agricultural Chemicals Approval 
Organisation (ACAO), a group of scientists at the MAFF Haipenden laboratories, 
backed by an advisory committee which granted an approval if it was satisfied that the 
products did fulfil the claims in respect of perfomiance made on the label of 
proprietary brands, for example of its efficacy in controlling plant pests and diseases or 
weed growth. Later, under the PSPS, this was only done on products which had 
previously been given a clearance on safety grounds by the PSPS. The ACAS thus 
gave products an official status over and above its safety clearance, for which a charge 
was made. The purpose of the scheme was said to be "...to enable users to select and 
advisors to recommend, efficient and appropriate crop protection chemicals and to 
discourage the use of unsatisfactory products" (MAFF, 1985a). The Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) later considered that since an armual list of 
p ro v ed  products was published by ACAS, and since this was the main source of 
advice on the choice of pesticides, this constituted a considerable incentive for 
manufacturers to have their products included, and hence to seek the prerequisite PSPS 
clearance (RCEP, 1979). The annual list also reproduced the BASIS list of registered 
distributors, who were required to deal only in PSPS cleared chemicals and to give 
preference to ACAS approved ones. This therefore also provided an incentive for 
distributors to join BASIS, and hence also supported PSPS and ACAS.
The Pesticides Scfety Precautions Scheme. After two years of trials, the 
Notification of Pesticides Scheme (later the PSPS) was set up in 1957, 12 years after 
the ACAS, and was die centre of the British pesticide control system (MAFF, 1971). It 
was a formally negotiated agreement between the Government departments and 
agencies responsible for agriculture, health and safety,^  and trade associations 
representing notifiers of pesticides.^  The scheme was operated by Government 
departments with the advice of the ACP, supported by the SSC. Under the scheme, 
manufacturers provided details of a pesticide’s physical, chemical and biological 
properties, its persistence, mode of action, and breakdown products. Before approval 
was given Ministers would consult the Advisory Committee and representatives of 
official departments. The committee drew on the advice of the SSC, made up of 
scientists with expert knowledge of various aspects of pesticides. The SSC scrutinized
These were the MAFF, the Dq)artment of Health and Social Security (DHSS), the Dq>artment of die 
Environment (DoE), the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) under the Dqiartment of Employment (DoEm), and 
equivalent Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish offices.
These were die BAA the British Pest Control Association (BPCA) and the British Wood Preserving Association 
(BWPA).
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each pesticide on the basis of the manufacturer’s data and by drawing analogies with 
related compounds. It could advise the AGP that the chemical was too hazardous for 
use, or tiiat only a provisional clearance should be given so that further field tests 
could be held (Sheail, 1985). All data from manufacturers and ACP and SSC 
proceedings were confidential. Government officials from MAFF and the HSE gave a 
clearance for selling a product, when satisfied that, if their precautionary 
recommendations were followed, it could be used safely. Prior to selling, a product 
label reflecting the precautions had to be agreed between the manufacturer and the 
officials. There was also a provision to review the safe use of a pesticide in the light 
of new evidence. Once approved, the pesticide could be scrutinized under the ACAS.
The trade associations in tum had made it a condition of membership that their 
members, prior to marketing, would notify to Government officials, all products 
containing new chemicals for use in agriculture, horticulture or food storage for 
clearance as described above. New uses of chemicals already on the market, and new 
formulations, were treated similarly. So long as trade association members respected 
the rules of this scheme, price competition from foreign imports was prevented. 
(Unless a foreign manufacturer went through the testing procedure and received 
clearance for a product, it would not be offered for sale by members of the 
association). Since members of any of these groups could propose a new use for a 
chemical, or sell chemicals in different packages or combinations, "notifiers" included 
many companies other than manufacturers.
The British Agrochemical Supply Industry Scheme. The BASIS was set up on the 
17th of March 1978, at the behest of Government. It involved the BAA, UKASTA and 
NAAC, all of whom helped formulate the codes of practice (COPs) and the 
agreements. The products covered by the scheme were those cleared by the PSPS 
(other than rodenticides and wood preservatives) for professional use in agriculture, 
horticulture, forestry and seed treatment In order to register with the scheme, 
distributors (who included any individual or organisation retailing or applying 
pesticides under contract) gave a written undertaking to abide by Part n  (for 
distributors), Part in (for seed chemical distributors or appliers) or Part IV (for 
distributors who were also appliers) of the scheme (BASIS, 1985b). Each part included 
amongst training and standards clauses, an undertaking:
(a) not to supply crop protection products to other distributors or wholesalers who 
were not registered under the BASIS scheme (which potentially excluded distributors 
who sold only PSPS cleared products, as well as those who did not);
(b) to store, supply, recommend or apply only those crop protection products for 
uses which were currently cleared under the PSPS and to give preference to the sale 
and recommendation of products approved under the ACAS where these were available 
and appropriate (motivating BAA members, obliged to subscribe to the PSPS, to also 
^ l y  for ACAS clearance); and
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(c) to provide evidence that the organisation was fully im^dementing the scheme.
Participants in BASIS (UKASTA, NAAC and BAA) all supportai it by making 
registration with the scheme a condition of membership of tite respective trade 
associations. Members of the BAA additionally undertook that they would only supply 
distributors registered with BASIS, from January 1979. The sanctions taken by the 
BAA were entered in the Register of Restrictive Trading Agreements (Registration 
Number 4726) held by the Office of Fair Trading, as was the BASIS itself. The 
sanctions BASIS held through its agreement with the BAA enabled some maintenance 
of control within the industry for a short period prior to FEPA (It did however 
exclude some manufacturers and distributors who registered with the PSPS, but not 
with a trade association or BASIS).
2.2 The Debate on Statutory Controls to 1979
This section deals with pressures to make the existing voluntary scheme for 
manufacturers and distributors (the PSPS) the basis for a statutory scheme, with or 
without modification or additiorL Since such a change would not be de novo the main 
considerations have often been the disadvantages and advantages that statute would 
confer on the existing scheme, participants in the debate assuming that they need not 
consider other matters of content The debate was therefore mainly about whether to 
introduce a statutory scheme, and what the force of law might mean to the voluntary 
scheme. Often this was seen as simply having an equalising force, in that everybody 
would have to comply with same rules. However the debate did tum more and 
more on additional possibilities as it intensified at different times, giving more 
consideration to additional or modified controls.
The main concem of this thesis is the policy making which occurred after the 
decision to legislate in 1984, where the climate of debate included the certainty of 
legislative changes. However earlier debates, especially that centering around the last 
decision to legislate prior to 1972, has explanatory potential for the main analysis. The 
concerns of dififerent sectors about the control system and the types of pressure on the 
system experienced around 1972 had similarities to the 1984 debate and possibly 
predisposed its pattern. Only the main participants are examined: the Government 
(MAF), the Advisory Committee, and ABMAC (BAA). Other Government dq>artments 
and factions within the ABMAC membership are not considered in detail here. The 
Advisory Committee took broadly the same official view as the Government at this 
time, at least from 1955, when the terms of reference of the committee were extended 
to include advising Government on the development of new legislation should this 
prove necessary. Two other actors with influence on the control system are discussed: 
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) and tire European 
Commission (EC).
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special attention is given to the components of arguments for and against 
voluntary and statutory schemes proposed by the Government and the Advisory 
Committee, and to whether these accurately represent pressures operating on the 
control system.
Section 2.2.1 focuses on the debate from 1950 to 1979. It describes how the 
Govemmmt's point of view changed with changes in pressures from the various 
committees and from within and outside the pesticide control system. This helps to 
explain what factors might have maintained the three more stable periods of policy in 
this time period: up to 1967 (voluntary policy favoured); from 1967 to 1972 (statutory 
policy favoured); and from 1972 to 1979 (voluntary policy favoured); and also the two 
decisions which changed policy and were officially announced in 1967 and 1972. The 
third period, from 1972 to 1979, saw the introduction of some additional controls and 
peripheral legislation, having the effect of delaying the advent of a statutory scheme.
Section 2.2.2 looks at the components of arguments for and against the voluntary 
and statutory schemes, given as official reasons for reversing policy by the 
Government and Advisory Committee.
Figure 2.1 incorporates official statements of decisions to change policy. These are 
assumed, in the absence of official indications otherwise, to bound periods of stable 
policy m aintenance. However die official statements or documents can only be 
assumed to approximate actual decisions, and apparent policy maintenance may 
disguise many efforts towards implementing a statutory scheme subsequendy discarded. 
Documents from parties other than Government and its committees which may have 
had a bearing on the debate are included in this Rgure.
22.1 The Debate on Statutory Controls
As already noted, the second Zuckennan working party (MAF, 1953) 
recommended giving statutory backing to the existing notification scheme for product 
registration should this prove necessary. The same group, in 1955 (MAFF, 1955), 
decided that the introduction of statutory controls was not required. Later, in 1961, the 
Research Study Group on Toxic Chemicals in Agriculture and Food Storage concluded 
that legal and voluntary measures/had been successful m ensuring the safe use of 
pesticides. In 1962 a proposal to promote a new bill failed to be introduced. According 
to Sheail (1985) this was because as die Government was unlikely to agree to a 
measure covering every aspect of pesticide use, it had to focus on essential controls 
and tiiere would be huge difficulties in drafting regulations to cover particular 
compounds, operator licensing and container disposal
The debate which continued from these times until 1984 focussed on whether 
registration and marketing (distribution) should be subject to statutory controls.
By the early 1960s, the pesticide control system consisted of the ACAS, the PSPS 
and tiie supporting agreements as described in section 2.1.2. Pressures from
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conservationists on both Government and industry in respect of OCs then shifted the 
climate to one more rec^tive to change. In addition, internal pressure on ABMAC 
from both large and small member companies in respect of the image of OCs were a 
threat to ABMAC’s role in encouraging membership and thus participation in the 
PSPS. External enticemaits to members from non-members enjoying the benefits of 
low costs from imports were also causing problems. ABMAC in tum put pressure on 
the Government for a statutory scheme so that participation would be universal and the 
responsibility for enforcing PSPS participation would pass from ABMAC to the 
Government. The ABMAC saw that retaining the voluntary scheme would result in an 
increasing inability to maintain their policing role because any discipline could be 
undone by small firms. At the same time thme was a public relations advantage in 
being seen to accept a stringent degree of control with a statutory scheme. Gillespie 
(1977) notes that ABMAC would have expected neither their working relationship with 
Government nor the clearance requirements to change under a statutory scheme. Those 
who stood to lose tiie most by a statutory scheme were firms not party to the P S P S , 
who would lose the advantage of lower costs from imported products which had not 
been cleared, in addition to having to provide a notification to the Government
In his statement on the 1964 Advisory Committee report, the Minister of 
Agriculture recognised that the voluntary scheme rxtight become inadequate:
T he Voluntary Scheme has so far worked well, but as scientific knowledge 
increases and more restrictions are found to be necessary, it comes under 
increasing strairt The Government are asking tiie Committee to examine the 
present voluntary safety arrangements and will consider whether legislation, 
i&diich the manufacturers of agricultural chemicals now advocate, would be 
desirable” (MAFF, 1964).
In his letter to the Advisory Committee he asked them to investigate such 
questions as whether 1) tqiproval of new chemicals should be confined to those which 
would be more safe and effective than those in existing use; 2) t^roval should only 
be given on a provisional basis; and 3) residue tolerances diould be prescribed. The 
Government would then consider whether the present voluntary scheme should be put 
on a statutory basis (Sheail, 1985).
In the meantime a Private Members Bill requiring manufacturers to identify the 
active ingredients - although only in farm and gardm products - was brought in as the 
Farm And Garden Chemicals Act in 1967 (Cap 50).
TTie focus of the more detailed review (ACPOTS, 1967) was the adequacy o f the 
voluntary controls. In contrasting the virtues of voluntary and statutory schemes, the 
voluntary was thought to be more flexible and thus able to cope with rtpidly changing 
circumstances in pesticide technology and usage practices, as well as being less 
expensive to operate than a statutory scheme (although as we shall see a statutory 
schane which just took powers to enable action has also been thought to have
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precisely tiiese advantages). However doubt that voluntary arrangements could be 
comprehensive was expressed, and most significantly the PSPS was seen as unable to 
prevent marketing of imported pesticides. The fact tiiat importers and distributors could 
avoid the scheme was a weakness or loophole in its voluntary capacity as there was no 
legal impediment on distributors to do otherwise. In addition hazards might arise from 
uncleared products.
ACPOTS recommended a statutory scheme to control all marketing and use, based 
on the voluntary scheme. The advantages of such a move were seen to be total 
compliance whereby all products would be subject to controls, and enfbrcability of 
restrictions on use and requirements of labelling.
The principal recommendations were therefore (a) to create a mandatory licensing 
system for products, and (b) to make use of unlicensed products or misuse of certain 
products in specified ways an offence. More detailed proposals were that: legidation 
should require information provision, the content of such being determined by the 
licensing authority in order to retain flexibility; advice to ministers should be on a 
similar basis to previous arrangements; oiforcement at the point of sale or supply 
should be instigated to ensure fliat products were licensed and of correct composition; 
provisions relating to labelling were met; specified uses of pesticides should be 
prohibited; misuse and abuse should be considered offences; and the controlling 
authority should be empowered to carry out independent testing.
Statutory control of residues was not thought to be appropriate because legislation 
under the Food and Drugs Act 1955 (Cap 16) (now replaced by the Food Act 1984 
(Cap 30)) was available if required. According to Sheail (1985) there was a great deal 
of discussion on the concept of tolerance limits. However the lack of detailed 
knowledge about the toxicity of individual compounds meant it was possible to 
postpone the introduction of statutory tolerance limits.
In conclusion they stated:
"While we do not wish to overemphasize the importance of the inevitable 
g£^ in the voluntary scheme we think that it is true to say that only under a 
mandatory scheme can it be certainly established that all pesticide and 
veterinary products, induding products imported for use by an importer, are 
subject to control It is also important to ensure that, when necessary, any 
restrictions on the use of a particular active ingredient can be enforced, fiiat 
all pesticide and veterinary products are properly labelled and that all 
distributors and others concerned conform to the same requirements. Another 
vital poinL..is that the Government should be possessed of adequate powers to 
act rapidly and effectively in unforeseen difficulties. Therefore while fully 
recognising the value of the existing voluntary schemes, we consider that an 
el«noit of compulsion should be introduced so as to ensure 
comprehensiveness and to provide the Government with the means to act 
should the need arise" (ACPOTS, 1967).
The MAFF accepted the committee’s recommendations in principle, and inter­
departmental discussions on what might be included in a bill covering use in
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agriculture, home-gardening, food storage, forestry and weed control ensued. 
Government departments drafted a "Pesticides Bill" in 1968 which included mandatory 
licensing controls on supply and labelling of products used in agriculture and food 
storage, the designation of certain forms of misuse (the use of poison baits) as an 
offence, and residue limits for certain pesticides in foodstuffs. It incorporated existing 
legislation on operator protection and labelling, and specified procedures for record 
keeping of purchase and usage, warning notices, and incidents reporting (Bates, 1969; 
Sheail, 1985). This would have replaced the Agriculture (Poisonous Substances) Act of 
1952 and the Farm and Garden Chemicals Act of 1967.
On consultation, the major contentious matter was whether the proposed Bill 
should cover those uses of pesticides outside agriculture and food storage, extending 
the scope of the PSPS to match the terms of reference of the Advisory Committee. 
The Committee’s view was that the Bill should include powers to extend the scope to 
include any pesticide product, and the Government agreed. There was discussion on 
whether the Bill should be enabling, or specific but with no scope for extension of 
controls.
In the meantime, the RCEP supported the ACP, saying that "Mandatory control is 
desirable, and will in the end be inevitable", and that there "...was already enough 
evidence to enable the Government to reach a decision and to introduce legislation at 
an early date" (RCEP, 1971).
However the ACP reassessed the matter in 1971, and found the situation less 
pressing. Imports without clearance were now few and unimportant, and most 
manufacturers had notified the committee of their products. There was a much reduced 
backlog in reviews, and the standard of labeUing had improved. The recent cooperation 
of the industry in the phased withdrawal of certain organochlorine (OC) uses had 
aicouraged them in this view (Sheail, 1985). However this still left the non- 
agricultural pesticides uncontrolled.
Following consultation with the RCEP, and with its agreement (RCEP, 1979), the 
BiU was officially abandoned in a statement made in 1972 by the Minister of 
Agriculture, Mr Prior (on the advice of the ACP) because, as he said "...the PSPS is 
now woridng so effectively". He continued that "legislation could prove essential if 
the voluntary scheme lost any of its present effectiveness or if there were new 
technological developments for which voluntary controls would not be appropriate" 
(MAFF. 1972).
It had thus taken a full four years between fonnulating the Bill and this official 
decision to abandon it before going to Pariiament in 1972. It can be assumed that very 
soon after 1967 the pressures on the Government lessened, and tiiat this in tum led the 
latter to stall and eventually capitulate. A Conservative Government was returned in 
1970, and it was unenthusiastic about regulation, especially as the imminent entry into 
the EEC posed the possibility of having to include even more regulation. Therefore
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although the Bill was prepared in 1971 it seems likely that the Government was not 
entirely committed to its introduction. The p a re n t maintenance of a statutory policy 
was therefore only an official position at this time. Between 1967 and 1972 there was 
less political pressure from conservationists as OC use lessened, and the ABMAC 
members were experiencing less competition from ncm-members importing cheap 
chemicals, so less pressure emanated from them. With this alleviation, ABMAC gave 
more place to the arguments of smaller distributors in support of the voluntary scheme. 
At the same time the Medicines Act 1968 (Oq) 67) which set up a statutory scheme 
for drugs, including some veterinary pesticides, may have illustrated the rigidity of 
such a scheme to Government Sheail argues that the publication of the RCEP’s report 
actually provided the pretext for abandoning a statutory scheme by apparently 
prompting a complete reappraisal of pesticide controls.
As noted above, between 1972 and 1979 the Government continued to m aintain a 
non-statutory policy and to express satisfaction with the voluntary scheme. In 1974 the 
RCEP affirmed that there was no case for replacing the voluntary system in view of 
industry cooperation and the decline in the use of OCs. However tirey said that 
mandatory controls should be reconsidered (a) if the level of control fell, (b) in the 
case of technological developments, (c) in the case of new uses for pesticides and (d) 
if obligations arose from EEC membershÿ (RCEP, 1974). In 1974 the DoE’s Central 
Directorate on Environmental Pollution (CDEP) recommendation, that non-agricultural 
uses should be subject to the same degree of control as agricultural ones, was accepted 
by the Secretary of State (DoE, 1974). Before 1976 however, dissatisfaction was being 
expressed again over non-deaied imports of pesticides and the suppliers involved. It 
was said that there was "misuse" of pesticides,^ presumably because uncleared imports 
were being sold, and there was again concem from environmental interests over the 
safety aspects of distributiorL
The Government took the view that the safety of stores and transport and the 
advice given on pesticides left much to be desired (Broadbent, 1986). In 1976 the 
Government suggested to the trade association representing merchants (what is now 
UKASTA) that self-regulation should be attempted, with the aim of making aU 
suppliers register under a scheme,® and after discussions with UKASTA, ABMAC and 
the NAAC, BASIS was formed in 1978. All suppliers registered under BASIS had to 
deal only in PSPS cleared chemicals and only with other BASIS members. The 
additional sanctions by the trade associations party to the agreement to ensure that 
their members registered with BASIS further discouraged the supply of uncleared 
chemicals, forcing more chemicals to go through the PSPS procedure. The setting up 
of BASIS was an attempt by the Government to avoid legislation It effectively passed 
responsibility for control back to the industry, and held off legislation for an interim
 ^ Ihteiview, BASIS. London 27/1/86.
 ^ Buerview, BASIS, London 27/1/86.
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period until the crisis vhich preceded FEPA. In addition, from 1978, the Government 
had the possibility of recourse to the Consumer Safety Act 1978 (Cap 38) which held 
the powers to allow Government to require clearance prior to marketing imported or 
domestic products, so it could always be said that regulations on the control of 
pesticides could be made if necessary. Thus the RCEP (1979) was led to comment that 
a loophole had been closed in the voluntary scheme and tiiat unsafe pesticides could be 
kq>t off the market However it said that "This earlier loophole was..jnore of theory 
than of substance, because over 95% of sales in tiie UK were throu^ firms belonging 
to the BAA, and the BAA had already taken action in the matter by introducing tiie 
BASIS". Both BASIS and the CSA quietened the industry and led to a period of 
confidence in the control of pesticides flow until 1983 (see Ch^iter 5).
22.2 Reasons Given for Changes in Official Policy
As might be expected, the various governments involved have been most vocal 
when they wanted to change tiie existing official policy and promote something new. 
Thus more detail about views and proposals were available at these decision points, 
sudi as in 1967, when the Government wished to change to a statutory scheme. Rgure
2.2 shows the views expressed at various decision points: in 1967; in 1972 when the 
"statutory" policy was retracted; in 1979 whoi the Government was obliged to express 
its non-statutory view, for example in formal evidence to the RCEP; and in 1983 in 
refutation of the latter’s pro-statutory stance.
It teases out tiie substantive elements which tiie Govemmenl/Advisory Committee 
used, either positively or negatively, in arguments about either the voluntary or a 
statutory scheme. Arguments are composed of one or more elements, portrayed in one 
of four modes: disadvantage of the voluntary scheme, advantage of the voluntary 
scheme, disadvantage of the statutory sdieme, and advantage of the statutory scheme.
Since the statutory scheme was always seen as a possible future evaituality with 
dimensions which were uncertain (viewed from a current voluntary state), views 
concerning it are projections, implying a lower level of precision than views on the 
voluntary scheme (which had known dimensions), which are perceptions.
Hie Government did not make any detailed retraction statements in 1972, but 
simply re-eiqiressed satisfaction with the current situation in the catch-all phrase "the 
voluntary scheme works very well". This is understandable, because to retract in detail 
migfit have entailed showing acceptance of elements previoudy said to be 
unsatisfactory in the voluntary scheme.
m 1967, the overall argument pattern was mainly in terms of tiie advantages of the 
statutory scheme and disadvantages of the voluntary scheme (far left and far right hand 
columns respectively). Where an advantage of the voluntary sc to ie  or a disadvantage 
of tiie statutory scheme is mentioned, it is always in tenns of the Govemment-industry 
relationship and its flexibility, but these elements remain the same whether the thrust
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Figure 2.2: Arguments about Voluntary and Statutory Schemes
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of an argument is for or against a statutory scheme. By comparison, the argument 
pattern surrounding the voluntary scheme (1972, 1979 and 1983) was in terms of 
disadvantages of the statutory and advantages of the voluntary (centre two columns): 
nothing positive was said of a statutory scheme, and the full range of costs was 
stressed.
Elements of resource and formal aims categories tended to be argued in tandem. 
When arguing for a statutory scheme (1967) cost was seen as likely to increase, but so
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was hazard control. In contrast when arguing for a voluntary scheme (1979) an 
increase in all resource elements (cost, time, civil servants, expertise) was said to be 
likely, yet no increase in formal aims (hazard control and assessment standards) was 
envisaged and safeguards were not mentioned. Safeguards were later (1983) stressed as 
very effective, although it is not clear that there had been any improvement since 
1979
In 1967, stresses on the Government resulted in emphasis on some elements. For 
example the Government’s bargaining position was thought to be greater with a 
statutory scheme, and this was at the time when they felt the need for more influence 
in the ongoing argument with the industry over labelling. In addition, enforcement of 
use restrictions was seen as important, as the Government wanted to restrict the use of 
OCs. Also, enforcement of membership of the control scheme seemed important as 
some firms would not cooperate in performing tests on old products.
As concerns powers backing the coverage of the voluntary control scheme 
(members and therefore chemicals) and compliance, it has always been acknowledged 
that there were shortcomings. However in 1983 one of the arguments against a 
statutory scheme was that there were already substantial powers available (FGCA 1967 
Cap 50; CPA 1974 Cap 40; HSWA 1974 Cap 37; and CSA 1978 Cap 38). 
Nevertheless, as will be seen later, when arguments were being developed in 1984 for 
a statutory scheme substantial gaps in these powers were listed.
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3. Participation and Policy Making
This chapter first looks at the conceptions of policy making as rational decision 
making, which are embodied in prescriptive policy analysis frameworks (section 3.1). 
It goes on to examiiœ the development of descriptive models of policy making leaning 
towards a more "political" rationality, which are based (a) on ideas of limits to 
rationality and (b) on observations of real-world policy making behaviour (section 3.2). 
The development of prescriptive frameworks which try to incorporate a more political 
rationality, and an attempt at introducing such frameworks in real-world environmental 
policy making are described in section 3.3. Political models of participation are 
described in section 3.4; and section 3.5 considers political rationality and procedures 
for participation, and the possible situational limits on these.
The chîçter then sets out the problems examined in the thesis. The framing or 
constraining qualities exerted by "situational limits to rationality" (pre-existing
substantive factors which may be more historical or more proximate to the present
debate; and concurrent substantive or procedural factors) on policy shaping are
examined in section 3.6. In section 3.7 an interchangeable terminology used in the
descriptive analysis of the influence of the above is described, in terms of the 
alternatives available: for objectives, routes to objectives, system perception and 
problem perception Alternatives can denote evidence offered by participants; evidence 
considered in decision making by more central participants; and the situational 
influences on policy making, describing general categories of influence as altematives- 
broadening or altematives-limiting in policy making. The issues chosen for detailed 
consideration include three likely to be seriously affected by situational limits, and one 
likely to be affected only slightly, as described in section 3.8.
3.1 Prescriptive Analyses Embodying a Rational Decision Model
Policy analysis is today largely concerned with social and economic problems such 
as regulation and pollution control, energy and education, housing and health care 
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Its methods derive from a model which describes decision 
making as rational. Its problems are decision problems and are cast as choices (under 
uncertainty) between alternative means for achieving a goal; and rationality means 
choosing the best means to attain a given goal. Its methods are prescriptive^ aiming to 
assist the decision maker with the choice, and include cost-benefit analysis (CBA); 
risk-benefit analysis and decision analysis.
A rational decision model portrays a policy problem as a choice facing a single 
political actor as to which course of action to take to reach a desired end. The actor 
goes through a sequence of mental operations to arrive at a decision. These steps are 
(1) defining goals; (2) imagining alternative courses of action for attaining the goals;
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(3) evaluating the alternative consequences associated with taking each course of 
action; and (4) choosing the course of action most likely to attain the goal (Stone, 
1988). One version of this model has been formulated as subjective expected utility 
(SEU) theory, the basic idea of which is to load all values into a single function, the 
utility function, in this way facilitating tiie quantitative comparison of alternatives from 
the perspective of the values of a single actor. In this case, before analysis takes place 
the decision maker is assumed to have a Well defined utility function such tiiat he/she 
can assign a cardinal number as a measure of h is ^ r  preference for any particular 
potential scenario.
When CBA is applied to public decisions it assumes a well defined decision maker 
who is objective and already has goals, a selection of explicit alternatives and explicit 
constraints. Thus problems are assumed to be well defined decision problems and 
analysis can concentrate on the assessment of consequences as the basis for a decisioiL 
The decision maker is assumed to want to act in tiie public interest such that his/her 
utility function is already based on maximization of total welfare and therefore he/she 
will choose an alternative or strategy based on a criterion of maximising the expected 
value in tenns of this utility function. Consistency is expected of the decision maker 
(he^she can assign a consistent joint probability distribution to aU future sets of events 
consequoit on the strategy so that lower level decisions will be consistent with higher 
ones) and this assumes that he/she is fully infbimed. In this paradigm, politics and 
human nature belong to institutional or behavioural givens and are outside the scope of 
the analysis (Simon, 1983).
3.2 Policy Making Behaviour and the Idea of Limits to Rationality
However in public policy making, human nature and politics are all too present, as 
demonstrated by descriptions of policy making behaviour. In a paper on power in the 
policy formation process, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) use the concept of non-decision 
making, where account is taken of how political issues are kept off the policy agenda 
by those in political power.
Edelmah (1971) again sees some policies as purposeful, and draws attention to 
symbolism, where politicians formulate policies which make them appear to be in 
favour of certain goals, whilst having no intention to ensure implementation (for 
example by not providing the necessary funding).
Lindblom’s conception of decision making in the policy formation process is 
somewhat less purposeful than Bachrach’s or Edelman’s. Lindblom (1965) sees policy 
makers reacting to a complex problem by "muddling through", formulating only very 
small political changes, and considering only a very small number of alternatives - 
essentially steering existing policy and having only a few limited goals amongst^ a 
mass of political rhetoric. He calls this political pattern "incrementalism" (regardless of 
any metiiods of analysis used), hi 1979 he described it as coming somewhere between
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taking big stq)s in policy, such as dealing with environmental problems as an 
integrated whole, and a comprehensive and scientific analysis of policy alternatives 
with reflect to particular smaller issues, "synoptic" in its aspiration to be complete. 
Incrmental politics (a) is intelligently exploratory when linked to sequences of trial 
and error, (b) reduces the stakes in each political category, encouraging losers to bear 
their losses without disrupting die political system, (c) mmntains the general value 
consensus because no specific policy issue ever centrally poses a challenge to 
participants, and (d) can accomplish drastic alterations in the status quo without 
stirring up the great antagonism which would meet a single larger change, if the 
sequence of small changes is fast moving. The first three attributes are considered 
necessary for widespread voluntary accqjtance of democratic government Incremental 
analysis based on this pattern, is described in the next section.
Viewed from the perspective of incrementalism, policy makers often refrain from 
thinking through or spelling out objectives to avoid conflict or to avoid providing 
standards by which their performance could be judged. As well as making small 
adjustments to existing policies, they accept that policy making is serial and fliat they 
will have to come back to problems again and again to reconsider the problem in the 
light of new data (successive limited comparison or SLC). Policies are made by the 
interactions of many actors; sudi actors adjust to one anotiier through bargaining, 
negotiation and compromise; and a value is placed upon consensus seeking amongst 
actors so that what emerges as policy is a compromise (Lindblom, 1959; 1965; 1968).
Etzioni also describes policy making as a strategy somewhere between synopsis 
and big steps and finds that some ra tionalistic  deôsion m^sng is used in conjunction 
with incrementalist decision making, calling this "mixed scanning". Mixed scanning 
en ta ils  a decision process in two phases. Initially a broad sweep is made of policy 
alternatives and these are assessed against stated values in general terms. Then within 
tills framework, decision m aking  proceeds incrementally in matters of detail.
"Incrementalism reduces the unrealistic aspects of rationalism by limiting the 
details required in fundamental decisions, and rationalism helps to overcome 
the conservative tiant of incrementalism by eiqiloring longer-run 
altematives...incremental decisions are made within tbê contexts set by 
fundamental decisions - made by the actor exploring the main alternatives he 
sees in view of his conceptions of his goals without specifying details" 
(Etzioni, 1967).
Dror (1964) also seeks an alternative model consisting of a recjqiitulation of some 
aspects of rational p lan n ing  but with heavy caveats of the form ”some clarification of 
values"; "preliminary estimation of payoffe"; or "explicit arrangements to stimulate 
creativity".
Smith and May (1980) believe that the contrast between incrementalism and 
rational models has been overdrawn - in explanatory mode the two models of decision 
m ak in g  converge. They say that rationality and incrementalism as principles are
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however diametrically opposed, and cannot be reconciled by mixed scanning, as 
fundamental decisions in one context are incremental in another and vice versa. Their 
objection to Dror is that he does no more than restate the opening commitment to both 
rational and non-rational elements and does not change the central features of the 
dispute between the principles of incrementalism and rationalism. Richardson and 
Jordan (1979) similarly emphasise the agreement between rationalism and 
incrementalism as descriptive approaches. Smith and May conclude that:
"die componaits of ’decision making’ in social policy are by no means 
obvious...the relationship between rationalism and incrementalism can only be 
shown through empirical research. More sophisticated accounts are required of 
the impact of policy makers’ ideologies, die nature of decision making, the 
conduct and outcomes of the various stages of the policy process within the 
machinery of policy administration".
They doubt the utility of expending any more intellectual energy in developing a priori 
models of decision making: "...the way forward lies in producing more, and more 
carefully researched data based answers to the following questions: what do relevant 
professionals, administrators, policy makers and laymen actually mean by decision 
making? What tactics do they employ? When? Where? How? and to what effect?".
Distinct from such empirical descriptions, Simon and Lindblom describe real-world 
policy making behaviour in terms of deviations from the perfect rationality set up in 
the prescriptive frameworks. The idea of perfect rationality requires a person to 
consider aU the possible alternatives and evaluate all the possible consequences of 
each. Simon’s descriptive model (1957; 1976) therefore argues that policy makers will 
always be subject to a "bounded rationality", able to consider only some alternatives 
and equipped with only limited information, so that they will always be obliged to 
"satisfice", or stop looking for the best alternative when they have found a satisfactory 
one. Simon concentrates on what Hogwood and Gunn (1984) caU "organisational 
limits" to rationality and "psychological limits" to rationality. "Psychological limits" 
recognises that we lack the knowledge of alternatives, the skills to calculate the 
consequences of them, and the clarity and consistency about values which are reeded 
to achieve complete rationality. "Organisational limits" refers to the 
compartmentalisation of different aspects of a problem in organisations which gets in 
the way of the "whole problem" ^ ro ach ; the departmentalism of outlook; and the 
fact that information flows do not relate to information needs in policy making. Apart 
from identifying "resource limitations", which recognises that rationality has costs in 
terms of time, energy and money, Hogwood and Gurm also identify "multiple-value 
limits" and "situational limits" to rationality.
This thesis will try to elucidate the effects of such situational factors on 
participation in policy decision making. These occur in the past as well as the present 
and may be substantive or procedural. These are discussed in section 3.6 in sections
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entitled Pre-Existing Substantive Factors and Current Substantive and Procedural 
Factors. The factors may constrain policy makers; be a constraint flowing from policy 
makers as a result of such constraints on them; or be a constraint originating with the 
policy makers.
As concerns "situational limits”, Lindblom emphasizes the political environment of 
policy making and the constraints of the given situation in which policy is made. 
Hogwood and Gurm (1984) note that ”...a policy maker does not write on a clean 
sheet, he does not decide in a vacuum. We are all influenced by the past (for example 
by precedents), by powerful vested interests in the present, and by people’s 
assumptions and expectations concerning the future".
In policy making, the ideals of explicitness and consistency are not achievable 
because political processes involve diverse actors, all making choices and not sharing 
objectives (Majone, 1985). Hiere is therefore no such tiling as a unitary decision 
making body in the policy area. Rationally it is impossible to accommodate all the 
relevant value and interest considerations (Simon, 1983). The existence of multiple 
values has been seen as a limit to rationality as mentioned above. However in tiiis 
thesis tiK extent of their accommodation by, and the comprehensiveness of, policy 
makers is investigated in relation to substantive and procedural situational factors, 
which latter include existing preferences for certain values held by certain sectors in 
the exiting pesticide control system.
In the rational model, situational factors relevant to the framing of policy issues 
are ignored. No attention is paid to questions sudi as: how did decision makers 
recognise that there was a problem; from where or from whom did the goals emanate; 
from where or from whom did tiie alternatives emanate; how were the choices made; 
were certain alternatives chosoi regardless of the consequences for the goals of some 
of the actors; and were the criteria of only some of tiie actors used as a basis for the 
dioice of alternative? Policy problems can be framed by key decision makers who can 
make routine screening decisions about the existence of problems and the need for 
remedies in fonnulating legislation and then translating that largely self formulated 
legislation into regulations. This discretion can condition what is appreciated in 
evidence presented at all stages.
33  Prescriptive Models Aspiring to a More Political Rationality
Conventional policy based researdi on pollution control and risk assessment 
stresses the im^xirtance of scientific rigour (Hoel et al, 1985) and the belief that 
decisions should be based on a strict separation of facts and values, with values only 
explicitly brought in at later stages of assessment (Rein, 1983). The political process 
by which a decision is reached is thus usually ignored in rational analyses, because 
they assume a unitary decision maker who will inject values and objectives, and 
prioritize these (there being no internal mechanisms for determining such in a rational
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model). In addition, although decisicms by politicians and civil servants are given a 
role to play by virtually all writers on policy analysis, the more rationalistic ones 
assume they are depoliticized (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).
Prescriptive policy analyses sometimes add on political aspects to the technical 
and economic aspects, for example Dror (1967). They include a stage where what are 
seen as political and institutional constraints that limit tfie freedom to choose an 
alternative are listed, so that consequences for the achievement of policy objectives can 
be estimated (Majone, 1985).
HoUing (1978) called for an adaptive environmental management and policy 
process, which integrated environmental with economic and social understanding at the 
very beginning of the design process, in a sequence of steps during the design phase 
and after imfdementation. He directed this argument "...to senior administrators and 
policy makers who are responsible for dealing with environmental issues".
The Open University’s Hard Systans Approach (Open University, 1984) attempts 
to incorporate multiple political values into its decision making framework by 
explicitly acknowledging them as an important part of the system under consideration 
in having two stages. Problem Framing and System Description, at the beginning of 
the analysis. These explore and make explicit the perceptions of all key organisations' 
and individuals in relation to the issue involved. The initial perception of, for example 
a risk-regulatory problem, exerts an influence on all subsequent stages of the decision 
making process, and so political factors are kept in view throughout die analysis. There 
is an inbuilt provision for returning to the first, two stages at any time iteration). This 
approach to analysis recognises that qualitative aspects of decision malting inevitably 
influence the choice of objectives and hence all later stages, and that their concealment 
leads to risk-related conflict The importance of the sequence in which Problem 
Framing and System Description is carried out (wittingly or unwittingly) in a real 
world situation was demonstrated by Tait (1988) to have repercussions for the selection 
of measures of performance by which to evaluate alternatives, which may selectively 
serve the values concealed in the "problem definition", again providing a source of 
conflict In conventional Hard Systems Analysis a decision on measures of 
performance follows directly from objectives setting, before generating alternatives; 
whereas if alternatives were considered first a broader range of values could be 
explored. This has repercussions for "effective participation" and the alternatives 
considered. In Tait’s study, a county council’s behaviour in an urban road planning 
case study was described as first deciding on the alternative they wished to implement 
then f ram ing the problem and describing the system so as to ensure this outcome (thus 
using the analytical process as a weapon of argument to support a course of action 
which had been chosen before the analysis was carried out). The favoured alternative 
supported their long-term policy objective of developing ari integrated computer- 
controlled system of traffic lights for tiie town, in line with the needs of commuters.
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However it conflicted with flie wishes of local lesidaits, cyclists, and parents of 
children at an adjacent school, who had other views on the acceptability of the extra 
traffic.
The RCEP (1988) has gone some way towards linking qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to risk assessment In its report on the method of selecting a Best 
Practicable Environmental Option (BFEO), it suggests including qualitative evaluation 
at the third of seven steps in the analysis (evaluating the options), the objectives 
having been set as a first step. The RCEP consider consultation to be necessary as part 
of fliis third step:
"The advice of experts may be sufficient to ensure that the best results for the 
environment are secured. However where the trade-ofis are difficult or 
controversial, the selection of a BPEO cannot be left to scientists, 
industrialists and regulatory experts alone. Public involvement is needed so 
that the public values underlying flie choice of a BPEO are identified and 
clearly understood... In the case of a new industrial project..the proposal for 
which planning permission is being sought should be the outcome of the kind 
of sympathetic process which we have advocated. In particular, die process of 
consultation and public discussion about the project should begin as soon as 
possible. It is also important that the different regulatory bodies should have 
early discussions about an industrial project so that conflicting requiremmts 
can be avoided".
In dieir step 4 (summarising and presenting the evaluation) weighting of non­
monetary values is recognised to imply a set of values which are not obvious.
"The scale of values must be clearly stated and the reasoning for them dearly 
explained. Fzesentaticm riiould be of data, scores and descriptive words; and 
numerical or other values should not be combined into a single value as tibis 
may obscure the controverdal nature of the value judgements which lie behind 
i t  This is more readily understood and far more informative".
In their step five (selecting the preferred option) it is recognised that different 
decision makers miglit come to different condusions about the BPEO based on the 
same evidence.
Lindblom (1977) and Wildavdcy (1980) see politics as more than just a means of 
injecting values into rational choice, having analytical significance itself. A multiplicity 
of participants in the political process reduces the chance of a feature being overlooked 
because of the way an issue has been defined by a particular decision maker, 
^d av sk y  (1980) writes that "...the purpose of policy analysis is not to eliminate 
advocacy but to raise the level of argument among contending interests...the end result, 
hopefully, would be a higher quality debate and perils^ eventually public dioice 
among better known alternatives".
Lindblom’s (1977) conception of policy analysis entails a process-aiding, 
negotiative, consensus-building, and not a problem-solving, orientation: the analyst 
designs procedures for group decision making and acts as a catalyst in the process.
30
Such analysts find the social interactions involved too complex to be fully grasped by 
the intellect and deny that explicit problems exist Policy problems may be temporarily 
resolved (removed from cunent debate) because a consensus had been reached by 
participants in the policy process. Analysts may cUd this process (Majone, 1985). 
Lindblom recognises real world clients for such analysis: the participant in existing 
interactions; die public official intervening in existing interactions to pursue a public 
purpose; and those interested in institutional reform who will analyse such interactions.
Incremental analysis, which Lindblom divided into simple incrementalism and 
disjointed incrementalism, is also useful in describing policy making. Simple 
incremental analysis is limited to a consideration of alternative policies all of which 
are only incrementally different from the status quo. Disjointed incrementalism is a 
more complex method of analysis which entails (a) limitation of analysis to a few 
familiar policy alternatives, (b) intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other 
values with empirical aspects of a problem, (c) a preoccupation with ills to be 
remedied rather than goals to be sought, (d) a sequence of trials, errors and revised 
trials, (e) exploring only a few possible consequences of a considered alternative and 
(f) fragmenting the analytical work to many (partisan) participants in-policy- making 
(Lindblom, 1979).
Hogwood and Gunn (1984) believe that a finished analysis should be a supplement 
to an ongoing political process, to be consumed, critically appraised, and possibly 
discarded by it, in the process of reaching a decision. The alternative is to let analysis 
replace politics and take over centre stage in the policy process.
In Simon’s more recent work he stresses the role of political mechanisms, 
envisaging circumstances (issues of high controversy) where debate and confrontation 
may be the only way to handle an issue (Simon, 1983).
This thesis will not try to demonstrate how observations of real world policy 
making may affect prescriptive frameworks for practice. However by being more 
specific about situational constraints on policy making it may suggest that these should 
be examined more carefully. More successful analyses may be undertaken by the 
2^ )preciation of such limits, and by reducing expectations of rational analysis.
3.4 Models of Political Participation
Partisan Mutual Adjustment (PMA) is a means of describing a pluralism typified 
by political interactions among many participants. Lindblom (1979) thinks of PMA as 
a mechanism for "social rationality" which sits well with the fragmented policy making 
involving SLC posited as disjointed incrementalism. PMA posits decentralised political 
decision making in which autonomous participants mutually affect one another 
resulting in (a) policies being better described as happening than as decided upon, (b) 
policies being influenced by a broad range of participants, (c) the connection between a 
policy and the reasons for it being obscure, since participants act for diverse reasons.
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and (d) a coordination of participants as policy makers, superior to any attempt at 
central coordination.
Assuming PMA as a description of the real-world rather than as an ideal, 
LindWom (1979) lists two common objections to PMA. Hrst, not all interests are 
represented by participants in the debate and participants do not exert an influence 
proportional to the numbers they lepiesenL (However centralised policy making often 
does not achieve this either and can even be an instrument for protecting historically 
inherited inequalities.) The second objection is fliat the participants do not represent the 
interest and values of the population but diare dominant interests and values so that 
there is not a "healthy competition of ideas", and sometimes "policy is set by a ruling 
dass with the trappings of a pluralist diversity". (However, if you divide policy issues 
into grand issues to do with the fundamental stmcture of politico-economic life and the 
simpler issues that ordinarily come onto the political agenda, only with the grand set is 
PMA weak or absent In the case of the simple issues - the large majority - PMA is 
active, though with defect of inequality in participation and tendencies towards 
corporatism.)
The fragmentation of policy making and consequent political interaction among 
many participants is seen by Lindblom as a method of raising the level of information 
brought to bear on decisions, thus a mechanism for "social rationality" (Lindblom, 
1979).
Given the SLC style, Richardson and Jordan (1979) believe that SLC itself is a 
reason for avoiding a preliminary insistence on clarification of values and objectives - 
the probability of harmony at that stage is low. There is more chance of agreement on 
a specific proposal than there is of agreement on objectives. The best policy is one fliat 
gains agreement The emphasis on accommodation between groups explains why 
decision making takes the form of comparison between pragmatic availaWe 
alternatives. Too radical proposals are unlikely to have wide attractions for the various 
interests. This encourages only relatively minor changes to be put on the agenda. In 
Richardson and Jordan’s view, Lindblom’s model accurately describes what happens 
because groups are integrated in the process, and this leads to an incremental style.
The thesis will try to say in what ways PMA and SLC may or may not actually 
take place in a legislative context
35 Political Rationality and Procedures for Participation
The procedures involved in making a decision are rarely considered in flie rational 
model. However sometimes flie way in which a decision is made is valued above the 
decision itself. Stone (1988) writes that "People value town meetings not because they 
render correct decisions but because they offer individuals a chance to participate in 
making policy decisions". In talking of court decisions. Brooks (1976) says that the 
legitimacy of court decisions about conflicts between individuals is based on the
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parties involved being prepared to accept as unbiased a set of rules and a procedure 
for sqiplying the rules. Majone (1985) notes that "When the factual and value premises 
are uncertain and controversial, when objective criteria of success or failure are 
lacking, the fomial characteristics of the decision process - its procedure - become 
significant". He goes on to say that the rationality and legitimacy of public policies 
must also depend on the acceptability of procedural considerations as well as 
substantive ones. In talking about the legitimating role of Parliament, Hogwood (1987) 
mentions fiie "...often supported view that policies are only fully legitimate if relevant 
interests are consulted in advance. Thus the legitimacy of a policy is seen as adhering 
to the process by which it was arrived at rather than parliamentary authorisation".
This thesis examines tire procedures involved in "consultation" during the 
legislative process and the views of participants as to the legitimacy of tiiese 
procedures. It investigates the extent to which procedural practices operate as 
constraints, in conjunction with other situational constraints, to inhibit effective 
participation in this legislative context
•
35 Factors Examined for their Framing Qualities in the Policy Debate
Jackson and Keys (1987) define a problem context as including the individual or 
individuals who are the would-be problem solvers, the system(s) within which the 
problem lies (in this case the pesticide control syston), and the set of relevant 
participants. This set contains all those who can make decisions which affect the 
behaviour of the system(s). The nature of the system(s) and the nature of the 
relationship between participants greatly affect the character of a problem context
3.6.1 Pre-Existing Substantive Factors
Established Participants in the Pesticide Control System. Previous judgements 
made by certain partrrers, for example tire agricultural industry and the regulators, or 
the chemical industry and the regulators, about who should be responsible for pollution 
and its control, are important factors in the debate about pesticide regulation. 
Arguments and proposals for intended rules and changes are likely to be premissed on 
vaguely moral safety grounds, well rehearsed by industry and government in the past 
A perceived identity of values shared by tire industry and the regulators may have had 
a large degree of influence on key policy makers, in what they appreciate as eviderree, 
and on their policy framing.
Hawkins (1984) talks about enforconent by regulatory agencies in terms of 
"capture theory". An agerrey is seen as being co-opted by those it seeks to regulate, 
irrèorporating and reflecting their concerns into its decision making in the intereàs of 
stability and self-preservation (Selzniçk, 1966). The shift is a subtle one in which 
"...thé mores, attitudes and thinking of those regulated come to prevail in the thinking 
of many regulatory officials" (Bernstein, 1955).
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Barrett and Hill (1984) (also with reference to implementation) in their work on 
implementation theory, emphasize that there is not necessarily an hierarchical 
relationship between actors formulating policy and actors implementing policy with 
respect to initiating policy. In die context of this thesis the people who influenced or 
made policy might have been those who officially made rules about policy, interpreted 
policy, or would execute policy. Or they may have been people who believed Üiat 
policy would impact on fliemselves or others. Policy making entails compromises with 
any or all of these people (involving conflicts of both interests and values).
Already Implemented Controls and Practices. The theoretical literature on 
implementation in the policy process holds some especially interesting theories
regarding the relationship between policy and implementation which may help to 
explain where some policy comes from (and also why the nature of the source can 
have implications for effective participation). The conventional approach to the
conceptualisation of the policy process is that policy originates "from the top", that is 
that policy precedes action and that actions can be related to specific policies. Barrett 
and Hill (1984) argue that action may precede policy: that policy may be a response to 
actions, like pressures, problems or innovation, and that actions cannot be directly
related to (or evaluated against) specific policy goals. Even where a policy appears to
exist it may not entail clear goal specification. Policy and action are therefore not 
necessarily sequential. A corollary of this is that actions may take place without 
policies, and possibly never lead to policies, and vice versa. Also actions and policies 
do not necessarily have a one-on-one relationship (that is, many separate actions can 
lead to a sirigle policy or many different policies can lead to the same action). It is 
reasonable to assume that policies which are related in substance and sequence are not 
necessarily closely related in time. This thesis will suggest that, given multiple 
participants, someone’s policy, witting or unwitting, always precedes action. Where 
actions appear to precede policy it is because either (a) the participants making policy 
are not in roles where public declarations of policy are necessary or the norm, or (b) 
the policy decisions are made at a time when those who might make such declarations 
on their behalf (administrative civil servants) are not in the public eye. Policies may 
also appear to precede actions when administrative civil servants articulate a pre­
existing policy-action sequence as policy, implying that it is yet to be put into action. 
This happens when they are in the public eye, such as during legislation, when good 
public relations are important.
Existing Formal Recommendations. Reports in circulation influence the civil 
service and Government, especially if seen as authoritative. The RCEP, for example 
has two main functions (Lowe, 1975): to provide an alternative mechanism to the 
Whitehall bureaucracy for considering the effectiveness of pollution control, which 
involves assessing relevant areas to reveal areas of neglect; and to provide a channel 
for new ideas, initiating novel and long term policy proposals. The latter demands a
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long tenn view of poILution to anticipate problems arising from technical change, 
which is a function often lacking in executive government It includes a commitment 
to m aintain a higb level of informal and sustained public interest in pollution 
abatement as only in such a dimate would Government action be prompt and decisive 
(RCEP, 1971). The RCEP has no fbnnal powers other than persuasion and the 
provision of information, which depend on the prestige of the Commission (arising in 
part from its independence from Government) and the influence of die Commission 
(arising in part from its cooperation with Government). Lowe writes that this 
effectiveness therefore rests on two antithetical elements (independence and 
cooperation), ensuring that it is responsive but not subordinate to Government
Unlike other commissions the RCEP examines present executive activities. It has 
generally not sought to inspect decision making in the Government’s pollution 
program, but to "monitor the executive machinery" for pollution control. The 
Commission therefore shares Parliament’s role of scrutinizing the executive. Lowe 
considers that this is desirable as there is no public accountability for organisational 
matters in die UK, and Parliamait has not evolved to meet the challenge posed by the 
modem coiporatefindustrial state.
3.6.2 Current Substantive and Procedural Factors
Participants. The identity of central policy makers (whether they are established 
members of the pesticide control system and what their values are), and the extent to 
which they are affected by substantive factors, shape their substantive policy making 
(the evidence from participants admitted as viable alternatives) and their non­
substantive or procedural practices (and hence tfie level of impact of procedural factors 
on effective participation).
The Legislative Process and Participation Procedures. The legislative process in 
Britain can be divided into pre-parliamentary, parliamentary and administrative phases, 
and the central three analytical chapters of this thesis (chapters 6, 7 and 8) follow this 
divisioEL The pre-parliamentary phase of the process is "legislative" because 
considerable shaping takes place at this stage, and "pre-parliamentary" because the 
legislature is not involved at this stage.
In each of these prases the role of the executive is predominant (Hogwood, 1987). 
WaMand (1968) went so far as to argue that "..legislation is now an almoist 
exclusively executive function, modified, sometimes heavily, by practices of group and 
parliamentary consultations". Richardson and Jordan (1979) characterise the British 
system as one in whitdi Parliament plays little direct role in the policy process, witii 
the formulation of policies being determined through consultation within relatively 
closed "policy communities" of Government departments and interest groups, hi the 
context of this thesis, meetings with interest groups and debates in Parliament are all 
seen as executive consultations so far as alternatives generation goes: some are merely
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more private than others.
According to Brickman et al (1985), rules of participation take on an overriding 
significance in chemical regulation, because it is a contentious area of public policy. 
Access to regulatory authorities permits private interest groups to shape the policy 
agenda and influence individual decisions. The regulatory process admits the views of 
non-governmental participants, but the extent, format and timing of participation may 
vary considerably. Consultation in Britain is a central element of the decision making 
process, but it is not as highly stmctured as in tiie US (as open or as formal). Major 
regulatory proposals are circulated to other Governmental departments, to affected 
industries, and to consumer and public interest groups regarded as competent by 
regulatory authorities. Comments made by tiiese parties are carefully considered in 
reaching final decisions so that groups drawn into the consultation process exert 
considerable influence on policy making. However groups not recognised as important 
by the authorities remain outside the administrative process and exert little or no 
influence (Brickman et al, 1985). Participation by a broader range of interests would 
avoid "capture" by powerful interest groups as described above. In rational terms wider 
participation would avoid bias and broaden the agency’s information base, helping to 
oisure decisions are reached in a more "rational" and less arbitrary way. If some 
sectors caimot participate, their versions of rationality with their associated choice of 
alternatives and objectives cannot be considered.
Brickman et al (1985) explain that the British regulatory system has repudiated the 
attempt to legislate procedural rules for administrators. In the same year that the 
Administrative Procedures Act was enacted in the US, the UK abolished an existing 
requirement for prior publication of administrative regulations. The Statutory 
Instruments Act (1946; Cap 36) terminated a movement towards a British APA and 
instead firmly established informal consultation as the preferred means of drawing the 
public into administrative proceedings. Such procedural informality means that 
Government officials act as gate-keepers, regulating entry into the consultation process, 
and controlling the flow of information to and among interested parties. Brickman et al 
see this systems advantages as being more suited to negotiation and consensus building 
because compromises can be made in private and kept confidential, as opposed to the 
open adversarial system in the US, which induces hardening of positions.
In one sense this may be seen as more accommodating of politically rational 
behaviour, since administrators do not have the same pressure to put their political 
decisions in terms of artificially scientific or economic rationality. However, it does 
nothing to accommodate plural rationalities nor does it favour the widening of 
Wministrators’ appreciation of available alternatives, sirce through informality the 
administrators have the discretion to admit only certain participants - either preserving 
existing bias or positively exercising preference.
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3.7 Description of the Contemporary Debate: Participants and Alternatives
Alternatives. In the prescriptive Hard Systems Approach (Open University, 1984) 
the generation of alternatives is a stage of the approach which is described as the most 
imaginative and free-thinking; where a large number of alternatives should be put 
forward for consideration, and an influx of new ideas is sought. It is the stage which 
calls for the most divergent, rather than convergent, style of thinking, and where a 
considerable amount of searching and a wide range of answers are tolerated. It is 
emphasized that if new and better ideas about objectives or problem definitions are 
unearthed at this stage, the latter should be reconsidered in the light of them - a 
process called iteration.
During the legidative process, alternatives are generated continuously by a wide 
range of parties. These have the potential to enlarge central policy makers’ range of 
alternatives (for broad objectives, or design of specific actions related or unrelated to 
stated objectives); to widen or change their appreciation of the control system, its 
behaviour, the problems, and the opportunities for change; and therefore to alter or add 
to the alternatives they consider. Through a detailed descriptive examination of the 
handling of a range of pesticide control issues, the thesis examines the extent to which 
new alternatives were considered, objectives were re-examined, and appreciation of the 
systems involved became more sophisticated, all of which could have been enhanced 
through a range of sources including central policy makers and less central 
participants.
The main currency involved in these potential dynamics is alternatives. 
Alternatives can be offered as addressing problems or indicating opportunities. 
Although a wide range of alternatives may be offered, it is argued that a number of 
influences operate to constrain their consideration - even of those alternatives favoured 
by central policy makers. The views of some participants may hold more sway than 
others. The range of alternatives considered may in some cases be influenced by the 
legislative process, including the time available, access afforded and standard 
procedures for consultation. The timimg of access in the process could be early or late 
and hence the degree of influence could be lessened or heightened, and central policy 
makers can regulate access and hence the expected alternatives they have to consider. 
The range of alternatives considered may be skewed by the control system in place, 
the participants in this control system, and the pattern of previous debates, depending 
on the importance (witting or unwitting) attached to such by central policy makers. 
This thesis will indicate to what extent and in what ways such factors can constrain 
the range of alternatives considered by central policy makers, indicating if possible the 
sources of goals and alternatives.
Participants. Since all participants have ideas which could contribute to central 
policy, all can be described as "policy makers"; Some policy makers are more central, 
and some have an elevated capability for effecting their policy decisions as change in
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central policy. Like Bairett and Hill, the thesis assumes that the policy making 
relationship between administrators and regulators is not hierarchical. Regulators also 
make policy and can influence the choices of policy makers who are more central 
(more central in that they are organizationally the administrators, who state decided 
policies). If one considers hierarchical influence, regulators may be superior in the 
number of their ideas which become official policy, compared to those of 
administrators which do.
Different goals and alternatives are favoured by different participants (entaihng 
criticism of the goals and alternatives advanced by others). This thesis is interested in 
the emergence and submergence of goals and alternatives in the policy making process. 
The offering of alternatives as evidence in flie policy debate is seen as potential 
participation. The opportunities for consultation (access) are also seen as offering the 
potential for participation. The consideration of alternatives, and the timing of this 
consideration, is seen as indicative of the degree of participant influence and therefore 
effective participation. Key decision makers may control or influence (purposefully or 
otherwise) the number and kinds of alternatives considered. They can keep alternatives 
off the official range of alternatives agenda, or postpone their appearance on it so that 
they carmot be considered and selected, or so that they can be considered more 
privately, under less pressure or with selected participants.
35 Pesticides Issues Examined in Detail
The substantive issues picked for detailed consideration fall into four areas, each 
of which is treated in separate sections (repeated in each of chapters 6, 7 and 8): the 
market and distribution; the registration process; spectrum of use; and use itself. 
Specific problems addressed in each area are: the extension of the PSPS to all 
suppliers and the introduction of a rapid registration scheme for imports; the data 
requirements of the registration process; the limitations on the use of a pesticide set at 
registration, specifically as regards minor uses; and conditions on use set outside 
registration, specifically the training of users.
The issues considered here therefore include three which were closely associated 
with the existing voluntary scheme for controlling pesticides, and with the reasons for 
legislating, and thus had a large existing situational burden. The fourth issue, the 
training of users, was further removed from the status quo of pesticide controls, was 
not related to the reasons for legislating, and was not initially stated as official policy, 
providing a contrast.
Major topics discussed in the context of these issues include the data requirements 
and standards in the registration process and changes in the administration to 
accommodate consideration of efficacy. The questions of public data disclosure and the 
introduction of fees for approvals are also discussed. Also seen as important is the 
setting of conditions to circumscribe pesticide use at the time of registration, and the
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resulting debate on the maiginalization of certain pesticides users and the expected 
dianges in the types of approval s o u ^
Knoepfel and Weidner (1982) see constituent policies as a substantive issue (the 
policy core) embedded in programme shells. A policy concerned with cleaner air for 
example needs: a monitoring programme to identify problem areas and ascertain 
progress: regulations governing emitter behaviour, an administrative structure to 
enforce the regulations; and financial resources to sustain the structure. Interest groups 
may seek to influence any or all of these areas. For the purpose of this thesis all such 
issue-shells are regarded as adjacent and overlapping substantive issues, attended by a 
continual development of debate and decision evolving substantive policies (each of 
which can in turn contribute to the s lu ^  of broader policy or - more unusually - be 
sh^)ed by broader policy). The "core" in Knoepfel and Weidner’s conception is here 
called "broad policy" and is seen as spanning the many relevant substantive policies. 
When broad policy has been formulated and stated as a general aim, the extent to 
which individual policies fulfil it can be debated, and groups can seek to implement 
individual policies in new issue areas in line with i t  Alternatively, the broad policy 
may become so generalised that every substantive policy appears to follow i t  entailing 
apparent consensus. Groups may try to influence broad stated policy in the hope of 
engendering further change, perhaps at a later date or under new management
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4. Working Methods: Data Sources, Fieldwork and Analysis
The first section (section 4.1) presents the research methods and protocols 
employed in gathering data. Use of a variety of sources was considered important to 
the corroboration and therefore increased validity of die data. The methods included 
actual participation in the parliamentary process, documentary analysis and interviews 
with public and private interest groups and regulators. Interviews were conducted 
during and after the consultation period on the regulations. The interpersonal aspects of 
gathering this type of data pose threats to validity and care was taken to minimise 
these, in design (question type and format), in preparation, in interview conduct, in 
recording methods and in transcription and interviewee assessment Section 4.2 deals 
with analysis of the data and explains which data were used, and for which chapters.
4.1 Data Sources and Fieldwork
4.1.1 Introduction to the Field
Early in this project the opportunity was presented of working as a research 
assistant to a member of Parliament who was very involved in the FEPB. In 
representing the MP I took part in many informal meetings to gather material for 
speeches and notes, for example with environmental, developmental, conservation and 
worker groups, as well as members of the pesticide manufacturirig and supply 
industries and other MPs. In the lobbies and through attending committee and whole 
house debate it was also possible to meet and talk with members of MAFF and other 
Govemmoit departments.
In participating in the Opposition preparations and meetings on the legislation 
during Standing Committee stages in fiie House of Commons it was necessary to 
attend meetings to decide tactics and s^ >portion work, personally undertake certain tasks 
and issues on the Bill, prepare speeches for all amendments for one MP including the 
lead speeches on fiiree issues, and pr^are issue papers on amendments for him and 
others. The job also included receiving, editing and promoting certain amendments for 
selection; telephoning universities for recent research results; scanning recent pesticide 
legislation from Europe and the US; keeping iq> wifii developments in the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAQ) and the World Health Organisation (WHO); attending 
committee debates and all other debates horn this stage to the regulations debate; 
liaising with MPs in h and ing  late or additional information to the floor of the house; 
composing and gathering signatories to an Early Day Motion; checking and correcting 
Hansard rendering of speeches; and collecting documents relating to the parliamentary 
process, briefing documents, parliamentary questions (PQs), amendments and letters.
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True participant observation is defined by Bedcer (1958) as a situation where
"...the participant observer watches the people he/she is studying to see what 
situations they ordinarily meet and how fiiey behave in them. He/she enters 
into conversation with some or all of the participants in these situations and 
discovers their interpretations of the events he/she has observed".
My work in Parliament fulfilled Becker’s participant observation criteria to some extent 
in that although there was only observation in parliamentary chambers (confined to 
galleries and benches), participation was possible behind the scenes, including 
interaction within the context of action with some of the subjects of study. 
Investigation of participants’ interpretations of events was not however undertaken in a 
formal or systematic way, and the time spent as a research assistant was treated more 
as a useful and intensive introduction to the issues and participants involved.
Working in Parliament for an opposition MP led to a degree of initial suspicion of 
my research motives in later interviews with managers from the agrochemical industry, 
but exposure to interest groups and regulators led to an awareness of the number and 
range of actors involved and greatly enhanced access to fiiese groups for interview. 
This outweighed any negative effects, particularly since initial suspicions were easily 
overcome.
4.1.2 Additional Invotvemem
Invitations to attend meetings of the Pesticides Group of the Agricultural and 
Allied Workers’ National Trade Group of fiie Transport and General Workers’ Union 
(AAWNTG(TGWU)) and Frimds of the Earth (FoE) were taken up during the 
parliamentary phase of the legislation. These invitations were as a researdier on the 
Bill and it was felt that groups acted in the way fiiey normally would have in my 
absence. The meetings included comments from me as part of the group. Attendees at 
the FoE meetings included most other environmental and developmental groiq) 
representatives who were negotiating priorities with the aim of coordinating their 
efforts. These were therefore particularly helpful towards matching groups to issues of 
concern. I also attended conferences attended mainly by public interest groups 
(OXFAM, 1985; London Hazards Centre, 1985).
It was also possible to attend a number of conferences held by or mainly attended 
by private interest groups to discuss the effects of die legislation on particular sectors. 
These included conferences held by the British Agrochemicals Association (BAA) in 
association with OXFAM (OXFAM, 1985), UKASTA (1986), The British Institute of 
Regulatory Affairs (BIRA, 1986), The Society for Chemical Industry (SCI, 1985), and 
a seminar on the changes in registratirm data requirements (Berry et al, 1989). In 
addition, a local ADAS group held a meeting at which I gave a talk on the legislation 
as it concerned farmers.
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Again these conferences, especially the woiking-group sessions where ideas were 
eqrressed by individuals when surrounded by odiers of like interests, contributed 
enormously to my understanding of the problems as perceived by manufacturers, 
distributors and users of pesticides at various intermediate stages of the legislative and 
regulatory processes.
As with private interest groups, access to Government depaitments as an observer 
was not available. One useful opportunity did arise however to attend a formal 
consultation meeting on the regulations with my supervisor, based on our response 
(Tait and Russell, 1985) to the consultative document
This provided some insights on the process itself: how the meeting was conducted, 
which actors were involved, which issues there was most interest in, what notes were 
taken on, and so on. The content of the meeting was noted, as with the above 
observation sessions, all of which were usehil pointers to the intermediate states-of- 
play (between public occasions) in the policy process. The seminar on registration data 
changes mentioned above had FRSD and AGP speakers and all the other conferences 
had PICD speakers.
A fourth source of information was the Agriculture Select Committee which 
considered the Effects of Pesticides on Human Health, from February to July 1986 
(House of Commons Agriculture Committee, 1987a; 1987b; 1987c). Evidence re la ting  
to the operation of the FEPA was taken from Government departments and private and 
public interest groups.
4.13 Documents
The documents collected were mainly in the public domain. From Parliament, 
collected material included the Official Journal (Hansard) debates for all stages of the 
legislation, which also recorded attendances and diviisions on votes; written and oral 
answers to PQs; copies of all stages of foe Bill, the Act and the ensuing Statutory 
Instruments (Sis); order papers containing amendment selections and progress on the 
Early Day Motion (EDM); pre-selection collections of amendments; and House of 
Cmimons library research briefs. Briefing documents and materials sent in by lobbies, 
as well as letters to, from and between Ministers, MPs and the public were collected. 
Agriculture Select Committee material was retained.
From the Government, useful documents included memoranda to Parliament, 
consultative documents and COPs issuing from the consultation period, and various 
dq>aitmental organization charts showing divisions of responsibility. No 
interdepartmental correspondence was available, and there was no access to 
administrative papers which remain confidential until they become public at the Public 
Record Office in 30 years time.
From private interest groups organisational newsletters containing news on actions 
taken and current positions were collected. Minutes of some private meetings on foe
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legislation were also obtained, as were conference p£q)ers including records of 
discussions. An attempt was made to obtain copies of interest group responses to 
MAFF’s consultation papers on legislation and the regulations. Of those who prepared 
responses four out of nine private interest groups acquiesced. Reasons for non­
cooperation included confidentiality and the heat of the debate about pesticide use.
The material collected from public interest groups was similar to that fiom private 
interest groiq>s but, as would be expected, die degree of cooperation with respect to 
providing copies of consultation responses was higher (eleven prepared and eleven 
received).
National and local newspaper cuttings, trade magazines and press releases were 
also collected. Such documents were used mainly to complement or reinforce the 
interview material and particularly to provide a chronological grounding of public 
events, where such material was lacking or unclear from interviews.
4.1.4 Interviews
Interviews were conducted in two main blocks. The first included public and 
private interest groups and some MPs and took plaœ in late 1985 and early 1986 
during the period of consultation on the regulations. Actors’ involvement in the 
legislation was easy to recall at at this time and opinions regarding the regulations 
were highly articulated because of the necessity to prepare written responses to MAFF. 
The second blodt of interviews was conducted with administrative and scientific civil 
servants involved in the pesticides legislation in participating departments of state. In 
anticipation of one interview per actor and consideration of the long time period over 
whidi information would be required, it was decided to stage these interviews after the 
main group of regulations had been passed. However it took approximately eight 
months after the initial request to obtain clearance in Whitehall, resulting in a longer 
than ideal interval before the interviews were conducted in late 1987 and eariy 1988.
Round One Interviews.
Scope. The scope of the first set of interviews was confined to public and private 
interest groiq)S with an interest in pesticides. Within the same period a number of MPs 
known to have an interest in pesticides were approached, including those who were 
more involved in the legislation (Standing Committee H) or less involved (House 
debates in the Commons), and some were interviewed. In addition, some interviews 
with public and private interest groups were conducted m the second roimd, and also 
interviews with an advisor to one of the private interest groups. These are included 
here.
Access and Interviewee Choice. Access to the interest groups was excellent (no 
request for an interview was refused). In contrast, cooperation firom MPs, other than 
those woiked with directly, was minimal. Of 21 MPs not m  Standing Committee H 
which considered file FEPB, nine replied to a letter enquiring about an interest in the
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pesticides legislation, and none thought an interview appropriate, usually because their 
interest was simply in "reducing pesticides use" or "poisons use". Of 16 MPs on foe 
Standing Committee, seven replied but only four were prepared to be interviewed.
The gmeral form letters sent out prior to choosing the interviewees are set out in 
Appendices 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. These were modified where necessary to take account of 
personal factors like previous informal meetings or requests for interview. The nature 
of my involvement in Parliament was cleariy specified so that it could then be stressed 
that foe present woik was on my own behalf and for research puiposes only. This was 
especially necessary as the fact seemed to be well known. A summary of letters sent, 
responses, follow up interviews and access to material is presented in Appendices 4.4, 
4 J  and 4.6. After each interview a letter of thanks was sent which also followed up 
on promises of further material or help with introductions.
The initial choice of interviewee was guided by knowledge of individuals with a 
high degree of involvement in the legislation as identified during die time spent in 
Parliament, or as indicated by correspondence, responses to Government proposals, or 
information firom personal contacts. Some groups more marginally involved were 
selected also, to achieve a broader view.
As the interviews progressed additional groups who were very involved but less 
vocal were uncovered. Also some groups who had an irqnit to make had decided that 
their aims were similar to those of another group and had formed a coalition where 
one group acted as spokesperson on issues. In such cases it was necessary to have 
formal interviews only with the group which was actively involved, and informal talks 
and material collection sufficed for others. Other groups simply made a thorough 
examination of proceedings and satisfied themselves that their views were adequately 
covered without entering negotiations of any sort In these cases (usually public 
interest groups) informal discussion and collection of material was all that was 
necessary. In tl% case of FoE, fire Campaign for Freedom of Information (CFoI) and 
OXFAM, extensive previous contact in Parliament obviated the need for formal 
interview. Nine private interest groups were ^ roached  for formal interviews and 11 
interviews were held. Similarly six public interest groups were approached, with seven 
interviews. Formal interviews with MPs totalled three.
The organisaticms and people contacted included the BAA; NFU; BASIS; BWPA; 
UKASTA; NAAC; AEA; PHIPCO; AAWNTG(TGWU); Green Alliance (GA); Soil 
Association (SA); Consumer’s Association (CA); NSCA; Wildlife Link (WL); FFPS; 
RSNC; OXFAM; FbE; CFoI; LFC; RSPB; Dale Campbell-Savours MP; Joan Maynard 
MP; Peter Lloyd MP; John l^lson (research assistant to Brynmor John MP); and 
Salingbury Casey Ltd. (advisors to BAA). Details of the interviewees are given in 
Appendix 4.7.
Interview Design. The interview design focused on the experiences of foe primary 
participants and enabled the interviewee to provide contemporary, anticipatory and
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retrospective accounts of, and justifications for, action. Opoi-ended semi-structured 
interviews were earned out wifii representatives of the interest groups. The parts of the 
interview dealing with past events were semi-structured because of the need to ask a 
number of specific and/or corroboratory questions. Those parts which dealt with 
involvement, evidence and the effects of procedure and decision makers’ views on 
involvement and evidence were more opem-ended and discursive. The checklist of areas 
covered is contained in Appendix 4.8.
The questions were designed to probe the relevance of the legislation to the 
organisation, and the extent and content of interaction with MAFF and Parliament, to 
determine participation in the policy process and evidence given. Questions about the 
extent of interaction wifii other groups, the interests of the organisation, and the facility 
of access they felt had been afforded were also considered important as they could 
influence the extent and content of representations, the maimer in which they were 
delivered and ultimately the way in which they were considered and/or acted uport An 
attempt was made to gain an impression of the values, background and role of the 
interviewee: if he/foe was primarily reqxmsible for representations to MAFF then 
his/her worldview was important to consider, although this data was not specifically 
sought By the same tokoi, if fiie interviewee was not primarily involved, this would 
be an indication that another actor might be a more appropriate contact
Questions enabling a more specific assessment of the importance of the legislation 
were asked, for example: (a) how much time the legislation took up at different stages; 
(b) what would usual behaviour be in it’s absence; (c) were there other more important 
items on the agenda at the time; and (d) how other pieces of concurrent or past 
legislation would compare in importance with FEPA.
The checklist was not allowed to constrain the sequence of the interview, which 
was seen as an open-ended conversation with an exploratory purpose which could 
fairly naturally be guided to cover most of the points without particular regard to their 
order. However an effort was made to keep to sequences within blodcs. hi this way it 
was possible to pick up and follow new and interesting items not previously 
anticipated. Subsequent questions arising from interview information were therefore not 
curtailed. Interviews with MPs were similarly open-ended, but the questions were more 
personalised.
The checklist was brought to the interview and the numbers were used to code the 
subject of discussion in a notebook. Numbers were ticked off from the list as the 
interview proceeded, so that it was readily obvious which areas still had to be covered. 
If time was running out the remaining question areas were prioritized.
In asking questions, Belson’s principles (as used in questionnaire surveys) were 
followed (Belson, 1986). Negative formulations were avoided, as were words which 
may have been unfamiliar. The use of qualifying clauses at the end of a question, 
posing compound questions, posing questions that explicitly offered alternatives or
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were suggestive or "leading" of particular answers were similatiy avoided. Some 
similarity of wording for the standard questions across aU interviews was attempted by 
memorizing, although information already received often made rephrasing a tactical 
necessity. A degree of consistency was achieved by such rehearsal The wording used 
in supplementary unplarmed questions depended on the context.
The interview began with assurances about confidentiality, to avoid inhibiting the 
discussion. The sequencing of blocks and questions within blocks were arranged in a 
series going firom more general to more specific. For example a question about 
duration and nature of involvement to fix the limits of the recall period would set the 
scene for the remaining questions, which would be about specific events and policies 
during that time.
Interview Protocols. The style of interaction followed certain general rules: not 
showing surprise or disapproval; not offering alternative explanations of questions; and 
not suggesting possible replies. However the rules were not invariably adhered to. For 
example surprise was used sometimes to elicit more material In the interest group 
interviews there was no negotiation of information and information sharing was 
considered ina^ropriate.
As concerns self-presentation, an attitude of familiarity and implicit sympathy with 
the experiences of the interviewee was adopted, as this was expected to enhance the 
quality of the information. Attention was paid to specific knowledge so that the role of 
the actor could be understood and sqppreciated. This entailed detailed background 
reading prior to the interview on the organisation and the issues with which it was 
likely to be concerned. Cannell and KWm (1968) believe that this is one of the main 
barriers to a good interview and observe that the interviewer must be perceived to be 
within range of communication on the desired topic.
With regard to more practical protocols, it was decided that the use of a tape 
recorder was not appropriate as it might inhibit conversation in what were considered 
highly sensitive and confidential areas. Instead, as much as possible was noted and 
coded with respect to the checklist Apart firom the checklist the main aid used was a 
diagram showing the dates of the main events in the legislative timetable, which was 
used as a prompt in the last resort The checklist was kept cm the left side of a 
hardbacked folder for easy reference, and the notebook on the right was flip-backed so 
as not to obscure it
Round Two Interviews.
Scope. The second set of interviews involved civil servants in Government 
departments who were responsible for various aspects of pesticide control, and who 
had a decision making role before, during or after the development of the statutory 
system. Most interviewees were involved in the regulation of pesticides before foe 
decision to legislate, but in the Pesticides and Infestation Control Department (PICD) 
and other divisions, some had been allocated solely to work on the legislation and/or
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the regulations. These individuals were of particular value in explaining the roles and 
procedures involved in the legislative process.
Access and Interviewee Choice. Access to Government departments was excellent 
A list of potential interviewees was pr^ared, and with the aid of a senior civil servant 
in MAFF a selection of potential contacts was made. The civil servant then approached 
interviewees on my behalf. However clearance for the interviews took several months 
to materialise. Further contacts were suggested during the first few interviews. After 
consultation on my choices and clearance, initial approach letters were sent to heads of 
divisions in which interviews were proposed. These requested permission to proceed 
and enclosed a standard letter intended to be sent to members of their staff. An 
assurance of personal confidentiality was given: this was enforced in all cases and was 
a condition of further access. The general form letters smt out to heads of departments 
and individuals are set out in Appendices 4.9 and 4.10 respectively. As in Round One, 
these were modified to take account of personal factors. Thankyou letters including 
follow-ups were sent
The heads of both PICD and the Pesticides Registration and Surveillance 
Dq)artment (PRSD) were reluctant to allow some members of their staff to be 
involved in the interviews. PICD refused permission to interview several of their more 
junior staff but allowed approaches to heads of branches. PRSD refused access at a 
rimilar level but access at a higher level was possible as a result of personal 
commitments.
As foe number of individuals who could be sq)proached in one division was 
restricted, individuals’ backgrounds were investigated so that, where possible, they had 
membership of two or three decision making groups or structures, or were involved in 
two or three different roles. Care was also taken to have minimal role-overlap between 
interviewees so as to achieve as wide a range of views as possible. In addition, a small 
number of individuals were chosen for their historical perspectives.
All of those contacted directly agreed to be interviewed, and without exception 
mentioned the constraints of foe Official Sectets Act (OSA 1939, Czqp 121) governing 
the confidentiality of advice to Ministers in so doing. The central decision makers 
interviewed were: administrative civil servants in the PICD of MAFF; scientific civil 
servants in the PRSD of MAFF; members of policy branches of the Department of 
Healfo and Social Security (DHSS), the Dq>artment of the Environment (DoE) and the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI); members of the Government’s Advisory 
Committee on Pesticides (AGP) and its Scientific Subcommittee (SSQ; and the Nature 
Conservancy Council (NCC). Ministers were not interviewed and the highest civil 
servant grade interviewed was grade 5 (assistant secretary level).
Seventeen individuals were interviewed, two of whom attmded a single interview, 
and one of whom was interviewed thrice. The people interviewed and their area of 
reqx)nsibility were as follows: Head of PICD (MAFF); Head of Branch A, PICD
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(MAFF); Head of Branch B, PICD (MAFF); Head of Branch C, PICD (MAFF); 
Director of Harpenden, ADAS-R&D(MAFF); Ex-Head, PRSD (MAFF); Present Head, 
PRSD (MAFF); Head of Risk Evaluation Branch A, PRSD (MAFF); Head of technical 
Services Branch, PRSD (MAFF); Director of Slough, ADÀS-R&D (MAFF); Ex-Head 
Toxic Substances Unit, CDEP (DoE); Present Head Toxic Substances Unit, CDEP 
(DoE); Head, of Pesticides Unit, CDEP (DoE); Chief Medical Officer, MTEPD 
(DHSS); Head of Chemicals Branch, (DTI); Chainnan of ACP, Chaimian of SSQ 
Pesticides Specialist, Chief Scientist’s Directorate (NCC). Appendix 4.11 gives details.
Interview Design. Open-ended semi-structured interviews were carried out with all 
individuals, but unlike Round One interviews there was no standard checklist of 
questions. Questions were individualized and differentially prioritized as the concern 
was with roles and specific issues of concern in policy making. The more general 
towards more specific rule applied as regards sequencing of questions. Some 
negotiation of information was entered into in the Round Two interviews to be 
absolutely sure of the sequence of activities.
Interview Protocols. Interview protocols and self-preparation were similar to 
Round One, although particular attention was given to dress and manner, which is 
considered by Young and Mills (1980) to be particularly important when interviewing 
members of an elite such as Government actors, but is equally true of all interest 
groups.
The nature of the precise roles and methods of decision making used could not be 
anticipated, but special attention was given to detailed background reading on the 
person’s likely roles, memberfoiiK, contacts, expertise and issues of concern. 
Appropriate sections of the Act, Bill and Consultative Document were rehearsed, as 
well as all recent updates. A summary of relevant information was prepared prior to 
the interview. Such background reading aided communication in interviews and hence 
conserved interview time. In the case of scientific civil servants this was particularly 
important, and many interviewees admitted that they were more at ease talking 
"jargon". My scientific background was especially advantageous in this respect This 
gave better interview depth, conserved valuable time and preserved goodwill with 
respect to future contact and recommendations.
(Questions relating to issue involvement were devised as guidelines. A "floating" 
list of questions to be answered during any of the interviews was maintained. Many 
arose firom other interviews, and an attempt was made to allocate questions to those 
individuals thought most able to give a full answer.
After the Interview: Making the Transcript. After the interview, the notes were 
examined and any short hand notations, badly written words and questions remembered 
but not noted were filled in in a different coloured pen. Transcripts were made as soon 
as possible after the interviews. The right hand pages of a hard backed notebook were 
used for writing out transcripts of both the questions and answers. The left hand page
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was devoted to various maiginalia: comments related to foe text which might be useful 
in analysis; further questions arising from the text to add to my "floating" list of 
questions in Round Two; alternative inteipretations to the immediately obvious; actions 
to be taken; notes on points which might be lost on later reading (explanations of gaps 
or linking themes between statements, or the reason for an additional question); and 
words which were dear in notes but which may have been incorrectly heard as they 
did not then make sense. After making the transcript, a letter of flianks was sent which 
also followed up any practical questions which had arisen in the interview, and 
confirmed any arrangement for future contact
A file was kept for each individual, containing literature associated with foe 
organisation, original notes of preparation and question sheets, original interview notes, 
letters to and from, requests for material and material received, details of addresses, 
telephone numbers, dates letters sœt and received, log of phone calls, letters, notes 
from phone calls and actions taketL The time each interview took and the amenability 
of the person to future contact were also noted.
After the Interview: Interviewee Assessment. Interviewee assessment consisted of 
attaining a "feel" for foe constraints that an actor was operating under, as this is 
helpful when revisiting transcripts for the purpose of analysis. Impressions of foe 
interviewee were noted, especially with respect to whether they were hesitant, 
cooperative or initially offixitting; whether their attitude towards me changed during 
the interview or they had obvious preconceptions of my "motives"; whether ttey gave 
me full attention or there were intenuptions or sidetracking; or whether there were 
questions foey were not happy to answer.
Notes were made on questions which may have been unclear or which 
interviewees had difficulty in answering, as well as any explanatory answers given by 
myself. Difficulty was often indicated by implicit modification of a question by an 
interviewee in order to answer it better. Modifications were also sometimes made to 
avoid answering a question altogether, or in order to fit experience if this created an 
opportunity to express an opinion Also noted were words which might have meant 
different things to different people. All of these considerations led to modifications of 
similar questions in subsequent interviews.
An attempt was made to identify factors or conditions which might operate against 
interviewees giving an accurate reply with respect to the required information. The 
kind of item considered included (a) foe person’s position as regards access to facts;
(b) foe person’s authority (were they in a position to say what they wanted to); (c) the 
person’s experience and capability; and (d) the extent of personal involvement in the 
legislation from documentary evidence and other interviewees. These helped in 
gatiiering an impression of incentives to be accurate; the likely period of direct 
involvonent and therefore memory; and other constraints on foe information given. In 
the case of access, for example, the rationale might be that if an organisation is
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worried about its lack of inclusion iri the process it may overstate the extent of its 
involvement This sometimes changed the way questions were asked, for example not 
asking questions in such a way that they assumed maximum access. Additionally, the 
views of individuals on what might hinder certain admissions was noted so that 
subsequent questions could be modified to be more enabling of answers.
4.2: Content Analysis and Use of Results
Interview data, responses to the Outline of Proposals and responses to the 
Consultative Document were analysed, along with data in the public domain, such as 
the Outline of Proposals itself, parliamentary debates, and the Consultative Document 
itself. Content separation, into the categories outlined in Figure 4.1 was undertaken.
Figure 4.1: Content Analysis Categories
EXISTING SUBSTANTIVE FACTORS: HISTORICAL
Historical Pesticide Controls And Their Evolution.
Views on Statutory Controls.
Individuals’ Involvement in the Past 
Explanations of Events.
EXISTING SUBSTANTIVE FACTORS: PROXIMATE
Events Leading to Statutory Control Decision.
External Events with an Influence.
Explanations of Events.
CONCURRENT SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
Fbrmal and Informal Procedures.
Individual Roles with Respect to These.





Reasons for and Views on Decisions.
Worldview Statements from 
all of the Above Categories 
plus some more.
Individuals’ Involvement 







NOT USED IN THESIS: 
SEE APPENDICES
The data were not always easy to place in a single category and a duplication rule was 
adopted in these cases. For example much "worldview" data were contained in issue- 
explanations, and this was useful in building a picture of an individual or
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oiganisational worldview, and also in linking evidence with motivation in issue 
analysis. The data for each category were selected in separate sweeps of all interviews, 
bearing in mind, as much as possible, only the category in question, to avoid 
confusion.
A useful distinction for types of ex^danation was kept in mind for each sweep, 
following Brown and Canter (1985), who distinguish between three kinds of 
exfdanatiorL' describing an expetimce; ascribing agency, and attributing morality. 
Descriptive explanations referred to by Ks^lan (1964) are those that make the 
meanings of events or experiences dear in a simple and straightforward sense. Diey 
are most likely to be factual accounts or provide background information from which 
dear inferences can be drawrL Ascriptive e?q>lanations are idmtified by Antaki and 
Helding (1981) as serving to ascribe agency to sequences of actions: define who is 
present or why events happen. They can refer to experiences of wants, needs or 
feelings; or to regular or consistent patterns of behaviour, such as habits, rules or 
norms. Morality explanations are explanations which justify, mitigate, excuse or defend 
actions, and entail blame to onesdf or others (Brewin, 1982). In analysing explanations 
given in interviews the researdi aim was not only to represmt actions, but also to 
understand them from the perspective of the primary partidpants.
The types of explanation sought differed in each category of content separation. 
Morality explanations were on tire whole ignored initially, or were relegated to the 
worldview maps referred to below. Descriptive e3q>lanations were favoured in the 
construction of historical event sequences found in Chapters 2 arxl 5, whereas 
ascriptive explanations were deployed in conjunction with the authors own attempts to 
interpret events. In Chapters 6 - 8  descriptive e;q)lanations of personal partidpation or 
evidence offered on issues were again heeded first in reporting tire development of the 
debate on the chosen issues. Ascriptive explanations played a part in the sections 
describing informal and formal Government arrangements concurrent to this debate. 
Morality judgements did come in to play in the reporting of perceptions of 
partidpative effectiverress.
For Chapter 2, descriptive historical explanations of pestidde controls and views 
on the necessity of a statutory system at different times were constructed from all 
interviews, cross-checked with each other and relevant documents, and used in 
conjunction with established literature, tiie task being to construct a multi-perspective 
account of the event sequence. Thus a more complete picture than was available to any 
one partidpant was constructed.
In Chapter 5, explanations as to why legislation came about were treated as rrew 
data which were relevant to the tiiesis in providing the immediate context for the main 
analysis in chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 focus on the contemporary debate. Data on the substantive 
issue areas referred to at the end of Chapter 3 form tire basis for interpretation of
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policy making, participation and factors influencing them. Evidence and decision 
chronologies are established. In addition concurrent factors including formal and 
informal procedural arrangements, which might influence policy making and 
participation are presented in these clusters, as well as views of participants on the 
legitimacy of partidpatiorL Interpretive discussion sections align dedsion and evidence 
with alternatives generation, consideration and choice, and indicate substantive and 
procedural factors influencing the latter.
Checking on authentidty was essentially a mental exercise carried out whilst 
separating the contents and later writing the accounts which appear in Chapters 2, and 
5. The degree to which a single interviewee contradicted, corrected or gave 
inconsistait information was considered; accounts were corroborated against secondary 
evidence such as documents; and the degree of concordance between accounts given 
by different interviewees of the same event was taken into consideratiorL
Some of the data were used to construct individual worldview maps (based on the 
template shown in Appoidix 4.12), this exercise being seen as providing additional 
insights within the context of issue analysis, but not central to the thesis. Some data of 
this type, collected from PICD decision makers was however used directly in 
interpretation, since they were seen as coitral policy makers. The "evidence" data used 
in the issues analysis is nevertheless seen as inextricably bound up with and expressing 
"worldview".
Data on the timing, nature and extent of lobbying was treated similarly. It was 
tabulated and used to construct interactions spreadsheets (based on the blueprint shown 
in Appendix 4.13). Group involvement in particular issues was taken as implicit in the 
emergaice of evidence on issues. However views on access to policy making were 
used in the assessment of participative legitimacy.
An am algam ation  of statements on the formal sequence of events, checked with 
official versions and documents, was used to construct the time-charts which spptai in 
Chapters 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8. These provide a baseline for the discussion of contemporary 
evidence and decisions within the context of issues analysis.
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5. Pre-Existing Substantive Factors: The Context of Change
This Chapter deals with the period immediately preceding the official decision to 
legislate, from early 1979 to 10 May 1984. It analyses in detail the changes in factual 
circumstances, pressures and the climate of opinion which help to explain the policy 
reversal. The voluntary arrangements remained unchanged in this period, but the trade
sanctions supporting them were disabled. A distinction is made between pressures
which catalysed the decision to legislate, pressures which, although real, only 
contributed to the buildup of the feeling that there should be legislation, and marginal 
pressures about areas which ought to be included only if there were legislation
Section 5.1 deals with broad-ranging recommendations or general events which 
may have influenced the following debate on pesticide controls. The second and third 
sections deal with the evolution of the earlier pressures for legislation, to involve 
pressure from Europe (section 5.2), and from industry (in turn explained in terms of 
pressures on the industry) (section 5.3). Section 5.4 deals with practices implemented 
by the regulators during this period, ahead of the decision to legislate. Section 5.5 
deals with the possible reasoning behind the decision to legislate. It brings into play a 
consideration of other influences, internal to the Government, MAFF and the ACP, in 
attempting to explain how a combination of factors tipped the balance in Cabinet 
Office towards legislation. Figure 5.1 summarises key dates in this period.
Figure 5.1: Proximate Chronology (1979 - 1984)
1979 RCEP 7th Report
1980 HL Select Committee.
NCC (Dr Moore) recommends statutory controls to prevent
misuse/abuse of pesticides and that PSPS should be returned
in strengthened form.
1982 WPPR
1983 Conservative Government re-elected.
European Commission formally objects to trade arrangements 
and BAA Code of Practice. Trade agreements disabled.
MAFF states pesticides legidation unnecessary.
Royal Society Report on Risk Assessment 
DoE response to RCEP 7.
1984 MAFF Announces Legislation at Earliest Opportunity.
RCEP 10th Report.
Food Act
DoE response to RCEP 10.
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5.1 The Climate of Opinion: Influential Reports and Events
5.1.1 The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
The RCEP’s seventh report, on "Agriculture and Pollution" (RCEP, 1979) had a 
major influence on the content of the debate and the alternatives offered at all stages. 
It expressed concern over some aspects of pesticide control, especially the scale of 
plication, the quality of the decisions about the need for pesticides and the type 
which should be used, and the environmental effects of excessive use and misuse. It 
laid emphasis on countering resistance to pesticides. The recommendations central to 
the issues considered in the thesis are discussed below; the full set of recommendations 
are summarised in Appendix 5.1.
On overall objectives, the RCEP said that it would seem desirable in principle to 
seek to ensure:
"...that the amounts and toxicities of the chemicals used are as low as possible 
consistent with agricultural objectives, and it might be expected that such an 
aim would be furthered if it was embodied in declared policy for pesticide 
use...There is, however, no such policy in the UK; nor does the possible need 
for it ^)pear to have been considered, notwithstanding the great increases that 
have occurred in the usage of these chemicals".
MAFF, and the agricultural and agrochemical industries’ view was that if chemicals 
were applied in accordance with the manufacturers label instructions their safety was 
ensured through PSPS testing. The RCEP’s concern was:
"...that this attitude is likely to be conducive to the unnecessary application of 
pesticides and that it will tend to create a climate in which the investigation 
and exploitation of developments in control techniques which might reduce the 
dependence on these chemicals is not pursued with sufficient vigour. 
Urmecessary pesticide usage...is undesirable because of the risks of pollution 
both direct and indirect to man and to wildlife, because it is likely to enhance 
the development of resistance to the pesticide and so squander its benefits and 
because it may destroy natural predators and so lead to subsequent and 
heavier infestation of a crop and to dependence on further applications that 
would have been urmecessary. We think there should be a considerably more 
questioning attitude than is now apparent, especially in the Government 
departments concerned, to the scale of pesticide usage, and we believe that 
this should be exemplified by a declared policy to reduce usage to a minimum 
consistent with efficient production".
On safety and efficacy, they recommended that in spite of practical difficulties and 
the increase in resources that would be necessary ACAS and PSPS should be 
integrated in line with the proposed "Acceptance Directive", and that information 
relevant to the environmental effects of pesticides should be presented to farmers in 
close association with that on efficacy, so that both aspects could be considered in the 
selection of the most appropriate pesticide for particular applications.
"The aim should be to assist the farmer not only to choose an efficacious 
product but one that will meet his needs with least risk of environmental
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damage. We think this aim is more likely to be achieved if safety and efficacy 
are considered together, within a joint scheme".
On zq)plication machinery, the RCEP noted that foe PSPS covered methods of 
application, and that pesticides were cleared for specific methods of application. But:
"...in the matter of ULV/CDA, the arrangements for validating new application 
methods have not matched the pace of innovation and the desire of farmers to 
make use of these techniques...The potential advantages offered by ULV/CDA 
from both fiie environmental and farming viewpoints are such that we wish to 
see work proceed on the development and assessment of these techniques with 
considerably more urgency than we have discerned among the organisations 
involved...if there are to be early advantages an integrated ggiproach is needed, 
by a team drawn from the several disciplines involved, i.e. biologists, 
chemists, engineers and safety experts...There is a clear need for official 
efficacy testing of equipment for spreading pesticides and for environmental 
considerations to enter fully into performance criteria...fiiese testing facilities 
would form an integral part of a combined PSPS and ACAS scl^me".
The RCEP felt fiiat file case for a statutory control scheme should depend on 
whether such a scheme would reduce misuse and bad application practices. However 
they also expressed the following concerns: stricter controls over use would be needed 
in the future to support strategies for countering the development of resistance; there 
would be wider use of ofiier pest control agents which may impose new hazards which 
would have to be controlled; the powers of the Consumer Safety Act to ban a 
particular pesticide was only a limited "stop gap" measure which fell short of 
providing a statutory basis for control over use; and if conditions set for safe and 
efficacious use were made mandatory and could be effectively enforced, legislation 
would be justified to give the control schane the necessary cutting edge. The argument 
against legislation had been given by the AGP who thought a statutory scheme would 
be inflexible, costly and time-consuming, would tie up additional toxicological 
expertise, would require an increase in the number of civil servants required to operate 
it, and would not lead to improved standards. The BAA had urged that only the PSPS 
should be givra statutory backing, rather than a detailed new Pesticides Act They 
feared that political considerations migfit produce an act, compliance with which would 
entail increases in expenses, staff and time in companies and Government. The RCEP 
concluded that the case for statutory control was not strong enough to risk disturbing 
existing control arrangements - but also that Ministers should have the power to act 
quickly should circumstances change. They recommended that general reserve powers 
should be taken to enable the Government to make regulations and to ^)point a 
statutory advisory committee. Statutory powers would bring pesticide control into line 
with the other countries of foe European Community.
On information availability, alfiiough some of the information supplied by 
pesticide manufacturers should remain confidential for commercial reasons, access by 
foe public, especially researchers, to some of the data and to proceedings between
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parties to the voluntary scheme should be considered. The ACP should review its 
confidentiality airangements wifii the aim of ensuring fiiat infonnation was not 
unnecessarily withheld.
The Government did not respond to the Royal Commission until late 1983, when 
it rejected the need for the general reserve powers. The PSPS was operating effectively 
and file Farm and Garden Chemicals Act (1967. Cap 50)* the Control of Pollution Act 
(1974, Cap 40), the HSWA and the CSA gave finner support to existing controls. Also 
"...any regulations that might be introduced would be designed to give the existing 
controls firmer support rather than change the way in which they operate" (DoE, 
1983). On safety and efficacy combination, the Government was already making plans 
to do this. On information availability, the Government argued that they favoured the 
release of as much information as possible, but that a "guarantee of confidentiality" 
was essential to the success of the control arrangements. It enabled companies 
operating in a competitive industry to make full information available for safety 
assessment As regards the ACP, "...the Government’s consultations revealed a wide 
measure of support among interests concerned, both for the Committee and for the 
Royal Commission’s proposals for extending its role”, but "...the overriding 
consideration is to preserve its indq)endence rather than to enshrine it in legislation". 
The Committee would publish annual reports, and its terms of reference would be 
widened so that it could advise on research work. On the issue of a policy aim, the 
Government accepted this main recommendation:
"...indeed it is already the Government’s objective...The Government concur 
with the Royal Commission’s view fiiat more effideni s^iplicaiion techniques, 
further development of integrated pest control systems...emphasis on pest- and 
disease- resistant varieties and better forecasting tediniques...offer fiie best 
prospect of fulfilling this policy objective".
On the assessment of new tediniques of application, fiie Government would rather 
collaborate in approved industry testing facilities rather than introduce qiecific efficacy 
testing arrangements for equipment On training, provided an industry-based national 
unified arrangement could be formulated, the Government was prepared to give official 
recognition to it, sponsor the training programmes, monitor proficiency standards and 
give official status to the certificates of competence issued. The Government would 
arrange discussions with representatives of the organisarior^ primarily concerned.
The Trath Report of the RCEP (RCEP, 1984) also affected consideration of 
evidence on certain aspects by the Government, which brought out its response during 
the pre-pariiamentary phase (see Chapter 6). The Government would have had access 
to the report at fiiis time, before it was published. It concluded that Britain’s pollution 
control policy was in need of a new momratum. Within Government, arrangements for 
the formulation of environmental policy needed strengthening. It was essential to 
reverse a decreasing emphasis on environmental protection, characterized by significant
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reductions in the resources available for research, monitoring and forward thinking. On 
infonnation availability its recommendation was that;
"...a guiding principle behind all legislative and administrative controls relating 
to environmental pollution should be a presumption in favour of unrestricted 
access for the public to the infonnation which foe pollution control authorities 
obtain or receive by virtue of their statutory powers, with provision for 
secrecy only in those circumstances where a genuine case for ii can be 
substantiated...Administrative and statutory requirements for public 
information, including those relating to pesticides...should be brought 
progressively onto a common footing...In cases where the protection of trade 
secrets is agreed to be justified, foe position should be reviewed regularly, and 
Mirtisterial certificates withdrawn or varied at foe earliest opportunity".
The Royal Commission restated that "...we adhere to the recommendation of the 
Commission’s Seventh Report that the voluntary PSPS should be given statutory 
force".
The report’s theme was the need for anticipation and prevention to be brought to 
bear on pollution control policy. Formal procedures were needed to ensure that foe 
principle of "Best Practicable Environmental Option" (BPEO) was made a reality. This 
was reinforced by a new concept of "Best Environmental Timetable" (BET), in which 
dear goals set in advance allowed polluters to plan their pollution control investments. 
Continuity and anticipation were the key features of these principles. "Pollution control 
policy, and environmental policy generally should be accorded the priority and 
resources adequate for their integration in foe national decision making process, so that 
their potential benefits can be realised and at least cost”.
In December, the Government brought out its response to the RCEP’s tenth report 
(DoE, 1984). It contained one major policy initiative on foe disclosure of information, 
but there were no plans to strengthen foe capacity of the DoE to anticipate new 
environmental problems.
The Government accepted foe thrust of foe recommendation for public access to 
information which the pollution control authorities obtained or received by virtue of 
their statutory powers. However it said it would be wrong to introduce a new uniform 
system which imposed unacceptable costs on industry or the control authorities or 
which required "...cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, for example to obtain 
exemptions from disclosures on agreed grounds". However "...our overall objective in 
this area is to satisfy as fully as possible the public’s legitimate demand for 
information without imposing a regime which could undermine the proper relationship 
between the pollution control authorities and industry". Annual reports on the work of 
foe ACP were again prontised.
With respect to foe recommendation on BPEOs the Government replied with a 
restatement of foe principles of its pollution control policy. Environmental goals, it 
said, must be realistic and based on sound science; the BPEO concept was accepted, as 
was the importance of new technology in cutting abatement costs and winning export
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orders. But the Government rejected or glossed over virtually all the RCEP’s 
recommendations for administrative change, leaving environmental policy making in a 
weak position. A CBI proposal for an advisory body on BPEO was one casualty: 
having rejected the RCEP’s earlier proposal that foe Industrial Air Pollution 
Inspectorate (lAPI) should be extended to tackle cross-media air pollution, and having 
failed to complete its draft circuit on BPEO, the Government was now saying that the 
BPEO was embodied in its approach to "major environmental considerations" and that 
where necessary foey would continue to seek advice from experts on specific issues 
rather than consult an additional standing advisory committee. They fiierefore saw no 
need for a statutory advisory committee.
As concerned BET and pollution control planning there were to be two new 
measures: the DoE, with lAPI and the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys was 
to launch studies to improve methods for detecting changes in healfo patterns around 
emission sources; and DoE was to work with the Genetic Manipulations Advisory 
Group (GMAG) on guidelines governing possible hazards from the release to the 
environment of genetically modified organisms.
5.1.2 The Royal Society
The civil servants involved in regulating pesticides and in administration said foat 
they had taken great notice of the Royal Society’s Report on Risk Assessment 
published in 1983 (Royal Society, 1983). Particular note was taken of the chapter on 
"Laboratory Experiments for the Estimation of Biological Risks", marked up for me by 
a PICD administrator. These sections noted that
"Some adverse reactions in man are predictable in only general terms from 
animal experiments...the laboratory tests on animals are of limited value in 
making quantitative predictions of the incidence of these reactions in man 
because of foe species-specific differences in metabolism and response to 
dmgs...Another in^rortant consideration is the reliability of the test procedures 
currently used. The scale on which it is practicable to carry out most animal 
experiments means that the chance of filing to ob^rve sraie reaction or 
event is probably of the order of 1 in 10 or 1 in 10 . This does not really 
form an adequate basis for extrapolation of the risk to the human population, 
which involves many millions of individuals, and is the reason why exposure 
should be restricted as far as is reasonably practicable, despite the value which 
has been ascribed to the ADI [Acceptable Daily Intake] or foe TLV 
[Threshold Limit Values]". "The UK regulatory authorities have long 
recognised, as have many other national administrators, that it is impossiMe to 
give an assurance of "complete safety" or "zero risk". It is therefore in the 
public interest to avoid exposure to potentially hazardous chemicals in so far 
as tibis is reasonably possible..E;qx)sure to environmental contaminants also 
needs to be reduced as far as practicable".
One of foe conclusions was that a possibly regulatory formula was needed "...in which 
a consistent cormnitment to the steady reduction of risks and detriments is coupled 




At a conference on the principles of pollution control in 1980, Dr Moore of the 
Nature Conservancy Council argued that the PSPS should be retained, in a 
strengthened form, because it was doubtful whether a more effective scheme, based on 
flexibility and cooperation, could be found. However the existing system of control 
was unable to keep the use of pesticides under scrutiny. This made it difficult to 
prevent farmers using excessive quantities of approved pesticides, to prevent the use of 
poison baits, and to assess the affects of pesticides on wildlife. He believed that 
statutory controls would have an important deterrent effect on such abuses (Moore, 
1981).
S2  The Crisis: Pressures ft*om the EC
The decision to legislate appears to have been catalysed mainly by extant 
obligations arising from Community membership and insisted upon by the EC, but 
additionally influenced by anticipated future requirements from proposed and adopted 
EC Directives. The calling into question of UK practice with respect to trade 
obligations contained within the Treaty of Rome is treated in section 5.2.1. (This was 
brought about mainly through the complex proprietary rights debate in the UK and the 
pressures of a maturing agrochemical industry, as is explained in section 5.3.) Section 
5.2.2 deals with the future harmonisation of registration requirements; section 5.2.3 
with proposed residues directives; and section 5.2.4 with the implementation of 
existing directives on marketing and use, and on classification, packaging and labelling.
52.1 Trade Obligations: The BAA, BASIS, and Pesticides Imports
In the summer of 1981, price differentials between UK and continental markets 
enticed some brokerage companies and farmers to import UK agrochemicals back into 
the UK from the continent and sell them here, undercutting the originating UK 
companies’ home market price. Products identical to those in the UK which originated 
in the continent were also imported. Alick Buchanan-Smith (Minister of State for 
Agriculture), speaking of this period said that "Substantial values of pesticides, 
claiming to be identical with comparable products developed for safe use here, were 
imported into the UK this year" (Financial Times, 1982).
Clearance for such parallel imports under the PSPS could not be effected because, 
although the chemicals in question were identical to those already cleared for use in 
the UK (and in most cases had already been cleared under the PSPS since they had 
originated here),  ^ they were treated as new chemicals in that PRSD refused to use the 
data they held for clearance purposes, insisting that the importer produce the data to 
support a new clearance, as PSPS rules required.
Interview, MAFF(PRSD), Westoning 11/1/88.
59
Since all data supporting a registration is treated as proprietary in the UK, even if 
the product has come to the end of its patent life, a generic manufacturing or trading 
company would have to secure pemiission to use the data (which would involve the 
payment of compensation) if they were not to go through the lengthy process of 
producing their own data.  ^ In the case of identical products, UK manufacturing 
companies may deny foat their own products are in fact their own, even fudging batch 
numbers or changing minor details of formulation to prevent identification,^ in effect 
making it impossible for short-term opportunists to obtain clearance.
Parallel importation as described here, was a practice which had been pursued for 
a long time previous to 1981/ However distributors found themselves in a new 
situation where marketing a product without PSPS clearance risked ousting from the 
scheme and consequent debarment from receiving other cleared products from BAA or 
BASIS members. Thus the BAA’s agreement with BASIS effectively limited 
distribution, and therefore use, to products which had been cleared under the PSPS,  ^
and the BAA was seen to be policing a scheme which kept prices on their products 
high. BASIS trading companies who chose to ignore the rules simply relabelled the 
product with an English label in order to sell it. Such merchants and contractors 
thereby broke the contracts they had signed with BASIS not to market or store 
uncleared products (Broadbent, 1986). BASIS made 42 visits to check on suspected 
storage on non-cleared products (BASIS, 1984). In December 1982 five firms were 
suspended from BASIS for periods ranging from 90 - 180 days and members of the 
BAA were asked not to supply them with their products {Guardian, 1983). According 
to the Guardian all five firms had been supplying one chemical which had not been 
cleared. The firms concerned complained to the European Court that by withholding 
their means of trading, BAA and BASIS were breaking free trade laws.
Some individual farmers also undertook parallel importing of chemicals for their 
own use. In this case, the chemical is considered already evaluated (effective 
clearance), but these imports had labels in foreign languages or carried 
recommendations that differed from those on products cleared for use in the UK 
{Financial Times, 1982), and the HSWA, requiring employers to instmct employees in 
the safe use of pesticides - which includes the provision of a label stating 
precautionary measures in English - was being infringed* in the absence of 
repackaging.
A complaint was sent to the European Court of Justice on the basis of the 
unfairness of a system where a product could not be marketed without clearance data, 
when tte data was already in place for that product and was technically public when
* Interview, MAFF(PRSD), Westoning, 11/1/88.
® Interview, MAFF(PICD), Harpenden 1/2/88.
 ^ Diterview, MAFF(PRSD), Westoning 11/1/88.
 ^ Literview, MAFF(PICD), London 6/5/86.
* Interview, MAFF(PRSD), Westoning, 11/1/88.
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the product had come off patent The complaint was laid against the manufacturing 
companies involved/ It is not dear whence the complaint to the European Court arose, 
but according to one PICD interviewee it was firom the NFU* who considered that 
MAFF was being obstructive, in effect preventing imports/
The EC was spedfically concerned about paragrsqph 9 of the PSPS which assures a 
person who notifies a pesticide to the Ministry for the purpose of seeking safety 
dearance that the data submitted will be used only in considering notifications/* The 
Commission drew the attention of the Ministry to recent judgements of the European 
Court of Justice which in their view meant that the Ministry ought to be prepared to 
use the data already in its possession where an identical product is the subject of a 
later notification (BASIS, 1983). MAFF upheld its position with regard to its role in 
the protection of proprietary rights, that is on not using data held by the PRSD to dear 
identical products" under the PSPS, even though the second company did not want to 
manufacture the pestidde. The Commission said that it regarded the UK Government’s 
position in this regard critically because of the competition implication (UK companies 
were in effect being dissuaded finom trading with the continent), arguing that the 
arrangemrats for safety clearance could contravene Artide 30 of the Treaty of Rome" 
by restricting trade in community products identical to those which had been deared 
under the PSPS to a degree greater than necessary for the protection of human health 
as provided in Artide 36" of the Treaty (MAFF, 1984m). According to an interviewee 
firom the Department of Health" anofiier critidsm was that the only information source 
recommending pestiddes was the ACAS list of approved products, and it only 
induded British pesticides.
Soon after the complaints were lodged, tire European Commission started to 
investigate the trade agreements, indicating that they believed fiiese to be in fring ing
 ^ Intenriew, MAFF(Slough Labs), London 9/11/87.
• Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 17/12/87.
* Interview, MAFF(PRSD), Westoning 11/1/88.
"(9) Departments undertake that the infonnation supplied in accordance with paragnph 73  above will be treated 
as confidential; will not be disdosed to persons other than those whom dqwrtments widi to consult and who 
have given the undertaking referred to in paragrrph 10 below [to sign a non-disclosure and non-commercial 
interest undertaking]; and not be used widumt the notifier’s consent odier than in commotion with the 
notification to uritich it relates. Hie Ministry of Agriculture, Fidieries and Food and die Health and Safety 
Executive, as coordinators, undertake to deal expeditiously widi notifications, although Trade Associations 
recognize that Departments must have enough time to study the possible hazards before agreeing to a product 
being cleared for use”.
Interview, MAFF(PRSDX Westoning 11/1/88.
Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community 1957. Part I: Principles. Title L Free Movement of 
Goods. ChqAcr 2: Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions B^ween Member States. Article 3Ù "Quantitative 
Restrictions on inports and all measures having equivalent ^fcct shafi, without prejudice to the following 
provisions, be prohibited between member states”.
Part I, Title L Chapter 2. Article 36 T h e  provisions of articles 30 to 34 fiiaD not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, oports or goofo in transit justified on the pounds of public mwality, public policy or 
public security; the protection of healfii or life of humans, animals or plants; die protectkm of nadonal treasures 
possessing artistic, historical or ardiaeological value; or die protection of industrial and commercial property. 
Sudi pn^ibitions or restrictions «hall not, howeva, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States”.
Literview, DHSS. London 6/10/87.
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Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome" by preventing or restricting competition, and it 
seems likely that the BAA and BASIS were invited to submit their observations at this 
point. In June 1982 BASIS submitted its scheme to the Directorate-General for 
Competition of the EEC to be considered for exemption from Article 85(i) under 
85(iii) (a clause allowing discretionary exemptions to be made), and also to the Office 
of Fair Trading in the UK for assessment in respect of the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act 1976 (Cap 34) (BASIS, 1984). In December 1982 officers from Brussels inspected 
the BASIS office files. Sometime thereafter, a letter of intent, dated 23 February 1983 
(Haigh, 1987) was sent finom the European Commission to the BAA, formally 
objecting by reasoned opinion to the two trade agreements and criticising the BAA 
Code of Practice (which supported the agreements by sanctioning only pesticides 
handled according to them) as distorting competition, infringing Article 85(i) of the 
Treaty. The Commission considered that sanctions against those who broke BASIS 
rules were not compatible with European fiee trade. The BAA was warned that if they 
continued to police their industry through BASIS they could be fined up to 10% of 
their armual turnover {Guardian, 1983), which could have meant £700 million for a 
firm like ICI. BASIS was therefore not considered exempt from the treaty, although 
the UK Office of Fair Trading had decided that the Restrictive Trade Practices Act did 
not apply to it  The Commission sought to have changes made to the BAA Code of 
Practice and the BASIS scheme, to ensure no conflict between them and community 
law.
The pressure from foe Coirunission caused the BAA’s sanctions policy to collapse, 
in that foe BAA had to tell its members not to act against firms brealdng foe BASIS 
Code of Practice, and this left firms free to ignore BASIS (Broadbent, 1986). Some 
distributors withdrew from BASIS when it became clear foat sanctions against them 
could not be maintained and were likely in any case to be withdrawn. After sanctions 
were withdrawn, about 50 companies withdrew from BASIS (BASIS, 1985a). The 
BAA realised that it could no longer police the PSPS and foat enforcing legislation 
would be necessary.
According to a BASIS newsletter (BASIS, 1984) BAA and BASIS had meetings 
with representatives of MAFF, and with foe Minister of Agriculture, to try to persuade 
foe Government to introduce a regulation making it illegal to sell agrochemicals which 
had not been cleared under foe PSPS, including a mechanism to enable proven 
identical products to be cleared in foe scheme by the quickest and most reliable means.
Part n i: PoIi<y of the Community. Title I: Common Rules. C huter I: Rules on Conqxtition. Section I: Rules 
^jplying to Undertakings. Article 8S(i): The following shall be prohibited as incompatible widi die common 
maricet: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or eflect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those which; (a) directly or 
indirect^ fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, 
technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a conqietitive disadvantage; (e) make 
the collusion  of «aitracts subject to acceptance 1^ the other parties of siq^lementary obligations which, by 
dieir nature or according to commercial usage, have no coimection with the subject of sudi contracts.
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In summary, the main pressures on the Government were
(a) the import of cheap pesticides, which increased pressure bn the BAA, and 
passed it to the Government;
(b) the EC’s criticism of the Government’s position with respect to proprietary 
data and restriction of trade; and
(c) the EC criticism of the trade agreanents directed at the BAA’s Code of 
Practice, another pressure passed to Government via the BAA.
5 2 2  The Future Harmonization o f Registration Requirements
In addition to the Commission’s concern about the parts of the PSPS which 
restricted trade, it wanted the UK Govemmrat to make other dianges in the PSPS to 
speed up the handling of notifications. It saw this as increasing cooperation between 
safety authorities in member states in line wifii its harmonisation concerns. Following 
the conceni over the import of uncleared pesticides, the Minister of State for 
Agriculture, Alick Buchanan-Smith, retorted by publicly calling for the EEC to adopt a 
Community-wide scheme for the registration of agrochemicals, saying that it was time 
they acted on their six-year-old proposal for "...a modest measure designed to establish 
a method for the acceptance of (fiant protection products on a Community basis", 
which would operate iri parallel with national registration systems. "The time has come 
to bring this directive into operation at the earliest opportunity", he said {Financial 
Times, 1982). He was referring to the Commission proposal for a Council directive 
concerning the placing of EEC-accepted plant protection products on the market which 
was proposed in 1976" under which manufacturers could have the choice of applying 
for Community-wide marketing, giving "European Community Acceptance" which 
would be granted by national authorities according to the provisions of the EC 
directive (Cailleres-Briquet, 1986).
Adoption of the plan had been delayed because of concern over uniformity 
wtrereby manufacturers and distributors would be able to use the least stringent 
regulatory authority. There was also concem that national authorities would be 
deprived of their ability to adrqxt the use of pesticide products to local conditions 
(Brickman et al, 1985). Both would remove the national prerogative to allow or 
disallow entry of pesticides (whether identical or not). The cost of registration 
procedures would also vary, again attracting manufacturers and distributors to possibly 
less stringent authorities. MAFF’s argument was that if the ’EC Acceptance" option 
were available then there would be no need for them to introduce a rapid clearance 
scheme for identical products.
«  OJEC, C2212, 9, 1976.
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52,3 Proposed Residues Directives
A tfaiitl reason for contemplating a statutory scheme was based on the fact that the 
UK was almost alone in having no statutory residue limits for pesticides in foods, 
whereas die preference of the Community as a whole was for a mandatory system of 
controls (Haigh, 1987). The first EC Directive on residues,w hich established 
maximum residue levels (MRLs) for about 40 pesticides on certain fruits and 
vegetables, was delayed because member governments did not accept the 
Commission’s proposal to set maximum pesticide tolerances for residues, a procedure 
whidi would have required eadi government to prohibit the marketing of produce 
exceeding the levels. Instead, the final agreement simply required governments to allow 
onto their markets produce meeting the m inim um  EC standards, whilst giving them the 
option of allowing or refusing products with higher residue levels. As the directive was 
optional as regarded the fixing of limits and the requirement to ensure compliance by 
random sampling, the UK had decided to take advantage of this derogation, arguing 
that the PSPS worked satisfactorily. It adopted Codex standards as presumptive MRLs 
(Gilbert, 1987), relying on PSPS recommendations for use and harvest intervals to 
ensure that residue levels did not create a risk to human health (Haigh, 1987). Thus 
the UK had avoided the need to set up official standards for residues. The EC however 
told the Government that by not having fixed levels the UK was leaving it opm to 
discriminate against imports and this could again be seen as restrictive trade practice."
Fürther proposed directives on residues in and <m cereals, and on foodstuffs of 
animal origin" were delayed by the UK on the grounds that the PSPS was adequate, 
but these directives when adopted were known to be going to be non-optional, and had 
to be implemented by June 1988 (Haigh, 1987), and it was this knowledge that led the 
UK to consider that national legislation to cover the Directives would become 
necessary, and to take powers in FEPA to "...specify Ww much pesticide or pesticide 
residue may be left in any crop, food or feedingstufT.
As it transpired, a further requirement of these Directives, that "..jnember States 
take all necessary measures to ensure, at least by check sampling, compliance with the 
m axim um  levels laid down", had a derogation, requested by the U K , which allowed 
member states not to apply the limits if (a) a residue monitoring system which attained 
the same effect was ^ l ie d ,  and (b) total population dietary exposures in 
representative surveys of typical diets were assessed. However this did not apply to 
pesticides exported to other member states or to pesticides imported from outside the 
Community.
”  76/895/EEC (OJEC L340 19:12:76); first proposed in 1969. 
hiterview, DHSS, London 6/10/87.
19 Respectively 86/362/EEC (OJEC L221 7:8:86) and 86/363/EEC (OJEC L221 7:8:86) when adopted (p ro p o ^  
6:3:80). These lay down maximum residue limits for organodiloiine and organophosphorous pesticides, qjplying 
to cereals and food of animal origiiL Member Stales may not prohibit or impede the "puttii^ into circulation" of 
products on the grounds that diey contain pesticide residues if die residues are bdow these limits.
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The non-optional items might have been seen by the Government to necessitate 
legislation at some later stage. However although such lepslation was not immediately 
necessary, it would have been difficult to pass legislation that did not take control over 
residues, without attracting the EC's attention.
5 2 4  Implementation of Directives 791117 and 781631
A further factor in the decision to legislate may have been that without it. 
Directive 79/117 on marketing and use,” and 78/631 on classification, packaging and 
labelling^ could not have been enforced.
Directive 79/117 prohibited the marketing and use (but not the manufacture, export 
or emergency use) of nine persistent organochlorine and five organo-mercury 
compounds (Haigh, 1987), and these uses were withdrawn under the PSPS. Member 
states could permit uses in certain specified cases but had to inform other member 
states and the (Commission. The UK was at the time making use of these derogations, 
principally for certain uses of mercury based compounds (MAFF, 1986a). The 
breakdown of the voluntary control system may have accentuated a feeling that total 
compliance with the restrictions on marketing and use was not feasible without statute.
Directive 78/631 was also relevant to distribution and use. In this case, packaging 
and labelling requirements were specified, with a classification of "very toxic", "toxic" 
or "harmful". Pesticides were not to be marketed unless they complied with the 
Directive, and in the UK the PSPS’s established procedures already implemented this. 
As with 79/117, those who complied with the PSPS complied with the Directive, but 
with the breakdown of the support afforded by BAA and BASIS, full enforcement 
could not be guaranteed without statute.
Both Directives are now implemented by the Control of Pesticides Regulations 
(1986/1510), and 78/631 additionally by the Classification, Packaging and Labelling of 
Dangerous Substances Regulations (1984/1244), the responsibility of the HSE.
S3 The Crisis: Pressures fk-om Industry
The import of cheap pesticides and the EC interest in the BAA and BASIS 
brought ongoing concerns about the PSPS and proprietary rights to a head. Price 
competition and the questioning of the rights of manufacturers to claim ownership and 
hence confidentiality of data after patents on products had run out (proprietary rights) 
appear to have been the main pressures on the agrochemical industry which led them 
to support legislation. Not all members of the BAA wanted legislation however: their 
push for legislation was an "on balance" consideration. As far as BASIS was 
concerned, they had no option but to push for legislation. The loss of their BAA- 
backed role as enforcers of the PSPS meant the credibility of their role as standaids-
»  79/117/EEC (OJEC L33 8.2.79): the "Prohibitions Directive". 
^  78/631/EEC (OJEC LI 14 29.7.78).
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keeper had to be promoted in legislation if they were to retain viability as an 
organization.
Competition and proprietary rights have not always been such an important issue 
to the agrochemical industry, and there has always been some unwanted trade from the 
continent which was ignored. Until this time there was very little pressure on the 
agrochemical industry, with high growth and little competition between companies. 
However from the late 1970s the industry had been entering the phase of development 
known as maturity: as more pesticides were produced the number of potential new 
markets declined, so that there were now few slots in the market capable of absorbing 
new high-cost pesticides in competition with existing products. The market, in other 
words, was saturated. Also, because public pressure for greater emphasis on 
conservation in the countryside was increasing, some multinationals had diversified into 
biotechnology crop protection products, which could cut back on environmentally 
undesirable irçuts like pesticides. The biologically active pesticides that were cheap to 
make and safe to people and the environment had become difficult to find. In 1985, 
25% more money was invested in R&D than would ever be recouped in sales, and the 
market had become starved of new pesticide products. This combination of market 
saturation and new product starvation had led to a significant decline in the inflation- 
adjusted price of pesticides, making it all the more difficult for companies to fund 
further R&D (Tait, 1988). The rate of growth was expected to decline still further 
(Tait, 1981).
Such market forces naturally led to increasing competition for markets, and many 
agrochemical companies had already gone out of business. Total demand for pesticides 
was likely to decrease further because the agricultural policies chosen to deal with 
food surpluses entailed taking land out of agricultural production. Under such 
conditions price competition, especially from extra-UK markets must have assumed a 
more threatening aspect, and the import of chemicals from the continent which created 
such concern in 1981 particularly threatened the livelihoods of the British companies 
with a UK-only market in pesticides.”
Because there were fewer new products, despite increased R&D expenditure, a 
higher importance was given to preserving a company’s manufacturing rights to those 
which it already controlled. However there were also a greater number of generic 
manufacturing companies trying to obtain those rights for themselves. Research based 
companies were therefore clearly interested in patent extensions and the restriction of 
data availability, only releasing data by commercial agreement (if they did at all), 
while generic manufacturers were interested in obtaining licences to the manufacturing 
rights when a patent ran out, and the facilitation of data availability. In 1981, patents 
on a number of major products, for example Glyphosate,” were running out and large
“  Interview, BPCA, London 17/2/86.
^  Interview, MAFF(PRSD), Wes toning 11/1/88.
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R&D companies were fiercely contesting cases brought by generic companies for a 
"licence to rights" to sell in competition. The original company in these cases objected 
to the license being given unless compensation was paid, and it was left to the courts 
to decide whether to grant the license, and what the level of compensation should be. 
This, in combination with the threat of fines from the EC for obstructing the import of 
pesticides by denying their identicalness (and thereby forcing inability to register 
through the withholding of the necessary data), worried the larger companies also.
The multinational R&D companies were used to complying with legal registration 
sdiemes, for example in the US, so legislation in the UK would have little impact on 
them, so long as üiere was some data protection. The UK-only R&D manufacturers 
were reluctant to have legislariorc”  They were keen to keep a voluntary scheme, as 
they had more reason to fear price-competition firom the continent, having only one 
market, and more reason to wish to protect their data. Ttey saw legislation as 
threatening, in that their data would be used to register identical products (whedier 
UK-originating or not) and so imports would be facilitated.
Within the BAA membership tiiere are MNCs, UK-only R&D, and also 
combination (R&D and generic) companies who wanted to protect data on their own 
products \riiilst also wishing to secure rights to manufacture other companies’ 
diemicals. Generic-only companies were usually not members of the BAA. The MNCs 
were largely in favour of legislation and the UK-R&Ds largely against The 
combination companies were largely in favour of legislation if an MNC, but largely 
against if a UK^nly company. As m i ^  be expected tibte BAA expressed the research- 
based companies’ views more than the generics, "...because generics depend on R&D 
companies, so if R&D are not in a good environment, neither win the generics be".” 
However, in pushing for legislation, it was actually expressing MNC R&D companies’ 
views over UK R&D companies views. Although its members preferred a voluntary 
scheme, the BAA probaUy knew that it could no longer perform this service for them 
in the absence of sanctions, and that it therefore had no option but to push for 
legislation, and, having made this decision, to be seen to push for legislation.
It was in the BAA’s interests, and in the UK Government’s interest, to support 
BASIS in its remaining role as a standards body, both to preserve its image and to 
secure a standing for it in the new legalised systeuL BASIS had been fiie 
Government’s way of postponing a legalised system, and it now owed allegiance to it 
for having performed this fimctiorL
Other possible reasons for the BAA pressure for legislation were the possibility 
that legislation might act to restrict trade, in controlling all distribution; and that some 
liability for the results of nrisuse and abuse of products might be displaced from the 
industry onto fire Government, in controlling use.
** Interview, MAFF(PRSDX Westoning 11/1/88. 
^  Biterview, BAA, London, 12/12/85.
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If the confidentiality of data within the registration scheme could be preserved, and 
the data only used for approving identical products, income on products could be 
protected to some extent after patents ran out Also, legislation could have been 
viewed as potentially promoting growth or arresting decline by creating new slots in 
the market and/or a longer lease of life for "pesticides" as a whole.
5.4 PRSD Implementation Arrangements Ahead of FEPA
^The RCEP noted, in 1979, that the question of whether the safety and efficacy 
sdiemes should be amalgamated was under consideration by MAFF, prompted by the 
EEC proposals for the Acceptance Directive incorporating safety and efficacy in 
dearance schemes for markets throughout die EEC. MAFF noted that the prindple of 
integrating the PSPS and the ACAS commanded general support, although integration 
would present practical difficulties and take time to implement One difficulty was that 
an extensive increase in resources would be needed to undertake the backlog of 
efficacy evaluations for products now outside the ACAS.
The Government’s response to the RCEP’s Sevoith Report (DoE, 1983) said 
"...the Government will shortly be discussing with the interests concerned how best to 
achieve die objectives of this recommendation". They had however, been discussing 
this for some time, more because of a concern widi the proposed Acceptance Directive 
than with the RCEP’s recommendations. They said:
"As a major first step a Pestiddes Registration Department has been 
established within MAFF. This has brought together the separate cadres of 
MAFF specially staff previously ragaged separately on safety a^ects of crop 
protection, food storage practice and animal husbandry chemicals, and those 
engaged on efficacy evaluation of crop protection products...The ACP will in 
future...be concerned not only with the safety of products but also with their 
efficacy. Safety considerations will however continue to have first call on the 
Committee’s attentions and resources".
In 1984 the PRSD decided to start preparing a more scientific "evaluation document" 
appraisal for the SSC, thus defining their role as scientific advisers helping their 
Government departments make judgements on sqiprovals, and not judgement formers 
themselves. This evaluation document became the public disdosuie document, in line 
with Mnisters’ wish for public disclosure during the parliamentary phase. In the 
parliamentary phase Mnisters appeared to be directing this development, and it is 
unlikely that they would have promised such disclosure during the public debate unless 
it had already been implemented, as with all other areas of controls. However tiiey did 
take the credit for this apparently "new" policy at that time. This was frustrating for 
members of PRSD:
"...what [the public] failed to grasp was that during 1984 - 1985 we decided 
that we should be accountable to the public and help our departments. When 
we do the committee report, we decided that instead of a few bits of paper we
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should put in the scientific chit-chat".
They felt pressure from pesticides coming under attack and wanted to put levels of 
toxicity into perspective for the departments by detailing chemistry, properties, manner 
of use, fate and behaviour, and persistence. They "had very strong views on format". It 
was stressed that "...diis was a local decision: [name], [name] and me. The scientists 
saying we should be more scientific...the idea was initiated here. In those days we 
ruled the roost". This interviewee made it dear that the move was not made with the 
legislation in mind: "I don’t mean that we did it in antidpation of fiiis, but it came 
before and so made it easier".”  Being less accountable for judgements on approvals in 
addition to a standardisation of the evaluation document could also have the effect diat 
manufacturers would be less likely to use personal pressure on members of PRSD to 
influence judgements. Since they have less contact wifii the committees and 
administrative departments this would mean less overall day to day influence.
S3  Deliberations Leading to the Decision to Legislate
The discussions with the EC flre wake of the BAA crisis dearly signified to 
MAFF that the EC expected something to be done with respect to the trade practices, 
and that "flieir attitude would cause problems".” In 1982, with the BAA also lobbying 
for a statute die Cabinet Office wanted to manage this wifliout recourse to primary 
legidation. In die words of one MAFF civil servant, "...we could have seen the EC off 
at this stage: all you’ve got to do is give them a firm answer really, but the EC had 
got the industry ratded...",” and the first search, for a means o f regulating supply , was 
initiated.
At this stage tl^  first objective of central policy makers at Cabir^ levd became to 
appease the EC. The approach taken was remedial: to try to modify the EC’s attitude 
so that they saw it as less of a problem, but then to remedy the problem situation 
themselves. Thus to begin with the Government discussed the situation with the EC to 
see whether their concerns could be m in im ised, it was realised that the EC intended to 
produce an opinion which would result in the trade sanctions being disabled and a 
further loss of control of the supply chain: this was not in the interests of the trade or 
the U K  Government, who concurred in their view that control of the supply chain had 
to be regained swiftly. As described in Chapter 2, there had been a history of loss of 
control and then re g ain ing  it, but thus far the UK Government had avoided assuming 
full responsibility for control. The Government realised that this time they would have 
to take, the responsibility. The other immediate problem in the view of tire EC was the 
obstacle to processing identical products applications, which was the responsibility of
*  Interview, MAFF(PRSDX Haipenden 1/2/88. 
^  Interview, MAFF(PICDX London 17/12/87. 
2* Biterview, MAFF(PICDX London 13/3/86.
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the Government. The Government must speed up the process, and use the data they 
held on existing approvals to this end.
It then became clear that the EC favoured a fiiU scale statutory scheme, and that 
directives on residues and other matters would have to be complied with in the future. 
MAFF’s departmental lawyers also advised that control of residues could not be 
covered by other legislation, such as the Food and Drugs Act 1955 (Cap 15) which 
related only to direct adulteration of food.
The harmonisation of data requirements and residues limits were envisaged by the 
Government as causing problems in the future, but were less immediately pressing. 
Although appeasing the EC was an objective, the EC had not insisted on legislation, 
and none of their concerns in themselves forced the Government to consider primary 
legislation. A rapid clearance scheme for identicals was set up without legislation. 
However the effect of the EC’s actions on control in the supply chain led the 
Government to review existing legislation with a view to creating subordinate 
regulations to ensure that all agrochemicals were registered before being marketed. 
There would be an advantage in taking powers to implement EC requirements ahead of 
the implementation date, in that the Government would appear cooperative, at least in 
this area, which was not one of major political or sovereignity importance.
At this time the Cabinet decided that it wanted a full position paper on pesticides, 
to see whether the legislation covered future needs adequately and to determine the 
necessary extent of controls should they decide to have a pesticides bill (mainly as a 
result of the need to control supply). There were many questions in the House of 
Commons about the Government’s position with regard to the EC and the trade 
agreements. The Government also had to decide on its long overdue response to the 
RCEP report
The level of public and officials’ consciousness on the need for legislation was 
raised by the RCEP report (RCEP, 1979),”  although neither the Government nor the 
ACP accepted that there should be legislation as a result o f ir.”  However with the 
pressure from the EC and industry, and bearing in mind that they might decide to 
legislate, the commitments which would be given in the Government’s response to the 
RCEP (DoE, 1983) had to be carefully considered.
Civil servants examined secondary legislation to see if it could meet the demands 
of the EC and industry, and the items it would be necessary to include in any primary 
legislation, including items recommended by the RCEP. It seems likely that the 
position paper had been started in early 1983, at the time of the EC letter to 
BAA/BASIS. The long delay in the response to the RCEP was probably a result of 
Government uncertainty on the necessity of legislation as a result of EC and industry 
pressure which had become full blown in 1981 and 1982. As the Fanners Weekly
® Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 28/9/87. 
”  Interview, ACP, Leic^ter 18/1/88.
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(1983) said, "It is understood that the delay in Mnistry action has been due to toing 
and froing between MAFF and the DoE about which pieces of legislation might prove 
^ licab le  in new regulations". It therefore seems likely that the primary versus 
secondary legislation debate was concurrent with deliberation on the Government 
response to the RCEP. In 1983 the Government must have decided that it could delay 
primary legislation for a little longer, and so wrote a negative response to the RCEP. 
As one DTI interviewee put it, "...the Government resisted right to the end - for 
doctrinaire reasons they thought the PSPS was marvellous because of its flexibility".^  ^
This resistance continued to apply, at least officially, right up to the public 
armouncement in 1984 that there would be legislatiorL
In preparing the position paper, participating Government departments held 
meetings to decide what would be needed in new legislation. The debate on legislation 
in relation to the RCEP report had continued between MAFF, DoE and the Department 
of Transport (DoT) since 1979, and the DoE would have preferred to see action on the 
aspects to which a commitment had been given. As concerns the tone of the position 
paper, the PICD was influenced by current reports.”  According to a MAFF 
interviewee” the volume of official and academic reports in circulation must have 
raised consciousness to such a degree that they tipped the scales in support of 
legislation through civil servants taking a degree of initiative with the policy content of 
the position paper submitted to Cabinet.
The Royal Society Report on Risk Assessment (Royal Society, 1983; see section 
5.1.2) was also influential within PICD^ and the ACP.””  As noted above, its main 
theme was that, because of the limits to risk assessment in general, we should attempt 
to reduce the quantity of new chemicals distributed in the environment This was in 
line with the aim of the RCEP report to reduce pesticides use to a minimum consistent 
with efficient production, in the context of low volume application methods.” Some 
MAFF administrators and scientists at Haipenden were beginning to assume a more 
cautious outlook.” The civil servants involved were divided on the question of 
legislation, but the "polluter must pay" principle, and regulation, was seen to be more 
appropriate than ideals of "freedom of the individual" and the flexibility of voluntary 
schemes. There was therefore a rising new school of thought on risk assessment within 
the civil service at the same time as the EC enquiry on the BAA and BASIS 
schemes.”
Interview, DTL London 11/11/87.
Interview, MAFF (Haipenden Labs), Cambridge 25A1/87. 
“  Interview, MAFF (Harpenden LabsX Cambridge 25A1/87. 
^  Interview, MAFF(PICD), London, 13/3/86.
Interview, SSC, London 30A1/87.
^  Interview, ACP, Leicester 18/1/88.
^  Interview, SSC, London 30A1/87.
^  Biterview, MAFF(FICD), London 13/3/86.
^  Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 13/3/86.
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The Government felt vulnerable on environment and food policy, and needed to be 
seen to be doing someüiing on the environmental front*® They were also under 
pressure from environmental interests*  ^ with regard to environmental contamination by 
pesticides”  and aerial spraying.” The conservation lobby was also active.”  Their 
contention had always been that too much land was farmed unnecessarily, as the UK 
was producing more food than it needed, and that in future more land would have to 
be diverted to recreational uses.”  This meant that there was a focus of public interest 
(which was likely to grow) in land use and conserving wildlife. Less land used for 
farming or less intensive fanning were both possibilities which would minimise 
pesticide use in line with the RCEP recommendation. Environmental interests 
overlapped considerably with those of the conservationists at this point According to 
the civil servants concerned, the time was ripe for environmental legislation, and their 
"long view" prompted them to look in detail at existing statutes on environmental 
issues, to see whether the legislation would cover the issues they knew would be 
important in the future. They concluded that the environment was not protected 
adequately from pesticides by existing legislation. This new "environmental gap" as it 
was presented by the civil servants, provided the politically timely reason for 
legislating.
Whether it was due to the strength of the civil servants’ arguments or the 
conviction of the Government that it needed environmental legislation for political 
reasons, "the environment" must have tipped the scales, already loaded by the more 
serious pressures. Apparently it was suggested by the DHSS that residues could have 
been included in a Food Act which they were promoting in 1984. (became Cap 30),”  
but the pressures were wider than this and it was considered better to focus on the 
environmental aspect”
^  Literview, MAFF(PICD), London 6/5/86. 
Interview, AEA, London 10/2/86. 
Interview, NCC, Peterborough 29A/88. 
Interview, AEA, London 10^/86.
** Interview, DHSS, London 6/10/S7.
^  Biterview, AEA, London 10/2/86.
^  Interview, DHSS, London 6/10/87. 
Interview, DHSS, London 6/10/87.
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Once it was decided to take a statutory route, for the above reasons, the protection 
of the environment was stressed, especially controls on misuse and abuse in line with 
the RCEP r ^ r t  The opening line of the pesticides section of the FEPB stressed 
safety to the environment, and this was deliberately placed in the pesticides section and 
not at die beginning of the Bill”
Although a combination of these additional factors led the Government to develop 
primary legislation, die initial concentration on the immediate political problems and 
the remedial attitude to them set the scene and later led to a bias in die consideration 
of all other issues in that alternatives were screened by the Government to ascertain 
m inim um  effect on the existing control system.
Despite these deliberations, just eight days before the announcement of the 
decision to legislate, the Commons Parliamentary Secretary for agriculture merely 
stated that the PSPS had served the nation well and would be given statutory support 
if necessary (MAFF, 1984i).
^  Interview, MAFF(Sk>ugh LabsX London 9/11/87.
73
6. The Contemporary Debate: Pre-Parliamentary Phase
The Right Honourable Michael Jopling MP, Mnister of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, publicly announced the Government's intention to legislate at the earliest 
opportunity to ensure the safe and efficient use of pesticides on 10 May 1984 (MAFF. 
1984a). This chapter covers the period from this date to 7 November 1984, when the 
Food and Environment Protection Bill went to Parliament PICD issued a consultative 
document giving an outline of its proposals for a new Bill (henceforward "die 
proposals")(MAFF, 1984b) on 22 June. The proposals and the responses and debate 
associated with them constitute the bulk of the data in the substantive policy analysis 
sections of this chapter. PICD expected die Bill to be introduced in the next 
parliamentary session The closing date for reqxmses was 30 July 1984. On 15 July 
1984 MAFF began circulating its draft Bill around WhitdiaU. On 31 July, the day after 
the consultation period ended, the Department of Transport announced additional 
controls on aerial spraying (DoT, 1984), and Parliament recessed on 1 August 
Responses to the proposals were still coming in throughout August and there were 
meetings between MAFF, the NFU and the BAA who were worried about certain
proposals. MAFF collated the responses in September. The Bill was due to be
considered by the Cabinet Legislation Committee in October. On October 25 MAFF 
armounced that "...the corrunents received from the consultations have been taken into 
account in preparing primary legislation" (MAFF, 1984c).
The Bill was passed through Cabinet Committee and was allocated a slot in titie 
next session of Parliament, as the Food and Environment Protection Bill (Financial 
Times, 1984). It was published on November 7 and introduced into the House Of 
Lords. Key dates in the pre-parliamentary phase are given in Figure 6.1.
6.1 Debate and Decision in Substantive Policy Development
6.1.1 Broad Policy Objectives
The MAFF press notice of the 10th May, accompanying the announcement of the 
legislative intention, stated that:
"This decision has been taken following increasing , pressure on the present
non-statutory arrangements, both from the import of chef^ uncleared
pesticides from the continent and from tiie European Commission which has 
been critical of the competition implications of the trade arrangements whidi 
support the Pesticides Safety Precautions Scheme" (MAFF, 1984d).
In a press release on the proposals (MAFF, 1984e) the document was described as 
outlining "...the aim of the legislation, and the powers which Ministers wish to take to 
regulate the îçproval of pesticides, their distribution and their use". It introduced the
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Figure 6.1: Pre-Parliamentary Phase Chronology (1984) 
MAY 10 MAFF announces decision to legislate.
JUN 22 Proposals for legislation published for consultation.
JUL 15 Draft Bill circulated in Whitehall
JUL 30 Official closing date for written responses to proposals.
AUG Pariiamentary recess.
SEP MAFF collating consultation responses.
OCT Bill considered by Cabinet Conunittee.
NOV 7 Food and Environment Protection Bill published.
concept of charging industry to cover the cost of approving pesticides, and proposed 
the conditions to be satisfied before approval could be granted. The reasons for 
legislation were again described by the Government, this time by Mrs Fenner: "In the 
first place, the Oovernmau is looking increasingly hard at all environmental questions 
and in doing so is directly reflecting the concern felt by people that we may not be 
doing enough to protect the œvironment we live in". In addition the voluntary scheme 
had, she said, come under pressure from two sources: "...firstly from the import of 
chei^, uncleared pesticides, particularly when currency fluctuations have made 
continental prices attractive; and second, from the European Commission who have 
criticised the competition implications of the trade agreements which support the 
PSPS".
At the beginning of June the BAA drew up a nine-point action plan on which it 
believed Government legislation on pesticides should be based. It was said to be 
hoping the PSPS would be backed by legislation in the next parliamentary session 
based on its own plans. The BAA director said "For years we have made 
representations to both this and the last Government to introduce statutory support 
Now this has been finally accepted, we must make sure the legislation is effective". 
The BAA wanted no sales of pesticides without PSPS clearance; legal controls on 
pesticide imports with the onus of proving identicalness to UK-markei products resting 
with the importers and hefty penalties; delays in processing notifications reduced, with 
the Government providing resources for registration; and enforcement of user label
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compliance. They also suggested that safety and efficacy should be combined into a 
single registration scheme, and that they would lobby for more information about the 
work of, and greater recognition of the independent role of, the ACP (Chemistry and 
Industry, 1984a).
On 16 October Michael Jopling gave a speech at the annual dinner of UKASTA 
outlining what he called "...our main objectives as we prepare our enabling legislation 
for Parliament". Firstly, a desire to protect the envirorunent had led to a concern over 
the efficacy as well as the safety of pesticides, as it was important that no more 
chemicals than essential were released to the environment Thus all pesticides would 
be screened for efficacy in future, a change referred to as having "major implications", 
and diere would be detailed planning after the Bill was passed. Secondly, the
Pesticides Safety Precautions Scheme had not effectively regulated imports, minor 
uses, novel application systems, tank mixes and so on:
"..jnost of which, because of the care which has been taken with the 
clearance of pesticides hitherto, is safe, but with which the statutory scheme 
will have to occupy itself with to some degree if it is to deliver what it seeks 
- a higher standard of safety to the worker, the consumer, wildlife, the crop, 
the bystander and the neighbour, the environment - than it now does".
They did not want to strait jacket the industry or unduly restrict imports. The extension 
of regulation to the use of pesticides was a new departure, which would be
implemented. Thirdly, the new arrangements:
"...would look different from the old because of the amount of information 
which will be available about their operation. We have been concerned that 
for reasons of commercial confidentiality the procedures which we now 
operate have done good only by stealth, and have as a result suffered from 
some lack of public credibility. I fear we have not been demonstrating the
fuUr^s of the testing we insist on in our clearance processes. Nor have we
perhaps presented all the information which we have on pesticide use and 
pesticide residues in the most informative way. We are looking at this, and I 
am sure we can strike a better balance" (MAFF, 1984g).
The (Queen's Speech in November referred to the Bill as aiming to provide "better 
protection of food and the environment" (Financial Times, 1984).
The broad aims of the Outline of Proposals were:  ^ "...to empower Ministers to 
control the supply and use of pesticides in the UK with a view to protecting the health 
of humans, animals and plants; having regard to the environment generally; and with a 
view to securing the efficient use of pesticides".
These were not contested, with both the BAA "supporting" the Government’s 
aims* and FoE congratulating the Government on accepting the (presumably FoE’s
 ^ Proposals: Paragnqih 1.
 ^ Response to Proposals, BAA, Undated 1984.
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own) broad aim.* However there were various responses that sought to add to the 
broad aims. The RSPB* pronounced it practical and desirable for the Minister to takf* a 
lead in exploring the scope for reducing overall levels of pesticide use. Research into 
minimum i r ^ t  programmes. Integrated Pest Management (IPM) and more efficient 
methods of 2q)plication, together with operator training and an improved advisory 
service to farmers would all make a valuable contribution to this end. In relation to the 
envirorunent, die RSPB said it would like to see die Government tatring the 
opportunity to secure higher standards of envirorunental protection than just making the 
PSPS statutory would ensure.
In addition a number of policy items were perceived as omissions firom the 
proposals. FbE said that there was a need for a dear Government statemeru on 
reducing use.* The lEHO also said that there was no proposal to limit the amount of 
chemicals used: the Government had failed to recognise the buildup of resistance due 
to the pesticides treadmill* FoE noted the need to promote IPM, for a policy for 
exports, and for a policy of moving finom broad spectrum to pest-spedfic pestiddes.* 
The RSNC wanted a commitment to researdi into alternative diemicals.” FbE proposed 
systematic epidemiological research on the effects of pestiddes on the health of 
workers, users and those in spray drift areas, and better PSPS test procedures, for 
example regarding wildlife and invertebrates.’ The Ramblers Assodation (RA) said 
that:
"...the marmer and scale on which crop spraying is now practised is becoming 
as unacceptable to the public as straw-burning. The Government should take 
much firmer action to control spraying and should encourage research into 
methods of reducing spray drift and into farming techniques that reduce 
dependence on pestiddes"."
The provision for strict controls over marketing and distribution was endorsed by 
one academic because previously restrained behaviour in developing markets was 
unlikely to continue in the face of falling demand for pestiddes. However the most 
urgent need was to control the user, as there was widespread misuse and abuse of 
pestiddes. There was a need to encourage vigilance and concern by emphasising 
education."
FbE suggested that the opportunity of supplanting all previous pestidde legislation 
with tiiis one piece of proposed legidation should be used to consolidate all aspects of
 ^ Response to P ressais, FoE, 19/07/84.
* Briefing Note on Proposals, RSPB, 22/10/84.
* Response to Proposals, FoE, 19/07/84.
 ^ Response to Proposals, lEHO, 8/8/84.
 ^ Response to Proposals, FoE, 19/7/84.
* Reqxxnse to Proposals, RSNC, 8/8/84.
’ Response to Prqxisals, FoE, 19/7/84.
Reqxmse to Proposals, RA, 30/7/84. 
Response to Proposals, Joyce Tait, 28/09/84.
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pesticides law, which were presently contained in 59 acts and 35 orders, regulations or 
rules, but noted that the Government had ik > such intention except in the case of aerial 
spraying."
6.12 Products Subject to Approved and the Case o f Identical Imports
Products Subject to Approval. It (qspeared Aat all pesticides categories covered by 
the PSPS could come within the scope of the new provisions. Thus wood 
preservatives, products for protecting animals against ectoparasites, plant growth 
regulators, some plant preservatives, pest control agents and pesticides used in water 
systems and buildings as well as agrochemicals could be included."
Non-Agrochemical trade associations complained about this wide scope. The 
animal health group of the Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry (NOAH) 
worried that "...the definition of pesticide was so wide that it could cover a number of 
things which could be called pesticides, for example substances ’protecting animals 
against ectoparasites’ or products which arc not defined as medicines and are not 
registered under the Medicines Act"." UKASTA said "I think the Ministry didn’t 
realise what a big job it had taken on - the ramifications of the word ’pesticide’ 
includes all sorts of things"." And the BWPA: "Barically we are very unht^y  with 
the proposals especially with the definition of what a pesticide is. ’Pesticide’ should 
relate to a purpose rather than to a chemical"." The BPCA appeared to be totally 
urq)repared for the proposals: "From the moment the Outline of Proposals was out we 
realised they had got it completely wrong as far as our side was concerned. We 
realised we were being misrepresented"." The AEA was surprised because previously 
"...when we heard a rumour that MAFF were going to revise the PSPS we told [the 
PICD] we would like to know where our interest slotted in. We were told it was none 
of our business"."
Inclusion under this provision meant that the ofoer proposed provisions directed 
towards agrochemicals rather than pest control and wood preserving chemicals (for 
example data requirements) would be inappropriate. Both the BWPA and fire BPCA 
pointed out that nothing covering training and certification for firms active in their 
fields had been included (ENDS, 1984b), something they had long demanded, whereas 
agrochemical training and certification for storage and supply had been covered. 
Presumably this was because BASIS already existed and had a training role.
The lEHO was concerned about the withdrawal of facilities previously utilised by 
local authorities at the Slough laboratories in relation to control of public health pests.
Briefing Note on Proposals, FoE, 14/9/84. 
"  Proposals: Paragnph 13.
Interview. ABPL London 28A/86.
^  Interview, UKASTA London 28/1/86.
I® Interview, BWPA London 29A/86. 
n  Interview, BPCA London, 17/2/86. 
Interview, AEA London 10/2/86.
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This it felt was due to emphasis on agricultural products, which was the underlying 
dieme in the proposals."
The fact that some products which had previously been outside the scope of the 
PSPS might also be included was suggested by the phrase "manufactured products". 
This suggested that anti-fouling paints migju be controlled. The BWPA and the Paint 
Manufacturers Association had been in disagreement over whether preservative stains 
and varnishes should fall within the voluntary scheme, and this longstanding argument 
was hi^ilighted by the possibility that they would now be regulated statutorily.
The BAA on the other hand were more concerned with inclusion than exclusion, 
and accepted the proposals so long as products used with pesticides, such as adjuvants 
arKi wetters, were included.*
Identical Imports. The main provision in the proposals was to create general 
powers to enable Ministers to "..make regulations to prohibit the import, supply or use 
of any pesticide unless Ministers have approved conditions for its supply and use".*^  
The relevant requirement was that all suppliers emporter, manufacturer and distributor) 
were to seek approval of a pesticide prior to its use in the UK.*
The BAA supported the proposals so long as: approval would need to be obtained, 
and not simply sought; and would be needed before first sale, not sinqfly first use; and 
providing that users importing products for their own use were included in the 
definition of an importer.* The BAA said they did not want identical products coming 
in with French labels for health and safety reasons.* BASIS likewise wanted importers 
to have their labels cleared.* The CA* implied that market protection might go too 
fan with regard to the EEC, would there not be a problem with the UK requiring 
submission of data prior to approval, where a product was already approved in another 
member state? If harmonisation of approvals was to take place in the future under the 
"acceptance directive", there should not be such a legal impediment (assuming identical 
products).
At the beginning of June a Government initiative to curb parallel imports of drugs 
into the UK was announced. Mr Clarke (Mnister for Social Security) said:
"A new statutory instrument tightois tiK provisions vbidi were allowing 
substantial quantities of imported drugs from all over the world to be imported 
exempt from our product licensing. New licensing arrangements for EC 
manufactured drugs will ensure that nothing from other EC member states is 
marketed in the UK unless it is either identical to or has no differences in 
therapeutic effect from a product licensed here".
Response to Proposals, lEHO, 8/8/84.
^  Response to Proposals, BAA, Undated 1984. 
“  Proposals: Paragraph 2.
“  Proposals: Paragnçh 3.
^  Reqxmse to Proposals, BAA, Undated 1984.
Interview, BAA, Peterborough 29A/88.
2* Interview, BASIS, London 27A/86.
Response to Proposals, CA  22/8/84.
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As for pesticides, this initiative had been stimulated by the entry of cheaper products 
from Europe, undercutting British product prices (Chemistry and Industry, 1984b). 
However in diis case diere was no apparent European Commission involvement
MAFF’s press release of September 6 (MAFF, 1984f) mentioned that the 
legislation would not outlaw imports from the continent, avoiding restraining free 
trade. They had been discussing with the NFU and the BAA the introduction of a 
rapid clearance scheme for identical products from abroad which would facilitate trade, 
and hoped to introduce this system as soon as possible.
6.1.3 Conditions Applied to Pesticides in the Approvals Process
The inclusion in the proposals of more detail on the concept of efficacy excited 
much comment, and is dealt with under the first diree headings in this section. The 
proposals noted that, in accordance with its conunitment (to the RCEP) to look for a 
means of combining the PSPS and ACAS (that is safety and efficacy data handling), 
the Government intended this legislation to permit such and would frame regulations 
accordin^y (MAFF, 1984h). The meaning of the term "approval" was to encompass 
both senses, of "safety clearance" under the PSPS, and of "fg^)roval for efficacy" under 
the ACAS." Existing cleared pesticides, not previously cleared under ACAS, were to 
be deemed "approved".* Account would be taken of alternative efficacious products 
which might be markedly safer, in exercising powers to withdraw or withhold 
{ )^provaL* An explanatory note* stated that*
"...this is not intended to imply that \riien s^ >proval is sought for a new 
pesticide it risks refusal if an efficacious product already exists...The provision 
is intended to cover the situation where of two products of comparable 
efficacy, the use of one invcdves markedly greater safety risks than the other.
In such a situation Ministers might wish to evaluate the risk/benefit ecpiation 
of the pesticide in the l i ^  of the need for its use".
The next three headings deal with issues felt to be serious omissions in the 
proposals, the substance of the testing requirements, specific chemicals, and the more 
fundamental issue of reliance on one source of data. Two further headings deal with 
information disclosure and fees.
Merger of PSPS and ACAS. The aim of merging PSPS and ACAS initially seemed 
laudable to environmental groups such as FoE,” WL,* RSNC* and the CA,* who had 
long urged such a merger in line wifii the RCZEP proposals, and had assumed that all
^  Expkmamry Notes to Proposals.
Proposals: Paragrqih S.
^  Proposals: Paragrqxh 5.
30 &qdanato^ Notes to Proposals.
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products would have to be submitted for efficacy {^roval if it came about The BAA 
supported the merger, so long as it did not result in future delays in bringing a product 
to market* UKASTA was against i t  arguing that it would make the process slower 
and more expensive and suggesting a simple standard for efficacy within the process 
which could later be raised to full approval after a period of commercial use 
{Agricultural Supply Industry, 1984).
A strict efficacy test was seen by FoE* as:
"...being in the best interests of the public, the environment and the 
agrochanical industry. Using pesticides which are wholly or partly ineffective 
increases environmental, Ircalth, and safefy risks, and constitutes needless 
overuse. There are already suggestions that many farmers employ pesticides 
which are not s )^proved for efficacy. This may suit the chemical companies 
but it is not acceptable to the public, and cannot be a sign of competent 
Government regulation".
Cleared Pesticides Deemed Approved. The proposal to extend efficacy approval to 
pesticides already cleared for safety but not formally approved as efficacious” was 
controversiaL Far from the RCEP’s idea of increasing efficacy testing, the degree of 
efficacy testing would be very substantially reduced overall.
The Guardian (1984a) considered that the proposal made a mockery of the 
previous approval testing, and thought it suggested "...that there will be a more relaxed 
q)proach to proving efficacy, perhaps working towards a complete dropping of this bit 
of consumer protection". There would be no re-testing, "...even diough toxicology 
techniques have advanced greatly since many of the pesticides were first introduced" 
{Guardian, 1984b). Martin (1984), m the New Scientist, similarly thought that the 
proposal was a sign that testing for efficacy would be relaxed.
The BAA, for obvious reasons, accepted this proposal, aldiough they were 
concerned that "only" already-cleared pesticides were to be deemed approved. They 
recommended that products already inside the approvals process should have staging 
arrangements made to enable efficacy data to be produced.* Environmental groups 
were more concerned with the 2,300 products which might escape efficacy 
testing*”***’ and might be used more freely, with the reduced consumer protection 
fois entailed given a public assumption that "s^roval" meant efficacious.”  FoE and 
the RSNC found the proposal particularly distasteful in conjimction wifo the statement
33 Response to Proposals, BAA, Undated 1984.
3® Response to Proposals, FoE, 19/7/84.
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that the word "approval" was to be used to encompass the sense of efficacy approval 
in addition to that of safety clearance.
Recommendations were based on an aim of efficacy testing for all products, and 
were that products which were only safety cleared should not be accepted or should 
be revoked until efficacy data were available;””  such products should be assessed for 
safety and efficacy in a continuous review;”  all safety cleared pesticides should be 
approved but those without ACAS efficacy approval should have their overall statutory 
approval revoked (FoE alternative 2).
There was concern that legal backing would be given to uiueviewed pesticides 
whose clearance m i^ t rest on inaccurate safety assessments,”  and to the use of 
products which had given concern in the past (2,4,5-T, OCs in general, Dieldrin and 
Aldiin in particular, Aldicarb, Mevinphos, Captan, Thiram, Dichlorvos and Oxy- 
demeton methyl).”  FoE’s recommendation on this point was that a Rebuttable 
Presumption Against Registration (RPAR) such as that operated in the US* could be 
built into the Bill to give Ministers a clear way of dealing with contentious products.
Alternative Efficacious Products. The BAA said that the availability of alternative 
efficacious products should only be considered when there was adverse safety data 
available concerning a particular product’^  In the absence of markedly different safety 
risks the law would make it easier to market new "me-too" products with no proven 
benefits over their predecessors. FoE on the other hand wished such consideration to 
extend to all products (assuming that information on their efficacy would be made 
publicly available), not just those submitted for approval. Pesticides suspected of 
causing a serious hazard should never be approved in the first place where adequately 
tested safer products were available for the same purpose.”  The RSNC went further, 
saying that approval should be withdrawn when there was evidence of a hazard, even 
where no alternative existed.”  An advantage of such measures was seen by FoE to be 
the reduction of the total number of pesticides in use, because the likelihood of pests 
developing resistance to a wide range of products would be diminished and some 
pesticides could be held in reserve for emergency use.*
The RSPB” and FoE* identified a weakness in the proposals in that since efficacy
*3 Response to Proposals, RSNC, 8/8/84.
^  Response to Proposals, FbE, 19/7/84.
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trials results would be absent for cleared products deemed p ro v ed , it would be 
impossible to evaluate the "risk-benefit equation" of comparaWe products. Martin 
(1984) considered that the power to ban the import, sale or use of a pesticide if an 
alternative efficacious product already existed could be used to protect manufacturers 
firom inexpensive foreign imports even if the product was already approved for use in 
this country. He suggested that this could be another way of circumventing the Treaty 
of Rome (as well as making a mockery of the Government’s philosophy of efficiency 
and value-fbr-money through competition). The BAA certainly supported the new 
proposals, largely because "...they would help to block the imports of cheg^r 
pesticides from Europe, called parallel imports" {Financial Times, 1984).
The Substance c f the Tests: Types, Criteria, Standards and Harmonisation.
The proposals required all suppliers to provide such information as was considered 
necessary by Mnisters for foe purpose of granting sqjprovaL” It was to be left to 
Ministers’ discretion to decide what information might be necessary.” This requirement 
was not contested. No detail was given and it (apparently merely enshrined the status 
quo ante. However the BAA noted that it would expect to be consulted on what 
information would be deemed necessary,* presumably concerned that information 
requirements could be changed at any time.
The CA considered it a serious omission that details of the assessment criteria to 
be used in testing were not itK^ luded in the proposals.* The RSPB wanted to know if 
the tests would provide sufficient data to evaluate foe "risk-benefit equation" mentioned 
- would there be tests of target-specificity?^ The Institute of Environmental Health 
Officers® was concerned that the method of (çjplication should be taken into account 
in judging efficacy. This was prompted by fiie issue of aerial spraying which was 
allegedly less than 10% efficient yet accounted for the greatest proportion of public 
exposure and complaints. The RSNC® reconunended that a test of volatility be 
introduced in addition to spray drift tests, quoting studies showing damage to brassica 
crops finom mecroprop herbicide vapour 30 hours after spraying. FoE was concerned 
that the "environmental criteria" proposed for inclusion in the efficacy testing were not 
explained, especially as very little work of this kind was being done.
Despite the fact that the proposals were for enabling legislation, FoE* fdt that the 
Government could have been clear on such points, for example by listing products by 
type of registration (wholly/ partly efficacy tested and so on), and by making 
registration dependent on a degree of efficacy testing. Similarly the BAA hoped that
33 Proposals: Paragraph 6.
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the regulations would reflect their claim fliat the best practical efficacy data came from 
experience of field use (meaning that regulations should not be too demanding on 
initial approval for use). The BAA also felt tiiat dfficacy "criteria" ^ u l d  only refer to 
claims made on the label (as existing legislation already required products to fulfil 
label claims).®
The RSPB suggested that the adequacy of ttie standards required in the test 
procedure should be reviewed to take into account the controls and standards operated 
by the EEC and the US.® Similarly the CA suggested that the requirements of the 
PSPS and ACAS (as the basis of future assessment) should be reviewed and draw on 
krmwledge of other schemes involving notification, submission of data, and assessment 
for safety, for example the notification scheme for dangerous substances.®
With respect to fire aims of environmental and user protection, fliere had been no 
mention in the proposals of a review of standards. Assuming that such a review would 
be taking place, the RSPB said that their views and those of the NCC should be taken 
into account in anticipating the long term effects of pesticide use in the environment 
They suggested a two-stage approval system whereby provisional clearance would be 
granted pending a review of a product’s efficacy and safety record over a five-year 
trial period.®
Again, which pesticides were to be tested for efficacy was not dear, and the CA 
wondered whedier garden chemicals were to be assessed on the same basis as 
agricultural ones and whether this was appropriate.®
Martin (1984) and The Guardian (1984a) bofli noted that there was no evidence of 
an intention to work towards international harmonisation of standards of pesticides 
testing, to which the EEC and the UN were committed.
S p e c ^  Chemicals. On June 5, the TGWU reopened discussion on the safety of 
the herbidde 2,4,5-T in a report documenting ill health following exposure in 29 cases. 
Effects induded breathing and drculatory problems, prolonged chloracne, miscarriages, 
birth defects and one case of soft tissue sarcoma (TGWU, 1984). The ACP had 
rejected the studies on the latter daim in its 10th Review of 2,4,5-T safety, and the 
Government had refused to ban it (ENDS, 1983). The report said that the use of 2,4,5- 
T was banned in some European countries and more that ICX) British local authorities 
and employers were committed to using alternative weedkillers. However huge stocks 
remained in Britain and these were widdy used in agrochemicals and weedkillers sold 
for garden use (Times, 1984). The report also mentioned that the ACP had reviewed 
and dismissed a sim ila r earlier TGWU dossier (ENDS, 1981), and it was alleged tliat 
the ACP had not interviewed those involved where they said they had, and that they
Respons« to Proposils, BAA, Undated 1984.
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had been given details of cases where they said they had not
On 13 July, FoE launched a nationwide campaign (FoE, 1984a) against foe use 
and sale of over 170 pesticide products containing seven active ingredients (dichlorvos, 
dieldrin, aldrin, thiram, captan, aldicarb and 2,4,5-T) about which they believed there 
to be serious cause for concern. They proposed that the Government and/or 
manufacturers should make public the results of health, safety and environmmtal tests 
on which they were cleared for use. They pointed out that such information was 
presently withheld and foe proposals for legislation failed to include disclosure. Tbe 
campaign involved leafleting foe public outside retail outlets and asking retailers to 
remove products until information was available.
The campaign, and foe BAA response to it, was widely reported in the local and 
national press (I have approximately 50 examples). The BAA dismissed the accusation 
of secrecy as totally unsubstantiated: "Results of tests are published and companies 
contribute to internationally published reviews and summaries of safety data. Raw data 
is, however, not published because it costs on average £7.5 million to produce and a 
company cannot afford to give away that investment". The BAA also said that "...the 
agrochemical industry is cotmnitted to making even more data available to the public 
and is considering ways in which this can be done while protecting the cormnercial 
value of the data" (English Farmer, 1984).
In early July in the US, the Bivironmental Protection Agency (EPA) decided to 
ban most consumer uses of wood preservatives and to regulate commercial and 
industrial use, following suspicion that products containing creosote, pentachlorophenol 
and arsenic derivatives might cause cancer and birth defects. The EPA action affected 
97% of the US wood preservative market and was expected to cause havoc wifo the 
DIY market, as consumers would be forced to hire certified cormnercial tqyplicators. 
This worried UK wood-preservative manufacturers. The chairman of the Environmental 
Committee of the BWPA said that under the PSPS (HSE) a r s ^ c  derivatives were 
used in foe UK only for industrial treatment, but pentachlorophenol was used by both 
industrial and consumer sectors and creosote was widely available. A Cuprinol 
spokesman said the proportion of pentachlorophenol used in UK products was around 
two fiffos of that used in the US. A Coalite spokesman said criticism of creosote was 
ill-informed {Observer, 1984).
The BWPA commented that the US ban should have no effect on preservatives 
manufacture in the UK. "The fundamental difference between foe USA and ourselves 
is that bona fide British preservatives must be cleared under the PSPS...the level of 
chemicals used in American preservatives is far higher than we would allow".
In mid-August, West Germany banned paraquat, the world’s most widely used 
herbicide, sold in Britain as Gramoxone. In the UK paraquat was on the official 
poisons list and was obtainable only from chemists and licensed dealers. In the US 
only trained and licensed people or those under tiieir direct supervision could use
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paraquat Three sets of data on the cancer links of paraquat were found to come from 
International Bio-Test Laboratory (IBT) tests of dubious quality. The other set, 
performed by ICI, was found to be inadequate by the EPA. Earlier in the year, West 
Germany had refused to renew IQ ’s clearance for paraquat, fearing it might not break 
down in the soil and might saturate sandy soil. Traces of the chemical had been found 
in water. IQ  insisted that it was safe for use on aquatic plants but the US forbade its 
use for clearing ponds and waterways and in the UK treated water could not be used 
for irrigation within 10 days of treatment The UK Government had no plans to take 
action against paraquat at that time {New Scientist, 1984).
The existing voluntary ban on the use of OCs for the majority of agricultural 
purposes was seen as an obvious case for the introduction of a statutory ban on all 
persistent OCs by the RSPB. An EC directive (83/131/EC) amending the earlier 
Prohibitions Directive (79/117/EC) to delete all remaining derogated uses of DDT and 
other OC and organomercury compounds would come into force in October 1984 and 
the Government had a dear duty to outlaw the use of the compounds covered.^ The 
RSNC concentrated its corrunents on diddritL Research by themsdves and the NCC 
had determir^d that the decline in otter numbers in the 1950s and 1960s was almost 
certainly caused by diddrin residues which affected breeding success. There were 
reports that diddin was still in use: the ITE’s armual report referred to industrial 
(timber preservation) use, illidt use as a sheep-dip, and a belief that imports were 
coming in from Ireland. They proposed that all uses of diddrin should be withdrawn.^ 
Fundamental Changes in the Approvals Process. The SA wrote that amalgamation 
of efficacy and safety within the same set of regulations only extended credibility to, 
and entrenched further, an unsatisfactory and iruqjpropriate state of affairs, where 
manufacturers were the sole suppliers of evidence on safety. The force of law would 
be added to past inaccurate safety assessments and industry-compiled data verifying 
their own efficacy claims would also be accepted. They noted that reliance on 
manufacturers’ data should be rectified as a matter of urgency, by setting up a public 
control agency (hke the EPA) to verify manufacturers’ safety data. Legislation 
provided the opportunity to do this and to fund the agency by introducing a sales levy. 
The present structures have not provided an adequate or evoi an acceptable standard 
of protection against the hazards associated with the long-term use of pesticides on 
crops intended for human consumption”.^
Irtformation Disclosure. Nothing on information disclosure was included in the 
proposals. On the confidentiality of the PSPS, the BAA implied that it was not 
prepared to support statutory disclosure, strongly urging that "...any information 
provided will not be released without the consent of the person from whom it was
3® Briefing Note on Proposais, RSPB, 22/10/84. 
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obtained”." They did confirm that "...the public’s right to know die basis on which 
safety assessments are made by the ACP is appreciated, and we believe that more 
information on this would be in the public interest". They focussed on commercial 
confidentiality, urging that the legislation would recognise that data required for 
regulatory purposes cost the manufacturers many millions of pounds to produce.
The Freedom of Information Campaign (CFoI)" and other like-minded groups 
(SA, RSPB, WL, FoE and lEHO), were particularly concerned diat the proposals 
contained nothing on the "...unacceptable degree of secrecy surrounding the hazards of 
pesticides cleared for uses under the PSPS". The facts that the BAA, die RCEP and 
Mnisters at the DoE and DoEm had all recendy expressed support for removing 
unnecessary secrecy about environmental matters in general and pesticides in 
particular, and that a Government reqxinse on the matter to the RCEP 10th Report was 
still awaited, were seen as relevant here.
Current arrangements were especially worrying since safety data released from die 
US had confirmed that products on sale in both the UK and US were cleared on die 
basis of invalid tests carried out by IBT Laboratories and others. However die ACP 
had released no information on the problem, or details of action to be taken, and 
misleading statements about the extent of die problem had been made in Parliament.
The same groups outlined practical consequences of the confidentiality policy: 
people exposed to pesticides were denied information about the degree to which the 
pesticide had been tested, the hazards that may have been found, and the adequacy of 
any recommended control measures; observed wildlife deaths and environmental 
damage could not be checked to discover if these were known effects of suspected 
pesticides; scientists investigating possible hazards were obstructed in their work.
Commercial interests were overstated by industry because of patent protection in 
major world markets. Duplication of tests by competitors was wasteful of finances and 
laboratory animals. When a product came off patent interested companies could pay a 
share of the original cost of providing registration data to obtain a clearance to market
The repeated exposure of inadequacies in safety studies had led to tiie introduction 
of new disclosure provisions in US pesticide law, designed to improve the detection of 
faulty data by allowing public scrutiny of manufacturers’ safety and environmental 
studies. Another factor in promoting the scheme was tl% desire to prevent 
manufacturers using their safety data as a way of maintaining a monopoly over their 
products even after the patent had expired. Fôllowing a Supreme Court ruling in June 
1984, these provisions were now being imfdemented. CFbl, FoE and others 
recommended the introduction of a similar scheme, which (a) allowed disclosure to the 
public but not to foreign or multinational companies; (b) allowed the use of data only 
by the originator for 10 years; (c) allowed data in the possession of the EPA to be
33 Response to Proposais, BAA, 1984 Undated. 
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used for five subsequent years in support of a second company’s registration provided 
the originating company was compensated; and (d) allowed second companies only to 
cite data known to be in the EPA files, not submit it, in support of the (q^plicatioiL
Fees. The proposals noted that all suppliers were to pay fees to cover foe cost of 
considering a pesticide for approval." It was to be left to Ministers’ discretion to 
decide what fees should be paid." The principle of registration fees was itot contested 
and foe BAA made a point of noting its acceptance of the principle." However 
consultation was felt necessary on the level of fees and their assessment It was argued 
that excessive fees would lead to arguments that seeking ^rproval was the sole 
prerogative of large companies and that fee concessions on minor uses of pesticides 
should be made to encourage applicants. The BAA anticipated at this stage that minor 
uses would be a casualty of the legislation.
6.1.4 Conditions Applied to Pesticide Use Within the Approvals Process
It was intended that" "Ministers will make their approval of the supply and use of 
a pesticide subject to the imposition on the supplier or user of sudi conditions as they 
consider necessary to ensure its safe and efficient use".
The conditions related to: the user of pesticides, in that purpose, location, method, 
amount and timing of use could be specified;" the manufacturer, in that the labelling 
could be specified;* and potentially foe manufacturer, distributor and user in that 
containers to be used for supply, storage conditions and disposal of pesticides could be 
specified.*  ^Additionally:® "As at present, conditions of use will be carried on the label 
which wfll itself require ^)proval under the statutory arrangements unless a specific 
exemption is granted". As approvals were given for certain pesticides and certain 
manufacturers, labelling was the only condition which was integral to and attached to 
the ^)provals process, and it was on the label that manufacturers could specify areas of 
use.
This section focuses on manufacturer control of the label, and two limits on use 
which could be specified or limited within the approvals process: amounts to be used 
and q^lication methods to be used. The equivalent sections in Q u ^ r s  7 and 8 will 
additionally deal wifo restrictions on the crops on which a pesticide could be used, and 
with tank mixes which could be used. The debate on minor uses only surfaced 
marginally to the issues discussed in this {foase.
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Labelling. Labelling was the condition integral to pesticide approval which 
affected use under the PSPS, and would continue in the statutory scheme, A major 
concern of the environmental groups was the fact that MAFF had not made it clear 
whether additional conditions would have to be put on the label. MAFF also had not 
indicated whether the new conditions would be substantially different from before, 
when manufacturers submitted their own label for approval, and did not follow 
instmctions from MAFF emanating directly from MAFF’s consideration of the data. 
This was seen as manufacturers being allowed to write the law, since anyone not 
following the instructions on the label could be prosecuted.” If MAFF clarified the 
conditions they envisaged imposing regarding the nature of the labelling to be used 
before granting s^roval, environmental groups felt that it would be easier to comment 
on the acceptability of the conditions.^
The BAA, predictably, commented that "...conditions should include mandatory 
compliance by users with the label recommendation for safe use. The mandatory 
requirements on labels should cover such matters as safe storage, disposal, timing or 
harvest intervals (where applicable), tank mixes and methods of application".” 
Speaking about this phase, the director of the BAA said at interview that "...we wanted 
to make it an offence not to follow the label - the label is the prime means of 
communication between the manufacturer and the user and is very important".”  The 
NFU were, again predictably, opposed to this:
"The NFU is concerned that legislation would place unnecessary restrictions 
on users...Information given on the label is largely what the manufacturer 
chooses. The PSPS clears a label but does not advise if less would be all 
right, for example, and the ACT does not fill in on this to an acceptable level 
at all. Manufacturers basically say ’please confirm x use is OK’".”
Application Methods and Amounts o f Pesticide to be Used. The BAA* said that 
"...we would like the exceeding of recommended rates of applications by users to be 
made illegal, and while reduced rates can lead to reduced efficacy, and possibly 
encourage resistance, we would iK)t consider reducing application rates to constitute an 
offence".
The proposed conditions on amounts seemed to denote that the recommendations 
of the manufacturer would become legally enforceable.® The prospect of a specified 
minimum allowable rate of application being enforced aroused much opposition, being 
seen as a mechanism for ensuring inflated sales and profits for the agrochemical
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industiy.*” Users, it was felt, should be free to ^)ply minimum rates of their own 
choosing*”” if in their opinion the pesticide was effective at lower concentrations, 
something which would become illegal under the proposals. The RSNC said that 
manufacturers should set rates which ensured that a product would do as claimed 
under a wide range of conditions.
On the subject of maximum rates, WL” and FoB^ sa^d that #ey  wotüd oifiy be 
welcomed if the maximum amount was set such that tl% total quantity of a particular 
pesticide in a given area or crop would not exceed an environmientally acceptable 
level, set so as to reduce overall pesticide applicatiort This should be reflected in 
conditions on the number of s^lications, in both conventional and Controlled Droplet 
Application (CDA) equipment
The idea that users may not be allowed to use lower rates than specified was felt 
to be especially intolerable in the light of the Government's commitment to securing 
efficient use with regard to die environment given that technological advances in 
application machinery could allow lower doses.””” Many farmers were already using 
lower rates wifli conventional and CDA sprayers, and CDA and electrostatic sprayers 
not only used less chemical but also produced less spray drift Innovation should not 
be stifled.^* The NFU was also said to be seeking assurances flrat innovations in 
{plication methods would not be inhibited as a result (ENDS, 1984b).
The RSPB felt that the Mnister should take a lead in exploring the scope for 
reducing overall levels of pesticide use, including research into minimal input 
programs, IPM, and more efficient methods of pesticide ^licatiorL^"
On the application methods themselves, die SA^P complained that die pioposeds 
did not give consideration to the different delivery methods available, althou^ they 
were vitally important in deciding on recommended doses for safety and efficacy. 
Existing dosage recommendations were seen as totally inadequate to prevent pollution 
by conventional wide-spectrum sprayers, and the introduction of recormnended droplet 
sizes to prevent spray drift and polluting "rofl-ofT was recommended. Dosages quoting 
droplet size would encourage more efficient and environmentally cleaner spray 
equipment The SA also wanted a phased ban on the use of wide-spectrum nozzles and
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a lequircment to use CDA equipment, but the BAA thereby wanted a requirement for 
suppliers and users of application machinery to ensure that the safety and efficacy of 
approved products was not adversely affected by application equipment (ENDS, 
1984a).
In June 1984 the Soil Association published a report, widely absorbed by the 
Press, on pesticides spray drift from conventional hydraulic sprayers, and claimed that 
the smaller droplets produced did not impact on crops but remained in the air causing 
damage to crops, animals and humans (Thorpe and Dudley, 1984). The SA 
recommended the use of CDA, which enabled less pesticide to be used more target- 
spedfically. The report claimed that CDA was being obstructed by pesticide 
manufacturers, who feared the new technology would reduce sales. It called for new 
controls over spray equipment, compulsory notification of aerial spraying, the banning 
of water as a carrier for spray chemicals, strict rules covering labelling and instmctions 
on the use of chemicals and an independent body to assess pesticide quality and 
effects. The BAA dismissed this claim as groundless, saying that several firms were 
actively engaged in promoting CDA and that reduced application rates were not always 
achieved with the new equipment Farmers had been disappointed with the results of 
CDA. Evaluation of new techniques was as necessary as assessments of safety and 
efficacy (ENDS, 1984a). The NAAC urged farmers, agrochemical merchants and 
cherrtical firms to go on tire offensive against the "...emotive, biased, vicious and ill- 
informed" campaigns being mounted against the farming industry, and said tiiat the SA 
report was "...simply another addition to the fiood of dubious, pseudoscientific but 
definitely anti-chemical documents which are enforcing the farmer-bashing campaign" 
(Scotsman^ 1984).
Farmers and machinery manufacturers had been worried by the proposals, 
believing that the Government intended to outlaw the use or development of new 
techrtiques such as CDA or the use of cleared pesticides on minor crops. On 
September 6 MAFF issued a press release (MAFF, 1984f) after receiving many letters 
on the subject, assuring farmers that tiiis was not the case and that the Government 
"...was very conscious of the need to make allowances in the legislation for the 
development of new {plication techniques and new pesticide uses". They hoped the 
consultation process would help them establish how best this should be done.
Also, farmers had expressed concern that they would not be allowed to use lower 
rates tiian specified on the label Mrs Fenner assured them that if the Government did 
decide to impose conditions on amounts, they would be in terms of maximum rates 
only and would have no affect of farmers who chose to go below the maximum 
currently recommended on the product label
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6.1.5 Conditions Applied to Pesticide Use Outside the Approvals Process
Training o f Users. Training of users was not one of the main items in the Outline 
of Proposals, nor did it attract much comment at this stage. Training for distributors 
was the concern of BASIS, who wanted to perpetuate this aspect of tiieir activities. 
The NFU was against specific controls on users, in fact on this basis they did not want 
legislation at all: "A nice compact code of practice for use is better and much more 
likely to be followed than 30 regulations".^”
The issue of how practical standards denoted by the conditions were to be 
administered was answered mainly with respect to conditions of storage and disposal, 
and mainly by various calls for COPs. The lEHO however, whilst suggesting a code to 
cover all the conditions additionally mentioned training for operators and farm 
workers.^”
62  Concurrent Procedural Factors
New Central Participants. The new leader of the team at MAFF Pesticides HQ 
(PICD), in chaige of the legislation, was an expert in EEC trade laws from the 
Agriculture Directorate. The UK Government presumably needed advice on the 
acceptability of its proposals to the EC. Additional civil servants with particular 
experience of legislation were also appointed to senior positions in PICD. These 
changes dismpted relationships which had been built up with the regulators (the 
PRSD) and the pesticides and farming industries. At this time the director of the BAA 
was also changed, disrupting the relationship between the BAA and the PRSD. 
However the relationships between the PRSD and the companies. AGP and SSC (that 
is the regulators and the regulated) remained unchanged at this time. The new 
members of PICD would therefore have had to rely heavily on advice from established 
participants, especially in the PRSD.
The Timing o f the Legislation. Once the decision to legislate had been announced, 
on 10 May 1984, tl% "normal procedure",*”  that is finding a parliamentary slot 
2^ )peared to operate. In fact the opposite probably happened: that is finding a slot 
probably prompted the official announcement, which might otherwise have been 
delayed.
Only eight days previously, on 2 May 1984, Mrs Fenner responded to a PQ 
(MAFF, 1984i) about statutory control, saying that pesticides had been controlled since 
1957 under the non-statutory PSPS which had served the nation well. She said its 
effectiveness was under continual review (Daily Telegraph, 1984) and that "The PSPS 
would be given statutory support if necessary". It seems likely that a private decision 
had been taken at this time but that a definite slot had not been granted.
Interview, NFU, London 25/11/85. 
Response to Proposals, IHEO, 8/8/84. 
Interview, DTI, London 11/11/87.
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Some interviewees expressed the belief that the Government delayed announcing 
their decision until they knew they had a slot so that it would be less likely to be 
noticed.*” However after the legislation was announced the Daily Telegraph at least 
(1984) seemed to think that a slot had not yet been allocated, saying that 
"parliamentary time will have to be found" and "it could be some time before the 
necessary new Bill comes into force". Regarding the pace of events, a MAFF 
interviewee*” said that "all hell was let loose to get the Bill out as soon as possible". 
Some others expressed the view that the Government had "tried to fight a retrograde 
action against the move", suggesting that either Cabinet or MAFF civil servants 
thought that they could get away without primary legislation right to the very last 
minute (Guardian, 1984c).
The PICD civil servants would have preferred to have had more time to prepare 
primary legislation, but the Cabinet Committee wanted legislation as soon as 
possible,*”  and approached parliamentary management. A bill dealing solely with 
pesticides, as de novo legislation, would have been difficult and time consuming,*® and 
was not possible in the current session, as fiiere was already one Bill scheduled from 
the same DepartmoiL**® The difficulty of negotiating with the Cabinet Office over 
parliamentary time for a Pesticides Bill was obviated by extending MAFF’s Food and 
Environment portfolio Bill, which was being drafted and which already had a slot, to 
include pesticides.
The Food and Environment Protection Bill had already been drafted for two 
reasons. Rrstly MAFF’s Food Division had found that there were no powers to put 
restrictions on food in the event of a radioactive release after experiencing a minor 
release from Windscale,*** and secondly the Fisheries Division (which coordinated the 
Bill) had found that there were no powers to control dumping or incineration at sea. 
These two subjects of the Bill had determined its title before the control of pesticides 
was added.
This course of action had other advantages. The Food and Environment Bill was 
important and therefore certain to get a third reading, and if an environment bill had 
gone through without mentioning pesticides it would have drawn attention to the fact 
that the UK had not met the EC’s requirements.***
The Drctft Bill. The PICD began circulating its draft Bill in Whitehall a fortnight 
before the previously armounced consultation period was due to expire (approximately 
15 July), although the draft Bill was not intended to be considered by a Cabinet
Interview, SA, London 27/2/86.
Interview, MAFF(Slough), London 9/11/87. 
Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 13/3/86. 
Interview, DHSS, London 6/10/87. 
Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 15/1/88.
111 Interview, MAFF(Slough), London 9/11/87.
112 Interview, DHSS, London 6/10/87.
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legislation committee until October (ENDS, 1984b). A spokesman from MAFF denied 
that this was a departure from standard practice (ENDS, 1984c). An explanation could 
have been lack of time and the fact that so many departments had to be consulted. An 
alternative explanation was the content of the draft Bill, which reportedly included a 
ban on the disclosure of pesticides safety data save on the authority of a Minister and 
only with the consent of manufacturers (Guardian, 1984d). This issue was not 
mentioned in the proposals. According to ENDS (1984c) the PICD was seeking to 
preserve the status quo ahead of the Government’s response to February’s RCEP report 
(RCEP, 1984) which recommended that disclosure arrangements for pesticides should 
be relaxed. If this were so, it would also have had the effect of avoiding protests 
before the Bill entered Parliament
The argument that the draft BUI was based on an early consideration of responses 
to the proposals would seem unlikely given that according to New Scientist (1984), 
MAFF had still not collated these responses by the middle of August
The Consultation Exercise. MAFF stated that "Ministers are anxious that interested 
organisations should be able to contribute fully to the preparation of the legislation and 
I should therefore be grateful to have in writing any comments on these proposals by 
Monday 30th July" (MAFF, 19841). This left only 5.5 weeks for responses.
Enabling Form o f Proposed Bill. The proposed Bill was to fall into the category 
of enabling legislation, providing general powers for the puiposes specified (MAFF, 
1984h), which were to "...enable Ministers to make regulations to prohibit the import, 
supply or use of any pesticide unless Ministers have approved conditions for its supply 
and use" (MAFF, 1984b). Details of the statutory controls were to be elaborated at a 
later date, in the regulations to be made after the Act was passed (MAFF, 1984h). 
Hence any detaUed thinking was obscure at this stage.
63  Influences on Participation and Policy Making
In the phase of regulation described in this chapter, the pressures on the 
Government fiom the EC and the UK pesticides industry were coupled with a 
precipitate arrival at a decision to legislate. This led to a document which featured 
proposals for making the approvals scheme statutory, whilst elaborating little on areas 
outside the existing scheme such as pesticide use. The existing ^provals scheme was 
to be preserved. Considerable shaping had therefore taken place before the Bill was 
formulated. Once the decision to legislate had been turned over to the civil servants, 
they did however review all existing controls with the aim of including powers in the 
enabling legislation to cover all future necessities, although this did not mean they 
would necessarily develop policy with a view to implementation throu^ regulations in 
these areas.
The urgent need to control pesticides supply leading to taking the first opportunity 
to legislate, had left little time for a detailed revision of all pesticides controls in the
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primary legislation. The civil servants involved said they would have preferred much 
more time between taking up their new positions and having to send new legislation 
through Parliament. Had the pressure on the Cabinet Office not been so strong, they 
might have had more time to appraise aspects of pesticide control other than those 
associated with the supply chain, and assess the impacts on sectors other than the 
agrochemical industry. The personalities at PICD, with dieir impression of reports such 
as the Royal Society’s on risk assessment, were probably at least as important as the 
portfolio and enabling traditions in covering such a wide range of issues in the 
legislation. (In addition, when the FEPB was enacted, they could have left the aspects 
of pesticide use to much later, but training was taken up as an item for investigation).
A consequence of the proposal to enshrine the existing scheme for approvals in 
statute was that all pesticides within the scope of the PSPS would be required to be 
submitted for approval, and therefore non-agricultural pesticides, a large number of 
which had not gone through the PSPS before would now have to be submitted for 
scrutiny and approval. Whilst the full ramifications for all sectors had not been 
explored at this stage, the importance of having the power (whether used or not) to 
control aU pesticide supply was clear in the minds of civil servants:
"The key is giving statutory control over distribution and sale. This is the 
most important achievement. For example we talked with the makers of anti- 
fouling paints for seven years about the possibility of their being regulated 
voluntarily. They knew that their paints were killing marine life. In the end 
they consulted fiieir parent companies and said they wouldn’t do it  In that 
these paints now fall under FEPA, the manufacturers know they have to work 
within a regulatory framework. And they have no way omt".***
The most important objective as seen by Government and agrochemicals 
manufacturers was ensuring full compliance with the existing scheme and not change 
in the existing scheme. The civil servants had however particular wishes to control 
sectors which were presently troublesome. With regard to tl^ inclusion of other 
sectors, this was presented as an oversight by non-agrochemical trade associations at 
this stage.
Another consequence of focussing on tiie PSPS was that in drawing up the 
proposals, file groups involved in the discussions were the BAA, NFU, EC, ACT, 
PRSD, PICD and other Government departments (that is only participants involved in 
or affected by the existing scheme who were opposed to any change in it). This biased 
the focus of debate towards the existing scheme and its preservation. PICD even turned 
away the agricultural engineers trade association from the debate at this stage, saying 
that the changes would not affect them. Since agricultural engineers are involved in the 
use of pesticides, it is clear that either central policy makers’ interest in controls over 
pesticide use (as opposed to powers to take controls) was not high, or they did not
Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 6/5/86.
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wish to debate use controls at this time. The stage had been set in the proposals 
without wide consultation.
Non-agricultural pesticide trade associations similariy felt fiiey had not been 
consulted, and that if they had been the ramifications of their inclusion could have 
been pointed out, and the scope of the proposals modified. If such associations had 
been consulted at this stage, a fuller view of the range of controls lAdnch might be 
necessitated would have been gained. Further, if the whole system had been examined 
in detail at this time (not possible because of the time allowed) it might have at least 
become dear who ought to be consulted in order to learn more. On the other hand 
there are indications that civil servants, whilst not realising the full range of 
implications, did know the range of sectors they wanted to be able to control, if it 
were dedded later that they wanted to do so. Whilst dvil servants may not have had 
the time to consult these interests, it was also convenient for them not to do so, so 
avoiding opposition when fiiey had not yet dedded which additional pestiddes they 
wanted to control Given the enablingnature of the legislation fiiey knew they could 
exclude spedfic sectors or pestiddes later. The BAA on die other hand wanted 
coverage to be as inclusive as possible, even induding products to be used in 
conjunction with pestiddes.
One ramification of wide indusion was that existing approval requiremoits would 
be inappropriate, as they were geared to agrodiemicals - another problem arising from 
insuffident early consideration of the range of interests affected.
Importers of non-identical imports were induded in the scope of sectors having to 
provide data from approval Identical imports, the handling of which was a focus of 
the EC complaints, were dealt with immediatdy during this phase, with the 
introduction of a rapid dearance scheme to facilitate free trade. This was undertaken 
outside of statute, and was to be dealt with purely administrativdy, using approvals 
data already held by the PRSD.
Since the focus was on including all pesticides in the approvals process, the 
adoption of a political rationality would imply that this was the appropriate stage to 
rei^raise the existing voluntary scheme. However the existing scheme appeared not to 
be open to potential modification at this early point Again this might have been a 
result of time considerations, compounded by relatively rrew central policy makers 
without à grasp of the range of subjects, and the added uncertainty that consideration 
of a range of alternatives would introduce. Therefore alfiiou^ some alternatives for 
small or more radical changes were proposed, and some doubts erq>ressed, these could 
not hope to influence the content of the Bill being introduced.
The PRSD (the existing structure to implement controls) for the most part wanted 
to preserve their structure or have control over its change. The proposal to combine 
safety and efficacy testing was a result of pressure for harmonisation from die EC, and 
possibly from the BAA, given that it would make registration more difficult and
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possibly deter some companies from marketing in die UK in the short term. The RCEP 
had also proposed this merger, leading the Government to declare this move to be a 
reqxinse to the RCEP, a commitment given during discussions on the EC's demands. 
This combination of safety and efficacy had die advantage of iqipearing to be a major 
change brought in with the legislation, whilst in fact the procedures already existed, 
and bringing together the separate stmctures was a minor exercise given drey existed 
in the same building. In fact, implementation of this sctreme at PRSD had taken place 
ahead of the proposals document, not necessarily in anticipation of UK legislation, and 
working documents on the data requirements were already in use. PRSD members 
were confident diat they could re-arrange their structure in advance of the legislation 
with respect to incorporation of efficacy and safety and revising the evaluation 
document PRSD, as established participants in regulating pesticides, were present at 
all stages of the legislative process, and were on die Bill team and the consultation 
panels for interviews on the regulations relevant to the operation of their dqiartmoit
It is interesting that the only thing stated as something which definitely would be 
implemented (as opposed to areas in whidi powers to control were being taken) was 
somedimg which was already being implemented. The degree of certainQr was 
therefore extremely hig^ before this proposal was introduced into the public debate, 
such diat effective participation in the debate was unlikely. Later, discussions on the 
technical content were taken up in working groups, after the regulations had been 
made, again largely out of the public view. It is interesting to note that in a talk on 
changes in the existing scheme as a result of the legislation a settior PRSD member 
listed "efficacy part of approvals" under his heading "areas with greatest amount of 
change" (Tooby, 1986). It may have meant great change for a few agrochemicals 
companies, and for any other sectors who found they had to submit products for 
ggrproval for the first time, but the efficacy apparatus was already in place under 
ACAS, and the change for PRSD was mainly in the volume of work they would now 
have to undertake and the concomitant increase in staff.
The PRSD role with respect to data handling was tiius preserved, better defirred as 
concerns who they could expect to seek t^roval, and enshrirred in legislation giving 
them more authority. In implementing a combined scheme ahead of legislation a fa it 
accompli was presented by PRSD to PICD, which made it less likely that changes 
would be suggested. Any attonpt to suggest modifications to PICD would, in any case, 
be unlikely to have much impact, given their understanding of approval technicalities. 
As we shall see in later clusters, PICD did not in fact tackle it at all but left the 
technical debate to continue where it had started, back with the regulators, who 
evolved the content administratively after the regulations had been passed.
Although the PRSD had built \sp personal relationships with the manufacturers 
over the years, and hence might have been expected to take the manufacturer’s side, 
this was not the case when it came to manufacturers making PRSD’s own job more
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difficult Some scientific civil servants were very happy with the new arrangements for 
rapid clearance because they did not like manufacturers’ tricks in trying to inhibit 
identicals clearance.
Die lack of consultation meant that suggestions for basic changes in the substance 
of data required or for more fundamental changes in the data sources and data 
appraisal bodies were not considered. Technical aspects were not reexamined (except 
behind closed doors between companies, AGP and regulatory staff in already existing 
relationships). This was resented especially by non industrial sectors such as the unions 
and environmental groups, who had requested representation on the working groups.
The manufacturer/user conflict over the freedom to reduce the levels of pesticide 
applied tdso had its roots in the past:
"In 1979 the BAA had an argument with [the NFU] about lower doses. They 
said we were in contravention of the terms of the PSPS if we applied lower 
than the stated doses. Had we been in a statutory position at tiiat time the 
trend towards reducing doses would have been deterred".**^
This old debate re-emerged with the imminent possibility that such measures might 
become irreversibly fixed by statute.
Training of users was introduced because of the "portfolio tradition" in legislation. 
To quote a PICD civil servant: "Training was introduced because training is infrequent 
and must last 20 years. The idea was to revise the whole system: from the production, 
distribution and storage of pesticides to the ability of the people who use them".**^  At 
this stage it was unclear whether the power to require training was intended to be 
implemented. If it were it would be a genuinely new area of control; "...w c w ere 
starting more from scratch than in most other areas - if you take storage standards, the 
legislation was simply enshrining things which already existed...we were not 
specifically concerned with training before - that was a new bit".***
The responses to the proposals studied for this thesis contained no detailed 
conunents on training, except one case stating that it should be considered.
6.4The Quality of Participation
The controls envisaged were not explained in detail and the substantive debate was 
thereby diverted. The impact of this on the quality of participation can be best 
expressed by the reactions of the participants themselves.
The Proposals Document. Great issue was taken by non-industry groups with the 
Outline of Proposals itself, which created more questions than it answered. It was felt 
that the proposals were vague, generalised, and did not provide adequate details of the 
content of the later regulations, and further that the Government’s aims were not
Interview, NFU, London 25/11/85. 
Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 17/12/87.
Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 17/12/87.
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matcJied by the proposed content********”**** As a result it was seen as difficult to 
assess likely effects*** and üierefore to comment sensibly or adequately, there being no 
basis for discussion by interest groups or Parliament and likewise no basis for a foil 
and responsible public debate.******** As the basis for a consultation exercise the 
proposals were thus seen to have little value, and the SA were led to state that 
"...seeking comment on such proposals is insufficient substitute for a proper process of 
democratic consultation".** The Government was warned by Wildlife Link that as only 
points of principle could be made in response to such a document, it was difficult to 
comment, and this fact "must be borne in mind when considering our comments".*** 
Some felt that tire lack of detail indicated that the regulations would only give 
force to the PSPS******** and that the Government had not taken the op^rtunity to 
rethink the scope of the controls in the light of increasing use of pesticides and 
growing public concern about their use, and continuing evidence of their harmful 
effiects on wildlife and the enviromnenL***
As with concerns about enabling legislation it was felt that individual concerns 
and Government aims would not be met because they were not described in detail The 
RA noted that "...such regulations are unlikely to reduce to any extent either the rate at 
which pesticides are applied or the risks to the public arising from their use".*** The 
RSPB was worried that there was no indication about how the aim of securing 
efficient use of pesticides might be achieved** and foe CA detailed items, information 
on which was "vital to any system of f^rproval" (details on safety and efficacy 
assessment criteria; lexicological and other data which were to be submitted; how 
assessments were to be carried out; who was to carry out the assessments). The CA 
especially regretted "...that the proposals did not include information about the control 
system [supply and use] which must be known to foe dq)artment".**
2^ 2 Response to Proposals, FoE, 19/7/84.
1“  Interview, AAWNTG, London 28/1/86. 
Response to Proposals, CA, 22/8/84. 
Response to Proposals, SA, 24/7/84. 
Response to Pr<^sals, WL, 21/8/84. 
Response to Proposals, WL, 21/8/84. 
Response to Proposals, WL, 21/8/84. 
Response to Proposals, SA, 24/7/84. 
Response to Proposals, FoE, 19/7/84. 
Response to Proposals, SA, 24/7/84. 
Response to Proposals, WL, 21/8/84. 
Response to Proposals, WL, 21/8/84.
Briefing Note On Proposals, RSPB, 22/10/84. 
Response to Proposals, RA, 30/7/84.
Response to Proposals, WL, 21/8/84.
^  Response to Proposals, RA, 30/7/84.
123 Briefing Note on Proposals, RSPB. 22/10/84.
1** Response to Proposals, CA, 22/8/84.
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In some cases, rather than complaining about the lack of detail, organisations 
requested clarification and/or meetings. The BAA response especially contained many 
such allusions: "...the provision of infbrmation...is something about which tire 
association would like to be consulted"; "detailed consultation would be welcomed on 
what is intended"; "the association would welcome consultation on these points"; 
" would welcome consultation on...fees...and assessment"; "we support the conditions 
as detailed but would welcome clarification..."; "clarification would be welcome on the 
last paragraidi".**
Die demands arising from these complaints were all predictably enough for more 
information, that is that details should be spelt out***” Some alternatives given were 
that: details of how supply and use were to be controlled should be included in the 
primary legislation;** regulations should be published widi the Bill;** and draft 
regulations should be published before the Bill*^ (FoE, 1984c). Some were compelled 
to ask for a meeting to discuss the questions raised.*** In one case a demand for a full 
review of the proposals to be initiated was made, involving a full range of interest 
groups.*** One warning was given, by FôE, that they would be informing the public of 
Parliament’s responsibility to bring in detailed legislation which really did fulfil its 
aims.**’
The Consultation Exercise. Two complaints arose over the "consultation" exercise, 
the first concerning the amount of time allocated and the second concerning 
opportunities for discussion. Five weeks was considered not enough time to prepare 
good responses by the AAWNTG, which wrote to the hfrnistry stating as much and 
did not formally respond: in order to prepare good responses, that is "scientific" 
reqxmses it was rrecessary to consult the membership and this took time (a scientific 
response was rrecessary as it would not be disregarded so easily). "I’d like to believe 
that the Government was acting in haste because they will be going to town on the 
regulations, but this is not rrecessarily the case...we would have liked to have had more 
say".***
The New Scientist commented that "...when a Government allows only one month 
for comments on a piece of legislation it is not urueasonable to suppose that is has 
something to hide. This is certainly the case with the proposed legislation on 
pesticides" (Martin, 1984).
^  Response to Proposals, BAA, Undated 1984.
Response to Pn^)Osals, FoE, 19/7/84.
2^2 Response to Proposals, CA, 22/8/84.
22* Response to Proposals, CA, 22/8/84.
22* Response to Proposals, WL, 21/8/84.
2^ Response to Proposals, WL, 21/8/84.
2^ Response to Proposals, CA, 22/8/84.
2^ Response to Proposals, SA, 24/7/84.
2® Response to P ressais, FoE, 19/7/84.
2^ Interview, AAWNTG, London 28/1/86.
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As concerns opportunities for discussion, the SA complained that the Ministry had 
not discussed the proposals with the wide range of interested parties, for instance they 
personally had not been included in discussions although they represented farmers and 
consumers directly affected by the proposals and were ready to expand on their 
submission. It was claimed that the Ministry had only discussed the proposals with the 
industry, and that the resulting bias of advice was evident from foe proposals.**’
The demand was that a more detailed set of discussions should be the basis for a 
review of the proposals before the legislation was framed.
Another, p e rh ^  related, claim, by the Guardian (1984a) was that the 
armouncement was "attended" by a conspicuous lack of publicity.
Enabling Form of Bill. The proposal for an enabling bill became an issue at this 
stage in environmental, conservationist and developmental groups’ responses. Many 
were convinced that the legislation would not improve the situation either in line with 
their own aims or those outlined by the Government. The main reaction was that the 
legislation should not be enabling.********* Some groups, for example the AAWNTG,^ *® 
even refused to respond to the proposals "because they were so inadequate".
The reasons behind the concern were as follows. FoE believed that the 
Govemmait were unlikely to use it’s powers, for example to revoke approvals, as it 
had not implemented previous enabling legislation. Also the lack of detail did not 
merely indicate lack of conunitment, but was the more likely because the Government 
had not given a firm and specific commitment to use the powers "...without which the 
proposals have no more weight than the paper on which they are written", and this 
was evidenced by the fact that the proposals failed to place duties on foe Ministry of 
Agriculture or its services like ADAS or on other agencies where duties are required. 
The statute books were littered with enabling legislation which was ignored or 
underatilised, for example the COPA (1974, Cap 40) which took 5 years to bring into 
force (FoE, 1984b).
The prohibition on pesticides damaging to wildlife had in fact never been used 
(MAFF, 1984j) even though it had been cited by Ministers attempting to defend the 
ability of the PSPS to protect the environment as recently as May that year (MAFF, 
1984k). According to FoE, it was also likely that health, safety and envirorunental 
safeguards (foe Government’s aims) would not be introduced or enforced, evidenced by 
the fact that there were a number of pesticides which remained approved although 
grave doubts existed about safety (FoE, 1984b).
The AAWNTG were not quite so sceptical, believing that rather than not being 
used at all, enabling legislation would be used as a breathing space, where the Ministry
2^ Response to Proposals, SA, 24/7/84.
2^ Response to Proposals, FoE, 19/7/84. 
2^ Response to Prqx>sals, RSNC, 8/8/84. 
2« Interview, AAWNTG, London 28/1/86. 
2« Interview, AAWNTG, London 28/1/86.
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would take their time to make regulations, or make the regulations mild, this being 
evidenced by experience of an administration which had no real intent to do 
anything.*"
AAWNTG also offered the view that enabling legislation was only appropriate if 
one was dealing with a subject that by its nature changed quickly so that regulations 
could be brought in in an unusual event, and that this was not the case with pesticides. 
An enabling act could be used for good or evil.
The BAA’s submission on enabling legislation*’* contrasted sharply: simply saying 
that "the concept of enabling legislation is supported by the BAA. We welcome the 
statement that Ministers will take powers to make regulations to prohibit the import, 
supply and use of any pesticide until such time as Ministers have approved conditions 
for their supply and use".
The main demand arising from the disenchantment felt by FoE and RSNC was 
that, given it was enabling legislation, a firm commitment should be made to use 
it*’**” Public support for general powers and the success of enabling legislation in 
making the proposed system work would depend on such a commitment Such 
commitment would be deemed to have been demonstrated by producing a detailed 
proposal on how it was intended to treat pesticides about which doubts existed.*** A 
relevant example would be revoking approvals, not just when a suitable alternative 
existed, but when there was concern and overwhelming evidence of a product’s 
envirorunental and health safety, even where no alternative existed.*’’
*2® Interview, AAWNTG, London 28/1/86.
*22 Response to Proposals, BAA, Undated 1984. 
*22 Response to Proposals, FoE, 19/7/84.
*22 Response to Proposals, RSNC, 8/8/84.
*2* Response to Proposals, FoE, 19/7/84.
*22 Response to Proposals, RSNC, 8/8/84.
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7. The Contemporary Debate: Parliamentary Phase
This chapter follows up the debate surrounding policy development during the 
passage of the Food and Environment Protection Bill (FEPB) through Pariiamoit from 
7 November 1984 to 10 July 1985. The FEPB was introduced into the House of Lords 
on 7 Novanber 1984 and received its second reading on 22 November. Dates relating 
to its subsequent passage through Parliament form the detailed time framework for this 
chapter and these are given in Figure 7.1. Other important dates relate to formal 
documents presented to Parliament by MAFF. The "Notes on Qauses" were produced 
in December (MAFF. 1984m); the "Statement of Intent" about the same time (MAFF, 
1984n); and the "Heads of Proposals for Regulations" (MAFF, 1985b) and a revised 
"Statement of Intent" (MAFF, 1985c) in March 1985. The Food And Environment 
Protection Act (1985; Cap 48) was published on 16 July 1985.
During this phase, it IS assumed that policy shajnng is largely controlled by the 
Government and the executive (ensured by the parliamentary majority of foe 
Conservative Party) so that they continue to be "central" policy makers.
The first reading of a bill is simply the formal tabling (HL, 1984a). In second 
reading no alterations are possible, and the Government majority ensures that it is 
passed. In this case at foe same time as second reading in the Commons, a money 
resolution was passed, allocating resources to foe legislation (HC, 1985b). The 
committee stage in the Commons On fois case Standing Committee H, held over eight 
one-hour sessions), is the main parliamentary stage where details are discussed and 
amendments are laid. At this stage, opposition and back-boich MPs moved 
amendments of a fairly technical nature. At report stage the Bill is taken bade to foe 
floor of the House, where discussion is again Government dominated. Fewer opposition 
amendments are selected than in committee. Most amendments are Government 
drafting ammdments. The Government can also move amendments as a result of 
undertakings given in conunittee. After the Bill had passed forougb both houses, it was 
returned to the Lords, for a consideration of the Cotmnons’ amendments (HL, 1985c).
7J. Debate and Decision in Substantive Polity Development
7.1.1 Broad Policy Objectives
The Government’s Bill did not state objectives. However foe controls envisaged by 
Govemmoit at the be^nning of the parliammtary phase (second reading) 1984b) 
were enumerated by Lord Belstead (C; Minister of State, MAFF), for the Government, 
as falling into three areas, in addition to the immediate action taken to set up foe rapid 
clearance scheme. He stated that controls taken in* the Bill would: (a) ensure that all 
pesticides intended for use in the UK were submitted for scrutiny before marketing and
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impose conditions on these pesticides before cqjprcval (evidence of efficacy would be a 
new requirement in this area); (b) extend pesticide controls to the field of use; and (c) 
enable MRLs to be set in food crops and animal feedingstuffis. They would also 
"review the whole scope of pesticide controls". On pesticide use. the debate prompted 
by the RCEP had led the Government to a commitment to ensure that UK pesticide 
use was "...the minimum necessary to ensure the efficient production and distribution 
of food and to safeguard human health", by seeking to reconcile the use of pesticides 
to maintain high productivity with the prot^:tion of the environment finom the risks 
arising from their use.
The idea of "use" was seen at this stage as a catch-all for every aspect other than 
"making Ae voluntary scheme statutory". Controls on use were considered separate 
firmn tiie q>provals scheme, the concern being to cover use by taking appropriate 
powers. This may in part have been a refiection of the PICD division of 
reqx)nsibilities at this time: the "up to approval" brandi and the "after approval" 
branch. The concept covered conditions set on use at registration, and possible 
conditions on the user irfter registration, and residues in foods. The control of residues 
was not necessarily seen as integral to controls on use, and was couched in terms of 
"tiie environment" or "reducing pesticide use", or as a monitor of policy, and was 
latiier at this stage simply conforming to the requirements of the EC.
Controlling the "environmental effects" of pesticides was assumed to be 
manageable within the f^rovals process in terms of the data requirements and 
conditions applied to particular pesticides. Efficacy testing was assumed to equate to 
reducing use and thus also to reducing effects on the environmait. Neither of these 
things would have any impsu:t on the fundamental requiremŒts of tiie ^qnovals 
process.
A special case was made in Parliament that there were neither general nor specific 
objectives stated in the Bill: it was "...a bit vague to say *go forth and govern New 
South Wales’ - you o u ^  to be told vaguely how to do it" (Earl Onslow, C; farmer). 
Various alternatives for a statement of objectives were laid down in debate and 
amendments. It was felt that the object of a bill, especially an enabling one, should be 
clearly stated in a preamble, and that such would give guidance in debates and to civil 
servants. It was important to state principles because of the wide public interest (Lord 
Madde; (Z; farmer). There was a principle involved: Parliament could not allow a bill 
to become law without a statement of objectives (Lord Melchett; Q . Objectives should 
strike a fine balance between the environment and practical fanning and should guide 
the aims of farmers and manufacturers to be efficient and target-specific (Lord Stodart; 
C; farmer).
In second reading (HL, 1984b) Lord Walston (SD; fanner) proposW that the 
existing objectives of tiie voluntary PSPS could provide the substance of tiie Bill’s 
objectives:
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T o  safeguard human beings (whether as operators applying products, as food 
consumers or otherwise), livestock, domestic animals, beneficial insects, 
wildlife (that is non-taiget flora and fauna) and the environment generally (for 
example soil, air and water) against risks which could arise from the use of 
pesticide products".
Lord Belstead (for the Government) gave an assurance that general powers would 
enable all of these things.
Lord Madde then moved an objectives amendment as a Clause 15 preamble in 
committee (HL, 1984c), based on fiie PSPS,  ^ quoting precedents in the Food Act
(1984; 30) and the Consumer Safety Act (1978; Cq> 38), where principles on
whidi to base regulations were clearly stated. The Government agreed in principle, 
because the proposal was based on the PSPS.
Lord Melchett thought such guidance not specific œough, and on the second 
committee day (HL, 1984d) moved a more detailed objectives dause,^ designed to 
probe the Government’s intentions. The Government reiterated that they would prefer a 
brief and pointed statement based on the PSPS if they were to have a statement of 
objectives, and at report stage (HL, 1985a), they brought in a preamble on objectives^ 
whidi "...said in a few lines all tiiat needed to be said about the general purposes of 
this part of the Bill". It was a pointer to what the regulations would aim to achieve, 
and was clear, crisp and comprehensive, although it was not a programme for 
pestiddes. He had borne in mind that regulations should be drawn as widely as
possible to prevent evasion by those adversely affected.
At second reading in the House of Commons (HC, 1985a), Mr Davies (L) 
introduced a range of objectives he believed should direct thinking on detail The 
prindple that tiie countryside should be a safe place at the same time as expecting it to 
produce our food had not been advanced or safeguarded in the Bill. Another prindple 
should be protecting our heritage for tiie future. A third prindple was that there should 
be an informed public if there was to be public debate where choices could be made. 
People should be made aware of the details concerning the effects of the pestiddes to 
be used. Fburthly, they should be aware of the trading relationship between them and
Clause 15(1) The Ministers may jointfy 1^ Regulation in  order to  stfeguard human beings (whether as operators 
applying products, as food  consumers or o th e^ise), livestock, domestic animals, beneficial insects, wildlife (ie. 
rum-target flora  and fauna) and the environment generally (eg . soil, air and water) against risks which could 
arise from  the use c f  pesticide products: [(a)-(h)]. And in this Part Of This Act "Regulations" means legulations 
under diis section.
C IJ6  Objectives. In  drawing up regulations to ensure the setfe and effective use o f pesticides under this Act, 
M inisters shall ensure (i) t ù  progressive reduction o f pesticide pollution o f a ll kinds: (ii) the conservation o f 
flora, fauna and semi-ruttural ecosystems; (Hi) the heedth and strfety o f consumers, and people living and working 
in or visiting town or country; (iv) the health and scfety o f livestock and domestic animals; (v) the health and 
'integrity o f the soil ecosystem and its flora  and fauna; (vi) the elim ination o f practices leading to excess use and 
over use; (vii) the elim ination o f practices leading to increased pest resistance, with or between species o f pest; 
(viii) the progressive raiuction in  pesticide use; (ix) the availalnlity o f an adequate number o f appropriate 
pesticides fo r  agricultural and other use; and (x) the furtherance o f alternative m ethods o f controlling pests, 
iOher than through the use t f f  chemical t^en ts.
The provisions o f this Part o f this Act shall have effect with a view to  prthecting the health o f human beings, 
creatures and plants, scfeguarding the environment and securing die scfe, efficient and humane use o f pesticides. 
CL15 The Ministers may jointly ^  Regulations...
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the tiürd woild, and the effects of tedmology on developing practices in the third 
world. The Bill fell short there too. Mr Davies said that when legislating they must be 
aware of tiie overall impact of Government policy on the scale of pesticide use. If 
there were dangers and discrepancies in the way in which their declared policies were 
operated, the Government must be prepared to build safeguards into the legislatiorL 
In committee in the House of Commons (HC, 1985c) two amendments were 
submitted and agreed, which added to the basic statement of objectives. The first, on 
the continuous development of means of pest control, represented a Government 
defeat, and allowed the ACP to take the initiative in advising the Government rather 
than waiting for issues to be referred to them. It was introduced as a substitution by 
Mr Farr (C, farmer).* The second was a Govemmoit amendment which made the 
provision of information one of the four main objectives of Part in.^ The debates 
centering on these two amendments are taken up in the following sections.
7.1.2 Products Subject to ^proved and the Case c f Identical Imports
Products Subject to Approval. One amendment and one addition were made in the 
Bill over and above the aims set out in the Outline of Proposals. First, the Bill 
aicompassed all pesticide products, rather than the more limited range included in the 
proposals. Products such as paints and varnishes containing pesticides, and marine anti- 
fouling paints, now fell within its scope, apparently because "...the Government 
decided that it would be wrong to miss this rare opportunity to provide powers to 
regulate products which, while they m i ^  not be top of the control agenda at present, 
may in future pose problems during use" (ENDS, 1984d).
Again, non-agricultural associations who had been included in the scope of the 
Bill without due thought were indignant The BPCA approached certain Lords, and 
"..mot a single one realised tiiat our side of the industry was equally involved. No-one 
even mentioned i t  We talked to Belstead. The people who drafted the Bill did it 95% 
with farming in mind".  ^The AEA wanted to make up for lost time; "Our priority was 
to make sure there was reasonable recognition of our interest because of having 
previously been told it was none of our business".^ The CA was worried that there was 
a lade of lobbying on behalf of gardeners: "The Government didn’t take on board that 
the legislation affects gardeners. This was a gap in this legislation. MAFF is not 
particularly interested in tiie consumer side".’
* The Provisions of dûs Part of this Act shaU have effect (a) with a view to the continuous development o f means
d) to protect the healdi of human beings, creatures and plants; Qi) to saf%uard die environment; and (iii) to
secure safe, efficient and humane methods o f controlling pests.
 ^ (a) With a view to the continuous development of means [(i-iii)] and (b) w ith a view to making irformatlon
about pesticides available to  the pubUc.
* Interview, BPCA, London 17/2/B6.
7 Interview, AEA, London 10/2/86.
* Interview. CA, London 27/2/86.
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Identical Imports. An immediate decision had been taken to establish a rapid 
clearance scheme for identical imports in response to one of the main pressures for 
legislation. Arrangements for all suppliers to seek approval prior to marketing related 
to the objective of complying with the EC requirements on trade restrictions and the 
resulting need to satisfy the BAA by regaining control, especially over imports. These 
key objectives as reasons for legislating were cast by the Government in wider terms: 
"The proposed controls over pesticides are again inspired by the search for safer 
standards of environmental protection". The PSPS had come under pressure from:
"...the import of uncleared pesticides and from criticisms by the European 
Commission about its trade implications. It was these pressures which first led 
us to decide fiiat we should come to Parliament with statutory controls 
concerning pesticides...all pesticides intended for use in the UK will be 
required by law to be submitted for scrutiny before being marketed...the 
scheme’s dependence on a restrictive agreement between manufacturers and 
suppliers - that they could handle only products cleared under the PSPS - 
cheated a conflict of loyalty for suppliers. They were faced on the one side 
with that agreement and oh the other with the possibility of supplying 
customers with products from overseas, which are sometimes cheaper. This 
situation was not really tenable" (Lord Belstead; HL, 1984b).
The Government did not aim to impinge adversely on the industries concerned: "I 
would emphasize that the Bill is not designed to restrain trade. A basically Aee market 
system can work best within a fair regulatory framework. This Bill is intended to set 
higher standards for protection of food and the environment without obstructing the 
industries concerned" (Lord Belstead; HL, 1984b).
At second reading in the Lords (HL, 1984b) Lord Walston wanted an assurance 
that farmers, as members of the Community, could still import identical products, 
providing they were dearly designated and conformed to any requirements the UK laid 
down. Lord Stodart added that otherwise British farmers would be at a competitive 
disadvantage in the production of food. He hoped rapid clearance would apply to 
importing farmers. Lord Stanley (farmer) said "I cannot exist if one, or indeed both of 
my hands are tied behind my back by restrictive national legislation". Lord Mackie 
said all imports should meet the same standards of safety and labelling as in the UK.
The Government stressed that access to cheap, safe and efficient pesticides would 
not be denied, and that the EC would not allow it  They intended "...to introduce 
administratively, on 1st January of next year, a rapid clearance scheme fiee of any fees 
for imported pesticides provided that they are identical to products already cleared for 
use here". In the first day of Lords committee (HL, 1984c) Lord Craigton (Q moved 
an amendment, echoing the BAA’s response to the proposals, seeking to insert 
"exposure for sale" into the prohibitions’ to prevent the advertisement of cheap 
uncleared imported pesticides. The amendment was withdrawn on the Government’s
lS(l)(ajrhe Ministers may jointly by regulations prohibit the importation, sale, oqjoswre fo r sale, supply or use 
of pesticides but exclude from the prohibitions pesticides of a description specified in the regulations.
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assurance that "sale" probably covered it  Lord Craigton also wanted to know what 
would happen to imported pesticides whose labels were not in English. At Lords third 
reading (HL, 1985b) Lord Belstead came back with an amendment which inserted both 
"exposure for sale" and "possession for the purpose of sale"in the Bill.
In tiie second Lords committee day (HL, 1984d) Lord Stanley moved an 
amendment to ensure rapid clearance for imports.^ ® Without this amendment, British 
farmers would be disadvantaged compared to their European counterparts. The 
Government’s promise to introduce a rapid clearance scheme for imports needed to be 
in the legislation. Lord Belstead, for the Government, restated the intention to have a 
rapid clearance scheme for imports, and to provide for genuine competition for 
identical products.
Lord Melchett wanted imports to be safe, and therefore wanted to know how they 
could be known to be identical. Lord Belstead said that the arrangements would be as 
straightforward as possible. After discussions with the commission, MAFF had agreed 
that for the purpose of rapid clearance, identicalness of a product would be satisfied 
when the active ingredients were the same and both were produced by the same 
company, either in this country or abroad. Formulations should be tolerably the same. 
The procedure would essentially be a paper exercise: to demonstrate identicalness of 
two products tiie importer would have to provide a copy of the label of the import and 
its batch number, details of the product cleared in this country, and a copy of the label 
instructions in English to be attached to the imported product. Later a reasonable fee 
on farmers’ imports would be charged. The seven days limit would be achievable 
largely, but not in all cases. The Government would, however, see that it was kept to a 
matter of days. The BAA and the NFU had agreed to the procedures.
Lord Stanley asked what would happen to products which were identical but not 
from the same company. It was anomalous that while even tolerably different 
formulations would be cleared if they were from the same company, products which 
were more identical but fiom different companies would noL At Lords report (HL, 
1985a) he tabled an amendment which would give rapid clearance to all similar 
chemicals whether or not tiiey were manufactured by the same company." The mere 
fact that the Government had introduced statutory regulations for agrochemicals would 
automatically make it easier to prevent, obstruct or make it more difficult for farmers 
importing similar chemicals. He therefore thought the Government should correct this
lS(l)...and in diis Part of this Act "regulations" means regulations under this section.
( )In exercising their powers under subsection (1) above the M inisters shall make such arrangements as may 
be appropriate to ensure that all applications fo r  the use o f sefe pesticides imported to the United Kingdom are 
cleared within seven working days c f  receipt, free o f charge to the applicant.
(2) Pesticides may be identified in any way...
lS(l)...and in this Part of this Act, "regulations" means regulations under this section.
{ fin  exercising their powers under subsection (I) above, the M inisters shall make such arrangements as may 
be appropriate to ensure the rapid clearance o f all applications fo r approval fo r  the use o f scfe pesticides 
sim ilar to those previously approved in accordance with regulations made under this section.
(2)Pesticides may be identified in any ws^...
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by accepting the more positive words of die amendment to encourage and not restrict 
competitive imports.
Lord Belstead said that his definition of "identical" would ensure no material 
differences with respect to safety. However although "similar" products’ active 
ingredients could be the same, formulation differences could have a significant affect 
on the product’s safety. Such products could not therefore be cleared by the simple 
method for identical products. Lord Stanley felt that this would allow an unscrupulous 
manufacturer to keep out even "identical" imports made by his company. The 
amendment was withdrawn.
At second reading in the Commons (HC, 1985a) there was again pro-farming 
support for the easiest means of access to ches^ imported pesticides. There were also 
concerns about the safety of non-identical formulations, especially finom the Third 
World, and concerns about non-English label instructions.
In Commons committee (HC, 1985c) there was more concern about English labels 
and safety, and Ministerial assurances that all merchants and farmers importing 
pesticides would have to produce English labels under the rapid clearance scheme. 
Previoudy, if importers’ employees used non-English labelled pesticides they would 
have been contravening the HSWA 1974. In answer to a question on stodqpiled 
imports, the Mnister said it would not be illegal to u% these up.
7.13 Conditions Applied to Pesticides in die Approvals Process 
Lord Belstead said in his introductory speech:
"This clause would allow us to impose conditions before pesticides are 
^yproved under a statutory sctone. Many of these conditions will be familiar 
to those who operate within the existing schemes, but for the first time we 
shall be demanding of all products evidence not simply of safety but of 
efficacy as well. Under the conditions of a^^roval we intend to ensure that no 
pesticide will be released onto the UK market urüess it is demonstrably 
beneficial to agriculture, horticulture or human health" (Lord Belstead; HL, 
1984b).
The Substance o f the Tests: Types, Criteria, Standards and Harmonisation. In 
Lords committee day two (HL, 1984d), Lord Northboume (Indep) moved an 
amendment to ensure that the parameters of the tests were laid down by Ministers and 
not left to the manufacturers.^ He said tire PSPS often cleared for safety only those 
recommendations the manufacturer chose to specify. This meant tiiat the pesticide 
might not be thoroughly and adequately tested.
15(SXb)..x)f any of its intemational obligations.
(SA)ln deddm g whether or not to grant exclusions o f approval under section 15(1) o f this A ct the M inister 
shall have regard to  tests o f a type to be specified in the regulations designed to assess (i) the effectiveness o f 
the pesticide fo r which exclusion or approval is being sought; (il) effective application rates and methods c f 
application in relation to  a range o f soil and climate conditions; (iii) the effect o f the pesticide upon the 
enviremment including man, animals, plants and so il ecosystems; and (iv) the economic or other justifications for 
the use o f the pesticide by comparison w ith other pesticides available fo r  the same purpose which may involve 
less risk to the environment.
(6)A person who...
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Lord Belstead replied that under die regulations a document would be published 
setting out the type and standard of tests. The document would be continually updated 
to take advantage of scientific developments. To enshrine the tests in regulations could 
impede that process. It was not possible to establish a definitive list of tests for all 
pesticides. Lord Melchett wanted to know the status of the guidance in the document 
on tests. Lord Belstead said that if applicants had not complied with guidance, their 
chances of getting a clearance would be lower. The amendment was withdrawn.
Wlren interviewed, the SSC expressed concern that FEPA should not "...preclude 
the kind of benefits which exist in our system, for example we can talk to Harpenden. 
We thought specificity was very dangerous". This was because:
"(1) If next year we made a new discovery, we want to feel fiee to ask for 
extra information; (2) A company can ask ’do we need to do all the studies?’
- it may well be that they don’t, for example insect growth hormone mimics 
are long-chain fatty acids and if it gets into you or me it is in two carbon 
fragments before it even gets near a foetus, so there would be no need to do 
teratology studies; and (3) if a scheme is prescriptive, it would result in killing 
a large number of animals"."
The ACP similarly wanted to avoid specificity in data requirements, citing medical 
legislation under the Medicines Commission: "...clinical trials became so slow that 
enabling legislation to allow clinical trial exemption certificates had to be produced. 
This confirmed to many of us that legislation was not very good".^* The ex-head of the 
PRSD said that in any case the PSPS was continuously improving, asking for new 
techniques to be used and gaining new knowledge, but that a plateau situation had 
been reached where "...some believe we have gone too far asking for information that 
we cannot use [because of] difficulties of extrapolation with large differences between 
species. Enthusiasts of toxicology have run away with themselves...The new skills are 
not now in measuring things, but in interpretation"."
Cleared Pesticides Deemed Approved. Lord Meldiett, at second reading in the 
House of Lords (HL, 1984b) said tiiat there were 6-700 products in the existing 
efficacy scheme, but 3(XX) under the PSPS, so that the proposal to simply give efficacy 
s^roval to PSPS-cleared products constituted a massive reduction in controls as 
efficacy testing would only be carried out on a few i%oducts. Lord Belstead gave an 
assurance that tiie Government’s intention was to cover all products. However to cover 
all existing cleared pesticides in respect of efficacy was impracticable, so there would 
have to be a transitional period. All new applications would be screened for efficacy, 
but existing products would be screened for efficacy only when they came up for 
review.
Interview, SSC, London 30/11/87.
Interview, ACP, Leicester 18/1/88.
Interview, MAFF (PRSD), Westoning 11/1/88.
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In the Lords second committee day (HL, 1984d), Eaii Peel (C; Fanner) moved an 
amendment which would require the 3,600 existing products not screened for efficacy 
to be tested within two years." He said that this way fanners would get more 
knowledge about the efficacy of different chemicals and that this may lead them to use 
less chemicals. It was accepted that all products could not be efficacy tested 
immediately, but some time limit was desirable. Lord Melcl^tt noted that the fanning 
press and the BAA had reported there would be a five year period.
Lord Belstead replied that there was a problem witii requiring applicants to 
demonstrate efficacy, and that was diat they had to decide exactly what data could be 
regarded as being sufficient evidence of efficacy. This was an even greater problon 
with non-agricultural products, and each class of product would have to have a 
different class of efficacy test
The problem with timing was that to clear 34 products per week as the 
amendment implied would amount to rubber-stamping old products and would simply 
be a paper exercise, whereas the intention was to embark on a deliberate and 
painstaking supplication of the new rules. The Government was thinking of a five year 
period so far as reviews were concerned. It would be subject to consultation whether 
the five years would become a regulatiorL Priority would be given to the most toxic 
IModucts. The amendment was wididrawn.
Specific Chemicals. On S June 1985 (World Environment Day) a campaign to stop 
the manufacture, sale, use or trade in 12 common pesticides was launched by FoE, 
OXFAM and the TGWU on behalf of the Pesticides Action Network (PAN), called the 
"Dirty Dozen Campaign". The pesticides were selected because of their actual or 
suspected carcinogaiicity, teratogenicity or acute toxicity, and because of dieir 
involvement in poisoning incidents in the Third World. Eight of the pesticides were 
still cleared for agricultural, horticultural or garden use in the UK." hi anticipation of 
the launch, die BAA did a survey of exports of pesticides in the banned or severely 
restricted category in die UK. Companies had told the BAA these pesticides amounted 
to 0.27% of total overseas sales, and this "...gave the lie to much of what is said about 
the industry’s attitude to the Third World” (ENDS, 1985a).
At second reading in the House of Lords (HL, 1984b) Lord Auckland (Q 
complained that there was no sdredule of substances which would be tested or banned 
as a result of the Act, whereas previous legislation of this nature had included such.
I/formation Disclosure. In November 1984 it was announced by CFoI that they 
intended to introduce an Environmental Pollution Information Bill during the current
lS(l)...and in diis Part of diis Act "regulations’' meais regulations under this section.
(lA)Regulations shall include d ptcviston  that a ll pesticides which at the date c f  the passifig c f this A ct have 
not been approved under the Agricultural Chemicals Approval Scheme (or any modification thereof) shall be 
subm itted fo r  such approval within two years o f the date o f the passing c f  this Act.
(2)Pesticide5 may be identified in any way... 
n  2,4,5-T; DDT; Camphechlor, Chlordane; Chlosdimefrcm; Ethylene dibromide; DBCP; Aldrin; Dieldiin; Endrin; 
Lindane; Ethyl parathion; Paraquat; and PentachloiophenoL
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pailiamentary session, using either the private member’s bill or 10-minute rule 
piDceduies. This was intended to implement the RCEP’s recommendation on 
infonnation disclosure contained in its 10th report (ENDS, 1984e).
At report stage in the House of Lords (HL, 1985a) the Government tabled 
amendments empowering the disclosure of safety data to the public and the demanding 
of information fiom manufacturers in connection with international controls on 
pesticide exports as well as approvals, having "regard to dre interests of persons 
supplying the information" when drawing up the regulations. )^ th  respect to 
disclosure, "there will be some data, particularly on processes and formulation, which 
will be of little public interest in the safety field but which will be of great value as 
trade secrets". These would be excluded. In addition "the safety data themselves have 
commercial value as in some cases they represent many years’ research by the 
originating company". Some peers said they would look for a further amendment 
obliging Ministers to look to the public interest as well as diat of the manufacturer 
when drafting the regulations. Another successful Government amendment gave 
statutory backing to the ACP and enabled the regulation of pesticides in storage.
During debates in Commons committee on 25 and 30 April, Labour MPs s o u ^  
an amendment (drafted by CFoI) to oblige the Government to disclose the full studies 
on the health and environmental effects of pesticides which are submitted for the 
purposes of product ^ ro v a l. Manufacturers’ interests would be safeguarded by a ban 
on the use of these studies by competitors except with the originating companies’ 
approval This challenged the Government to go beyond its current intention to 
disclose only summaries. The Government was again reminded of its agreement with 
the RCEP that there should be a "presumption in favour of unrestricted access to 
environmental information", and that it seemed to be placing the manufacturers 
interests above those of the public. Mrs Fenner (C, MAFF Parliamentary Secretary), 
for the Government, promised to think again about this balance between commercial 
and public interest More than summaries might be possible she said, and although the 
Government was not prq)ared to put in as many resources as were required to operate 
the US disclosure system, this did "..mot rule out the possibility of our making 
arrangements similar to those of the United States".
An amendment which made the provision of information to the public one of tire 
four main purposes of Part HI of the Bill was tabled by the Government on the second 
report day." In addition to disclosing summaries of pesticide safety data scrutinised by 
the ACP, the Government was considering arrangements which would allow 
researchers access to the raw data submitted by manufacturers for product approval 
purposes "if a scientific case can be established". The amendment was apparently 
introduced as a result of careful reflection on the debate in Committee (HC, 1985e).
(a) Widi a view to the contmuous development of means [(i-iii)] and (b) with a view to making information 
about pesticides available to the public.
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Mrs Fenner said the Government had believed they had already struck the right 
balance between the public interest in access to information and die protection of the 
commercial interests of those who supplied the information in the Bill:”
"...but the feeling in Committee was that more could be dme in die Bill to 
favour the public interest as the Royal Commission recommended. The 
Government has reflected carefully and in response have tabled the 
amendment on die gaieral purposes of this part of the Bill. If accepted, the 
amendment would... apply to safety data about chemicals and to other 
infbrmadon and to information about the control exercised over pesticides in 
the BilL I believe that this addition to Clause 15 further strengthens the 
presumption in favour of public access. We cannot adopt the Royal 
Commission’s use of the term ’unrestricted access’ in a legal statute because 
that would nullify the effect of subsection (5), which protects the legitimate 
interests of manufacturers...We are moving public information into the highest 
category of purpose of the BilL However we are maintaining the balance 
between the public interest and the respect for commercial interests in the 
body of Clause 15. That seems to us to be a significant improvemenL..We 
believe that the public’s access to information should have a high priority and 
should be an integral part of these provisions. By moving the relevant 
provisions to the first part of Part m  we have highlighted the em^diasis that 
we attach to the principle".
Tte amendment was agreed to with no vote.
Fees. At the third reading in the Commons (HC, 1985f) the Government 
introduced an amendment extending the power to recover "reasonable fees", to include 
the collection and processing of information on pesticide use, and the monitoring of 
the environmental effects of pesticide usage, as well as the administrative costs of 
processing applications. Questioned about these provisions in the Lords, the 
Government spokesman said that the fees would bring in £1-2 million per year, mostly 
from manufacturers, but some from merdiants, importers and farmers sedting approval 
for new uses of existing pesticides. Meanwhile anyone seeking pesticide safety data 
MAFF would be charged the costs of producing the documents.
7.1.4 Conditions Applied to Pesticide Use Within the Approvals Process 
The BilL In introducing the Bill Lord Belstead had said that
"This clause would also extend pesticide controls to fire field of use - and this 
is a major change. At present safety often d^ends on the user adhering to the 
recommended conditions of use on the label, and the record of pesticides in 
human safety demonstrates the care with which the great majority follow the 
recommendations. We are, however, faced with ^  increasing range of 
concerns, from water and wildlife interests to residue levels at the point of 
consumption of food; and increasing range of pesticide types; and increasing 
range of systems of application; and, very likely, an increasing degree of 
competition for markets. Under these circumstances it does not seem feasible 
to control the environmental effects of pesticides at the approval stage alone, 
and that is why it is intended that the new scheme will exert statutory controls
”  (2Xj) "provide for the availability to the public, subject to any conditions Aat the Ministers consider appropriate,
of information supplied for the purposes of fids section".
(5) "In determining any provision to be made by virtue of subsection (2Xj) above the Ministers shall have 
regarà to the interests of persons siqjplying the information to which that jnovisicn would relate".
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over use..it is not our intention to create a strai^acket for the fanning 
industry, and I am confident that we can develop ground rules for the 
application of pesticides which ^  sufficiently strict for the risk involved but 
permit the development and use of new and more effective pesticides and 
application systems" (Lord Belstead; HL, 1984b).
Amounts, Application Methods and Tank Mixes to be Used. In Lords second 
reading (ML, 1984b) Lord Walston noted the development of electrostatic spraying 
which reduced the quantity of pesticide spray used and targetted it more effectively. 
He wanted an assurance that nothing would inhibit the use of such new equipment 
Lord Stanley agreed that progress should continue and that farmers were ahead of 
research in CDA. Lord Craigton thought implication devices should be controlled and 
specified, and that equipment should be able to be seized. Lord Mdchett drought there 
should be licensing for application systems: machmery should be checked to see that it 
was implying pesticides properly. He hoped that implication systems would be cleared 
rapidly. Baroness ^ficol (L) also said there should be control of the type of equipment 
used, and encouragement for better methods and machinery, with time limits on 
obsolete equipment
In Lords committee day one (HL, 1984c) Lord Northboume tried to introduce 
amendments which controlled "the method of application and delivery devices"." Earl 
Onslow said that the BAA supported controls on machinery and quoted their letter, 
saying "...we support the extension of controls to the use of agrochemicals, including 
the means of application". Lord Craigton noted that the Notes on Clauses said label 
conditions could encompass "all appropriate application methods which are in common 
use" and thought mat control of application machinery should not be left to the label 
but should become part of the pesticide approval process, that is the Government 
should decide. Lord Melchett thought that the Government should take responsibility 
for application machinery and that the regulation should include details of the nozzle 
angle, nozzle capacity, pressure and flow rates on which research had been done by 
BCPC, all of which would improve performance. The BCPC schone was a practical 
example of an existing schane that the Government could build o a  The last thing they 
wanted to do was inhibit CDA. Lord Stanley and Baroness Camegy feared flie 
amendments might restrict the invention of new machines; and recognised that the 
problem was that a chemical used in conventional machines would need different 
regulations to those used in CDA.
Lord Belstead said that having to license and approve individual machines would 
cause difficulties because in deciding safety there were many other fectors to take into 
account:
30 lS(l)...and in this Part of diis Act, "r^ulations" means regulations under dûs section.
( }In fram ing regulations under Part IJI c f  this A ct the M inister shall have regard to the need to  lim it the 
appUcation o f pesticides to  target crops w  animals and to avoid contact with other crops, wild plants and 
animals and shall fram e the regulations to control methods o f application and delivery devices accordingly. 
(2)Pesticides may be identified in aiy  way...
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"...we believe it is light to ensure pesticides are only applied through 
machines which are appropriate and safe for die purpose...we believe die way 
of controlling the correct operation of machines should be through imposing 
those statutory responsibilities on die user, and by backing them up with 
education, achdce, and in the final instance enforcement".
The HSE would enforce tte provisions by serving prohibition notices on anyone using 
pesticides in such a way as to create a hazard - including incorrect use of a machine, 
so that use could not continue if the machine remained in that cmWition or if the user 
did not take instruction on correct use.
Lord Melchett pointed out that a farmer could be advised by a machinery 
manufacturer that a piece of (plication equipment was for use with a particular 
pesticide, but if he got it wrong it would be the farmer who would end up in the dock. 
He felt diat the regulations should bite on the machinery manufacturer and say what 
sort of machinery should be produced. The concentration of chemicals and so on 
would be covered by regulations anyway, but they were left with deciding whether the 
machinery manufacturer or the farmer should bear the onus to make sure the 
equipment was appropriate. There should be a COP for machinery manufacturers. Lord 
Craigton again noted that the Government should decide on die application machinery 
and not leave it to either machinery manufacturers or farmers. The RCEP had said 
there should be an obligation to use the correct delivery device and it was the 
Government’s job to take this on. Lord Belstead said tiiat to regulate machinery they 
would look at each chemical and consider the Ukety machinery with which it would be 
s^lied  and that they would not be bound by the requests of manufacturers in this. 
Each chemical would be approved m relation to appropriate triplication methods and 
outlawed for other application methods. He said he would look into the BCPC scheme.
In tire second day of Lords committee (HL, 1984d) an amendment which would 
allow seizure of machinery if it was unsuitable or being used in unsuitable 
combination with a pesticide was laid by Lord Craigton. Lord Belstead thought that 
the first part was heavy-handed as there ntight be a variety of reasons besides the 
machinery for sub-standard spraying. On the machine-pesticide combination he said:
"...it is very firmly the Government’s opinion that in order to ensure the safe 
use of p^c ides, machines must be matched to pesticides, and users 
instructed as to what machine to use and how to use it..we intend to look at 
eadi chemical and ^prove each in relation to safe (plication methods only".
This would üKdude the madrir^ type, the adjustment and tiie use of the machine. Lord 
Stodart jfeared that farmers would need différait machines for each pesticide. Lord 
Craigton wifodrew the amendment saying that the pesticide and the sprayer used were 
one and the same thing in respect of instructions of the Ministry about crop protection. 
If there was a fault in one there could equally be a fault in the otiier.
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Lord Craigton moved another amendment to hold the Government to its 6th 
December promise to "consider the likely machinery by which a product will be 
applied" - such consideration was impossible without an amendment to provide for the 
inspection of pesticide application and delivery devices. Lord Belstead agreed with his 
own objective, but not with the means of achieving i t  An inspection system would be 
impracticable, and would amount to an MoT system for sprayers involving vast 
numbers of officers who would be better employed making sure farmers used the 
machinery already in their possession with the appropriate chemicals. Lord Craigton 
said the Government were missing the opportunity to follow the RCEP who said you 
could get the same value from a fifrh of the spray with the right sprayer. The RCEP 
said that there was not enough enthusiasm to improve the qirayer and there was no 
push from the Government because the incentive was to use more pesticide, not less, 
since this was the aim of manufacturers.
Lord Melchett again asked about the onus being on the farmer, even if a 
machinery manufacturer had advised him on the choice of machinery. The farmer 
would have a case in civil law against die manufacturer but would at die same time be 
prosecuted in criminal law. Would the farmer have the "due care and diligence" 
defence against the crirhinal charge?
"The Government are aiming their controls on sqiplication techniques at the 
farmer, making sure that farmers use due care and diligence in applying 
pesticides, and they have said it would be too unwieldy to try to test 
machinery when the manufacturers are responsible for i t  They want to keep 
all their controls on the farmer. In the case that I have suggested, it seems to 
me quite possible that the controls would not bite anywhere. The farmer 
would simply pass the buck to the manufacturer, and the Government have 
decided not to look at what the manufacturers do".
Lord Belstead said:
"...the Government feel very strongly that the responsibility for the safe use of 
pesticides has to rest with the user. I have de^doyed the reasons why we feel 
that but we do feel deeply. So far as the hypothetical case which the noble 
Lord has put to me is concerned, I was not meaning to be flippant After all if 
the noble Lord or I were to have die misfortune [to have a very bad car 
accident] it would be a matter for the courts to decide where the responsibility 
lay if we then started to argue that the steering or the brakes had 
failed...Having said drat I take the point that the noble Lord is concerned 
about where the control diould lie...I feel that the Government are right in 
saying that the point of control o u ^  to be with die u%r".
In Lords committee day two (HL, 1984d) Lord Stanley worried that the proposal 
to set m inim um  rates might stifle new techniques. In the past chemicals had been 
recommended at much higher rates than were now used, and the trend to lowering 
rates should not be stopped. CDA and electrostatic sprayers could deliver a very low 
concentrated dose if sprayed in oil There was a temptation for manufacturers to 
specify higfrer than necessary rates, if ordy to protect themselves, especially as efficacy
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daims could fall off with less chemical but greater safety. Eaii Swinton (Q, for the 
Govemmoit, said that minimum dilution rates were set to ensure spray was not 
dangerous to the operator or bystanders.
Later in committee, Lord Stanley introduced an amendment to ensure a 
progressive attitude to new technology and new pestiddes.^ This would encourage new 
pesticides and fbnnulations by stating on the label a range for timing, îçjplication 
methods, and wetters. He was especially wonied about tank mixes. Companies would 
recommend mixing only from among their own products, whereas mixing widi one 
bdonging to another company might be better. The amendment would make it 
necessary for the Minister to state on Ae label "cross company” tank mixes. Wetters 
could cut down the application rate very considerably. The development of CDA 
should not be stifled: presently 20 products were sqiproved for CDA although a fanner 
could use other products too. But after passing the Bill he would not be aide to do so. 
What farmer would buy a CDA sprayer if he could only use 20 products with it?
Lord Belstead, for the Government, said he was conscious of the need for 
flexibility. At the moment labels placed too many restrictions. They would be 
reviewing labels to ensure unnecessary restrictions would be removed. They hoped to 
deal with new application techniques in a code of practice. Codes would be developed 
on safe tank mixes. The amendment was withdrawn
At Report (HL, 1985a) Lord Stanley moved an amendment to ensure that only a 
blatantly dangerous mix was prevented and other £q)proved chemicals could be mixed." 
If the farmer mixed chemicals which resulted in damage to his crop, the blame would 
be his. He could not think of a tank-mix case where damage would be to anyüimg 
other than the crop. Tank mixes should be innocent until proven guilty. Lord John- 
Madde (L; farmer) agreed with the amendment, mainly because of die tremendous 
saving in costs in tank mixes. Lord Belstead affirmed the advantages to the farmer, but 
did not think all mixes were safe to operators. The Government believed that it was 
safer to restrict tank mixing to those combinations which had been screened. They had 
already sqiproved a number of mixes and intended to stroigflien the screening 
arrangements as quickly as possible. They would encourage manufacturers to submit 
applications for tank mixes with their ggiplications for clearance. Lord Stanley said he 
could not think of a pair of chemicals which were more toxic when mixed. Producers
^  15(3)..jcsohiüon of each Hoi»e of ParHamenL
( )/« contemplatmg and rggulatiems made under this section fa r  the eqipraval c f  pestiàdes, the MirüMers 
shall have regard to the d es ir^ ility  c f  maximising (a) the sccpe fo r  users o f pesticides to improve the cost- 
effectiveness, tim eliness and flexibiüty c f p ea  control operations; and (b) the scope fo r  the development and 
adoption c f  new techniques, together with integrated pest management.
(4)If it qjpeais to the Ministers...
33 i5(l)...and in this Part of dûs Act "leguladons" means legulaûons under this section.
( JThe simultaneous application c f  approved pesticides by means o f the same machine shall be deemed to be
approved under regulations made under this section, unless, having regard to the desirability o f protecting the
health o f human beings, creatures and plants, and o f scfeguarding the environment, the M inister directs
otherwise in any particular case.
(2)...Pesticides may be identified in any way...
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were to be allowed to put tank mixes forward. If a farmer put forward a tank mix for 
clearance would he have to pay a fee? He did not see companies putting mixes 
forward for approval The amendment was withdrawn.
Lord Stanley moved another amendment designed to ensure that a progressive 
attitude to new technology was built into the tenns of reference of the AGP, which 
should appoint a sub committee to deal with die development of new sprayers, new 
pesticide fonnulations, efficacious tank mixes, and pesticides for minor crops. The 
membership of the AGP should be widened with appropriate expertise. Lord 
Northboume said approvals of conditions should be more creative and irmovative. It 
was important that they should do this because die manufacturing companies would 
not Lord Belstead agreed that such development should be encouraged. However 
things were being done already without having to set up a committee, for example 
work at ADAS. The Government was already reviewing the scope of the expert panels 
to the AGP and what had been said would be considered in the review.
At third reading (HL, 1985b) Lord Belstead moved amendments which allowed 
the Government to grant consents to particular types of activity, such as application 
methods, so diat it was beyond doubt that the Government had powers to i^ ly  
conditions to such things.
Lord Stanley moved another amendment, based on the NFU brief, to allow the 
AGP to take a creative role in the development of pest control practices by providing 
them with the power to take the lead in offering advice and providing for Ministers to 
consult it on development. Having stopped private individuals from "doing titieir own 
thing", the Government must now encourage innovation themselves. The existing role 
of the AGP would not have included this role of monitoring and reporting to Ministers 
on the efficacy of low dosage techniques, biological alternatives and more efficient 
machines. Lord Madde agreed that the AGP should advise and not simply be a tool of 
Ministers. Lord Northboume cited correspondence with ADAS which suggested that 
GDA was not being encouraged by them. He also cited a user who obtained a 
clearance to use a number of chemicals with one manufacturer’s GDA machine, but 
could not use the chemicals with any other machine. Lord Belstead agreed diat the 
AGP should be able to offer advice. He was happy to accqpt the principles involved, 
and would put down an amendment in the Gommons. There was no tmth, he said, in 
the daim that the legislation would put GDA in jeopardy. The amendment was 
withdrawn.
On 26 February (between Lords and Gommons stages of the debate) a dossier was 
published by FoE (FoE, 1985) listing more than 1(X) incidents in which pestiddes 
affected the public, animals and the environment. It recommended that limits on the 
quantity of pesticides sprayed and on numbers of (plications should be introduced 
and a reduction in pestidde usage should be an offidal policy objective. Spray 
machinery tests should also be introduced.
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In second reading in the Commons (HC, 1985a) general support was given for 
innovation and an AGP advisory role. Mr John (L; Opposition Agriculture Spokesman) 
sought an assurance that the regulations would not hold back more accurate 
technology, and testing of equipment to ensure accuracy. Mr Gampbell-Savours (L) 
advocated the adoption of a series of British Standards for spray equipmoit: on upkeep 
and safety; droplet size; amount of drift; and chemical safety. This would give formers 
confidence in the efficacy of the machinery they were buying. Mr Davies noted that 
the Statement of Intent said both minimum and maximum dilution rates could be 
specified in terms of concentrate per volume, whereas he had hoped the Government 
would take stq)s to ensure spraying was by GDA. Mr Farr noted the AEA’s concern 
that more sophisticated machinery would not be considered under the Bill and diat it 
wanted to be consulted on machinery. They were also concerned that a training onus 
should be placed on sprayer users.
As noted in the section on Broad Policy Objectives, Mr Farr, for the NFU, 
introduced an amendment in Gommons committee (HG, 1985c) which made the 
"continuous development of means" one of the main objectives of die Bill." The NFU 
said this was "...to give farmers room to manoeuvre...the boundary of legislation 
should be just inside the upper and lower levels of safety, not just set to the 
manufacturers recommendations"." Mr Farr said it was designed to recognise that in 
pesticides there was no state-of-the-art situation; there was a continuous flow of 
development and a continuous accumulation of knowledge. (This was bound up with 
another amendment to allow the AGP to accumulate such new knowledge on its own 
initiative.) "One could be a farmer today who applies a chanical which is out of date 
and out of use and the application rates can be changed tomorrow".
Fbr safety reasons there was wide agreement on the opposition benches, and by 
farming interests on the Government benches. Mr John agreed in terms of safety and 
on behalf of the fears of application machinery manufacturers. Old machinery often 
applied too much pesticide and the Bill should not inhibit research to develop safer 
means. Mr Garlisle (G; farmer and agricultural supply trade) agreed, saying that no 
aspect of agriculture dianged faster in terms of R&D than chemicals and their 
application and use. The amendment was in the spirit of the Bill and of those who 
were directly engaged in the trade of spray diemicals. If the Bill were seen to restrict 
the changing of techniques or their application or dosage rates they would be doing a 
disservice to the agriculture industry.
Fbr the Government, Mrs Fenner said she appreciated the wish to insert the 
concept of a continuous developmoit over time of the safe, efficacious and humane 
use of pesticides:
The Provisions of this Part of this Act shall have effect (a) wiüi a view to the continuous development c f means 
(i) to protect the healdi of human beings, creatures and plants; (ii) to saf^uard the environment; and (iii) to 
secure safe, efficient and humane methods o f controlling pests.
Biterview, NFU, London 25/11/85.
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"Of course we would want such an improvement to occur. We are in favour 
of a continuous development of pesticides which results in safer and more 
efficient materials, uses and application methods. It is precisely because we 
want such improvements and know the value of forecasting improvements and 
developments that we have sought broad powers in an enabling bill which can 
be amended in regulations to suit chaitging circumstances. The Bill as it 
stands does not prevent dûs so there is no reason to insert new words".
Mr John said the present practice of clearing one pesticide for one ^>plication method 
might restrict the usefulness of the BiU, and asked whether new pesticides would be 
tested for safety and efficacy using aU reasonable methods of application rather than 
just one. Mrs Fenner replied that because of misunderstanding on this aspect of their 
proposals a press release had been issued saying that there was rx> intention of 
outlawing the development or use of new techniques. "We hope our conailtation 
process will help us to establish how best this can be done so the data provided covers 
other uses and applications". Mr Farr said that the amendment (and accompanying 
ones) were "sigiüficant in diat they seek to provide scope fbr reducing the use of 
pesticides". There were means other dian pesticides for controlling pests. Biological 
control developmoit should be allowed and not restricted. Reduced application rates 
and tank mixes had been developed by users and had subsequendy been adopted by 
manufacturers and ADAS. Clause 15 was framed so that it was likely to restrict 
severely the ability of farmers to proceed with innovation. The AGP should have the 
ability to promote this develo{»nent and innovation. Regulations must be drafted so as 
to permit some latitude around current recommendations to permit progress and 
innovation within what one could call windows of safe use. The Government had 
indicated that it intended to provide "windows of safe use" with respect to maximum 
(plication rates, active ingredients and minimum dilution rates. That meant the farmer 
or grower could contiime to strive to achieve the lowest possible application rates. 
Other "windows of safe use" were needed however on tinring of application, spray 
deposition characteristics, use of additives, tank ntixes and range of crops. The 
successful establishment of some windows of safe use would require changes in the 
type of tests undertaken by chemical manufacturers when seeking approval (The 
nature of any new tests and extrapolation of results fbr registration jmiposes required 
the attention of the AGP, which should be able to look at alternative means of 
pesticide control)
Mrs Fenner replied that ADAS did such research into IPM and pesticide 
alternatives.
"The Government’s policy is to reduce the use of pesticides to a minimum 
compatible with efficient agriculture. We made that dear in our response to 
the seventh report of the Royal Gommission on Environmental PoUutioiL That 
is on the record, but it is not necessarily appropriate for the Bill.. J^othing in 
the Bill will prevent innovation. The Bill is being drafted broadly to ensure 
that".
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Mr Farr replied that:
"It is an important point of principle. [The Minister] said that ttere was 
nothing in die Bill to prevent innovation. But the purpose of this tiny group of 
amendments is to shift the whole emphasis of the Bill to inject a new and 
positive commitment to innovation in the Bill".
The amendment was put to the vote and was passed against the Government’s wish 9 
to 6. The Opposition all voted aye, plus Mr Farr, Mr Carlisle and Mr Skeet (C).
Also in committee, Mr John moved an amendment setting out conditions which 
should qipear on a label. These included permitted application mediods, maximum 
application rates and minimum dilution rates and permitted tank mixes. The 
amendment focussed on a mode of compliance which encouraged information, advice, 
training and general education rather than compulsion and penalties, and gave farmers 
a choice, enabling them to use their judgonent, hopefully to choose safer alternatives. 
If die intait of d% Government was to msdte peoide oteerve precautions, 
recommendations and requirements stated on the label (and in COPs), then why not 
make them explicit? Mr Carlisle thought labels comprehensive enough already and that 
the industry had already shown great responsibility in giving information. He suggested 
that die amendment gave farmers no flexibility. Farmers sometimes judged it better to 
use more or less than die recommended amount Mr Gampbell-Savours said it was 
important to specify minimum dilution rates as o;qx)sed to minimum qjplication rates 
because there was a trend to use less active ingredient and also a trend towards using 
lower volumes to raider the application of an active ingredient more cost-effective. 
The lowered ratio of diiutent to active ingredient must be kept from falling below a 
certain minimum for eadi formulation to avoid high concentrations of pesticide being 
applied to crops, the environment and operators. No minimum application rate should 
be specified as farmers were well enough informed on the minimum effective dosage.
It was felt that manufacturers would not initiate techniques whidi reduced rates of 
application. They should develop pesticides which remained efficient at low application 
rates. On tank mixes, he said that at least mixes which might not be used should be 
noted on die label Mrs Fenner, for the Government, said that the powers were wide 
enough to include everything in the amendment Althou^ it was in tune with their 
thinking, they should have a consultation before committing to such detail Application 
. methods, machinery and tank mixes would be more appropriate to a code of practice. 
It was possible to specify permitted application methods by regulation, but that might 
impose severe limitations on the development of new application methods. Mentioning 
specifics in fire Bill would make it difficult to introduce others later. Requirements for 
labels would be set out in regulations and she gave an assurance that all requirements 
specified in the amendment would be included.
Mr John moved another two amoidments, supported by the BAA, requiring that 
equipment be tested for effectiveness and obsolete machinery wifluirawn from
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manufacture gradually, and that inspection of equipment be provided for, in accordance 
with the RCEP’s recommendations. The Government had rejected an official efficacy 
test for madiinery saying they would recognise a self-financing test such as that of the 
National Institute of Agrochemical Engineering. There was concern about inhibition of 
new machinery, but efficacy testing of new machinery was important too, and new 
machinery which was obsolete should be withdrawn before sale. It was unfair to place 
the onus for machine efficacy on fire farmer. The manufacturer or supplier of 
equipment should bear the onus for die efficacy of a machine. In addition equipment 
in use should be inspected and madiinery clinics should be provided. Mrs Fenner 
opposed the amendments on the grounds that it would be difficult to define obsolete. 
They already indicated appropriate equipment for individual pesticides. The power 
existed to turn the recommendations in these amendments into conditions if they chose. 
Codes of practice would specify adjustment and use of equipment A test would not 
guarantee safe use - that depended on the operator. Mr John said that that was where 
training came in, but in addition maintenance of equipment to ensure it was 
mechanically sound was important Mrs Fenner said (a) there would be a general duty 
on users to act safely, (b) over time they would specify equipment-pesticide 
combinations, (c) how pesticides should be applied would be specified, (d) codes of 
practice might specify maintenance standards, and (e) enforcement officers would bring 
to court anyone contravening a statutory condition or Ae general duty, including 
anyone using the wrong machine or the rigfrt machine wrongly. Mr John said that a 
farmer would only expect a visit every 6 or 7 years so he might consider using badly 
maintained machinery worth the risk.
Mr John said that it was no argument against the MoT test and certificate, that 
cars did not remain as safe as the day they were tested, or diat the certificate did not 
guarantee die same level of safety some time after.
Mr Carlisle said that it was often new chemicals whidi made a machine obsolete. 
Mr John said there was a danger in a pesticide manufacturer being tied to one means 
of delivery. If chemicals and machines were tied, farmers would have to change 
machines all the time for new chemicals. It should be possible for a chemical to be 
tested for a number of application methods. The amendment was negatived.
Dr dark  (L; Opposition Environment Spokesman) sought an amendment to ensure 
the development of improved application tediniques was widiin the AGP’s remit 
According to the RCEP, ULV and CDA techniques might reduce the total active 
ingredient applied by 25%. The AGP ^ u l d  be able to give advice on this as well as 
on safety and efficacy of pesticides. Mrs Fenner said that the statement of objectives 
covered this and that the new scheme would be more closely concerned witii pesticide 
application than the voluntary scheme. These concerns would therefore be an integral 
part of the AGP’s concerns whoi it considered (^rovals.
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Mr John moved an amendment requiring pesticide approval test data to be 
provided for all application methods currently in use." If test data were not submitted 
in respect of a method, approval would not be given for f t  The AEA were worried 
that existing clearances were fbr hydraulic nozzles, so manufacturers would now have 
difficulty selling other machines. The question was, when new application equipment 
was developed, should the duty lie with the pesticide manufacturer, the equipment 
manufacturer or the farmer to test the machmery for all pesticides? They felt diat 
domical manufacturers should do it - it was easier for them to test a pesticide for all 
(plication methods as they were doing the test anyway and had die resources. 
Manufacturers should aim to enable pesticides to be applied from a wide range of 
machinery. The Government’s assurance was sought that they would not allow 
outdated methods to continue simply because aU methods of application had not been 
tested. Manufacturers should never get an approval fbr a particular method. Mrs Fenner 
said there were other solutions. The madiinery manufacturers could also have access to 
the approvals process fbr example. More time was needed to develop the best way to 
proceed. However regulations would be drafted so that they neither explicitly nor 
implicitly prohibited new application techniques. The ammdment was withdrawn.
Purposes for which Pesticides to be Used. In Lords committee (HL, 1984c), Lord 
Melchett moved an amendment proposing a new clause on the availability of pesticides 
for use on minor crops." This would be achieved by insisting that manufacturers did 
the necessary testing when they (grplied for approval. Lord Belstead said there were 
several possible options for ensuring that pesticides could be approved for minor crops 
and he would look carefully at therrL
Lord Northboume also moved an amendment which recognized mitx)r crops 
similar to existing crops, and those which were more exotic." In the former case a 
scheme such as the rapid clearance scheme fbr imports could be set up. In the latter 
case the manufacturers might be required to go to the erq)ense of making special 
provision. Lord Belstead said that Lord Melchett had put forward one option for 
making sure of the continued development of pesticides for use on minor crops, that 
was compulsion. Another way would be to provide farmers and growers with direct 
access to die approvals process. The Government had not yet made up its mind. One
35 (llA )A ny irformation provided in euxordance with subsection 21(a) above which incorporates a claim that a 
pesticide cannot be applied serfefy or efficaciously by a particular method shall include test data relating to the 
appUcation o f that pesticide by that method and any information provided in  accordance with the iforesaid  
stdtsection which in c o rp o ra i a claim that a pesticide can only be appUed safely or ^ a c io u s ly  by a particular 
m ethod or methods shall include test data relating to the appUcation o f that pesticide by any methods applying 
pesticides which are thereby excluded .
“  M inisters o f the Advisory committee on Pestiddes may, fa r  the purposes o f determining whether to approve any 
pesticide, request such tests to be carried out by or on b e h a f o f any person seeking such approval as appear 
necessary to ensure sufficient pesticides are avdlable fo r  use on minor crops.
37 lS(3)...iq)proval by resolution of each House of ParHamenL
( )In  contemplating any regulations made under this section fo r  the approval pesticides the M inisters shall 
have regard to the desiraU lity o f (a) maximising the range o f crops and pests fo r  which p esticides are approved; 
and (b) ensuring that approvd is extended without delay to substantially sim ilar uses.
(4)If it q^pears to the Ministers...
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thing was certain, a move away from restrictions on farmers must be made towards 
wider recommendations. Lord Melchett said the distinction was between the 
manufacturer and the user paying the cost
At Lords report (HL, 1985a) Lord Stanley brought back die same amendment to 
probe whether progress had been made in the method by which clearance would be 
given to use pesticides on minor crops and who would pay. Lord Belstead said that 
further discussions had made it dear that requiring manufacturers to seek s^roval fbr 
all crops was a problem because of liability for crop damage. The preferred alternative 
was giving growers direct access to the approval system without requiring them to 
generate expensive data and placing liability for the minor use on the grower.
There was no substantial debate on minor uses in the Commons.
7.15 Conditions Applied to Pesticide Use Outside the Approvals Process
Training o f Users. In the first committee day in the Lords (HL, 1984c) Lord 
Madde moved an ammdment on training," saying progress should be made towards 
training courses fbr, and licensing of operators, as spraying was probably the most 
dangerous operation on the farm.
Lord John-Madde moved a similar amendment" Lord Melchett noted that training 
and licensing was recommended by the RCEP. It was not clear whether the Bill as it 
stood could encompass licaising as wdl as training. Lord Northboume mentioned the 
problem of unsupervised operators if the licensed operator fell iU. Lord Stanley drought 
training reasonable, but licensing carrying interference too far. Lord Belstead, fbr the 
Government, said that die power to include licensing was in die BiU, but that the 
Government did not propose to introduce official licensing arrangements. He believed 
training was important, but did not intend it to be mandatory. The ATB ran a spraying 
course \diich led to a craft certificate, as well as other relevant courses. Last year it 
had trained 2,648 people in a variety of pesticide related courses. Lord Madde replied 
that Lord Belstead was not oicouraging training. There were many farm workers and 
small and large farmers who did not know enough about the dangers of quantities and 
mixing and spraying. Certification was also necessary to ensure adequate training, to 
prevent trained persons who were nevertheless idiots from using dangerous sprays. 
Lord John Madde said diat the whole Bill was about controlling tl% dangers of 
pestiddes and it was therefore ridiculous that tlK persrm who sprayed should not be 
controlled. Lord Madde said that if left to existing practices, die ATB would take 40 
years to train everyone.
lS(3)...approved by resolution of each House of Parliament
( )W here U appears to M inisters that substances approved fo r  appUcation under section (ISX lX s) obave may 
effect the health or scfety o f parsons o f work they may require that such appUcations be made only by or under 
A e supervision o f licensed operators cfter a preparatory period c fftv e  years.
15(5)...of any of its international obligations
( )After a period o f fo u r years from  the passing c f  this A ct a ll spraying on areas over 0 5  c f  a hectare must 
be done by an operator trained end in possession o f a certificate c f  his competence. I t w ill be the duty o f the 
M inister to see that training facilities are available.
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At Lords report (HL, 1985a), Lord Gallagher b ro u ^  out substantially the same 
amendment, but requiring training and certification obligation to apply only to 
supervisors. It was not unreasonable to ask Ministers to ensure that training facilities 
were available. The ATB would be ready and willing to do dûs. Earl Onslow preferred 
a COP for spraying. Lord Melchett thought it nûght not be practical to limit the area 
sprayed to half a hectare and that aU areas, no matter how small, should be sprayed 
under a certified supervisor. Lord Belstead said drat if more needed to be done the 
power to impose conditions on use would cover i t  The Government would consider 
making training and certification conditions of approval on the user, but consultations 
would continue. The amendment was widrdrawrt
At second reading in the Commons (HC, 1985a), Mr Carlisle noted that the 
clearest case for trairûng was fbr contractors, as such firms n t i ^  affect neighbouring 
properties, especially industrial pest controllers who sprayed in hospitals. Farmers 
should be trained and certified by the ATB to prevent health problems to themselves 
from spray. There was general support for trairûng, at least of supervisors.
In Commons committee (HC, 1985c), Mr John moved two amendments on 
trairûng, one for sprayer operators (farmers or contractors) and the other to ensure that 
the Government provided die training courses. The BAA had noted the mismatch 
between high-tech application methods and unskilled operators. The AEA was 
dissatisfied with the way their equipment was being used on farms and suggested a 
statutory training obligation The ATB was the (g^ropriate body. They needed a 
picture of the current level of competence. Approval of pesticides should be 
conditional on suppliers providing training fbr users, and users would have a duty to 
train workers. Mrs Fenner said that the Bill placed responsibility fbr safe use on 
employers and users. This was a powerful stimulus fbr users to aquire trairûng. The 
Government intended to require commercial operators to provide evidence of 
appropriate trairûng and supervision standards. In relation to farmers and farm workers 
there was a legal requirement for users to act safely, and a COP would advise farmers 
that they should be able to demonstrate diat appliers possessed training. As well as the 
ATB, local education authorities, chemical manufacturers and machinery manufacturers 
did training, so a substantial proportion of farm operators had been trained. This, 
together with the responsibility the legislation placed on users, should boost the 
demand for training. The ATB was confident that it could respond to the demand for 
training which the legislation would generate. MAFF officials were discussing practical 
problems with the ATB. In response to a question on penalties for failure to be 
trained, Mrs Fenner said that training would not be made a legal requirement, diough 
the legal responsibility of the user would be in tl^ Code of Practice. Mr John said the 
"legal responsibility" d ^ n d e d  on oifbrceability. Régulations should cover trairûng for 
users.
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7.1.6 Other Significant Amendments and Decisions: Synopsis
As wdl as application equipment and disdosuie of information, there was strong 
pressure on exports and aerial spraying.
On 5 Deconber Michad Spicer (Undersecretary of State for Transport) announced 
that controls on aerial spraying were to be tightened from 1985 (DTI, 1984). The 
minimum horizontal distance to be maintained by aircraft from houses was to be 
increased from 75 to 200 feet; aircraft would have to fly at least 200 feet above 
gardens; and water authorities would have to be consulted by operators before spraying 
was carried out near water. These dianges supplemented the prior notification 
arrangements announced in July. Many peers wanted a ban on aerial graying other 
than in exceptional circumstances. On 13 December, a PQ on aerial qrraying revealed 
that the new distance from houses announced on die 5th was wdl below that applied 
in other European countries. Criticisms of aerial spraying controls drew a promise that 
the Government would review the distribution of responsibility fbr aerial spraying, and 
review existing dearances for aerially sprayed pesticides.
At third reading in the Lords (HL, 1985b), an amendment to introduce prior 
infbrmed consent (PIC) for exports went to a vote. The Government said it was 
unwilling to accept the principle ahead of other countries or before it was agreed 
internationally. In any case the amendment went further than the draft code which only 
(qrplied to pesticides banned or severdy restricted. Hie amendment was narrowly 
defeated 29:24. In the Commons a Labour amendment seeking to introduce PIC was 
taken to a vote and defeated 8:6. The principle would have enhanced the sovereignity 
of importing nations by placing tiie onus on them to decide whether to accept the 
hazards involved. The UK had an opportunity to siqiport the current moves by tiie 
Dutch Government to incorporate the principle into national legislation, thereby 
increasing pressure on other EEC countries to follow suit and he^  reduce tiie 400,000 
pesticide poisonings which were estimated to occur in the Third World every year, 
argued Mr Campbell-Savours. The Government retorted that not a single devdoping 
country had spoken in favour of PIC when the principle was recently ddeted from a 
draft UK code of conduct In its place would be a requirement that importing countries 
should be notified when a ban or severe restriction on a pesticide was first introduced 
in the exporting state, and again on first shipment
The Government refused to say whether they would take advantage of the 
provisions in the forthcoming EEC residues directive for MRLs not to be observed for 
fbod destined for tiie home market whilst imposing tiiem for fbod traded between 
member states.
72  Concurrent Procedural Factors
Non Substantive Objectives. The Government objective to estaUish a framework 
for substantive policy in the primary legislation was more important to them than
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developing the substantive debate in this phase, at least within Parliament The 
pesticides part of the Bill extended to just four pages and included only three sections. 
The Government advised by die executive, controlled the debate and its outcomes 
largely in order to preserve this framework, so that the details of regulations could be 
decided in the administrative phase. This is not to say that the views of Parliament 
would not be takoi into account, only that if they were it would be when Parliament 
was no longer in a position to negotiate.
In the introduction to the Bill Lord Belstead said that his priority was to establish 
a framework (to be supplemented by regulations). This exercise would be seen as part 
of a continuing dialogue with all the responsible interests. He said the Government 
would listen and in due course put proposals to Parliament. An unofficial aim was to 
secure a rapid parliamentary passage and get the Bill onto the statute books early in 
1985. In fact the lack of detailed provisions for controls thwarted this aim and the Bill 
did not become a statute until July 1985.
Government Arrangements. As with the proposals, the arrival of the Bill in 
Parliament was speedy. The FEPB was introduced in the Lords. It is often thought that 
a reason for this is diat bills receive their most effective scrutiny and shaping in the 
Lords, and that the Lords make a more substantive contribution to shaping policy in 
Parliament than does the Commons, through the amendments it forces on Government. 
However in this case the Government wanted more time to prepare, its own case before 
arriving at the Commons.
A junior MAFF Minister was appointed to conduct the debates on pesticides in the 
House of Commons. She was new to pesticides issues and to legislation, and her lack 
of confidence led to a rather less flexible approach to dealing with amendments than 
might have been the case if she had had a greater appreciation of the impact of 
amendments. She very much stuck to her brief which led to inertia and frustration in 
the debate.
A "Bill Team" advised Mnisters in Parliament It consisted of senior PICD civil 
servants, who brought in additional individuals with particular expertise (from PRSD, 
NCC, other MAFF science divisions and other Government departments) for particular 
debates in Parliament
Govemment-group consultations and negotiations continued throughout this phase, 
especially during Commons committee stage, as did group-opposition meetings, 
meetings between opposition MPs and Ministers, meetings between Government and 
Conservative hffs, and meetings between opposition MPs. Environmental groups 
lobbied especially hard between Lords and Commons stages for further amendments. 
FoE, for example sent a letter to Lord Belstead listing 23 points it hoped would be 
raised during the Bill’s passage in the Commons.
Control Tools. Subsection 15(1) was the main provision empowering Ministers 
jointly to make regulations and 15(3) specified that this would be by statutory
1 2 8
instmmenL Subsection 22(3) introduced some flexibility in the exercise of powers, with 
provisions that (1) the powers need not be exercised in their entirety and (2) incidental 
and supplementary provisions to regulations could be made. Subsection 15(3) of the 
Bill required the Government to submit regulations made under 15(1) for the 
afflimative resolution procedure in both Houses of PailiamenL At committee stage in 
the Lords (HL, 1984c) an undertaking to aim to bring in regulations by 1 January 1986 
was givetL In fact, the first set of regulations did not materialise until October 6 1986. 
A research assistant on the Bill said:
"There is usually something left to the regulations in any legislation. The 
question is how much. In this case virtually everything substantial was left to 
tile regulations..." because the Government is avoiding trouble. Even the 
social security Bill had a lot more detaiL..the procedure is very unsatisfactory.
The debate on regulations is only a 1.5 hour procedure and the regulations 
can’t be amended. The Government still had the opportunity to introduce 
detail at committee stage, which is where the amendments on detail should 
have beoi gülowed,"'^
Hogwood (1987) notes that at committee stage in the Commons Ministers normally try 
to be accommodating to interest groups so as not to alienate opinion, and may give 
concessions if they do not involve too much compromise of principle. In this case the 
Minister was quite intransigent, probably tiirough ineiqierience. In addition the 
Government were making their minds up as they went along: "...the Government 
genuinely hadn’t made their minds up on a lot of things". However, although the 
Government had originally conceived of a fairly limited measure, and although there 
were few concessions given, "...they did end up going further than they had originally 
intended"."
Representation on Advisory Committees. At committee stage in the Commons (HC, 
1985c) there was a minor concession from Mrs Fenner in that the Government would 
now "welcome an input from representatives of the trades unions" on panels advising 
the ACP and SSC. However moves to include trade union, consumer and conservation 
interests on the ACP itself were denied.
73  Influences on Participation and Policy Making
The Bill included in its scope many more pesticides tiian those covered by the 
PSPS, thus including in its powers the troublesome area of anti-fouling paints, as well 
as many other areas which it might later need to regulate.
Non-agricultuial trade associations felt tiiat Parliament, and the PICD, did not 
realise or had not been made aware of the fact that legislation covered them. The
M There is a tendency to move in dûs direction in legislation and there are a number of reasons for this: 1) if the
Hâtait is con^lex and the subject itself is a changmg one; 2) if the Government have not made tq) dieir minds on
the detail and do not yet know enough.
37 Interview, HC Research Assistant, London 10/2/86.
33 hneryiew, HC Research Assistant, London 10/2/86.
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result was that much lobbying was carried out to appraise Lords and MPs of the facts.
During this phase the rapid clearance schone was to be implemented in response 
to EC pressure, to start on 1 January 1985. This was to be non-statutory and 
introduced administratively. Thus the criteria and procedure for establishing the extent 
to which products were identical and tiierefore the ease with which such trade could 
take place would not be discussed openly in Parliament, probably for fear of pre­
empting the debate with manufacturers. The regulation that all pesticides had to be 
submitted for approval would cover rx)n identical imports statutorily, but the 
administrative criteria for identicalness would still determine non-identicalness and thus 
which imported pesticides submitted to the rz^id clearance scheme would have to 
sutanit test data. Various attempts were made to have the criteria iqx>n which 
judgements would be based made statutory so that the details could be discussed, or at 
least to know the proposed criteria. A non-statutory scheme would preserve discretion, 
with no assurance that the criteria would always be adhered to. The Government had 
already decided the broad criteria. An identical product would have to be produced by 
the same cmnpany, have the same active ingredient and tolerably the same formulation, 
demonstrated by production of the label and batch number. Some Lords disagreed that 
the product had to be from the same company, thinking this restrictive to trade. 
Unscmpulous manufacturers could still potentially keep out identical products under 
this regime by refusing to identify batch numbers, although the test data on file could 
now be used to facilitate approval for these products.
The data requirements for registration might have been expected to produce the 
most technical debate. The head of PICD, when questioned, said he regarded efficacy 
and humaneness as the most technical area of legislation, but that the level of public 
debate on these was not good and that the interest group debate was mainly with the 
industry on protocols." This probably had much to do with the fact that the PSPS, if 
not ACAS, was well established, and no effort was made to review the basic safety 
requirements. As the head of the Harpenden laboratories said:
"This is an interesting example of legislation because we were running the 
scheme before. It was not as if we started it in 1986. If it were new then 
there would have been a need for a lot of tedmical agreement The legislation 
was to make fee voluntary scheme statutory"."
A lthou^ fee PSPS and efficacy requirements were to be made statutory, a strong 
preference for preserving a discretionary style in data requirements and keeping detail 
out of fee statute books was reflected in tl% fact feat decision making in this case was 
left largely to fee implementers (feat is tiie PRSD). The head of policy (PICD) said:
"Making the PSPS statutory is tiie big thing. But the administration [PRSD]
33 Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 6/5/86.
3* Interview, MAFF(HaipendenX Cambridge 25A1/87.
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have a hell of a lot of room to manoeuvre in tte  area of protocols and 
procedures...We arc dealing with a science-based policy where we arc trying 
to have a policy based on the scientific assessment of risk, so regulations can’t 
be cut and dried unless you put things in like ’should never be greater than 
Ippm’"."
On discretion versus prescription the ex-head of PRSD explained that
"...the difficulty is tiiat there are two basic philosophies in registration 
requirements 1) the checklist philosophy, where provided people do the tests, 
they have fulfilled their obligation, as in the USA and Germany; and 2) the 
PSPS, who only asked for tests if they th o u ^  tiiey could use the re ^ ts . 
Over the years there have been a number of people on the committee who 
would not ask for tests if they couldn’t use the results.""
And a policy person:
"We don’t ask for tests on the basis that it would be interesting to have the 
results - only if we need more data... The PSPS has always gone for the 
minimum consistent with satisfactory results. Companies may have problems 
with other countries wanting them to use more animals, and if there are 
results for a large number of animals we will look at them, but we would not 
ask fbr tiie tests to be done"."
As concerns the reasons for making efficacy testing statutory as well as the PSPS, 
many interviewees mentioned that the success of a product really depended on whether 
users found it efficacious and that tiiey would not buy it again if tiiey did no t" 
Questioned as to why a statutory control was then necessary, one interviewee 
answered:
"Well I suppose one of the reasons was the Government’s concern over 
environmental issues - a diaUenge could be ’how can you [the Government] 
justify using a pesticide which everyone knows to be an artificial molecule if 
it is not any good?’. So if the Government doesn’t need to use synthetic 
molecules they are open to challenge by environmental groups - but it is not 
my efficacy branch that is concerned with environmental protection - policy 
is","
a reference to the Royal Society’s rqxirt on Risk Assessment, which according to one 
MAFF interviewee had a great consciousness-raising effect in Whitehall.^ Another 
answer to the same question brought out the influence of the RCEP report and the 
adopted policy of reducing pesticide use:
"ACAS developed out of a desire of industry to show that their chemicals 
were OK, and this was taken witii the Ministry’s desire to be able to
33 Interview, MAFF(PICDX London 6/5/86.
3* Interview. MAFF(PRSDX Westrniing,! lA/88.
^  hiterview, MAFF(PICDX London 17A2/87.
3* For exanq>le: hiterview, MAFF(Harpenden Lal»X Camkidge 25A1/87. 
35 Interview, MAFF(Haipenden LabsX Cambridge, 25/11/87.
^  Interview, MAFF(PICDX London 13/3/86.
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recommend the most effective chemicals to farmers - the policy that ’pesticide 
use should be kept to a minimum consistent with effective production’ - we 
don’t want to use diemicals that are not effective".^
According to the BAA’s parliamentary advisor, the rdationship between BAA and 
PICD was not especially comfortable as the BAA were not kept up to date with 
decisions on issues affecting them. For example they were surprised by the 
Government’s insertion of the information disclosure clause at the end of committee 
stage in the Commons.
M nor uses and off-label approvals are interesting as problems which arose later in 
the decision making process. They arose as a result of making fee voluntary scheme 
statutory without consideration of possible repercussions, and a lack of foresi^it in not 
involving relevant groups. As the ex-head of PRSD said I n  the UK, politicians and 
administrators developed the thesis that legislation would solve the whole problem - 
but it won’t - it created the minor uses problem".^ The creation of the minor use 
category was a reactive decision taken late in the legidative process arising from 
enshrining the existing sdieme (entailing making the label statutory) and extending it 
to aH pestiddes. In more positive terms: "One of fee things FEPA has done is to 
identify a potentially huge area of use away from a label instmction"." Even users 
who were Government advisors did not foresee this problem: "I didn’t really look 
ahead and see that these problems would arise. We thought our (plication would 
continue to have iqyproval. MAFF weren’t dear - the situation changes week by 
week".^ Users in the Government’s plant health division of the Harpenden laboratories 
sometimes needed to control foreign pest introductions:
"The pests we will need to control won’t appear as a measure on a pestidde 
label, so we have to be able to get some sort of approval fbr emergency use.
We were not so concerned about this befbre as the label wasn’t legal. Now if 
it isn’t on the label we’re in trouble".^
Although many different proposals for training were put forward in Parliament, no 
decisions were taken during this phase.
l A  The Quality of Partidpation
Timing o f the Legislation. The Bill went to Parliament so predpitatdy that the 
interest groups had just enough time to prepare their case before Commons cormnittee 
stage. Even so the AAWNTG "...could only prepare briefs hastily or insubstantially 
and we reacted to the worst cases by default This was a pity - it relates to fee speed
7^ Interview, MAFF(PICDX London 17A2/87.
*3 Interview, MAFF(PRSDX Westoning 11 A/88.
^  Interview, MAFF(PRSDX Harpenden 1/2/88.
** Interview, NCC, Petoborough 29A/88.
^  Interview, MAFF(HarpendenX Cambridge 25A 1/87.
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at which the legislation was put through" "
Commons committee stage is usually where the greatest number of rqrresentations 
are made, but in this case this was to an even greater degree than normal. Interest 
groups tried to get amendments moved by sympathetic MPs.
Level o f Detail Given on Controls. The Bill itself was welcomed on all sides as 
necessary, in principle, and as the correct general approach. It was seen as non party- 
political, crossing party lines. The SA welcomed the legislation as "...there is the long­
term benefit of getting parliamentarians involved, so it is more likely that there will be 
further reforms in the future"." In Commons committee (HC, 1985c) Mr John said that 
the BiU improved the presort unsatisfactory legal position but that the object must be 
to provide the best possible framework in the light of their curroit knowledge. Judged 
by that starrdard the BiU was not entirely satisfactory to the Opposition.
That the BiU was enabling was felt to be the right qrproach by some, as it would 
be impossible to incorporate into the BiU aU of tire regulations necessary at present 
plus those which would become necessary in future (fbr example Lord Walston at 
second reading in the Lords (1984b)). Mr John, at second reading in the Commons 
(HC, 1985a), said that that which gave Mnisters power to do aU that was rrecessary 
also gave them tire discretion not to do so. He did not beUeve that in this case it could 
be left to such wide Ministerial discretion and gave notice that they would try to 
ensure that it was not
Obscure Powers. The powers taken iri the enabling BiU were felt to be vague and 
inadequate, with some essential things missing, and much that rreeded improvement or 
strengthening. For example Lord Melchett and Lord Craigton at second reading in the 
Lords (HL, 1984b) intended placing amendments to clarify these powers. Lord Stanley 
felt that the Government should clarify the powers by amendment, because of what 
might happai in the future if there was an irresponsible Minister or permanent 
secretary. Lord Melchett said that he took a cynical view of tire Government’s 
intentions: they had drafted the BiU and introduced it in this way to short-circuit 
parliamentary procedure. It was wrong for the Government to have attempted, on a 
matter as important as this to the general pubUc, to cœsumers of food, to tire 
agrochemical industry and to conservationists, to come before Parliament with a bUl 
that told them so Uttle about what was actuaUy going to luqiperL
Lord Madde said that he understood that it was a v ^  convenient tiling for civU 
servants to be able to put throu^i an order where if they put something good in they 
could also sUp in something distasteful, which was what some less scrupulous future 
Minister might descend to.
At second reading the Government said tiiat tire BUI would give powers to control 
aerial graying. Lord Melchett complained that they were obviously able to learn of the
^  bitoview , AAWNTG, London 29A/86. 
<7 Interview, SA, London 27/2/86.
133
powers of fee BUI by such chance remarks. A whole range of qirestions about aerial 
spraying were now opened up. Were feere ofeer things not mentioned like this? In 
Committee (HL, 1984c) he said Ire suspected that every time the Minister was asked 
"was such and such a practice covered by fee regulation making powers?”, his answer 
would be "yes".
A research assistant working on the Bill in the Commons found "...fee main 
problem was not knowing what fee Government intended...they were not giving any 
dues. We had to rely on the tenor of the Lords’ debates"."
The fact that powers would be exercised by regulation was not contested. However 
that Parliament was not allowed to see and debate draft regulations at a time when 
they could make an input, was. In addition suspicions were voiced that regulations 
would not be made at aU or would be put off indefinitely.
Commitment to Make Regulations, and to Make them Soon. As fee Bill did not 
specify a timescale for regulations, some doubted that the Government intended 
bringing in regulations at a ll An amendment curtailing this flexibility (Lords 
cormnittee; HL, 1984c) sought to place a deadline for regulations of 31 December 
1985, since the Government had said it was aiming for 1 January 1986; using ’"shall" 
make regulations’ in place of ’"may" make regulations’ to hold fee Government to 
making regulations. Lord Melchett said that the amendment merely committed the 
Government to making regulations, and did not tie them to their content: the flexibility 
to withdraw regulations without parliamentary consideration was undesirable. Lord 
Belstead said that (given the legislation was enabling) power to make regulations was 
almost always permissive, not mandatory. Carving regulations in tablets of stone in the 
Act was asking for trouble because of the treed for change with time. The Government 
were genuine in their intent to put regulations into effect The Statement of Intent 
showed this, and he gave a commitment to do so after consultations within 1986. 
December 31 would be difficult because of the pressure it would put on staff, and 
because of having to wait for residues rregotiations in Europe, and FAO and UNEP 
initiatives on exports. There would be a block of regulations, with some regulations 
coming out later, like residues.
In the Conunons (HC, 1985a), Dr Clark said that 30 years ago the Zuckerman 
Committee had reconunended the same controls as were being formulated now, but 
they were subsequently suppressed by a NCnistry com m it^. How were they to know 
the purpose would not be retracted again? Mr Hugfres cited fee COPA, which was still 
being enforced 10 years later.
Availability o f Drcft Regulations for Debate. Many fWt that draft regulations or at 
least some clarification should be presented to, and discussed in Parliament before 
enactment, since there was such a short time available for debate when they were
** In lay  lew, HC Research Assistant, London 10/2/86.
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presented fonnally under the affirmative resolution procedure. Many Lords complained 
that not knowing the content of regulations was causing confusion in the present 
debate where it ought to be facilitated. It was impossible to gauge the effect of the 
legislation otherwise. The success of a bill depended crucially on the regulations, and 
Earl Peel had had requests from the NFU, CLA and RSPB to have the draft 
regulations put before Parliament In the House of Commons, the Early Day Motion on 
the legislation, signed by 213 members called fbr the publication of draft regulations to 
enable informal debate.
The Government had previously granted such a request on the 
Telecommunications Bill (Lord Stanley, HL, 1984b). Lord Melchett believed that a 
draft of fee regulations was in existence because other Government departments, 
especially the Treasury, would not let a biU go before Parliament without a dear idea 
of regulatory intentions. It was therefore inexcusable that the Government had not 
responded to requests to see draft regulations. Letting Parliament see draft regulations 
would not predude consultation with interest groups but would allow proper 
consultation with Parliament The Government should not think it could short-circuit 
parliamentary procedure.
Lack of darity made itself fd t in all debates on substantive issues (see previous 
sections), and led to the extraction of information through detailed amendments and 
very long committee stages. Lord Craigton asserted that verbal assurances on the 
regulations should not be accepted, espedally since assurances about what would be in 
the Bill, like an allowance for fee development of new (plication techniques, had not 
been substantiated.
Lord Belstead said that in this case there would be a great difference between the 
legislation and the regulations. The legislation had to provide for all future 
eventualities. A second reason was that fee wording of the regulations would have to 
strike a firre balance between freedom and compulsion such that ctmsultation with 
interests was necessary first He would endeavour verbally to present the Government’s 
view on intended regulations point by point as the debate proceeded.
The Notes on Clauses (MAFF, 1984m) produced between Lords second reading 
and committee were felt to be inadequate.
At Lords cormnittee Lord Belstead said it would be difficult for the various 
interests if there was no room for a genuine consultation because Parliament had tied 
up the regulations so ti^rtly. He had now issued a Statement of Regulatory Intention 
(MAFF, 1984n) to show good faith. It had taken so long because nine departments had 
had to dear it. It was modest because a balance had to be stmck between the interests 
of people who believed pesticides had to be treated with the greatest of care because 
the vast majority of them were dangerous, and the interests of pestidde users who had 
to deliver products to the consumer in good conditiotL
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Earl Onslow wanted a sight of the draft regulations, so that the maximum amount 
of consultation was done in public, asking "...can we avoid the obsessive English 
disease of secrecy? AU these consultations seem to have gone on behind closed doors - 
whisper, whisper! The more that tiiese regulations are discussed in public the lu ^ e r  
we shall be when we get an agreed solution at the end of them!".
At the end of third reading (HL, 1985b) Lord Belstead said the Lords would be 
able to comment on details in the consultative document which would be issued after 
enactment
Similar complaints were made in the House of Commons. There was nothing to 
"get the teeth into" and commoits could not be usefuUy made without seeing the draft 
regulations (Ms Maynard (L); HC, 1985a) and there were therefore many fears about 
Part m  of the BiU (Mr Carlisle). Mr John beUeved the regulations must already have 
been drafted, if they were to be enforced by the end of the year, and if they were not 
then the Government’s statement as to the timetable was valueless. Mr McGreggor (C; 
Mnister of State, MAFF), for the Government, said that the regulations were 
incomplete. There were some thoughts as to what should be in them and these were in 
the Statement of Intent It was true that a crucial part of their intentions would be in 
regulations which was why drey would consult including MPs. Mr John said that the 
passage of the BiU was the last opportunity the House of Commons had to express 
concern over the content of the regulations, as the affirmative resolution procedure 
meant the regulations had to be accepted or rejected as a whole, and they could not 
then reflect any dissatisfaction on behalf of any organisation which beUeved its views 
had been ignored in consultation. Wide scrutiny could be given if the regulations were 
available in Parliament, even if they were presented piecemeal, and a draft should be 
available befbre committee stage. Mr CampbeU-Savours said that maximum 
information should be given as there was such wide aU-party agreement on legislation. 
The DHSS made known precisely the topics to be covered by regulations, so that 
omissions could be pinpointed. The House would not tolerate consultations where 
nobody could contribute to discussions.
Other reasons offered in favour of providing draft regulations were variously that 
this would provide a more reasonable and rational debate (Mr Campbell-Savo^); that 
it was unreasonaUe to be expected simply to accqrt the regulations later (Mr Howells; 
Lib); that the promised detail might not make it to regulations if it were not seen in 
Parliament and that it was a duty to assure Parliament and country that regulations 
would protect the public interest (Mr Hardy); and that all organisations needed to be 
properly consulted (Mr Farr, Mr Skeet).
Dr Clark said it was ridiculous to talk of prejudging the outcome of consultations 
with groups. Draft regulations would be released to these groups for consultation, and 
Parliament had a right to have a say in the formulation of regulations too. Some of 
these groups (for example NE^ and RSPB) were themselves calling fbr draft
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regulations to be placed before the House. When working committees were left to 
make regulations, they were found wanting, for example the WCA 1981.
Mrs Foiner, for the Government, gave much the same reassurances as Lord 
Belstead, saying that regulations coming after powers to make regulations was a 
logical order. Members of Parliament could present views during the consultation 
period.
In Commons committee (HC, 1985d), Mr McGreggor stressed that the 
Government had only consulted interests on powers, not on details which were not 
available to the committee. The content of the expanded Statement of Intent (MAFF, 
1985c) had not been appreciated, and he was now asking tiie dqiartment to prepare the 
possible headings of regulations to be drawn up.
Mr Davies said that the BiU was technical, so technical details had to be given in 
order to assess its impact The Minister had said intentions would be given as they 
went along, but there were no details, for exan^le in relation to aerial spraying criteria 
which would be used in granting or withholding (plications were not given. On every 
controversial point tiie Minister could say details did not matter because powers were 
available to cover all eventualities.
Dr d ark  said tiiat the Parliamentary Secretary had promised detailed answers to a 
number or questions asked in second reading, but they had not had replies.
Mr Skeet said regulations relating to the PSPS ought to be known and published 
in exact fonm. Mrs Fenner replied that there would be no regulations with reqiect to 
the PSPS. To simply follow the PSPS would mean that they did not admit that 
pressures existed. Consultation would be meaningless and insincere if regulations were 
published before them. The parliamentary debates would be considered part of the 
consultation.
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8. The Contemporary Debate: Administrative Phase
This chapter covers the debate surrounding policy develcpient, after the passage 
of FEPA, during the period whm fee main set of regulations was being drawn up, 
from 16 July 1985 to 6 October 1986.
On 4 September 1985 a commencement order was made which would bring the 
Food And Environment Protection Act into operation the next day (MAFF, 1985d). On 
September 30 an order establishing the ACP as a statutory advisory committee (MAFF, 
1985e), and regulations concerning the terms of office of AGP members (MAFF, 
1985f) were made, both of which were to come into operation cm October 31. Under 
the latter the ACP's independent members had to sign a declaration that they had no 
financial involvement with pesticides interests. On 4 November 1985, the Government 
issued the consultative dcxniment which would form the basis of the regulations 
(MAFF, 1985g) implementing the FEPA. The official consultation period ended on 31 
December 1985, and discussions with interested parties contirmed fbr a further two 
months.
The House of Commons Agriculture Select Committee began its incpiiry into 
pesticides and human health on 27 February 1986, initially considering the pesticide 
registraticm and approval systems including confidentiality of data and comparing the 
UK’s registraticm recpiirements wife those in Europe and North America. The report of 
the inquiry was not published until 27 May 1987. However, while the rqmrt itself 
could not influence the regulations, the evidence given by witnesses in the first sessicm 
(which lasted up to lOfe July 1986) was available to policy makers. In March 1986 the 
ACAS closed to new applicants (MAFF, 1988). In ^ r i l  1986 the first armual report of 
the ACP was published, relating to the year 1984 (MAFF, 1986b); and in preparation 
for the regulations, the level of registration known as limited clearance was wiflidrawn 
from use (MAFF, 1988).
The Draft Control of Pesticides Regulations were laid in Parliament for approval 
by resolution of each house on 3 July 1986 (MAFF, 1986c;d;e). On 16 July the House 
of Commons resolved that the draft regulations be approved by a vote of 219 to 128 
(HC, 1986). On 25 July The Regulations were passed by the House of Lords (HL, 
1986). The Control of Pesticides Regulations (SI 1986/1510) were made on the 29 
August 1986.
The regulations imposed a blanket ban on activities unless (a) die product was 
approved; (b) conditions of approval had been met; (c) the activity was consented to 
and (d) conditions of consents had been met The conditions which might be included 
in a consent to an activity were set out in 4 schedules, governing; sale, supply and 
storage; use (including training); advertisement; and aerial spraying.
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In July 1986 a Draft Code of Practice on the Agricultural and Horticultural Use of 
Pesticides was issued, and the official consultation deadline given was 31 October 
(MAFF, 1986f). In August, a second draft code of practice was issued, dealing witii 
the supply, sale and off-farm storage of agricultural pesticides, eventually to form the 
details supporting the regulations on distributors and contractors finom 6 October 1986 
(MAFF, 1986g). Tire consultation deadline was 14 November, (to 3 October 1986 the 
proposed Advertisement (Donsait was circulated with a closing date for comments of 
27 October.
The main body of the regulations was to come into operation on 6 October 1986, 
with certain others coming in respectively on 1 January 1987,^  1 July 1987  ^ and 1 
January 1988/
The first two Consents were also published on this day: the first on sale, supply 
and storage; and the second on use, in the London and Edinburgh Gazettes (MAFF, 
1986h), together with conditions on the Consents. The Advertisement Consent was 
published later than the period covered by this chapter, on 21 November 1986. Most of 
the conditions took effect immediately, but others were spread over 1987 - 1989. 
Statutory arrangements for the disclosure of pesticide safety data to the public also 
took effect on 6 October, althou^ the first evaluations for release to the public would 
not be available immediately. Rgute 8.1 sununarises key dates in this ;Aase.
8.1 Debate and Decision in Substantive Policy Development
8.1.1 Broad Policy Objectives
By this stage, the broad policy objectives had been established. The Consultative 
Document represented the Government's detailed policy proposals, which are described 
in the following sections.
8.1.2 Products Subject to Approval and the Case o f Identical lnq>orts
Products Subject to Approval. The Consultative Document, like the Bill, defined a 
pesticide broadly, "...to encompass the whole range of products which Ministers may 
wish to control over fire life span of the legislation". A pesticide was any substance, 
preparation or organism used for (a) protecting plants or wood or other [dant products 
horn harmful organisms; (b) regulating the growth of plants; (c) giving protection 
against harmful creatures; (d) rendering such creatures harmless; (e) controlling 
organisms wifii harmful or unwanted effects cm water systems, buildings or other 
structures, or on manufactured products; and (0 profecting animals against 
ectoparasites.* Some of these would be temporarily excluded fiom regulations, like
1 Regulation 4(1): Prohibition on advertising unless certain conditions were
z R ^ulaticn 3(3): i^ lica tio n  of regulations to marine anti-fouling paints.
3 R ^ulation 4(S)(b)(i): a ban on pesticide use unless certain conditions were m et
* Consultative Document: Paragrq>h 2.1.
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Figure 8.1: Administrative Phase Chronology (1985 - 1986)
AUG
SEP 5 FEPA 1985 {Commencement No.L) Order 1985.
SEP 30 Advisory Committee on Pesticides Order.
SEP 30 Control o f Pesticides (ACP)(Terms of Office) Regulations 1985.
OCT 31 Consultative Document on FEPA implementation.
DEC 31 Official last date for written responses to Consultative Document
FEB 27 Agriculture Select Committee pesticides inquiry starts.
FEB 28 Official last date for meetings about Consultative Document
MAR ACAS closes to new applications.
MAR Limited Clearance withdrawn.
APR Publication o f ACP's first Annual Report.
JUL Draft COPR laid, debated and approved by Parliament
JUL Agriculture Select Committee pesticides inquiry ends.
JUL Draft COP on Pesticides Use.
AUG Draft COP on Pesticides Supply Storage and Sale.
AUG Draft Data Requirements published in working document form.
AUG Control o f Pesticides Regulations 1986.
OCT 3 Draft Advertisement Consent circulated.
OCT 6 Bulk of regulations come into force.
Consents on supply, sale and storage; and on use
published.________________________________
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oiganisms which were not bacteria, protozoa, fungi and viruses; materials controlled by 
other legislation; materials disinfecting other materials; substances being tested for 
pesticidal activity in the laboratory or being used in any manufacturing process; 
pesticides used in any decorative paints, textiles, paints and paper, and pesticides 
intended solely for export^ These exclusions had the effect of restricting controls only 
to those products already covered by the PSPS, plus chemosterilants and anti-fouling 
agents/ Chemosterilants legally fell within the definitions of both medicinal products 
under the Medicines Act 1968 and pesticides in the proposed regulations. Since they 
were designed for use as pesticides they would be subject to FEPA regulations and 
exempted finom Medicines Act regulations.^  COPA controls on organo-tin-containing 
marine anti-fouling paints were to come in on 1 January 1986, but in order to bring 
the marketing of new anti-fouling paints and compounds under the same degree of 
control as pesticides generally, FEPA regulations would be added. This was "...logical 
in terms of environmental safety, will allow a wider range of biocidal agents to be 
controlled, and will make good use of the procedures and committee structures 
developed for controlling pesticides".' ENDS (1985b) noted that four months 
previously the DoE had invited the paint industry to cooperate in a new voluntary 
screening procedure for all new anti-fouling paints, but there had been no hint of a 
decision to include these in the pesticides regulations fiien, which move now signified 
notice to fire industry to participate fully in the voluntary scheme.
FoE felt that the exclusions unjustifiably narrowed the scope, providing grey areas 
which would not be catered for m regulations.' AAWNXG thought likewise, especially 
with respect to exports which should be regulated and subject to prior informed 
consent^ ®
The BWPA still felt the inclusion of wood preservatives unfortunate, as many of 
the control details were inapplicable to them. For example the efficacy data 
requirements were irrelevanL" PHIPCO likewise noted the agricultural bias in the data 
requirements and that public health and industrial needs were almost ignored." The 
Consumer's Association still noted a lack of clarity over whether the efficacy data 
requirement w lied  to garden pesticides: none of these had previously been efficacy 
tested and the implications for gardeners should be considered."^* The BPCA said that
3 Consultative Document: Paragitqdi 2.2.
 ^ Consultative Docunttot: Paiagrwh 2.4.
7 Consultative Document: Paragrqih 2A .
Consultative Document: Paragrqih 25 .
Response to CD, FoE, 30/12/85.
0 Response to CD. AAWNTC. 19/12/85. 
 ^ Intem ew, BWPA, London 29/1/86.
:  Response to CD, PHIPCO. 30/12/85.
3 Interview, CA, London 27/2/86.
Reqxmse to CD, CA, 9/1/86.
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"The Consultative Document had about 60 pages - 2 dealt with us and 60 with 
agrochemicals...it's better than the proposals where the Government didn't deal with 
public health and hygiene at alL But I still feel it's agriculturally based"."
In me section on enforcement, the Consultative Document stated that "Users of 
agricultural pesticides are likely to be more numerous than mose in offier sectors 
covered by regulations". According to the BPCA this overiooked me fact that more 
than 85% of sites on whidi pesticide spraying took place were non-agriculturaL" 
"There are more pesticides used on fanns, but we use more sites than farmers."" The 
NSCA worried that the situations in which public heaim pesticides were used were 
sudi miat the general public were more likely to come into contact wim mese 
pesticides than wim those used on farms."
UKASTA were:
"...worried about specialist sectors - things like treating warehouses, seed 
treatment, animal husbandry are all different and have meir own q>ecial 
problems. The Consultative Document may not be covering them adequately.
All grain merchants, for example, use pesticides on their own premises for 
pest control, as well as selling mem - we need different regulations to cover 
this"."
There would be repercussions for non-agrochemical sectors from the controls on 
containers. The Consultative Document noted that containers would have to be 
approved and it would be a criminal offence to siqrply a pesticide in any other 
container, mus stopping the practice of decanting.'® The BPCA noted that this 
provision would seriously affect me Pest Cmitrol industry and its method of working. 
It was usual for pest control companies to prepare sufficient rodenticide and insecticide 
to enable meir operators to carry out the day's work in hand and issue it to operators 
in suitably marked containers. Otherwise operators had to carry more product than 
desirable into their vehicles or customers' premises.'^  "If this becomes illegal it will 
make the job quite impossible. I think MAFF will have to give us a dispensation for 
this. MAFF don't understand. There are servicing companies - men come in in the 
morning and are given a quota"." BWPA would have similar problems but highlighted 
mem in relation to labelling: "The labelling requirements are not akin to anything 
BWPA members have used previously. The procedure is different Chemicals are 
concentrated men diluted on site - this is not taken account of."" The Consultative
^  Biterview, BPCA, London 17/2^6.
Response to CD, BPCA, 3 0 /1 2 ^ .
Biterview, BPCA, London 17/2/86.
Response to CD, NSCA, 20/12/85.
Interview, UKASTA, London 28/1/86.
30 Consultative Documoit: Paragnqphs 5.7-5.10. 
»  Response to CD, BPCA, 30/12/85.
33 Interview, BPCA, London 17/2/86.
33 Biterview, BWPA, London 20/1/86.
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Document did mention however, that the need for a statutory code of practice for use 
in wood preservation, public health and industrial pest control would be the subject of 
further discussions.'*
There was no debate in Parliament on this subject, and when die Regulations came 
out. Regulation 3 covered the pesticides to be controlled fiom 6 October 1986. The 
scope was unchanged fiom the Consultative Document Pesticides covered were the 
same as those covered by the PSPS, except that from July 1987 the scope would be 
erganded to include antifouling paints. The 6 October Consents did not mention scope, 
as they were concerned with general classes of activity related to pesticides, and not 
specific approvals.
Identical Imports. The Consultative Document noted that rapid clearance 
applications were to be made to the technical secretariat, who would make 
recommendations to Ministers without recourse to the ACP or SSC." The Government 
had undertaken to the EC that rapid clearance would take only 6 weeks if products 
were of identical manufacture, company and purpose. This system had been introduced 
administratively and would not be covered by a formal regulation.
The BAA noted that the "rapid", "fast stream" and "off-label" applications would 
all be competing for the same resource witii the normal requests for approvals. This 
combined with a substantial volume of products seeking to uj^rade to full s^roval by 
efficacy data provision, would lead to an overload of the sqyproval resource and 
delays."
FoE warned that although identical imports should go nqndly through the 
secretariat procedure, similar products should not, since tiiere might be significant 
differences as regarded toxicity and environmental impact" AANNTG thought the 
trend towards quick clearing schemes worrying; with regard to "fast stream" and 
"rspd" approval of identical products there was an obvious need for dear rules and 
procedures."
The BAA and BASIS on the other hand wanted to be sure products really were 
identicaL"”  The BAA said:
"Identicality is important you can argue that even if it is the same chemical it 
could be a different process - or the purpose or formulation could be different 
- and there could be potential hazards to wildlife and the environment 
Unfortunately it is still opoi house to go to Taiwan and pick up something, 
say it is identical, and place it for registration."'^
27
Consultative Document: Paragrqdi 7 3 . 
Consultative Document: Paragrq>h 4.18. 
Response to CD, BAA, 30/12/85. 
Response lo CD, FoE, 30/12/85.
“  Response to CD, AAWNTG, 19/12/85. 
® Interview, BAA, Peterborough 29/1/88. 
3* Interview, BASIS, London 27/1/88.
31 Interview, BAA, Peterborough 29A/88.
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Regulations 4(2) and 4(3) prohibited the sale and supply of a pesticide unless it 
had been approved (under Regulation 5) and a consult to the activity had been made 
(under Regulation 6(b)) and any coiKiitions of approval and conditions of ctmsent to an 
activity had been complied with. Conditions could be added at any time.
Regulation 7 related to the seizure and disposal of pesticides, and 7(2) said that 
"...if any pesticide had been imported into the United Kingdom in contravention of any 
of the specified prohibitions or of a condition of any ^ ro v a l or of any consent, either 
of the hfinisters may require that it shall be removed mit of the United Kingdom". 
There was no debate on these regulations in Parliament, and they would be amongst 
the first to come into force, on October 6fii 1986.
The Draft Data Requirements (MAFF 1986i) noted the procedure for identical 
imports sqiplications for approval (see Appmidix 8.1a)," and the guidance on 
information needed (see Appendix 8.1b)."
8.1.3 Conditions Applied to Pesticides in the Approvals Process
Efficacy Data Requirements. The Consultative Document outlined that anyone 
seeking qiproval for a pesticide product would have to produce information 
demonstrating that it would be safe, efficacious and humar^. Guidance would be 
issued on requirements from time to time." Under the PSPS, safety information was 
required (see Appendix 8.2), and the statutory requirements for safety data would not 
differ substantially fiom those hitherto £q>plied under the PSPS." At this stage 
humaneness data had not been specified, and indeed humaneness was not defined. 
Humaneness would however be a new requirement for products used against vertebrate 
pests." Appendix 8.3 gives the suggested aspects of vertebrate behaviour to be 
considered when assessing humaneness contained in tiK document A brief examination 
of evidence on safety requirements and humaneness is given here before going on in 
more detail to examine evidence on efficacy requirements.
F6E wanted safety and efficacy functions kept sqiarate so as to reduce "...the dear 
conflict between commercial considerations and the hazard aqiects involved in the 
production of pesticides". On safety data, they thought requirements should be 
expanded to indude long-term studies of low-levd exposure and toxicological data 
from oflier countries, lilm the US and Sweden." The AAWNTG" added tiiat further 
details were needed to ascertain diat safety data requirements would not give less 
protection than the Notification of New Substances Regulations 1982, and codes of 
practice under them. The London Food Commission also wanted separate safety and
33 Draft Data Requirements, Introduction IV: 35-39.
33 Draft Data Requirements: Appendix 3.
3* Consultative Document Pnagraph 4 3 .
33 Consultative Document: Paragraph 4A
33 Ccmsultative Document: Paragraph 4.11.
33 Response to CD, FoE, 30A2/85.
3* Reqxmse to CD, AAWNTG, 19A2/85.
144
efficacy assessment by transferring assessment to the HSE, saying that a single 
committee for both raised concerns that health considerations would be compromised 
by their agronomic implications. The protection of public health should be MAFF’s 
major objective. Safety testing should be earned out under the direction of the ACP 
because of lax standards of commercial toxicity testing. The testing should be paid for 
by the industry. The Ministry should be able to initiate clearance îçîplications and 
provide toxicological data for novel application methods which reduced pesticide 
usage, again paid for by the industry, because if it was left to manufacturers these 
methods would be slow to be introduced and limited to major crops." The RSPB 
thought present PSPS safety data requirements inadequate for determining safety and 
wildlife impact "Agriculture, horticulture and forestry" should not be considered a 
single field of use because there were forestry products like bio-control agents not 
suitable for agriculture and horticulture. Experimental data should be derived from 
named vertebrate species (including birds) representing those the product may affect 
for example sparrows and starlings instead of chicks and ducklings. Greater attention 
should be given to pesticide specificity, for example to target insects, target plants, and 
to the degree of insecticidal activity for herbicides and fungicides.*® The RSNC wanted 
a test on volatility under field conditions included; and data on wildlife hazards to 
include any harmful effects on wild plants.*^
As concerned humaneness, the BPCA worried that "...something will have to be 
done about humaneness. The industry needs all the assistance it can get to combat 
rodent infestation. Fm worried that in the CD there is a lot of reference to proving 
humaneness. I don't know how MAFF are going to do this".*' By contrast, for the 
BAA "There's no humaneness burden in agrochemicals".*'
The efficacy data requirements would, according to MAFF, be a "...new area for 
UK pesticide control". efficacy criteria were to be based on the internationally 
accepted definition of efficacy as the ability of a pesticide product to fulfil adequately 
the claims made for it on the (proposed) label To obviate the risk of unreasonably low 
performance label claims pesticides would be subject to a minimum efficacy standard, 
in that the use of the product would be required to give a consistent, well-defined 
benefit
"Hie Government has noted that in the wood preservation field and in certain 
otiier areas of use, the product label is not seen by the- purdiaser of the treated 
material or service. In these circumstances the test of efficacy may need to be 
related to advertised claims or public expectation".**
»  Response to CD. AAWNTG. 18A2/85.
3^  to CD, RSPB, 30A2/8S.
41 Response to CD, RSNC, 18A2/85.
43 Interview, BPCA, London 17/2/86.
43 Interview, BAA, Peterborough 29A/88.
44 Consultative Document: Paragnq>h 4 5 .
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The burden of the efficacy requirement was felt eqiecially by producers of non- 
agricultural chemicals. The BPCA argued that the consumer should be able to decide 
efficacy in the field: "If someone produces a non-effective pesticide, no-one will buy it 
a second time anyway, but we will have to spend a lot more money in proving 
efficacy. It could be good for some people - jobs for the boys in the Ministry".*' They 
objected to the principle of comparative efficacy. Approval should not be refused or 
withdrawn simply because a more efficacious product was claimed to exist There was 
a ladL of efficacy expertise in MAFF for public health and other products. These 
products were not registered under ACAS and companies had developed the required 
erqiertise. The extra finances to be raised by these companies were unnecessary and 
unjustifiable.** The AEA said that "The Ministry says they don’t want people to spend 
money on a chemical that isn't any good. I said to them [in response] it’s none of 
their business determining this - they don't make any effort to tell people not to buy 
sweets because they are not effective nutrients!"." The BWPA suggested [in response] 
that MAFF contact the Princes Risborough laboratories vdiich determine efficacy 
standards for wood preservatives: "MAFF seem to have skipped this entirely because 
they don't appreciate the difference between agrochemicals and wood preservatives".*' 
The Consumers Association noted that claims for many garden chemicals could 
lead the gardener to expect them to be 100% efficient, that is to kill all pests. Home 
gardeners had higher expectations yet used weaker, less effective formulations. They 
had evidence of pesticides whidi were ineffective for their intended uses. Guidelines 
on claims and efficacy criteria were needed for garden chemicals.*'
Efficacy was to be related to the individual formulation, recommendations for use 
and label claims, and rate, method and time of application. Efficacy would not 
necessarily imply high absolute levels of effectiveness in control of a "pest". A product 
with only modest activity or claims may have offsetting advantages, for example less 
effect on non-target organisms. There would often be reasons why a range of products 
with differing levels of effectiveness would be acceptable, so minimum absolute levels 
of effectivmess would not be set and there would be no requirement for performance 
to match fiiat of a standard reference product Guidance on the provision of efficacy 
data would need to be discussed in depth with interested parties."
The RSPB endorsed the decisions not to define minimum absolute levels of 
control, and not to make efficacy the overriding consideration. From the conservation 
viewpoint a product of modest activity with less affect on non-target organisms was 
dearly of advantage to a non-target species which might, in turn, be a source of food
43 Biterview, BPCA, London 17/2/86.
4« to CD, BPCA, 30/12/85.
43 Interview, AEA, London 10/2/86.
44 Interview, BWPA, London 20.1.86.
43 Respome to CD, CA, 9A/86.
30 Consultative Document: P a rag n ^  4.6.
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for other wildlife.'^
Certain principles would be applied; evidence would have to be obtained by 
scientificAechnical observation and measurement This could arise fiom planned trials, 
but results of practical use would ofien be an essential part of product evaluation. Lade 
of complaints, customer testimonials and anecdotal evidence would not be acceptable." 
Factors on which evidence could be required for evaluation is given in Appendix 8.4." 
Evidence gmerated in other countries could be acceptable if considered rdevant to UK 
conditions, as could evidence fiom a related use, crop or pest in comparable 
conditions.'* Efficacy data would normally only be required afier the trials permit 
stage."
The BAA noted that detailed guidelines were urgently needed so diat products 
could be advanced for iq)proval without delay. There was a lack of efficacy expertise 
in, for example, industrial, public health and the domestic garden market, and guidance 
on efficacy data would need to be discussed with interested parties. If all products 
currently sold for garden use required efficacy testing it was doubtful the system could 
cope. They expected a "tum-around” time of 12 weeks, now that a fee was to be 
charged. Definitions of "minimum efficacy standard" and "consistait well-defined 
benefit" were needed, and discussions were required to ensure that the proposals were 
workable." UKASTA also focussed on the resources for processing triplications: 
"..how does a small team cope with upgrading 3000 products in a 12-month period 
even assuming the manufacturers have got all their material together? The process will 
have to be phased"."
The CA thought that if the efficacy criteria were applied to home and garden 
chemicals, a "well defined benefit” would be difficult to quantify. Criteria specific to 
these areas were needed. Would approval be granted on the basis of agricultural or 
horticultural formulation tests?; would differences in application techniques be 
accounted for, for example the watering can or aerosol spray?" The RSPB welcomed 
the collection of efficacy data through scientific/technical observation and 
measurement, and hoped that evidence of impacts on wildlife gained in other countries 
would also be admitted." The Soil Association noted that "could include" meant many 
of the factors would not be taken into account in practice, so a list of factors always 
important œough to be included was required, important factors were left out and 
definite examples should be given, for example with (ii) (information about persistence
3^  Reqxxnse to CD, RSPB, 30A2/8S.
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in plants and soil) and (vi) (assessment of spray drift potential and volatility). The 
guidelines should be more detailed and comprehensive."
As a result of introducing a requirement for statutory evidence of efficacy, the 
ACAS scheme would be terminated on 30 April 1986, and applications for approval 
would not be accepted after 31 January 1986. The ACAS "approved products" book 
would no longer he published, and manufacturers were invited to re-register approved 
uses so as to qualify for full Approval under tire regulations.*  ^ Such re-registration 
would be allowed up to 31 January 1986 for products with ACAS s^roval in 1984/5, 
and products which had been approved during or since 1980 and had not had approval 
withdrawn."
As regarded introductory arrangements, products already on the market would be 
regarded as approved, as would products with PSPS Commercial Clearance plus ACAS 
Approval or an appropriate BSI standard (for example some wood preservatives). 
Products with only PSPS Commercial or Provisional Commercial Clearance would be 
regarded as Provisionally Aj^iroved until further data were supplied. PSPS Trials or 
Limited Clearances would be valid until termination of the PSPS, provided other 
Government conditions already set were met, and any further applications would be 
considered under the new arrangements."
The BAA wanted to. know how products with some recommendations eligible for 
approval but some only for provisional sqiproval would be treated; and what timescale 
would be allowed for cleared-only products to gain ^rovaL** The BPCA said drat the 
arrangements could cause a major problem for consumers. Many older pesticide 
formulations used by farmers, local authorities and pest control companies, such as 
warfarin, lindane, fonitrothion and pyrethrins would have to produce efficacy data. If 
the data were unreasonably expensive to produce, these products, often formulated by 
smaller companies, would disappear. This would concentrate power in the hands of the 
multinationals, limit consumer choice, and make pesticides more eiqiensive. If new 
data were not supplied, and approvals lapsed. Certificates of Free Sale might not be 
issued, which would affect the eiqxirt trade of smaller formulators.*' FoE felt that 
products already on the maiket should be re-tested so that products without ACAS 
approval would not be assumed to be sqiproved.** The Consumer's Association noted 
that home garden chemicals were only PSPS cleared so would be regarded as 
provisionally approved. As gardeners should have as wide a choice of chemicals as 
possible, they worried that providing efficacy data for full jqjproval of garden products
4® Reqxmse to CD, SA, 30/11/85.
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would be regarded as a low priority by manufacturers. Manufacturers should therefore 
be encouraged and helped to obtain full clearance for tiiese chemicals." The NSCA 
regretted the "deemed to be approved" clause and wanted a five-year deadline for 
review of existing products with PSPS clearance only." The RSPB were not satisfied 
that an chemicals in use were safe for wildlife such diat the introductory arrangements 
would lead to unsatisfactory chemicals receiving approval" The RSNC wanted 
information on effects on wildlife to be made specific, including references to indirect 
effects like secondary poisoning through die food chain.'®
Regulation 5 took powers to give approval in relation to a pesticide (as weU as to 
authorise use, supply, storage, sale and advertisement of a pesticide; to place and 
amend conditions on an approval; and to review, revoke or suspaid an approval). The 
regulation did not deal with those aspects of the new arrangements such as efficacy 
and other information requirements on notifiers of new products, which were to be 
settled by administrative arrangements separately but to the same timetable. PRSD 
would be doing much of this work with the SSC. The SSC would continue to assess 
technical data and advise on the extent and type of test data needed to judge safety 
and efficacy. A working group to the ACP which was already in existence, was to be 
constituted formally under the new controls.'^  This was die Medical and Toxicological 
Panel which would advise on the impact of pesticides on human health, and cm 
toxicological test methods. There were calls finom sectional interests for certain 
eiqiertise and for their own organisation to be represented in these bodies (see section 
8.4).
New approvals and conditions were to be published in die Gazettes as they arose.
The Draft Data Recpiirements (MAFF, 1986i) gave guidelines to be followed in 
submitting data for approval. Not all of the guidelines had to be followed, but this 
should be discmssed as early as possible with the PRSD. New active ingredients were 
to follow the guidelines already mentioned (Appendix 8.2). The document eiqianded 
considerably on these requirements to 200 pages, with sections on toxicology, residues, 
wildlife and the environmenl classificaticm and labelling, and biological agents cdassed 
as pesticides. Efficacy recpiirements were separated into two groups: pesticides for 
agriculture, Imrticulture, home and garden, focxl storage, animal husbandry, and 
herbicndes used on industrial sites and in or near water, and pesticides for public 
hygiene, household, wood preserving, and masonry biocides. The ratio of pages 
devoted to each was 50:3. More detailed guidance on humaneness data was not given 
in this document
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Applications for sqiproval would also come in from manufacturers, for use 
extensions, and from users, for identical imports, minor uses and tank mixes. The 
Committees (AGP and SSC) would be involved in new active ingredient applications; 
PRSD in such things as extensions of use, off-label approvals and tank mixes; and 
PICD in identical products intended for use by the importer. Access to the approvals 
procedure was Aerefbre being afforded to the user, and new data would not have to be 
supplied.
In October, after the end of the period which this chapter covers, MAFF was 
having to contend with the loss of experienced officials who were being poached by 
pesticide manufacturers to help them with their extra work loads under FEPA (ENDS, 
1986). The requirement for efficacy data and fees came in on October 6, and so a 
whole year’s worth of applications arrived at PRSD on 30 September. Nevertheless 
PRSD did not advertise for 6 new recruits until April 1987."
Also in October, a complete list of products approved was published (MAFF 
1986j). Over the next few years details of approved uses were to be added, including 
off label uses, until this volume comprised a full "compendium of tpprovals".
On 21 Novernber 1986 the first two new approvals announcements were made in 
the Gazettes. The entries were very short, and gave the product, approval number, 
approval holder, area of use, type of pesticide, crop to be used on, and "special 
conditions" including the batch numbers tire ^ ro v a l related to.
On 28 November there was an announcement of changes to approvals and a full 
review of Captafol: all approvals were to become provisional, with an expiry date of 
31 October 1987; approvals for use on strawberries and leeks and for aerial spraying 
were withdrawn; approvals for use on cereal crops were to be made conditional on 
there being no application after the ear had emerged. A full review was to be 
undertaken, for completion by 31 October 1987, and anyone wishing to contribute data 
were to make sure it re£u;hed PRSD by 31 December 1986. Also on 28 November a 
partial review (toxicological) of Captan and Folpet was announced.
Irformation Disclosure. In August 1985 the DoE issued a discussion paper on 
information disclosure (DoE, 1985), and in April 1986 fiiey followed it with a rqport 
on Public Access to Envirorunental Information (DoE, 1986).
The CD noted that Paragraph 9 of the PSPS undertook that data submitted for 
jpproval would be treated as confidential and would not be used "...without the 
notifier’s consent excqit in cormection with the notification to which it relates"." The 
RCEP had criticized the "refusal to release information on grounds of confidentiality" 
in that it "tends to become a reflex action", and this had:
"..Jed Government on occasion to refuse to give any informatiori at all about
the safety characteristics of a product when the rule might more reasonably be
33 Interview, DTI, London llA l/87 .
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used to apply to the raw data, and on odier occasions to publish detailed
analyses of the characteristics of a product to meet public concern about it".'*
With the acceptance of the "guiding principles" of the RCEP that there should be "a 
presumption in favour of unrestricted access for the public to information which the 
pollution control authorities obtain or licence by virtue of their statutory powers", there 
would accordmgly be no attempt to carry over Paragraph 9 of the PSPS into the 
legislation or to introduce the standard clause whidi makes it an offence for a public 
servant to disdose any information received in his administration of the legislation."
As well as publishing new approvals and amoidments in the London and 
Edinburgh Gazettes, a compendium of approvals, annual ACP rqiorts, usage data, 
WPPR reports, WHS reports and incidents reports, there were proposals for (a) 
publication of a Safety, Efficacy and Hurrianeness Data Evaluation and (b) access to 
raw data, of interest here.
A full evaluation of a product would be made publidy available when it achieved 
provisional g^roval. It would be based on the evaluation document currently prepared 
by the SSC when it considered its recommendation to the ACP,'* but revised to take 
into account the further SSC and ACP debates; additional data which may have been 
called for, any changed views as a result of the latter, and still further outstanding 
studies, which was die information the ACP had before it at the point of making its 
recommendation to Mnisters."
The BAA noted that diese proposals went "...far beyond what was tabled and 
agreed in the discussion between us on the *PRD Publication*"" (see Appendix 85). 
There was still a lack of understanding of the nature of the industrial property 
companies sought to protect. It was not possible to patent all the elements which made 
up intellectual property." The proposals went beyond what was done in most other 
countries and were substantially more comprehensive dian had bem discussed. The 
BAA suggested reverting to die "Draft PRD Publication". The draft was consistent 
with what was acceptable elsewhere, for example in Canada, inhere it was actually 
written by die submitting company and approved/edited by the regulatory authority. If 
the "Draft PRD Publication" was still proposed to be replaced, the BAA would expect 
similar opportunities to discuss the intended replacemenL They also expected that 
companies would see and comment on proposed publications." The BPCA had no 
objection provided die information was "...scientifically presented. References to tests
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on animals should be avoided"/^ FoE welcomed the release of the data.® AAWNTG 
wanted clarification on what was meant by "full evaluation" as regarded information 
disclosure, and an assurance that the list of information would be comprehensively 
followed in every case of information request®
Commercial interests were to be protected in two ways:
"First, througji a discussion with the notifier of the presentation of the 
formulation details so that enough is included for the purpose of the product 
to be understood, but not so much that any valuable proceM secrets are 
revealed; second, fiirough a continued requirement on notifiers of competing 
or duplicate products to present eifiier their own data, or evidence of an 
agreement that drey have the owner’s authority to use die data already on file.
The ACP’s evaluation will not be accepted as the basis of approval for 
competing products".**
The BAA noted that those submitting data should be required to affirm that diey 
actually owned the data and should warrant diat they had not knowingly infringed 
patents in gaining it, because ev@i where UK patents could be obtained, worldwide 
protection for the company would be lacking, due to countries having no, limited or 
short patents and no intellectual property rights. Their concern was to minimise the 
harm that might be done to export markets for UK products. The need for protection 
extended beyond "formulation details". They were worried tiiat the ACP’s evaluation 
could be used to sqiprove pesticides in other countries.®
The Government would not generally allow access to die raw data (study rqxirts) 
obtained by virtue of their statutory powers, believing that the full evaluation provided 
the information most enquirers would need, and that this would keep problems of 
commercial confidentiality to a minimum.® However departments would exceptionally 
agree to give access to raw data if tire SSC viewed an triplication as scientifically 
justified, provided an undertaking (which would be enforceable) to respect 
confidentiality and preclude commercial use was given by the researcher.®
The BAA said that discussion and clarification was necessary on (a) establishing 
the good faith of the researcher seeking access; (b) the method by which 
"commercially sensitive" information would be withheld/protected; (c) the means by 
which publication of opinions based on access to the data might be constrained; (d) the 
procedures for informing companies of the access request and grounds for it; (e) the 
necessity to ensure "raw data" were accompanied by evaluations so that they were not 
mislftariing; (f) the need for Departments to act together in affording access; (g) the
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method by which access would actually take place; and (h) the need for clarification of 
what was meant by "raw data (study reports)", since this might imply access to 
company overviews, ancillary material and linkage with such areas as metabolism and 
residues." FoE welcomed access to raw data but not to its release in "exceptional" 
circumstances and at MAFF’s discretion. It wanted automatic foil disclosure, avoiding 
half measures which would reassure neither the public nor the industry. This was 
reasonable as there were adequate safeguards against information pirating ”  AAWNTG 
wanted to know the basis on which the AGP would decide "scientific justification" for 
access to raw data. There should be a simple and accessible tqipeal procedure laid 
down in detail"
The CFoI considered only exceptional access to studies unnecessarily restrictive 
and an impediment to legitimate enquiry and debate about pesticide safety. As the 
Government no longer accepted that commercial considerations presented an 
insuperable obstacle to its release it was surprising that it would normally be withheld. 
As access would be discretionary, legitimate requests would be refused. As the SSC 
was responsible for many of the evaluations which could be challenged or criticised it 
was inappropriate that they should have the discretion to refuse triplications for access. 
The SSC would be deciding on the "scientific justification" of its critics’ arguments. 
Access to full studies would finequently be necessary, as scimtific disagreements on 
issues of pesticide safety were common, not exceptional: many competent authorities 
had reached different decisions to those of the AGP on the same pesticides. In 
addition, access would not only be sought with a view to serious challenge of 
manufacturers testing or an official decision: it might be sought when a group 
attempted to advise an individual reporting an ill-effect on whether it was likely to 
have been caused by a particular pesticide. Evaluations would often not be detailed 
enough for this.
If the Govemm«it feared time-consuming requests from incompetent researchers, 
die volume and complexity of the data would be quite sufficiort to deter than. 
Enquirers should not be required to demonstrate a strong case for disputing a decision 
before being allowed access. Britidi people could obtain information on pesticides 
from die US Government, and should be able to obtain such from dieir own 
Government Another objection was diat no information at all on the safety of 
pesticides now in use would be disclosed for at least a decade (when they would 
qiparently be up for review) whereas most enquiries would relate to these. These 
restrictions were incompatible with the Government’s stated policy of favouring 
"unrestricted" public access. The inevitable conclusion was either that the Government 
was not acting in good faith or that it lacked confidence that safety evaluations would
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withstand scrutiny.'^ The CA, l^ d life  Link and the RSNC were likewise disappointed 
at die discretionary and exceptional limits to disclosure: it should be exceptional to 
refuse a request, not to grant i t””"  The RSPB said it was prepared to accept the 
limits on access to raw data provided (a) the evaluations were adequate to make 
scientific judgements on, and (b) the raw data were available to the NCC and ITE 
officers in the normal course of their duties (where confidentiality was protected by the 
Official Secrets Act).” The Soil Association said that to restrict access to die raw data 
at die same time as admitting there was debate between SSC and AGP was to deny 
access to data which might have led the AGP to nearly ban a pesticide, so denying 
experts a chance to decide whether the ACP made the right choice.”
Regulation 8 said that (1) "Ministers may, at the request of any person, make 
available to him for inflection, on such conditions as they may determine, an 
evahiatiorL.."; and (2) "If a person satisfies the Ministers that an evaluation made 
available to him for inflection...gives insufficient information for his purposes, the 
hhnisters may make available for his inspection, at such times and on such conditions 
as may be determined by the Minister, the study reports (or odier data) supplied in 
support of an application for the approval". It went on to allow for (3) fees for data 
and (4) prohibition of commercial use or publication (widiout Ministerial etherization) 
of die data. Further conditions laying out fiecific arrangements for the release and 
protection of data would be decided administratively.
There was no debate in Parliament over and above previous evidence given.
After the end of the period covered in this chfiter, on 3 February 1987, it was 
announced that the first evaluations for disclosure would shortly be avmlable. A 
description of disclosure details and safeguards was circulated (MAFF 1987; see 
Appendix 8.6).
Fees. On 16 July a new deregulatory White P fier was published (DTI, 1985) 
which would remove burdens imposed by planning, tax, health and safety and other 
rules fiom small and medium sized businesses (thereby encouraging development and 
creating jobs). In it the Government had plans to set up a new system to assess tiie 
compliance costs of legislative proposals - with the aim of stemming the flow of new 
regulations. Officials in each department were to conduct these assessments, 
coordinated by a central task force in Cabinet Office.
Also in it was a single paragraph on pollution control policy: development should 
be allowed to proceed without onerous conditions where it was uncertain that 
environmental problems would occur. "If subsequently there are shown to be serious
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environmental problems, the local authority could take action against nuisance under 
the public health and control of pollution legislation". According to ENDS (1985c) this 
sentence explained the DoE’s failure to issue promised proposals to give local 
authorities anticipatory control powers for non-combustion industrial processes which 
cause air pollution. It looked like reactive statutory nuisance legislation would apply.
The deregulation drive could affect EC environmental policy. A pf?er sent to foe 
EC, drawn up in consultation with foe CBI, the Institute Of Directors and Chambers of 
Commerce (attempting to influence EC proposals on deregulation to be presented to 
the European Council) suggested scrfrping or amending several proposed or existing 
directives in the environmental and workplace safety fields (ENDS, 1985c).
The CD noted that foe Act enabled foe charging of fees and that principles would 
be settled by Ministers with the consent of foe Treasury after consultation with 
representative organisations (BAA, BPCA, BWPA and NFU). The Minister could (a) 
charge an applicant a fee for the administrative expenses of processing the application 
for approval as well as a fee towards foe cost of carrying out any examinations and 
tests to enable a decision on an approval; and (b) charge fees to sudi persons as be 
considered a^ropriate from time to time in respect of collection and processing of 
information (for example pesticide usage surveys and formulation monitoring), and of 
monitoring the effects of pesticide use (for examjde residue and wildlife incident 
surveillance). The document noted that "The Government considers that such persons 
should be fiie holders of approvals".”
The BAA believed that the fee charged for an approval should reflect the costs of 
processing, but suggested a graduated scale of charges commensurate with processing 
demands: higher for a new active ingredient, but less for formulation changes, or 
reviewing or upgrading a provisional approval. They were however concerned at the 
prospect of Ministers carrying out tests at the expense of the notifying company, 
possibly implying double testing, and raising foe question of data ownership." If data 
were generated by laboratories conforming to Good Laboratory Practice, whence arose 
the need to carry out work elsewhere? If extra work was required the company should 
do it so data ownership complications did not arise. On the levy for monitoring they 
questioned how much they should pay towards what was considered a Government 
responsibility for the public benefit This activity could be open-ended, and the 
AC3VSSC should have a role in endorsing survey and mentoring work.” The BPCA’s 
response generally concurred with this, and they worried that the provision would be 
an open cheque to any Mhiister seeking to justify work at laboratories threatened with 
cut-backs.^" The RSNC welcomed fees for monitoring and surveillance.*®
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In considering the level and structure of reasonable fees:
"...the Government has been mindful of the need to recoup reasonable costs 
without placing an undue burden on industry, and in particular on the smaller 
companies. For this reason the possibility of a flat rate charge per g^yproval is 
not favoured on the grounds that it would place an unfair burden on 
companies with smaller turnovers and might discourage pesticide 
development".
Two types of fees were proposed (a) a standard charge at approval and (b) an annual 
charge based on a percentage of the annual domestic turnover of all approved and 
provisionally approved pesticides of the company concerned.*® It was proposed that, 
taken together, the fees should recoup foe total approval administration costs plus 50% 
of the costs of information collection and mcmitoring. The total cost would be of the 
order of £2.0 million. The standard charge would be about £1000. The annual charge 
to companies would be of the order of 0.4% of their UK turnover (based on £538 
million domestic turnover for the UK pesticide industry).
The standard fee would be charged on all applications after bringing the 
regulations into force. The first annual charge would be based on the sqrproval holders 
turnover in the 12 months commencing with that date.
The BAA considered that since fees were to be charged they would want to see 
jqrplications dealt with in 3 months. They wanted an exact costing of the activities of 
approvals and monitoring. Fees charged for qrprovals should reflect actual costs 
incurred in processing each application. Regarding the turnover levy, the £538 million 
figure seemed too high, and double counting and inclusion of sales at different points 
in the distribution chain may have occurred. BAA members rqx)rted £345.9 million in 
1984 and the difference was unlikely to be accounted for by non BAA member 
sales.*® AAWNTG said that fees should be higher than simple "cost" on the principle 
that those wim create a risk or potential risk should manage, and therefore pay, for 
it*" The RSPB noted that charging should apply to home manufacturers, foreign 
manufacturers and distributors of imported products.*®
The regulations did not deal with new arrangements on foe levying of fees, which 
were to be settled by administrative arrangements sq>arately but to foe same timetable.
After the period covered by this c h a ^ r ,  on 18 January 1989, the Pesticides (Fees 
and Enforcement) Bill was presented in foe Houses of Parliament replacing the fees 
sections of FEPA with more specific provisions, presumably as a result of 
administrative experience and perhaps difficulties. It was passed ((Zap 27) on 19 June. 
The Act empowered setting and charging fees specific to "foe cost of handling and 
evaluating applications" in place of "in respect of the administrative expenses of
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processing". It also enabled requiring of payment in respect of the balance of any costs 
whidi had not been recovered as well as collecting and processing information and 
monitoring. Ministers would lawfully be able to use the revenues generated by the levy 
on turnover in order to meet the costs of evaluating p lica tio n s before an approval 
had been given, as well as those arising after afp ival; and could lawfully use the 
same revenues to carry out tests considered necessary to determine whether an 
approval should be granted. The FEPA provision to consult with organisations and 
treasury about amounts was supplemented by provisions that payment could be 
calculated on turnover of a single pesticide or all approved pesticides held by one 
person; that M iniers could use any method to calculate payment if evidence of 
turnover had not been supplied; and that Ministers could permit phased, amended, set 
off, waived or refunded payments.
8.1.4 Conditions Applied to Pesticide Use Within the Approvals Process
Form of Controls on Use. As^'regaided labelling, just as the details of approval 
were outside the regulations, so the details of the labels, integral to approval, were not 
specified in regulations. Statutory items to be included on the label would be settled 
administratively.
The CD set out that under the PSPS, ^Tplicants seeking clearance were required to 
agree a label with the technical secretariat to ensure conformance with the Farm and 
Garden Chemicals Act 1967 (active ingredient to be stated on the label), the CPLDS 
Regulations 1984, the Poisonous Substances in Agriculture Regulations 1984 
(protective clothing requirements on label) and AGP recommendations, and to ensure 
that uncleared uses were not being recommended.*® This would continue under the 
new arrangonents and it would be a condition of sqpproval diat a product was supplied 
only under the label agreed by Govemmoit Any statutory conditions attached to an 
2^ >proval would have to be dearly stated. Pending revision of all labels, discussions 
with suppliers would agree a simple means of indicating which conditions on existing 
labels had become statutory requirements.*”  There was to be a new Labelling and 
(Container Design Panel set up to advise the SSC, which would indude sectional 
representation. It would advise on "problems arising from labelling", amongst odier 
things.*" There were great demands for representation on this Pand (see section 8.4).
The CD noted that finom 1987 users would be required to comply with specific 
obligations (a) to use a pestidde only for its approved usé as stated on the labd or in 
published lists; (b) to observe any stated maximum sqrplication rates and minimum 
dilution rates; and (c) to observe other approval conditions relating to use, for example 
harvest intervals. From 1988 there would be an obligation to use only notified
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adjuvants and tank mixes. However guidance on the selection and use of alternative 
sq>plication techniques would be provided in a statutory code of practice on the 
agricultural and horticultural use of pesticides, as would guidance on good spraying 
practices and odier information, drawn finom existing guidance and other codes of 
practice such as the Code of Good Agricultural Practice under the COPA 1975.*® 
"This combination of specific obligations and guidance in a code of practice is 
proposed in order to ensure that the effective control of use will not inhibit users from 
developing more efficient means of controlling pests, for example with lower dose 
rates or new application methods".*** The tension was largely about whether labels or 
guidance would be used to control certain activities.
The relevant regulations were as follows. Regulation 4(5) stated that no person 
would use a pesticide unless the pesticide had been g^roved (under Regulation 5) and 
a consent to tire activity had been made (under Regulation 6(c)).
Regulation 4(5)(b)(i) stated that no person would use a pesticide unless the 
conditions of approval relating to use had been complied with. This was the regulation 
which could include conditions on amounts to be used (like maximum dose rates and 
minimum dilution rates) and application methods, and would not come in until January 
1 1988.
Regulation 4(5)(b)(ii) further stated that no persœ would use a pesticide unless tire 
conditions of consents to an activity had been complied with. (From October 6th 
1986).
Regulation 6(c)(i) consented to the use of pesticides by notice in the Gazettes, 
subject to conditions set out in Sclredule 3 and any further conditions that might be 
specified by such a notice (From October 6th 1986).
Schedule 3(1) provided a general obligation on all users to take all reasonable 
precautions to protect tire healtii of human beings, creatures and plants, and to 
safeguard the environment generally (fiom October 6th 1986).
Schedule 3(2) provided for controls on the mixing of two or more pesticides (finom 
1 January 1989).
Schedule 3(3) provided for controls on the use of pesticides with adjuvants (from 
1 January 1989).
Ccmditions could be added at any time.
In the Cormnons debate (HC, 1986), Mrs Fenner said that adjuvants used to be 
cleared throu^ the PSPS, but no longer fell within the definition of pesticide under 
the Act The intention was for Harpenden to continue to evaluate adjuvants and publish 
a list suitable for use with approved pesticides. Users would be fiee to use any 
adjuvant on tire label or in the MAFF list, provided there were no restrictions or 
counter-indications on the adjuvant label.
10* Consultative Document' Paragnph 75. 
110 Consultative Document Paragnph 63.
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In the Lords debate (HL, 1986), Lord Skelmersdale (Q , for the Government, 
noted that a list of compatible chemicals for use in the same tank would be published 
by the Ministry so there would be no need to go into the intricacies of putting this 
information on the label.
It was proposed initially to prepare a statutory code of practice on the use of 
pesticides in agriculture. This code would be based on existing guidance to farmers in 
leaflets produced by the BCPC, the agriculture departments and the HSE. The draft 
code would be published for consultation after the regulations.***
The Draft Code of Practice (MAFF, 1986f) gave guidance on the selection of 
pesticides, which included (a) referring to the "Compendium of Approvals" to check 
the pesticide was approved for the intended use,**' and (b) studying the label and 
following the manufacturers recommendations for use.**' Thus it was advised that the 
manufacturers recommendations were followed; it was not a statutory requirement 
However some parts of the label, some of which might have been recommended by 
manufacturers, could be made statutory.
The Draft Data Requirements (MAFF, 1986i) gave a list of information which 
manufacturers should include on the label. These included (a) a restriction of use 
phrase, for example "For Use Only As An Insecticide", (b) a brief statement on 
biological use, for example 'Tor The Control Of Aphids And Red Spider Mites On 
Top Fruit", and (c) directions for use. What the latter might consist in was not 
specified, but was to be discussed between the applicant and the PRSD.
After the end of the period covered in this chapter, in January 1988, a PKZD
interviewee reported that a press release had just come out explaining which parts Of
the label should be regarded as statutory requirements and therefore might lead to
criminal charges if not followed. Powers were available to put all things on the label, 
for example minimum dilution rates. However the decision was that minimum dilution 
rates would be a statutory requirement. Much would be advice on how to apply 
and would not be statutory.***
Amounts o f Pesticide to be Used. The BAA noted that it would be necessary to 
spell out the reason for observing "minimum dilution rate", being the health and safety 
implications of higher concentrations of active ingredient in spray. It might be better 
expressed as a maximum concentration allowable.**' The AEA noted that where 
maximum application rates and minimum dilution rates were set, and for what purpose, 
could inhibit technical progress.*** Wildlife Link welcomed the specific obligations, but 
felt fiiat all pesticides should have a maximum application rate and total number of
Consultative Document: Paragraph 7.2. 
Draft Code ùf Practice: Paragraph 42 . 
Draft Code of Practice: Paragrq)h 43 .
"4 Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 15/1/88.
Response to CD, BAA, 30A2/85.
^^ 4 Response to CD, AEA, 18A2/85.
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applications, so üiat the amount of a pesticides in a particular area should not exceed 
an oivironmentally acceptable level.**'
Also after the end of the period covered by this chapter, on 2 January 1988, the 
head of PRSD branch**' explained how they had tackled reduced volume. A group of 
toxicologists got together
"...to answer the question ’could we reduce volume safely?’ We had two 
objectives, (1) to come out with a reduced volume COP, and (2) to have a 
tolerance bifot into the label Because manufacturers have to prove it’s 100%
OK toxicologically and we couldn’t get round the fact that they would have to 
produce a toxicological assessment to put it on the label, they decided the 
Code would say that ’the farmer must read the label and (1) if it says the 
compound is toxic or very toxic they cannot use reduced rates or (2) if it says 
you cannot use the pesticide widi a hand held lance or without protective 
clothing, then don’t use reduced volume. (3) - All the rest you can use at 
reduced volume provided you wear gloves and if in a tractor without a cab 
use boots and gloves and protective clothing. If you have to use a face shield, 
then you also have to use it when spraying with a hand-held lance’. The 
rationale was that these very simple precautions give tenfold increased 
protection so you can reduce the volume by ten times. It is practical - the 
farmer just had to divide by ten. And it doesn’t exclude CDA".
AppUcadon Methods to be Used. The CD did not mention application methods, 
presumably because it had been decided to provide guidance in the Code of Practice, 
and not on the label
The BAA noted that foeie was no reference to application techniques, and that the 
means of application could affect safety and efficacy and should be specified on the 
label.**' The BPCA asked whether "ai^ rroved use" included approved methods of 
iq^licatioiL*'* The Soil Association noted diat as soon as adequate equipment existed, 
the obligations should include a stated droplet size for a particular use, the {diasing out 
of hydraulic nozzles and the introduction of more efficient and safer equipment*”
The CD did however note than an Application Technology Panel would be set up 
to advise the SSC on application techniques in relation to new developments, 
environmental safety and efficacy. Membership of this Panel would include sectional 
interests. There were wide caUs for representation on the Panel which would decide 
details. The Panel would presumably formulate the guidance which would appear in 
the Code of Practice.
The Draft Code of Practice (MAFF, 1986f) gave guidance on the selection of 
application techniques; "...pesticides must be applied by the means which best meets 
your legal obligations, the needs of the enteiprise, the target crop, the particular
"3 R«pons« to CD. WL. 24A/86.
Interview, MAFF(PRSD), Harpenden 2/1/88. 
Response to CD, BAA, 30A2/85.
Response to CD, BPCA, 30A2/85 
Response to CD, SA, 30A1/85.
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product in question, and safety or environmental considerations",*”  and, "For sprayers, 
particular care should be taken to select the most suitable type and size of nozzle. 
When applying pesticide the law requires foat you do not exceed the sq>proved 
maximum dose which will normally be specified on the label So choose the nozzle 
carefully".*” Application methods were therefore to be user-discretionary. The detailed 
guidance on nozzle selection, taken finom tire calibration procedure prepared by the 
ATB and BCPC (and adopted by AEA and BAA), began with an exhortation to 
"READ THE LABEL: Check diemical pack for recommendations on volume of 
application and spray quality (nozzle type and operating pressure)".*" This meant that 
the tq)plication technique, although reconunoided on the label, was not to be one of 
the statutory parts of the label
On p lica tio n  methods, the problem for the Government was expressed by the 
head of PKZD: "...we can't just give legal force to what the manufacturers ask - or else 
who is the lawmaker?"*”  The Iread of the PRSD said "Pesticide manufacturers will 
exclude some equipment, but equipment manufacturers have been developmg 
equipment which allows one to %q)ply low volumes, and pesticide manufacturers are 
reluctant to do the tests for these".*”  The director of Harpenden mentioned that:
"One of our problems is that pesticide manufacturers will only label foe most 
common method of application...but foe machinery manufacturers are 
developing new techniques. One of the problems in the UK is that the spray 
manufacturers and spray equipment manufacturers are different organisations 
and stay apart So we [PRSD etc] are the 'meat in the sandwich* to an 
extent".*”
So, just as the PRSD provided the interface between the pesticide manufacturer and 
pesticide user, they provided the interface between the pesticide manufacturer and 
spraying equipment manufacturer.
According to PKZD,*”  the Application Technology Panel would spend 1987 sorting 
out the code on reduced volume applications. At 8/10/87 the director of PRSD was:
"...endeavouring to look at ways of extending the range of equipment 
available to farmers, in the Application Panel by looking at the developments 
to see which are producing sprays regarded as equivalent to conventional 
madiinery...there is a degree of controversy as to how effective CDA 
applicators are for different applications - you may need the different sizes of 
droplets produced by conventional sprayers".*”
Draft Code of Practice: Paragraph 4 5 .
Draft Code of Practice: Paragnqxh 4 5 .
3^* Draft Code of Practice: Appendix 2.9.
*”  Interview, MAFF(PÏCD), London S/6/86.
1» Literview, MAFF(PRSD), Harpenden 8A0/87.
Interview, MAFF(Haipenden Labs), Camlnidge 25A1/87. 
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Tank Mixes and Adjuvants to be Used. The AEA said that an obligation to use 
only notified adjuvants could inhibit technical progress.*'*
The main debate in the Commons and Lords was on adjuvants and tank mixes 
(HC, 1986). Mr John said that the committee had favoured fiie minimum of pesticides 
qyplied with the maximum of accuracy. Adjuvants, which made lower quantities of 
pesticides more effective and cut the risk of spray drift, were to be subject to an 
approval procedure which was not part of the regulations. This omission had led 
UKASTA and the AEA to believe that manufacturers had been given an effective veto 
on what substances could be used with foeir pesticides and vriiat means of (explication 
could be used. They had had an absolute assurance that such techniques would be 
neifoer explicitly nor implicitly banned. Mr Griffiths (C) said that a CDA sprayer 
manufacturer in his constituency claimed the regulations would destroy his business. 
An advisor to the latter had writtoi that this:
"...gave a diarter for the major international agrochem manufacturers to 
restrict development and special explications of adjuvants in the United 
Kingdom...one caimot use an adjuvant except in accordance with the 
conditions of approval given in relation to a pesticide and...would in fact be a 
label fiom a manufacturer".
This was bad as some products made no recommendations for any adjuvant, evoi 
where the market for the pesticide would not exist without an adjuvant The intention 
to publish a list would not be implemented until some time in the future. Paragraph 3 
of schedule 3 would contain "something to the effect that this pesticide may only be 
used with adjuvants which appear on MAFF’s list": "something to the effect" was 
unsatisfactory when the House was being asked to pass specific regulations.
Mr Carlide said that the regulations would restrict many farmers in the mixes they 
could put in tiieir own tanks as they would have to keep rigidly to manufacturers’ 
recommeixlations. He was also concerned that adjuvants did not appear in the 
regulations. The cost to the fanning industry could be considerable. Geographical and 
climatic conditions meant that farmers should be able to mix and use the strengths of 
chemicals according to their judgement
Mrs Fenner only restated that there would be a list and that she could not give the 
exact wording that would appear in foe regulations.
In the Lords (HL, 1986) Lord John-Mackie said the advantage to the use of tank 
mixes was that three or four sprays could be mixed, saving pesticides, physical woik 
and physical crop damage. But now this could only be done with approval If the 
approval was to come finom the label it would give manufacturers wide scope to 
prevent the use of mixes which might reduce their sales. Adjuvants similarly saved 
spray and made them more efficient.
130 Response to CD, AEA, 18A2/85.
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The Use Consent of 6 October, included conditions on tank mixes and adjuvants 
which were now to be effective on 1 January 1989:
"No person shall [combine or mix for use two or more pesticides /  use a 
pesticide in connection with an adjuvant] except in accordance with the 
conditions of the approval given originally in relation to [that/those 
pesticideA^esticides] or as varied subsequently by a list of authorised [tank 
mixes/adjuvants] published by Ministeis"/”
Therefore a combination of labels and lists was to be used. The question of who would 
have the discretion to put use restrictions on the label was still open, but MAFF would 
presumably formulate their lists by 1 January 1989.
The Draft COP noted:
"It is the user’s responsibility to ensure that the proposed use of any 
adjuvant/pesticide or pesticide^xesticide or pesticide/liquid fertilizer tank mix is 
in accordance with the terms of approval for tire pesticide produ(X(s) 
concerned. It is therefore necessaiy to consult eWier foe pesticide product 
label(s); the ’compendium of approvals’; or any sqxarate MAFF list of 
p en n it^  tank mixes/adjuvants as (expropriate" (my emphasis) (MAFF, 
1986f).“
The Draft Data Requirements (MAFF, 1986i) noted that users could submit tank 
applications for approval Combinations confoiming with the aims of FEPA would be 
listed in MAFF’s approved UsL No format for these applications was given at this 
stage.
On 19 January 1989, a new Use Consent replaced the first, and the tank mix 
condition was changed:
"Until 31 December 1991 no person shall combine or mix for use two or 
more oiganophosifoorous pesticides or mix for use two or more 
oiganophosphorous pesticides or an organophosphorous pesticide and a 
carbamate pesticide unless the approved label of at least one of the pesticide 
products states that the intended mixture may be made; aiKl no person shall 
combine or mix for use two or more pesticides if all the conditions of 
(qxproval relating to this cannot be complied with".
Presumably tests had to be carried out by MAFF to ascertain the safety of these 
mixtures.
Purposes for which Pesticides to be Used. The procedures for dealing with the 
minor uses of pesticides were detailed in fire CD. They were to be developed 
administratively and hence did not appear in the regulations.
The OD noted that "One of the main problems incidental on the introduction of 
controls over u%, as distinct from supply, is the problem of minor uses of pesticides. 
As far as we can ascertain, this is a problem mainly confirred to the agriculture and
X31 Consent 2: Conditions 4  and 5.
132 Draft Code of Practice: Paragraph 4.15.
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horticulture area of use".^ ”
The BPCA said that this was not confined to agriculture and horticulture. They 
were problems which would significantly affect the puWic heath, amenity and 
industrial sectors. The proposals were unacceptable.^ ** The AAWNTG were concerned 
that minor uses actively introduced a loophole into the law. "Minor uses” was not 
properly defined, and even if it were they felt no use of a substance ^ u ld  be made 
other tiian in an "approved” fashiorL^ The CA said that it was unclear whether this 
s^ lied  to home and garden chemicals. Would a label have to refer to specific plants 
found in a garden, and if a gardener used a product for other plants was he doing so at 
his own risk?"^ The NSCA noted that many public health uses would be regarded as 
"off-label", and wanted an exemption to permit such uses by local authority officers.*’^  
The RSPB noted tiiat there might be a problem with chemicals used for nature 
conservation purposes, notably in vegetation management in nature reserves, but that 
the procedures would provide for conservation off-label minor uses."*
"Mnor Uses" were defined as "...those advantageous uses of pesticides for which 
anticipated sales volume is not sufficient to persuade the manufacturer to carry out the 
research and development required for approval and label recommendations". 
Manufacturers sometimes sought clearance for use on major crops, but sometimes 
clearance was sought and granted for use on a wide range of crops (for example all 
ornamentals) whereas the product label recommendations would refer to a much 
narrower range. The result, said MAFF, was that horticulturalists could be deprived of 
much of their pesticide armoury once regulations under the Act made it illegal to use 
products for other that approved uses.“® The problem was that a manufacturer's 
recommendation for use represents liability for damage caused to a crop through that 
use, so if the market for a use was small it was not worth while either to risk making 
untested recommetKlations or to carry out the tests necessary to ensure crop damage 
did not occur.*"
The BAA were concerned about off-label approvals: "...anything which diminishes 
the control which a ccxnpany is able to exercise over the use of its product, or which 
might reduce its commitment to, and responsibility for, its safe and proper use cannot 
be desirable, to industry, the regulatory authority, users and the public at large". The 
label would be devalued as a means of communication; the image of a product might 
be prejudiced; and the approvals system would be overloaded. On liability the BAA 
said that die legal implications had not been fully addressed. The Council Directive on
^  Consultative Document: Paragrqdi 433. 
15* Response to CD, BPCA. 30/12/85.
1“  Response to CD. AAWNTG. 19/12/85. 
15* Reqiœ se to CD, CA, 9/1/86.
157 Response to CD. NSCA. 20/12/85.
1» Response to CD. RSPB, 30/12/85.
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the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member 
states concerning liability for defective products (8S/374/EEQ stated that "...the 
liability of the producer arising from this directive may not, in relation to the injured 
person, be limited or excluded by a provision limiting his liability or exempting him 
from liability" (article 12). The BAA were also concerned about control of acreages 
because the initial acreage might in time increase and cease to be a minor  use.*** On 
the other hand the BPCA approved of off-label approvals, given that general use was 
restricted to label recommendations.*"
FoE wanted to know who would decide what constituted a "minor use", and felt 
the whole area should be handled by the AGP.*" PHIPCO noted that off-label uses 
also constituted a problem within the food industry, food importers, and public 
health.*** The Soil Association considered that the off-labd approval procedure could 
become cost and time saving, and liability avoiding for manufacturers who could 
exploit this cheap and fast clearance. There should therefore be a set upper limit for 
crops to qualify for this simpler system, measured in acreage grown nationally, annual 
profits finom sales, or the crop as a percentage of total UK crops. On liability, a grower 
could be liable to rfaims for damages to health from off-label uses: would this liability 
be with the user or with the assessors of the pesticide?**'
"Mth the help of horticulturalists, the Government had identified the size of the 
problem, in terms of pesticide uses they would wish to continue.**' The first step fire 
Government would take was to publicise af^roved uses not on product labels. 
Eventually they would publish all approvals, making dear approved products and 
which crops and conditions applied to them, so that a grower would be informed of a 
wider range of approved products than on the labd.**  ^ The second step would be to 
arrange expert assessment of unregistered uses without requiring supporting provision 
of full-scale data packages from growers. Notification would be to PRSD, and 
spedfications would be as set out in Appendix 8.7.*"
The BPCA said that these lists would have to be published monthly to be 
acceptable to than, ard that the holders of approvals should issue technical sheets 
giving details of off-label uses.**' The BAA wanted companies to be notified when a 
grower applied for an off-label fqrproval.*'' The RSPB commented on the 
spedfications: the applicant should state bis assessment of environmental hazards posed
1*1 Response to CD. BAA, 30A2/85.
1*» Response to CD. BPCA, 30A2/85.
1*5 Response to CD, FoE, 30/12/85.
1** Response to CD. PHIPCO. 30/12/85.
1*5 Response to CD. SA. 30A1/85.
1*5 Consultative Documoit: Paragrqdi 436. 
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1*5 Consultative Document: Paragnph 438. 
1*9 Response to CD. BPCA, 30A2/85.
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by his proposed use; and in reasons for effectiveness the applicant should show if fully 
^rproved uses for the purpose had been considered.*'*
Using data already on file, the technical secretariat would assess the grower’s 
proposals. A PRSD interviewee explained that proprietary rights were to be disregarded 
and anyone’s data could be used. This was considered fair, as sales could be extended 
whilst no-one had liability.*" It was expected that in most cases it would be possible to 
grant approval or suggest amendments to the conditions of use. Approval would be 
refused if there was insufficient data on file or if the pesticide was unsuitable for the 
proposed uses. Applications would be accepted from both groups and individuals.*" 
The {qrproved uses and approval conditions would appear as a published list, not on 
the label. The NFU had seen a problem with the sharing of an off-label approval 
(where one farmer paid but had to keep the use secret b^cau^others would not be 
able to produce documentation when inspectors came around), and had lobbied for the 
publicly-available list "Because the NFU are involved we will try to see that it is not 
secret, but benefits the whole fanning community".*"
Decisions on all p lications and the publication of the list of off-label approvals 
had to take place before 1 January 1988, when the ban on non-approved uses came 
into force. A PRSD interviewee explained that there would be a priority system for 
evaluating off-label plications: "...priority is given to those [agricultural and 
horticultural] sectors who would be at a loss - which need a pesticide but for which 
no-one has given a damn to develop one".*"
Crop liability would rest with the user, but the user would not be liable for safety 
considerations arising from minor uses. In view of the crop liability problem, 
development of off-label approvals into on-label approvals would remain at the 
manufacturer’s discretion. It was suggested that after two years with no crop safety 
problems manufacturers and growers might be oicouraged to cooperate in the 
generation of crop safety data.*"
The BAA said that this would remain at the manufacturer’s discretion because of 
liability and commercial reasons.*" At interview, they said:
"...you can’t insist tiiat the manufacturer use his resources to pass products for 
the peppermint marL.No R&D company would do the work. They want to 
seek full p ro v a l and stop off-label approvals. Off-label approvals will have 
to be very tightly reined in or it will expand into something unmanageable".*"
7» Response to CD, RSPB, 30/12/85.
75* Interview, MAFF(PRSD), Haipenden 1/2/88. 
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The main argument was in terms of crop liability:
"Liability is a problem. The BAA sees anything that diminishes the label as a 
risk in this respecL..The way the off-label p ro v a l process is set out in the 
consultative document is very unsatisfactory. The EC directive on liability is 
likely to put liability squarely on the manufacturers, so that in court the 
grower with his off-label approval may have a case under the EC directive".**
Later, when they were told that liability lay with the user, they said "But the law 
d p n d s  on particular judges" and that in any case "there would be a loss of credibility 
of the product and it would be in the farming press". The blame was laid with die 
NFU: "There is an element of deregulation in taking on the new off label uses. The 
NFU lobbied on applications for them and won over the Minister".*"
A PRSD member felt that the o ff label p iroval system was a "retrograde step", in 
that there would be no incentive for manufacturers to get something on the label. "We 
found lots of interesting things - there are lots of off-label uses whidi are valid, but 
the company don’t want them on the label for commercial reasons. It costs a firm dear 
if fiiey damage a crop".*®
FoE was concerned that o ff label approvals could become p ro v e d  on die 
inadequate basis of "no complaints" from those involved in using them. More 
comprehensive scientific data would have to be taken into account*" AAWNTG said 
decisions on minor uses must go through the committee. The criteria for sanctioning 
an o ff label approval was not strong enough: and p ro v a l must be on the basis of 
safety and residue tests.*"
On fees, as well as the p lic a n t, other growers and manufacturers would benefit 
from an off label q>proval. The Government would therefore charge a standard 
nominal fee, intended to ccmtribute towards administrative costs, and set so as to deter 
frivolous applications. £50 per application was proposed.*" A PRSD interviewee 
explained that only one grower had to p l y ,  but the crop p ro v a l would not be held 
in anyone’s name, so that the £50 could be spread over an asscxiation. It was thought 
fair that the first registrant should pay the fee, because they would be the first to feel 
the need.*"
The BAA considered £50 too low to discourage fidvolous p lications. The fee 
should relate to actual costs incurred, and a higher fee might be necessary for 
growers.*"
759 Interview, BAA, London 12/12/85.
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The Draft Data Requirements (MAFF, 1986i) noted that applications for approval 
of minor uses could be made. The applications were to follow the fbnnat already 
discussed (Appendix 8.7), which remained unchanged in this document Applications 
conforming to die aims of FEPA would be added to the eventual "compendium of 
p rovals".
After the end of the phase covered by this chapter, MAFF was inundated with 
recjuests from farmers and horticulturalists for official p ro v a l to use pesticides in 
p lications not listed on product labels. The £50 fee was to be brought in in October 
and in the week preceding its introduction 2,400 iqiplications were sent iiL
8.15 Conditions Applied to Pesticides Use Outside the Approvals Process
Training o f Users. The Government said tiiat training of users was presently 
provided by a variety of different organisations, and to a variety of standards. The 
ATB, manufacturers, suppliers, and agricultural colleges provided training. In the pest 
control and wood preservation areas where a service was more often supplied tiian 
simply the pesticide itself, companies and local authorities trained their own operators. 
"There is no unified system of training and in considering the need for one the 
Government had found itself much in agreement with the recommendations of the 
RCEP in 1979".*" "It is proposed therefore, that Mhiisters will, by regulation, impose a 
general obligation on all those who use pesticides in the course of their business to 
ensure that they and their employees have received adequate instructions and guidance 
in the safe, effective and humane use of pesticides".*" "It is further proposed that 
Ministers, by regulation, impose a recpnrement on those whose business is the 
p lica tio n  of pesticides that they and their employees involved in the use of pesticides 
attend an approved training course and obtain certification that they have reached the 
p rop ria te  standard in the safe effective and humane use of pesticides".*" At 6 May 
1986, a PICD interviewee characterised the proposals in the Consultative Document as 
"unclear". "We need to discuss the need for training, the syllabus, the timing as far as 
contractors and other operators are concerned".*^ "We are still wavering over training. 
It may not get into the first set of regulations. We need more time".
When the regulations were being formulated, in accordance with the undertaking 
given in Parliament, civil servants had to check out "...what was available, what 
existing structures could be used, and what the appropriate level should be".*^
The BPCA welcomed the provisions relating to training and certification, and said 
the distinction between these two should not depend on whether a charge was made.
1*7 Consultative Document: Paragngih 63.
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but on whether the work was being carried out for a third party.*”  The AEA welcomed 
the obligation on users to be trained. All operators should be required to attend an 
authorised course of instruction, and as a minimum should receive a certificate of 
attendance.*”  The NSCA noted tiiat as mandatory training and certification would 
p l y  to local authority staff, the training already received by EHOs should be taken 
into account*”  The SA thought there was a grey area over who was forced to take 
training: would there be a minimum size of holding to be eligible for training, and 
would just the person in charge have to be trained?*”
The CD noted that "The Government will be discussing witii the ATB, BCPC, 
NPTC, PHIPCO, and organisations representing pesticide users the establishment of 
appropriate training courses and standards and the necessary {tiiasing in period for the 
requirements...and its extension to farmers and growers".*”
The BPCA noted that ^  BCPC courses were already widely recognized and that 
ttey would be happy to submit them to independent assessment by PHIPCO.*”  FoE 
recommended a statutory requirement that cdl users should receive a minimum training 
period in all aspects of pesticide use.*”  The NSCA said that the "general obligation" 
was insufficient unless backed up by competence certification for farmers /  
employers.*”  The RSPB welcomed the "general obligation" but said that it would not 
receive the encouragement s o u ^  by the RCEP unless backed by promotional 
activity.*" The Soil Association wanted the consultation phase to include others 
affected by pesticide use, like organic farmers, trades unions, conservationists and 
occupational health e^qxrts.*®
The basic regulations on use described in the last secticm applied to training of 
users, and specific obligations were set out in Schedule 3. Schedule 3(4) required all 
those who use pesticides in tire course of their business to be competent and to have 
received adequate instruction and guidance on the safe, efficient and humane use of 
pesticides (from October 6th 1986). Schedule 3(5 and 6) required, for agricultural 
pesticide use, contractors and persons bom later than 31 December 1964 (under 25 on 
1 January 1989) to obtain recognised certificates of competence unless working under 
the direct and personal supervision of a certificate holder, from 1 January 1989. 
Conditions could be added at any time.
77* Response to CD, BPCA, 30A2/S5.
773 Response to CD, AEA, 18A2/8S.
77* Response to CD. NSCA, 20A2/85.
773 Response to CD. SA, 30A1/85.
77* Consultative Document: Paragraph 6.8. 
777 Response to CD, BPCA, 30A2/8S.
77* Response to CD, FoE, 30/12/85.
779 Response to CD, NSCA, 20A2/85.
7*9 Response to CD, RSPB, 30A2/85.
7*7 Response to CD, SA, 30A1/85.
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There was little debate on this in Parliament Mr John cited it as one of many 
areas where controls were being weakened: in Committee it had been agreed that 
training was vital when handling a toxic substarice.
"Our assent was therefore strained to breaking point when the regulations 
became knowrt They provide that orüy people \riio will be under 25 in 1989 
will have to be trained before they can apply pesticides, ^ t h  normal 
retirement dates, that means that it will be 40 years before everyone who 
handles pesticides will be covered by the regulations. I have heard of phased 
introduction but this is taking it to absurd lengths. A qualified work force is 
important".
When the Use Consent came out on 6 October, conditions provided that from that 
date employers had to provide users in their employ with instruction, and that persons 
using pesticides in the course of fiieir business had to have received instruction.*”  
Furfiier conditions provided that from January 1 1989 commercial users and farmer 
users of agricultural pesticides had to have a certificate of competence or work under 
the supervision of someone who had such; but that in the case of farmer users only 
persons bom later than 31 December 1964 had to possess such.
The decision on training was that the passing of a test would be required, and not 
just fire attendance at a course. According to the civil servant in charge of training, this 
was in answer to the worry that there were one or two people who really needed to 
pass a test but who pleaded experience. "We could say ’well if you have lots of 
experience, then the test shouldn’t be a bother to you’".*”  The burden on the present 
system had its influence in imposing age limits: "The age limit was set because we felt 
that for reasons of not wanting to impose a difficult burden on farmers and training 
facilities it was not practical to have fiiousands of people suddenly passing through. 
The system would crumble".*" The argument for not including the majority of present 
farmers was that the great majority of pesticide use would be covered:
"...the logic was that you can in fact say that a proportion of the people who 
have been spraying for a while have got some experience. The concem was 
with the people who were doing it the most, like contractors...From the point 
of view of the environment crops and fire public, contractors spray fiiousands 
of hectares whereas farmers only spray a few. So if we train the contractors, 
then we’ve got a large chunk of the pesticide users. The remaining concem 
was with new people coming into the industry - so 'everybody from x age 
on’".*"
For the remaining (most present) farmers (where there only was a requirement to have 
someone on the farm trained^, perceived existing pressures were retied on, in that 
PICD:
7** Consent 2: Conditions 1 and 3.
70 Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 17/12/87. 
7® Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 17A2/87. 
70 Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 17/12/87.
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"..hoped that in this way we could ensure that the employers were meeting 
their obligation...we counted on two pressures (1) it would be convenient for 
employers to require their employees to get training (2) if the men wanted to 
move from job to job it would be useful to get the qualification".*"
Fann workers’ rate of pay was already being increased with NPTC skills certificates,*"
"...so we combined training for all contractors, training for aU new entrants, 
with significant encouragement and heavy leaning for others. We would give 
the scheme time to get working and have set a review date. If it was not 
working we could draw the age obligation back a lot."*"
It seems likely that resources were the main constraint dictating that farmers 25 - 65 
could escjqie certification. One interviewee from the DHSS said that MAFF would 
have liked to train everyone but they were "...not allowed to".*"
The Draft COP (MAFF, 1986f) said that the training obligation could be met by 
attending a reco^iised training course, by in-house training, or by a combination of the 
two. It set out what such a course should teach the user (see Appendix 8.8), but did 
not specify recognised courses or certificates at this stage.*"
Later, in a r^lacement Use Consent advertised on 19 January 1989, training was 
amended. The training conditions, which allowed use of an agricultural pesticide (a 
pesticide for use in agriculture, horticulture, in or near water, or industrial herbicides) 
(a) with a certificate, or (b) under the supervision of a certificate holder, gave a third 
option for other pesticides (home garden, animal husbandry, food storage practice, 
vertebrate control, home larder and kitchen, other domestic, wood preservative, 
masonry biocide, public hygiene, nuisance, other industrial biocides, anti-fouling paint, 
and "other" as may be defined by the registration authority): (c) if "he uses it in 
accordance with an approval, if any". This obviated the need for training for use of 
these pesticides.
8.1.6 Other Significant Decisions: Synopsis
Controls on suppliers and distributors, apart from a general duty to take all 
reasonable precautions so as not to endanger humans or the environment (to be 
amplified in other statutory provisions and COPs), were a duty to Supply pesticides 
only in officially approved containers; restrictions on advertising; attendance at and 
certification from a designated training course for storers and retailers of commercial 
products; and armual submissions of returns on quantities of active ingredient sold in 
the UK from companies with approved and provisionally approved products.
7^ Interview, MAFF(PICD), Lùjidûii 17/12/87. 
7*7 Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 15/1/88. 
7** Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 17/12/87, 
7*9 Intoview, DHSS, London 6A0/87.
799 Draft Code of Practice: Paragraph 2.
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Apart from the offence (from 1987) of using pesticides for other than approved 
uses or in breach of the conditions of a{q>roval (to be amplified in COPs), a duty was 
to be placed on all pesticide users not to endanger man or the environmenL Records of 
pesticide usage were not to be formally required but failure to keep records could be 
used as evidence in a prosecution or be the subject of improvement notices if it had 
safety implications.
On exports, the Government’s intention was to use the UN’s IRPTC to notify all 
countries of any bans or severe restrictions imposed on pesticides used in foe UK. 
Firms exporting these products were to be asked to tell foe Government, to enable it to 
notLfy the importing country of the shipment
On reviews of approvals, the Consultation Document noted that full reviews of 
PSPS clearances had until now only been initiated following changes in usage patters, 
evidoice of adverse effects, or applications for a revised clearance. However foe 
drawback of this was that products could remain on the market for 20 years without 
being reviewed, even while great strides were made in analytical and toxicological 
testing methods. In future all pesticide products would be automatically reviewed every 
10 years after first commercial approval. A phased review of all existing PSPS cleared 
products was also to be carried out No mention was made of the 5-year deadline for 
completion of the reviews, hinted at in Parliament
A major change was to be a move firom the four-stage clearance scheme operated 
under the PSPS to a 3-stage approval procedure, whereby the trials and limited 
clearance stages would be amalgamated into a single trials permit allowing closely 
supervised R&D to be carried out for one year under stqnilated conditions. MAFF’s 
explanation for this move was that firms had increasingly sought to gain an early 
foothold in the market by taking advantage of die less onerous data requirements in the 
UK’s lim ited  clearance phase, which was unusual among industrialised countries. As a 
result pressure had increased on the Government to consider limited clearance 
{applications "...often of a variable standard and with variaWe quantities of supporting 
data". In addition, enforcement of limited clearances - which could apply over 
substantial areas - had proved "difficult if not impossiWe" and breaches of clearance 
conditions had occurred.
In April 1986 the ACP’s first annual report (MAFF, 1986b) recorded its actions on 
applications for clearance during 1984. Products contmning five active ingredients 
received full commercial clearance; 12 active ingredients received or had renewed 
provisional clearance; and three applications were rejected. In addition Chlorbromuron 
(Ciba-Geigy) herbicide was downgraded from full to provisional clearance pending 
validation reports on mammalian toxicology studies originally conducted by the IBT 
laboratories. A decision to restrict the application of all synthetic pyrethroids with 
regard to periods of beneficial insect and bee activity in crops was announced 
following a 1982 review of environmental and toxicological properties (ENDS, 1986).
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Later, on October 30 1986 a consultative document on pesticide residues was 
published (MAFF, 1986k). Three months were given for consultaticm and a further two 
for discussions. The introductory letter described the document as discussing the 
principles of a possible statutory system, and setting out reasons for proposing a 
statutory system. After the consultation exercise, if they decided to proceed with 
statutory residue limits, the details of commodities and chemicals to be covered would 
be the subject of a second consultation late in 1987. On 1 August 1988 the Pesticides 
(Maximum Residue Levels In Food) Regulations 1988 (SI 1378) were made, coming 
into force on 2 August 1988 and 31 December 1988. Very detailed schedules were 
attached giving MRLs for specific pesticides in a range of foods.
&2 Concurrent Procedural Factors
The Consultative Document. The Consultative Document set out what were still 
termed "proposals" whidi had been agreed between departments for implementation 
through regulations. According to a PKZD interviewee the document was to be seen as 
"...our policy document, not a compendium of detailed plans".*® It was emphasised that 
the proposals were subject to change following consultations with the AGP, the HSC 
and Parliament; and that individuals, groups and representative organisations affected 
by the proposals should equally contribute to discussions before they were finalized. 
The period for writtai comments was two months (November and December 1985), 
with another two months for subsequent discussions with organisations (January and 
February 1986). The distribution list for the document is given in Appendix 8.9 
(MAFF 1985g). 1,500 copies of the document were sent out by PICD, and they 
received 125 written submissions.
The "Consultation Exercise". As compared to the 125 written submissions there 
were fgyparently only 25 consultation meetings with representative organisations (HC, 
1986). This probably meant that multiple meetings were held with fewer than 25 
separate organisations.
The Drcft Regulations. The Draft COPR were laid before Parliament under the 
affirmative resolution procedure. The scope of the debate on a statutory instrument is 
confined to fire contents of the instrument, and discussion of alternative means of 
achieving its object is not in order. Nor is any criticism of the parent Act permitted 
(Cocks, 1971). The regulations had to be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole. 
The time for debate was one and a half hours. The regulations were accq>ted as a 
whole mid hmice "The Regulations" were no different to the draft regulations.
Control Tools Available, Those Chosen, and Timing o f Introduction. The FEPA 
provided powers to control some areas by regulation or order, and others by 
administrative means. Regulations could be used to control import, sale, supply.
791 Interview, MAFF(PICD), London 13/3/86.
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storage, use. advertisement, residue levels, disclosure of information; to establish an 
AGP; and to enforce. Administrative means of control could be used to require 
information, charge fees, recover expenses, issue codes of practice and authorise 
enforcement officers.
The regulations related to advertisement; sale, supply and storage; use and 
disclosure of infonaadon. All of these things were prohibit^ except in connection 
with an approval for a specific pesticide (a further regulation covered granting 
sqjprovals), and a consent to an activity (a consent being a general rule covering all 
approved pesticides and covered by a further regulation), along with conditions 
attached to approvals and consents. Possible conditions on consents to the activities of 
sale, supply and storage; use; advertisement and aerial spraying were set out in 
schedules to the regulations, each of which contained a general obligation to take 
reasonable precautions to protect the health of human beings, creatures and plants, and 
to safeguard the environment, and some specific obligations. Consents would be 
advertised in the London and Edinburgh Gazettes.
Some regulations possible under fire Act were therefore not formulated in the 
October 1986 set of regulations, notably residues (which were to be the subject of a 
later consultation exercise and further regulations) and identical imports (which had 
already been controlled administratively; imports in general were controlled under 
regulations on supply). In addition many of the included regulations would not come 
into effect until after a transitional period, notably certificates of competerree for 
suppliers (1 January 1987); users' compliarree with conditions of approvals (1 January 
1988); advertising (1 January 1987); persons under 25 on 1 January 1989 to obtain 
recognised certificates of competence (1 January 1989); and controls on tank mixes and 
adjuvants (1 January 1989). In the case of training, the phased introduction meant that 
it would be a further forty years before all pesticide users were trairred. In the case of 
tank mixes and adjuvants, MAFF were to publish lists to acceptable uses, so that this 
regulation spilled over into control by administrative means. All of these were areas 
which were far removed from control of the supply of pesticides.
Administrative procedures were not detailed, but there was to be a code of 
practice rm agricultural and horticultural use of pesticides. Details of the approvals 
process would be settled administratively as would arrangements which entailed 
providing access to the process by sectors other fiian suppliers (like minor users). 
Much of the work on these details would be carried out on a continuing basis by 
panels under the advisory committees, and by working groups. There would be 
Environmental, Medical and Toxicological, Labelling and Container Design, and 
Application Technology Panels. Detailed work on user obligations, again far from the 
status quo, were to be given more time, less public scrutiny and could be revised 
continuously. In addition a large portion of existing arrangements on data requirements 
in the approvals process were to continue to be settled administratively, thus preserving
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discretion with respect to infonnation required and keq>ing the basis of decisions non- 
standard on individual pesticides. Which conditions would have to be or could be put 
on the label and whidi of those conditions would be statutory requirements on users 
were not detailed. Codes of practice would cover aspects of use not covered by the 
approvals’ or consents’ conditions. These would be largely drawn from existing 
literature, but guidance on p lica tio n  techniques would be provided here rather than 
on labels.
Consents. The 6 October Use Consent, and that on Sale, Supply and Storage, did 
not amplify on the conditions set out in the regulations. The transitional periods for 
certain controls were the same as in the regulations. However certain things in the 
regulations were left out of these first Consents, for example advertising.
On 19 January 1989 new consents were issued which replaced the original ones, 
varying them slightly as a result of administrative difficulties. The Pesticides (Fees and 
Enforcement) Act was also introduced for fois reason.
Codes o f Practice. The force of a COP is such fiiat a failure of any person to 
follow the guidance given would not of itself render a person liable to proceedings, but 
it would be admissible in evidence in any criminal proceedings under the parent Act
The Draft Code of Practice on the Agricultural and Horticultural Use of Pesticides 
was circulated to a large list for comment Parts of i t  like parts of the label, referred 
to statutory obligations, but most was guidance.
Representation on Decision Making and Advisory Committees and Panels. The 
AGP was to be a statutory body, to be consulted by Ministers on regulations, 
approvals and conditions, and to advise on request or on its own initiative in furthering 
the pesticides part of foe FEPA. It was to continue to consist of members independent 
of commercial or sectional interests (see Appendix 8.10). Its expertise was mainly 
toxicological and medical, and an environmental expert would be appointed as its remit 
now covered the environment, efficacy and humaneness. Officials of Government 
dq)artments would continue to attend AGP meetings as asseswrs, providing "advice 
and assistance" but taking no part in decisions.
The SSC would continue to assess the technical data supporting applications for 
ai^roval and advising the AGP on conditions to impose to ameliorate ridü, and on the 
extent and type of test data needed firom manufacturers to judge safety, efficacy and 
humaneness. SSC would continue to consist of representatives firom Government 
departments and agencies, as well as academic, medical and research estaWishments 
(see Appendix 8.11). An additional expert to advise on the environment would be 
appointed.
The existing fonnal Medical and Toxicological, and Environmental, Panels would 
continue, and in addition there would be a formal Labelling and Container Design 
Panel, and a Pesticides Application Technology Panel The Panels, apart from the 
Environmental Panel, would include sectional representation firom pesticide
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manufacturers, farmers and trades unions for the first time, although these would not 
be involved in the approval process.
The Medical and Toxicological Panel would advise on medical problems put to it, 
point out matters concerning the impact of pesticides on human health, and advise on 
toxicological test methods. Members of foe SSC and DHSS would be involved, and 
one representative from each of BAA, BPCA. BWPA, NFU, TGWU, NAAC and 
GMBU.
The Environmental Panel would advise on environmental problems put to it, point 
out matters concerning the environment and advise on wildlife inq)act assessment 
methods. The curroit membership, which did not include any sectional representation 
(see Appendix 8.12),. would continue, with the addition of a representative from the 
DoE.
The Labelling and Container Design Panel would point out problems arising from 
container and label design, and advise on improving standards. Members of 
Government departments and research establishments would be involved, as well as 
one representative from each of BAA, BPCA, BWPA, NFU, TGWU, NAAC, GMBU, 
plus BCPC and UKASTA.
The Application Technology Panel would advise on explication techniques in 
relation to operator safety, environmental safety and efficacy, and review and point out 
new developments in explication technology. Members of Government departments and 
research establishments would be involved, as well as one representative finom each of 
BAA, BPCA, BWPA, NFU, TGWU, NAAC, GMBU, plus the AEA.*”
Influences on Participation and Policy Making
The Consultative Document gave a large list of pesticides which could be 
regulated, but restricted current regulations to those covered by the PSPS plus 
chemosteiilants and anti-fbuling paints. Thus the product range regulators were familiar 
with was dealt with, plus the troublesome anti-fouling paints industry, whilst pesticidal 
materials covered by other legislation were not brought in and consolidated, despite 
attempts by environmental groups wishing more categories to be regulated including 
pesticides for export The regulations stuck to fire original decisions, and foe regulatory 
scope remairred basically that of foe PSPS. Thus fire debate on scope over foe three 
phases had had no efifect on fire regulations.
As concerned pesticides which were to be regulated, again not enou^ forethought 
had been given to foe effect on sectors. The wood preservatives efficacy data 
requirements were irrelevant and garden chemicals had irever previously applied for 
efficacy approval The fact that Pest Control products were jqxplied over a larger 
number of sites and had greater exqxxsuie to the public had to be taken i i ^  accoimt in
192 Coaisultative Document: C huter 3.
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safety data lequirements. Part of qxprovals presently entailed agreement on a container, 
but if this was made statutory the operating practice of decanting pest cxmtrol products 
would be stopped. Similarly part of approvals oitailed agreement on label conditions, 
and the practice of buying wood preserving products in concentrate and diluting them 
on site would be stopped.
The BAA and the Government sustained the idcnticalncK criteria in this phase on 
the grouruls that safety would be jeopardised. Environmental groups agreed. The Draft 
Data Requirements, giving details of the procedure to be followed for identical imports 
and foe information needed, were published after foe public consultation and debates 
were over, thus confining foe discussion to affected sectors and regulators.
Vrith respect to data requirements there was no real technical change. A scientific 
service interviewee said:
"On the technical side we are pleased that the scheme stayed the same, and 
especially pleased to know that people will now all be following the rules. 
Before, we didn’t know if we were being ignored. It has also defined our job 
so it is simple to understand what we do".*”
Thus PRSD could feel more secure that their authority was not being eroded. In 
addition they were back in charge of developing the protocols for efficacy data, and 
their arrangements for circumscribing their role to "scientists" had not been challenged. 
As a PRSD interviewee said:
"...the legislation identified our real role. This is to ensure that the 
Government g^  the right technical advice. Putting this in writing is very 
important as previously we hadn't stopped at advice but had sometimes gone 
forward and given clearance. The legislation enthrones the administrative 
branch",
meaning as decision takers.*"
^^fo respect to use, there were likewise no new safeguards: "Legislation has not 
generated new safeguards. All foe safeguards were on tire label before. However there 
was no comeback if foe farmer didn’t follow the label. Now it is illegal not to".*”
Even in this {foase decisions on training had not been well formulated, and a lot of 
the detailed consideration on it was still to take place. It was, in addition, only in this 
phase that it was taken up as an issue by interest groups. A range of alternatives had 
still to be set out and discussed. The head of PICD said:
"This is an area whidi has been less thought through- We have less 
information on i t  It's the thing, if you like, that is furthest away from tire 
PSPS. The PSPS has nothing to do with use, except insofar as in cormolling 
supply you ultimately control use...foe further from known territory, the more
79* Interview, MAFF(Haipenden), Cambridge 25/11/87. 
79* Interview. MAFF(PRSD), Westoning 11/1/88.
795 Interview, MAFF(Harpenden), Cambridge 25/11/87.
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we require infonnation before we move".*”
Members of PICD were fiierefore very receptive to, and were actively seeking 
suggestions in consultations.
8.4 The Quality of Participation
Consultative Document. A lack of detail in the document was lamented by most 
interviewees, who as a result requested meetings with MAFF, for example UKASTA:
"...the Consultative Document is not practical - it has to be made practical. It 
represents the broad intentions. We won’t know about the fine-tuning until we 
see the actual regulations and statutory instruments...It’s one thing to work out 
the grand theories but when we get down to the nitty-gritty is when the fights 
will come. The whole drift of our comments is that..the Consultative 
Document is a good basis for discussion and UKASTA is willing to cooperate 
in making the regulations as practical and workable as possible".*”
Wildlife Link still felt uncertain that foe powers would be used.*” Other organisations 
actually felt they had benefitted in the end from the lack of detail, in fiiat they had 
been invited to join working groups which would woik out details of controls apart 
finom the regulations, for example the NAAC, who were invited to join three panels.*” 
Shortcomings in the substance of the Consultative Document have been explicated with 
respect to particular issues in previous sections.
The Consultation Exercise. The AAWNTG were impressed with the consultation 
exercise: "The amount of trouble gone to and the amount of time taken is very 
good".'" Tire BWPA on the other hand felt the exercise based on the Consultative 
Document to be "a nonsense", because "...the draft regulations themselves were written 
well before Christmas, so what does ’consultation exercise’ mean?""*
In their response to the Consultative Document, the BAA requested "specialist 
meetings" between PICD and BAA on particularly important areas of the document to 
ensure understanding of PICD intentions and BAA reactions. They said "...we would 
wish to field different groups of people having appropriate expertise". They wanted 
meetings as early as possible and a sight of the draft regulations before they went to 
Parliament They noted that in their response.firey had "...refrained from making 
specific proposals, believing that these would best be made during the discussions"."'
The AEA described their meeting with foe PICD as very useful, amicable, 
impartial and constructive, where they discussed various alternatives open to foe
79* Inteiview, MAFF(PICD), London 6/5/86.
797 Interview, UKASTA, London 27A/86.
7* Biteiview, WL, London 19/3/86.
799 Interview, NAAC, London 6/3/86.
** Interview, AAWNTG, London 29/1/86.
*®7 kterview , BWPA, London 20A/86.
*7* Covering Letter to Response, BAA, 30/12/85.
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Ministry in a pleasant atmosphere."'
Many groups felt the need for still further meetings, especially meetings on the 
regulations themselves, and pushed to be included in working groups (see next 
heading).
Representation on Decision Making and Advisory Committees and Panels. There 
had been requests for the representation of various gmu%K on foe committees 
throughout foe pre-parliamoitary and parliamentary phases, and appointees had been 
set out in foe Consultative Document (see previous section). Groups were now 
particularly keen to be represented on panels which would work out the details of 
conditions on activities relevant to them.
The NSCA wanted local authority (as the publicly accountable body enforcing 
aerial spraying provisions) and environmental group representation on committees and 
panels."* Wildlife Link wanted two nature conservation experts and a voluntary 
wildlife movement assessor on the ACP; two nature conservation experts on foe SSC; 
representatives from the wildlife movement on the Environmental Panel; and 
representatives of environmental groups on the Labelling and Container Design Panel 
and foe Application Technology Panel"' The CA wanted a garden chemicals expert on 
foe Labelling and Container Design Panel"'
The TGWU(AAWNTG) wanted more group involvement in the ACP, and details 
of how foe HSE would make an irqnit to the ACP. They wanted an Advisory 
Committee on Toxic Chemicals (ACTS) type body within the HSC containing 
employer, employee. Government and environmental interests to monitor all aspects of 
pesticides relating to safety, to liaise wifo a MAFF body wMch would only do efficacy 
monitoring. The health, safety and environmental roles of Government and advisory 
bodies were currently involved in crop protection considerations, whidi caused a 
fundamental conflict between safety and production factors within MAFF. The 
proposals left the ACP "as closed as ever", It and the SSC should contain medical and 
toxicological representatives acceptable to and s^xpointed by unions and environmental 
groups, as well as environmental and consumer interests, and be accountable to the 
HSE. The SSC should contain a residues expert The Panels were solely advisory and 
had no powers of decision or veto so were unlikely to have any effect on decision 
making. The Environmental Panel had no sectional representation, and the other three 
panels should have equal numbers of employer, employee and environmental group 
representatives."*
UKASTA welcomed its inclusion on foe Labelling and Container Design Panel”
Letter from AEA to PICD, 28A/86. 
Response to CD. NSCA. 20A2/85. 
Response to CD, WL, 24A/86.
** Response to CD, CA, 9/1/86.
Response to CD, AAWNTG, 19A2/85.
** Response to CD, UKASTA, 16A/86.
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The NAAC welcomed the statutory status of the AGP and approved the "independent" 
status of its members (NAAC, 1986). The AEA welcomed its inclusion on the 
Application Technology Panel, and suggested the chair should be occupied by an 
engineering expert, naming the Deputy Director of the National Institute of 
Agricultural Engineering. Chairmen of panels should attend as assessors at SSC 
meetings. They also requested membership on the Labelling and Container Design 
Panel because of the possibility that labels might preclude engineering innovation.”  
FoE considered that the regulations did not go far enough or allow for proper 
accountability of the pesticides industry. The reforms and innovations in the 
regulations would be a "hollow sham" if the AGP remained unreformed, and union and 
environmental groups remained excluded from representation on some of foe 
committees. Like the TGWU, they suggested division of responsibilities between 
MAFF and HSC to avoid a conflict of interests. The ACP and SSC should have 
representatives from a wide range of pesticides-concemed groups and not simply 
reproduce the restricted PSPS model. The environment experts should have foe full 
confldence of unions and environmental groups. The panel system was welcomed, but 
further unions and environmental groups should be represented.®®
The BPCA wanted public health and amenity pest control experts on the ACP and 
SSC. They noted that some civil servants on foe SSC were involved in contract 
research projects taken on by Government establishments so that they too should 
declare commercial work. The Environmental Panel should be open to sectional 
interests, and a Residues Panel should be set up.®* The BAA welcomed the 
independence of foe ACP and SSC, bat said they believed the HSC were setting up a 
pesticide panel under foe ACTS to provide advice and recommendations on approvals 
to foe Secretary of State for Employment. It would be damaging to ACP/SSC decision 
making to be subject to further review by foe HSC wifo respect to the effects on 
health and safety of people at work.®' They wanted weed science (to cover efficacy) 
and public health expertise on foe SSC. The Medical and Toxicological Panel should 
be split into its two functions, and one expert from each fleld should be provided by 
foe BAA. Likewise for foe Labelling and Container Design Panel. They wished to fleld 
industrial environmental expertise on foe Environmental Panel.®' PHIPCO wanted 
public health and industrial pest control expertise on foe AGP and SSC. The 
Environmental Panel should have sectional representation. The food industry would 
like a Residues Panel.®*
7® Response to CD, AEA, 18A2/85.
“ 9 Response to CD, FoE, 30/12/83.
“ 7 Response to CD, BPCA, 30A2/85.
Covering Letter to Response, BAA, 30/12/85. 
^  Response to CD, BAA, 30/12/85.
“ * Response to CD, PHIPCO, 30/12/85.
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OXFAM wanted NGO representatives on the Environmental Panel. In addition all 
panels should have expertise on pesticide use in the Third World, especially the 
Environmental and Labelling and Container Design Panels.®' The RSNC wanted NGO 
represoitation on the ACP, at least as observers. The Environmental Panel was 
dominated by agricultural departments. New members should be appointed from other 
departments and there should be at least one NGO representative, as well as an 
ecosystem ecologist The Labelling and Container Design Panel and the Application 
Technology Panel should have environmental representatiorL®' The SA wanted NGO 
representatives from organic farming, environmental groups arxl trades unions on the 
Environmental Panel NGOs should have a greater chance to feed ideas to the 
Labelling arxl Container Derign Panel At present it was unclear if the Panels could 
take tire initiative in providing advice and so the scope for involvement would be 
considerably curtailed. The Medical and Environmental Panels* terms of reference 
suggested they were solely responsive.®' The RSPB thought that environmental 
represmtation on the ACP and SSC should be considerably strengtherred. There should 
be at least two experts, one in vertebrate biology and another in wüd plant botany. The 
SSC should have experts on native flora and pure entomology (as opposed to 
agricultural entomology) to redress the agricultural bias. The Environmental Panel did 
not have adequate representation of the natural environment and was also dominated 
by MAFF: Voluntary nature conservation NGOs should be involved, and botanical 
representation was rreeded. Half the representatives on it should be nominated by 
environmental organisations like the RSPB. This would increase confldeiree in it®'
Like tire myriad suggestions for participation on these groups, there were many 
suggestions in CD responses for possible material to be included in the Code of 
Practice, which was similarly to be constructed (partly through panels) out of sight of 
many interested parties. For example the BPCA wanted PHIPCO to be consulted;®' 
FoE and AAWNTG wanted COPs recommended by unions and environmental groups 
incorporated;” ®* the RSPB and the RSNC wanted environmental hazards stressed and 
to be consulted;” ”  and tire SA wanted consultation with NGOs in general.”
Control Tools Chosen. During the debate on the regulations (HC, 1986) the 
Opposition opposed the regulations on the grounds that they would be ineffective. 
Complaints were made about the general manner in which the regulations were framed;
573 Response to CD, OXFAM, 30/12/85. 
57* Response to CD, RSNC, 18/12/85.
577 Response to CD, SA, 30/12/85.
57* Response to CD, RSPB, 30/12/85.
579 Response to CD, BPCA, 30/12/85.
5* Response to CD, F6E, 30/12/85.
551 Response to CD, AAWNTG, 19/12/85. 
55* Response to CD, RSPB, 30/12/85.
553 Response to CD, RSNC, 18/11/85.
55* Response to CD, SA, 30/11/85.
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the probity of Ministers in introducing them in this form when details had been 
promised; and the omission of items from regulations which the Consultative 
Document had said would be included.
The Government was accused by Mr John of misleading MPs about their 
intentions during the passage of the FEPB in Parliament, when details of the control 
arrangements were promised in the regulations, whereas the regidations in hand were 
"...almost as general as the Act itself, and just about as vague". Parliament would now 
have to wait for a stage beyond secondary legislation:
"...tertiary legislation, legislation by advertisemenL.Not only were we misled 
in Committee, but the regulations are now being framed in such a form - by 
adverts advertising them in the London Gazette and Edinburgji Gazette - 
which will mean that many details of pesticide use will never be debated in 
the House".
It was still impossible to tell from the regulations what "...sort of controls we shall end 
up with", because of the discretion they allowed Ministers. Even the advertisements 
would only give controls on categories of activity relating to all pesticides, not details 
of controls on the pesticides themselves.
It was true that the schedules gave some details of what the conditions might 
comprise, but these were sketchy and even then there was no obligation to include aU 
those points. On tc^ of this details which were not mentioned could also be advertised 
in the Consents. Parliament was being firmly shut out of the substance of the debate.
Ministerial probity was called into question by assurances given which had not 
materialized, for example that there would be detailed regulations on labelling and 
containers (HC, 1985c), which had not even been mentioned; and that there would be 
twelve additional agricultural inspectors (HC, 1985d), when from evidence givra to the 
Agriculture Committee they now knew there would be none.
The fact that the tqxprovals procedure was not covered by regulation but would be 
left to administrative procedure was considered an omission given what had been 
covered in foe Consultative Document. The omission of adjuvants from the regulations 
left it to the discretion of manufacturers to veto or not adjuvants, tank mixes and 
application methods. Mr Griffiths noted the intention to produce a MAFF list, but that 
the list had not been presented and would only be presented "at some time in the 
future". Parliament was being asked to approve an intention, not a regulation. Mr 
Hughes noted that the mefood the Government had chosen (consents) was basically the 
granting and withholding of licences: this was "...putting back the day and the way in 
which foe law becomes effective".
Ms Maynard worried that further regulations implementing items not so far 
covered would not materialise. In addition the ^ p e  of the regulations was too narrow 
whilst pesticides exempted from than were too wide, which was "the worst of both 
worlds".
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Mrs Fenner said that it had to be accepted that "...in principle Ministers should be 
able to add ofoer controls as circumstances change", and that since the changes had to 
follow the intention of the Act there was no need for Mr John to wait to see what the 
Consents contained. The reason that many points in the Consultative Document were 
not in the regulations was that there would be administrative arrangements covering 
them.
The regulations were approved by a vote of 219 : 128
In foe Lords debate on foe regulations (HL, 1986), Lord John-Mackie complained 
of foe wide powers taken to alter provisions simply by advertisement which did not 
allow sufficient consultation. He was also worried about Ministers making infonnation 
available "...on such conditions as they may detennine": these conditions needed to be 
better explained. Again the question of whether the approval for a tank mix or 
adjuvant would come from a label was unclean if it did the manufacturer had tire 
discretion to prevent mixes which would reduce sales. It was unclear what level of, 
and when, fees would be charged. Lord Skelmersdale, for the Government, repeated 
Mrs Franer's statement that it was irecessary to be able to add conditions in 
circumstances which changed rapidly, such that it was impractical to make "...endless 
regulations through foe statutory instrument procedure". The regulations were agreed.
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9. Conclusions
This Chapter first focuses on foe operation of substantive and procedural influences 
on the development of regulatory policy within foe context of this case-study. It goes 
on to discuss some generalisations which can be made about foe style of policy 
making wifo respect to foe general approach to policy making and foe approach to 
participation (admission of participants and alternatives to the debate). This leads to a 
consideration of foe legitimacy of foe policy making process during regulation 
formation in terms of participant effectiveness and foe quality of debate. The Chapter 
concludes wifo some comments on foe limitations of foe analysis, suggestions for 
further research, and a synopsis of substantive developments in pesticides controls in 
foe UK in relation to european intergration.
Irfluence o f Pre-Existing Substantive and Concurrent Procedural Factors, hi the 
situation investigated for this thesis, there were a number of factors which combined to 
influence policy making style, effective participation, and thus the potential for change 
in pesticides controls. Individual issues can be characterised by the presence of factors 
associated wifo them and tiie degree to which they are present. The style of policy 
making and participation can be inferred from such characterisation. Most issues are 
beset by a large number of existing substantive factors. Most policy making is reactive, 
preservative, conservative and closed wifo foe result that participatory effectiveness is 
normally low for those wifo no existing sectoral involvement. (Concurrent procedural 
factors associated wifo foe legislative context have little or no effect on foe style of 
Government policy making or effectiveness of participation. The Government mode is 
to finish foe public phases of policy making as quickly as possible and wifo minimal 
changes and return issues to their normal decision making arenas. The public handling 
of debate during foe legislation served to highlight the underlying attitude to wider 
participation which is ever present but usually not obvious. However concurrent factors 
associated with foe central policy making civil servants themselves and influences on 
them, like lack of time, influence policy making and participation.
In this case, relationships between administrative policy makers and interest 
groups, including foe BAA and tire NFU, were not longstanding. Also, since foe 
administrators were new to this debate they relied heavily on advice from the 
regulators. Thus existing stakeholders had most access to central policy makers, and 
their preferences (usually to preserve existing controls) were influential in policy 
making in the legislative process. The regulators had even more influence than their 
stake in foe existing system and preferential access accorded them, because of foe large 
disparity in knowledge between themselves and new PICD administrators. As foe 
regulators’ main relationship was wifo agricultural pesticide manufacturers, a bias in 
consideration of this area was inevitable. As shown in Chapter 6, these effects were
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most prominent at the beginning of the period under study.
The influences of existing relationships and practices were further compounded by 
the lack of time available before going to Parliament As described in Chapter 6 there 
was only time to examine the potential implementation problems associated with 
making the existing scheme controlling pesticide supply statutory. There were a 
number of areas with which central policy makers were not familiar - thus details on 
areas other than the PSPS were lacking and the quality of debate suffered. Even in this 
restricted area many of the consequences of fois situation were not anticipated, as 
noted in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, in connection wifo foe scope of coverage and foe minor 
uses problems. Another effect of foe lack of time was that a wide range of participants 
were not admitted to foe decision making process at an early stage, when most of foe 
policy sh^xing took place. If there had been a Government pesticide policy in place, 
the short time scale would not have been so much of a problem.
On foe other hand, because foe senior civil servants were newly appointed, they 
were less influenced by loyalty factors, were likely to have a fresher appreciation of 
the issues involved, were possibly less politically biased towards particular sectors, and 
had a more open mind on alternatives. The fact that they had little time to come to 
terms with the range of existing practices and controls mitigated against foe operation 
of these attributes, especially in foe early stages, where they could have broadened foe 
range of alternatives considered. They were laigely guided by foe participants in place 
especially the PRSD and foe ACP. Even during foe consultation on the regulations 
time was short, but certain issues could still receive consideration after foe main body 
of regulations had been passed. Had they had more time to familiarise themselves with 
the possibilities, they might have been able to be seen more publicly to be considering 
more alternatives, and actually consider more alternatives before foe framework was 
flxed. Consultation after foe legislation was quite wide, and anyone who wanted to 
meet wifo MAFF was accommodated. However by that time the potential for change 
was more limited.
The lack of time to fomiulate wide ranging controls before foe most public phase 
of policy making - the parliamentary phase - had other effects. It allowed civil servants 
to be tougher than perhaps foe Government had intended. Both the PRSD and foe 
PICD wanted to have more control over the manufacturers and to define their own 
roles and therefore authority more closely. It was not they but the Government and foe 
ACP who were doctrinaire wifo respect to flexibility within foe approvals process and 
deregulation. The administrative civil servants played a large part in persuading 
Government to take on more powers to appease foe EC, foe RCEP, and public opinion. 
Such powers may never have led to controls, but foe civil servants involved made sure 
that some of them did. This was due to foe influence of reports such as foe those of 
the RCEP (1979) and the Royal Society (1983) and their belief in foe "polluter pays" 
principle and foe value of regulation.
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\STthin the most public debate arenas, where there is maximum Government 
oversight, it is generally less easy to introduce change. The Government is interested 
in getting its bill through Parliament without substantive change. This may indicate 
insensitivity to public opinion, but is more likely to be a case of the Government not 
wishing to appear to be obstructive with respect to the pesticides industry, leaving this 
job to the administration. Where they did want to introduce a change which would be 
distasteful to the industry, but applauded by environmental groups, such as the 
disclosure of information clause, they left it to the Opposition to introduce it as an 
amendment, as reported in Chapter 7. Unfortunately with this mode of operation 
further changes take place out of Government oversight, where there is also less public 
participation. Civil servants did compensate for this by attending and speaking on the 
legislation at a large number of open conferences.
These general effects were present in different combinations and to different 
degrees for different issues. The number and type of factors involved can indicate 
policy making style (especially with regard to consideration of alternatives, relationship 
to participants and speed of change), and participative effectiveness. Generally 
speaking, all factors act to constrain the range of alternatives perceived as possibilities 
and therefore to constrain participative effectiveness.
There is an intrinsic degree of constraint exercised by the amount of information 
available about an issue, which is in turn determined by the age of the debate on the 
issue. A new issue with a large amount of Government or administration interest has 
the greatest potential for r^ id  change in the begirming and for effective participation. 
It also has the greatest likelihood of bypassing more entrenched influences, although 
participants with long involvement in previous regimes will seek to make it 
compatible. The fact that new issues emerged in relation to FEPA and were brought to 
debate was primarily because of the presence of new administrators, rather than the 
ideas of more established participants, and the influence on them of reports such as 
that of the RCEP (1979). Even so, new issues like training were not fully debated until 
after the most public phases were over and the main set of regulations had been 
published. It is possible that, even without the lack of time, such issues would be 
considered away from the view of the public and the Government
Concurrent influences then operate on the above: aspects of procedure or practices 
could either entrench or enhance tte range of control alternatives and range of 
participation considered (for example the fact that legislation had to be rushed through; 
delegation of the legislation to certain decision makers who may or may not be part of 
the established system; not disclosing details of official thinking; the nature and timing 
of the consultation processes). (Current administrative decision makers can influence 
procedures and what are seen as problems.
A level of influence existing slightly further back in time was the nature and 
extent of interest and debate, and the pressures existing in relation to a range of
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pesticides issues, but especially the issue areas which provided the immediate impetus 
for change and the decision to legislate and were thus highlighted. These set the stage 
for both of the above.
An additional level of influence depends on whether, and the degree to which, 
there are established practices or controls (the state of policy making in the control 
system). It is also affected by the degree to which present participants are established, 
and the state of flxity or readiness for change they embody. The latter could provide 
pressure for change, but more often preserves the status quo ante, operating as a 
considerable inertia, influencing all other levels.
Thus, if decisions and decision makers are relatively entrenched on an issue, 
procedures will tend to entrench it further. From the observations on the issues 
discussed in this thesis, this is usually the case. If foe EC or public pressure exert an 
influence, change and participation are however possible. If foe control issue is a new 
one initiated by foe executive, change and participation opportunities are optimal, for 
example wifo the issue of training for pesticide users.
The impact of existing factors on participatory effectiveness (and therefore foe 
p red a tio n  of foe legitimacy of foe policy making process) is thus mediated by 
central policy makers. Their beliefs, and preparedness to be open, comprehensive and 
accommodating are reflected in foe arrangements they make. However foe degree to 
which their preferences can be expressed in these arrangements is constrained by 
situational factors. The constraining effects in turn can deliver more or less of their 
potential impact depending on policy makers’ level of interest in options, level of 
authority to make choices, and level of ability to be comprehensive.
Since central policy makers mediate foe influence of the other factors, their views 
on what influences them are important to consider. Their dedsion making was said to 
be influenced by (a) degree of knowledge, (b) degree of certainty, (c) degree of 
information and (d) amount of time available. All of these affect their oppotiunities to 
consider alternatives, when they decide to have informal meetings, and whether formal 
consultations will affect them. In other words when they can, when they will, and the 
drcumstances under which foey can consider alternatives and whether they can and/or 
will engineer those circumstances. This affects current arrangements and behaviour 
such as postponing manoeuvres, and negotiative manoeuvres.
The views of policy makers on what influences them give some indication about 
foe conditions under which scope for effective partidpation exists. Policy makers 
would have to be relatively unhampered by existing practices and controls, foe 
influence of their political masters, and foe oversight of their political masters. There 
would have to be a relative lack of knowledge and of immediately available 
information from habitual sources, and of presented information from other sources. 
There would have to be a relative lack of sectoral bias, and of "important" sectoral 
interest. The policy makers themselves would have to be interested and have foe time.
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All but the last are unlikely to occur very often, and even then, the policy makers 
would have to be relatively disinterested with respect to sectors or ideologies.
Approach to Policy Making. The general approach to policy making during the 
legislative process of the FEPA was reactive. The precipitate decision to legislate was 
occasioned by reaction to a situation seen as a problem by certain sectors. As a result 
alternative views of problems or descriptions of existing practices and the ways in 
which they might be affected were not considered. This led to a further set of 
problems, engendering further reactive decision making, rather than decision making 
geared to avoidance of problems.
Given die generally reactive nature of Government decision making, problems 
must arise within an existing system and from the point of view of an important 
sector, to be significant enough to engender debate, intervention and potential change. 
It follows that important sectoral participants are also reactive in their approach.
Controls built into the legislation, for example for training, which had fewer roots 
in the existing system, were treated a little more proactively with respect to alternatives 
consideration, but were reactive to the extent that this was an RCEP recommendation 
(RCEP, 1979). The appearance of proactivity was reinforced by a relative lack of 
obvious interest from actors seen as important, there being, so far as was apparant, 
only mild pressure in favour of the proposal from the BAA, and against it from the 
NFU. The fact that training was considered at all was probably due to the individuals 
at MAFF, who did seek a wide range of views before opting for reinforcing existing 
non-contentious practices whilst not burdening the existing resources of the latter, 
probably because of private resistance from the NFU. Even the "evaluation document" 
whidi PRSD were to release to the public had already been developed by the 
regulators, on their own initiative, previous to the decision to legislate. However in the 
parliamentary phase it seemed like a new central policy directive. The actions of one 
or another sector always preceded Government policy on individual issues.
In existing control areas, the information level was considered a sufficient basis 
for decisions. In new areas contemplated for control, the degree of group interest in 
presenting alternatives, and not an unavailability of information may have been 
important Policy makers sought out existing information and expertise in these cases, 
rather than commission de novo research into alternatives.
The potential for change usually occurs in areas where there are already extensive 
practices and stakeholders and therefore a high degree of interest and pressure from 
both public and private groups. But because these stakeholders are important to central 
policy makers, the latter are unlikely to originate change which is radically different 
from that conceived of by the stakeholders. Policy making in the case studied here was 
thus incremental in central areas. Even in areas without important stakeholders, more 
radical changes will be attempted only infrequently precisely because there is 
insufficient interest or pressure, in the absence of highpoweied private interests. The
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issue of infoimation disclosure was imposed on MAFF by the development of central 
Government policy, and whilst it had to be introduced in the legislation, as much as 
possible was done in the administrative phase to accommodate the views of the 
pesticides industry and the regulators.
Policy making took place not only under a rule of conservation of existing 
praçtiçes and controls, but also under a rule of preservation of existing decision 
making style. The discretionary and private nature of AC?, SSC, PRSD and company 
decision making was preserved, and much decision making which could have been 
more public was elaborated in closed working groups. Information about the basis of 
AGP decisions was made available only (rfter decisions had been made. Many groups 
would have liked to be represented on committees making, or overseeing the making 
of, decisions. Unfortunately the parliamentary phase (Chapter 7), at which the greatest 
number of alternatives were available and the most wide ranging discussion could have 
taken place, was also the time when the Government was being uninformative about 
their thinking. They did not discuss alternatives, only acknowledged them.
The sequence of activities in rational and prescriptive decision making models is 
regarded as h i^ y  important, for example Open University, 1984. It is assumed that, 
no matter how informal or implicit activities are in the real world, this sequence is still 
important for the course and outcome of decision making. Situational constraints such 
as established controls, or Government practices such as preserving the form of the 
original Bill to the greatest extent possible in the parliamentary phase, will influence 
the sequence of activities in probably irreversible ways. For example, after the 
parliamentary phase it would have been extremely difficult to re-set objectives. Also, 
established practices with their inbuilt measures of performance having been accepted 
before objectives were considered, limited the range of future objectives to those 
compatible with them.
Established practices are more important than normally recognised in policy 
making. If research concentrates only on current events, implementation may often 
appear to precede policy, whereas in fact it may embody previously unspoken, 
unformulated or unpublicised policy which only becomes articulated in the public 
arena when Government decides to take action. If the framework of analysis 
incorporates implicit and informal items, and if the historical record (supplemented by 
interview data) is such that it is possible to discern these, then policy will probably be 
seen to precede implementation, although it may only be articulated after it. The 
original "policy-action" only appears to be restricted to action because of the lack of a 
broad policy associated with it, and the lack of a range of alternatives from which it 
can be seen to have been chosen. This kind of policy-action can also be seen to be 
action taken as the result of a severely limited policy analysis taken by one sectoral 
actor to be compatible with his/her operating situation. Thus a divide between policy 
and action is difficult to perceive.
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When we take multiple actors and the history of established practices and 
participants into account it may well be that someone's policy always precedes action. 
That policy may not be formulated, or officially announced, or passed to those central 
policy makers inclined to announce policies. Indeed there is no need to announce a 
particular person’s or group’s policy-action as policy unless the debate becomes more 
public and Aere is a need to appear organised and puiposeful. For example, the 
evaluation document which regulators developed on their own initiative was taken over 
by central policy makers and presented as new policy. In all areas of practice, a 
multitude of policies and actions by many non-central policy makers could contribute 
to the "policy" of central policy makers. This argument does not constitute a 
fundamental disagreement with Barrett and Hill’s (1984) argument that action 
sometimes precedes policy, but rather suggests that which precedes what depends on 
the point in time at which a particular analysis commences. Also, since the "divide" is 
indistinct, it may not be very useful as a conceptual tool until what constitutes "policy" 
and "action" is more highly specified for a variety of contexts.
This thesis supports incrementalism by successive limited comparisons, as posited 
by Lindblom (1965), as the dominant mode of policy making for pesticides control in 
a legislative context Decisions taken on controls avoided challenging important 
participants. In the case of the pesticide approval system for example, the status quo 
with respect to agrochemical producers was laid down as the first position. This was 
followed by consideration of evidence from other important sectors (such as farmers 
and non-agrochemical pesticide producers and suppliers) of perceived adverse 
consequences for themselves of pursuing the status quo (but not other evidence). This 
in turn was followed by administrative adjustments, after the parliamentary phase, to 
accommodate these concerns.
The reluctance of the Government to spell out objectives on the basis of which 
radical alternatives could be proposed, also fits this style, as did their eventual 
acceptance of an amendment specifying objectives based on the objectives of the 
existing pesticides control system, the PSPS.
An appearance of political rationality and a comprehensive consideration of 
alternatives was given by the collation of wide ranging consultation responses. 
However the only options considered seriously were those which would be incremental 
in effect. A range of incremental options may have been considered, but this was not 
broad or comprehensive. This thesis therefore agrees with Smith and May (1980) that 
in the real world, incrementalism and rationalism converge. Etzioni’s "mixed 
scanning", at least in single-issue areas, is really only a rational-comprehensiveness 
within narrow limits, and thus is also incrementalism, or at best saticficing (see Simon 
1983). If wc consider sectors, another way of looking at this would be to say that it is 
incremental because the "political rationality" extends only towards the consideration of 
evidence presented by certain sectors.
190
Where issues have a technological component, and where the degree of certainty 
over policy alternatives being considered is high, the degree of open-ness to less 
central policy makers is low. A corollary of this is that in more technical areas, an 
hierarchical relationship between policy makers and technical regulators probably does 
not exist or may be reversed.
Approach to Participation: Admission to the Debate. The political rationality of 
pesticide control policy making is more comprehensive than that inherent in most 
prescriptive frameworks, but inevitably less effective than one that attempted to 
incorporate plural views of the situation. Given that the decision processes of central 
policy makers could never be truly representative of these plural views, die early 
involvement of a wide range of interests would encourage a closer £^proximation to 
political rationality. This means that procedural aspects carry more potential than 
substantive ones to influence positively political rationality.
The attempt to introduce a wide ranging system description and problem framing 
stages at the beginning of some prescriptive approaches recognises the importance of 
early recognition of existing practices and the views of participants, but the analysis 
will inevitably still be able to serve certain political interests selectively, since single 
analysts cannot replace involvement of a plurality of participants. Thus the beliefs and 
capabilities of the analyst chosen are important in these respects. Again, as for 
prescriptive approaches, what is important is the sequence of activities and the 
earliness and breadth of involvement of participants.
Lindblom’s (1977) and Wildavsky’s (1980) view that a multiplicity of participants, 
or politics, raises the quality of debate through alternatives being better known 
(p e rh ^  eventually leading to public choice), were not demonstrable in the case of the 
FEPA. The debate during the parliamentary phase, whilst wide-ranging, took place 
with little indication from the Government of their intentions, and did not influence 
policy making choices, at least not in an immediate or obvious way. Hogwood and 
Gunn (1984), Walkland (1968) and Richardson and Jordan (1979) all write that the 
policy making process is largely non-parliamentary in the UK, involving confidential 
discussions between recognised groups and Government departments. In this case, even 
though there was a parliamentary phase, the trend was for the Government to allow a 
one-way flow of information from participants to themselves. The result was that the 
quality of public debate was low and decisions were kept to confidential discussions 
after the parliamentary phase, as we saw in Qiapters 7 and 8. The Government 
continually mentioned their preference for "not pre-empting" later consultations.
The Government took on board problems, as framed by certain participants, with 
respect to their effects on the part of the control system with which they were 
concerned. When the decision to legislate to control pesticides was taken, only those 
sectors which had been affected by the problem were involved in early consultations. 
Consideration of other areas by the civil servants preparing the legislation only
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extended to the general areas of activity they needed to take powers to control, for 
example manufacturing, use, storage etc. Admitting a wider range of participants 
earlier in the process may have changed the original content of the legislation or 
widened the appreciation of the potential effects of controls. In terms of ’analysis of 
options’ (given the incrementalist style and that the policy-actions of regulators 
preceded the policy of central policy makers), the analytical work could be said to 
have already been completed by a limited range of partisan participants, as in 
Lindblom 1979. hi the case of the form of the document on manufacturers’ test data to 
be released to the public, that promulgated by the regulators (the evaluation document), 
was chosen over that proposed by the manufacturers (the "Draft PRD Publication").
Participant emergence and access, and the informal rules which govern this, are 
important determinants of policy. The degree to which there is regular informal access 
as opposed to formal opportunities for participation in the most public phases, governs 
the nature and extent of their influence in shaping policy. As a consequence, there is a 
premium on gaining access to the more private and informal, but strictly guarded, 
decision making arenas, and therefore lobbying to this end.
The formal consultation process which took place on the regulations, had more 
time and was more open. In some cases new areas were considered. Again, this was 
after a great deal of scene-setting had taken place, but with new issues, there was the 
time properly to consider alternatives. At this stage, policy makers actively sought out 
inputs on alternatives for training implementation.
The operation of "closed policy communities" (Richardson and Jordan, 1979), is 
facilitated by the closed informal nature of the consultation exercise. Access to the 
consultation was non-discriminating (that is it was open to all interested groups). In 
this way the procedure for participation was satisfactory. However the degree of 
influence wielded by less central participants through this apparent equality of access, 
could never have been equal, given the enormous number of choices that had already 
been made. An appearance of "Partisan Mutual Adjustment" was given by the 
consultation exercise, which in fact enabled closed decision making, through a 
LindWom-style (1979) "pluralism" inherently biased with respect to particular sectors. 
Groups not recognised as important did not remain outside the administrative process, 
as Brickman et al (1985) suggest However, their influence was probably marginal. 
This thesis supports Brickman et al in their assertion that the informality of the 
wnsultation process allows Government officials to regulate the flow of information 
among interested parties. Again, they mediate the breadth of alternatives considered 
and flie choices made, whilst appearing to support effective participation. However, 
within this process, civil servants could undertake consideration of more radical 
alternatives, given that they have the opportunity to see a wide range of alternatives 
without the scrutiny of important sectoral participants or the Government However 
this is unlikely to result in radical choice, because of lack of interest and the need for
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openness in appealing for resources.
In the situation examined for this thesis, certain practices or implicit policies 
influencing participation were seen to operate. Public debate was avoided when an 
unpopular control measure was introduced (access to manufacturers’ registration data) 
by introducing an amendment without forewarning, towards the end of the 
parliamentary phase, when the potential for change or informed argument was low. 
Priority was given to participants in the existing practices and controls when policies 
were being developed which might affect their modus operandi. This included the 
pesticide industry and their regulators (the latter being assumed to possess the most 
relevant technical expertise). This could be a general pattern, or one which is more 
likely to arise where there is insufficient time to develop policy. Consultation and the 
search for alternatives was wider where there was no status quo in terms of established 
participants or practices, for example in the case of training of users; and in other 
areas when a high degree of certainty over basic choices had already been developed. 
Alternatives which did not seriously challenge the operability of choices were 
disregarded. Even in the case of training, which was not incorporated in the existing 
pesticide control system and where little external pressure existed, the alternatives 
sought were still those which might be based on existing practices.
The Legitimacy o f Policy Making. The legitimacy of policy making in developing 
pesticides regulations during the legislative process is assumed to be largely 
determined by participant satisfaction with it
In general, non-agrochemical pesticides manufacturers, as well as other private 
interests and environmental groups, would have been happier with a process of 
legislating for the control of pesticides which gave them the opportunity to become 
involved in the problem framing stage of policy making. Being brought in at a stage 
where the focus was on the likely effects of alternatives already chosen and how to 
minimise the problems contingent on them, was not seen as acceptable. The extent of 
previous negotiations with some sectors, like the BAA, had decreased the value of 
involvement for these sectors. However particular groups, like the NAAC, were 
satisfied with the results of such lack of consultation in that they were given access to 
the more private decision making arenas, where they could have a more long term 
impact At the proposals stage of the Bill this general concern was compounded by the 
lack of time available as this affected the quality and comprehensiveness of 
participants’ inputs. The concern was further compounded by the quality of the public 
debate which was frustrated by the lack of openness about decisions or at least about 
current thinking on issues with respect to potential controls.
Satisfaction with the process thus varied with (a) perceived extent of disclosure 
and whether disclosure was concurrent or belated; (b) the timing of access (before or 
after decisions); (c) the overall tirning of, and time given to, participatory access; and 
(d) the perceived extent of consideration by central policy makers of alternatives
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offered by participants. Participatory effectiveness is closely linked to participant 
satisfaction with procedures, but the actualities of timing and extent of consideration of 
alternatives offered are important It was not possible to detemiine the extent of private 
consideration of alternatives, only to infer effectiveness from whether chosen 
alternatives or arguments in support of chosen alternatives reflected a variety of inputs. 
Legitimacy in the policy making process during regulation formation was 
unsatisfactory from the point of view of public interest groups and most private 
interest groups. Some private groups later felt vindicated through being incorporated 
into closed decision making. Some private groups were not concerned with legitimacy 
for all or even for themselves in the public procedures, because they were already 
involved in the closed processes.
Regulation formation, if it is to be more democratic, demands a more participative 
and substantive base to allow evidence absorption, resulting in a fuller consideration of 
alternatives and the development of a guiding overall policy position in the knowledge 
of the systems involved. To achieve this, policy decision making would need to be less 
conditioned by existing factors and established procedures for involvement, which 
come into play only at times when they are most likely to be ignored because of time 
and focus factors. Policy decision making would need to involve wide and early 
consultation. A more proactive approach to pollution control would be required which 
incorporated exploration of the whole system, relevant actors and their interactions in a 
participative way. Even if the latter did not warrant immediate change, there would be 
a better-prepared base of knowledge to inform policy decision making with a view to 
change at a later date.
Although policy decision making will always be conditioned by existing factors, it 
should be possible to foster participant satisfaction, even in incremental change. 
However the impact of all other factors on participant satisfaction and effectiveness 
relies largely on the particular policy makers chosen for (or already in) the job, these 
being political choices.
Since existing practices and controls condition later comprehensiveness, analysis of 
alternatives should ideally have taken place before the original implementations. If 
comprehensive planning and participation were introduced in advance, the need felt by 
some for radical change might not arise, and the inevitable incrementalism might be 
acceptable.
Limitations of the Analysis and Suggestions for Further Research. This analysis 
was limited to events occurring after the decision to legislate because of the starting 
date of the research. It would therefore have been difficult to explore the degree and 
nature of company and civil servant involvement in shaping the opinions of the 
Brussels bureaucracy, although it might have been easier to gain access to the latter 
than to Whitehall The insights gained might have led the analysis into interesting 
areas of participation and decision making at the EC level, and comparisons with UK
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processes.
The research was broad based in terms of the initial range of issues examined, and 
sectors interviewed. This design led to a very rich picture of the complexity of policy 
making in the presence of many political participants. However the later decision to 
focus on a smaller sample of issues (necessitated by the bulk of data generated) may 
indicate a more manageable course whereby a few participants relevant to a small 
number of issues are each interviewed more frequently. An even richer analysis might 
result, although it is possible üiat a greater level of detail would not be forthcoming 
from die interviewees concerned.
The research reported here could be developed to examine UK and European 
s^roaches to controlling risk-related technologies. Comparisons could be made 
between the patterns of participation inherent in controlling an established (the 
pesticide) industry, and those apparent in the control debate on the newly emerging 
biotechnology industry.
Postscript: European Influences on the Development of UK Pesticides Controls. 
Although the timing of the FEPA was catalysed mainly by extant trade and 
competition obligations arising from the Treaty of Rome, the decision to legislate and 
the coiitent of the legislation was influenced by anticipated future requirements from 
proposed and adopted Directives.
Before the FEPA, UK controls over pesticides had been reactive, voluntary, non­
standardized and flexible. Responses to European legislation had been to do the 
minimum, without recourse to primary legislation. The UK used a derogation for DDT 
uses beyond the binding date of 79/117 (which prohibited its marketing and use), later 
withdrawing these under the PSPS without introducing legislation. Directive 76/895 
establishing MRLs and monitoring was optional, and Britain chose not to comply. The 
UK was the only Member State which argued to continue a provision making the 1986 
Residues Directives optional, having continued PSPS arrangements only for food 
intended for domestic consumptiorL The UK did produce secondary legislation 
implementing 78/631 on classification, packaging and labelling before the binding date, 
but only as this had already been implemented by the PSPS.
As described in Chapter Five, the UK Government had resisted EC pressure to 
make the voluntary scheme statutory until it became clear that the former was being 
undermined by an increasing awareness of EC opinion. In fact, the changes the EC 
wanted in this regard could have been accomodated by secondary legislation. FEPA 
and COPR represent a new anticipatory response to the EC through the introduction of 
primary legislation and more explicit regulations. In theory this reduces flexibility and 
administrative discretion in the area of residues controls. However a lot of room to 
manouvre has been reserved to develop the detail of the regulatory science demanded 
of industry. It remains to be seen whether this discretion will be used to further the 
harmonisation of pre-market notification protocols.
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Appendix 2.1: General Controls on Pesticides.
General legislation on the manufacture, use and sale of chemicals in the UK is 
contained in the Health and Safety at Work Etc. Act 1974 (HSWA, Cap 37), the 
Control of Pollution Act 1974 (COPA, Cap 40), the Consumer Safety Act 1978 (CSA, 
Cap 38); and Part T of the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 (FEPA, Cap 
48).
The HSWA is primarily concerned with chemicals as a potential source of danger to 
people at work, and hence their protection. It places a duty on manufacturers, 
importers and suppliers of substaiices for use at woik: (a) to ensure that the substance 
is safe and without risks to health when properly used; (b) to have the substance tested 
as necessary; and (c) to ensure adequate information about Üiese tests (Haigh, 1987). 
Administration is by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
The Notification of New Substances Regulations 1982 (SI 1496) were made under the 
HSWA and the European Communities Act (1972). They implement the notification 
portion of the Commission Directive known as the "Sixth Amendment" (79/831/EEC), 
which adds a scheme of prior notifications intended to anticipate and prevent effects of 
chemicals on man and the environmenL This is done by requiring testing for potential 
hazards before marketing, and adding a new classification of "dangerous to the 
environment" to the original Directive (67/548/EEC), whose purpose had been solely to 
protect people.^
The HSWA also places a duty on employers to secure the health, safety and welfare of 
persons at work, and to provide for fire protection of the public fiom work activities. 
The Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (ŒMAH) Regulations 1984 (SI 
1902) made under the HSWA and the European Communities Act 1972 implement the 
"Seveso" directive (Directive 82/501/EC) on major accident hazards Onduding fires, 
e3q)losions and massive emissions of dangerous substances) which requires steps to be 
taken to prevent major accidents and limit those which do occur. These include safety 
reports, notification of sites, emergency plans and informing the public of the correct 
behaviour to adopt in the case of an accident The Seveso Directive extended fiie 
powers and duties of the HSE to consider affects on the environment alongside affects 
on mart
After FEPA. an amendment (SI 890) to SI 1496 came into force cm 18 June 1986, making minor amendments to 
ensure that the UK regulations were in full conq>liance with the directive and its requirement diat manufacturers 
notify natkmal au&oiities of die results of toxicological arul other tests at least 45 days before being placed on 
the market (Haigh, 1987). It also details {socedures for the classification of dangerous substances according to 
hazard and risk entaihnent, and makes provisions for packaging and labelling.
2 1 2
The COPA is primarily concerned with chemicals as a potential source of danger to 
the environment, and contains powers to prohibit or restrict the import, use in 
cormection with trade, or supply for any purpose, of certain substances for the purpose 
of preventing damage to man or the aivironment The Control of Pollution (Supply 
and Use of Injurious Substances) Regulations (1980, SI 638) made under COPA 
implement an EC Directive (76/769/EEC OJ L262 27:09:76 as amended by 
82/828/EEC) restricting Polychlorinated Biphenyls and Triphenyls (PCBs and PCTs). 
In addition, the Control of Pollution (Supply and Use of Injurious Substances) 
Regulations 1986 (SI 90) implementing a Directive (85/610/EEC) banning new 
applications of PCBs and PCTs, and the sale of second-hand plant and equipment 
containing such, were introduced in 1986.
The CSA is mainly concerned with protection of the consumer, and contains powers to 
ensure that goods are safe and to make orders prohibiting goods whidi are not safe. 
The Dangerous Substances and Preparations (Safety) Regulations 1980 (SI 136) made 
under the CSA implement EEC directive 76/769/EEC for chloroethylene in aerosols, 
and also Directive 79/663/EEC bannir^ tridiloroethylene, tetrachloroethylene and 
carbon tetrachloride in ornamental products, and Tris (2,3-dibromopropyl) phosphate in 
certain textile products known to be in contact with skin.
Part I of FEPA contains broad emergency powers to prohibit farming, fishing and fbod 
preparation in the event of an escape of a substance likely to create a hazard to health 
through human consumption of food.
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Appendix 4.1: Letter to Private and Public Interest Groups.
I am a PhD research student studying policy aspects of pesticides control, particulaiiy 
in relation to the Food and Environment Protection Act (1985). I worked on the Bill 
during its passage in the House of Commons for Mr DN Campbell-Savours MP.
I am gathering information from tire organisations who were involved in the 
legislation, regarding the nature and extent of their involvement and the issues with 
which they were particularly concerned.
I would like to come and talk to you in the rrear future, and will tele^dione you shortly 
to see if tills would be possible, and to arrange a date. In the meantime, I would be 
grateful if you could send me a copy of your response to the MAFF Consultative 
Document on tire pesticides regulations and, if you prepared one, a copy of your 
response to their outline of proposals for legislation. I would be happy to send you a 
copy of the response which my supervisor Joyce Tait and I prepared, if this would be 
of interest
I must stress that I am writing and working on my own bdialf only.
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Appendix 4.2: Letter to MPs on Standing Committee H.
I am a PhD leseardi student studying policy aspects of pesticides control, paiticulaily 
in relation to the Food and Environment protection Act (1985). I worked for Mr DN 
Campbell-Savours MP on the Bill during its passage in the House of Commons.
I am writing to all members who sat on Standing Committee H which considered the 
Bill, and I would like to come and talk to you at some time in the near future, with 
respect to your involvement in the legislation and the subjects with which you have 
been particularly concerned.
I would be grateful if you could send me a letter indicating whether this would be 
possible. I would then telephone you to arrange a date
215
Appendix 43: Letter to MPs with Apparent Interest in Pesticides.
I am a PhD research student studying policy aspects of pesticides control, particularly 
in relation to the Food and Environment Protection Act (1985). I worked for Mr DN 
Campbell-Savours MP on the Bill during its passage in the House of Commons.
I am writing to all members who appear to me to have had an interest in the 
legislation, to try to discover the .extent of their interest, and therefore whether it would 
be appropriate (and acceptable) for me to come and talk to you with respect to your 
involvement in the legislation.
I would be grateful if you could send me a letter outlining the extent of your interest 
and whether an interview would be acceptable to you. I would then telephone you to 
arrange a date.
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Appendix 4.4: Interest Group Responses to Requests.
Interest Group Response To Response To
Interview Written Material
Request Request




























D . Campbell-Savours 
J. Carlisle 
D . Clark 
R. Davies 
J . Farr
D . Heathcote-Amory 
G. Howells








Appendix 4.6: MP’s Responses to Query about Pesticides Interest.
MP Reply
D . Alton +
K. Carlisle +
S . Chapman +
F . Cook -
D . Crouch -
J. Cunningham +
T. Dalyell -
E . Deakins +
K. Eastham -
N. Foreman -
R. Freeman ' —
N. Godman -
P . Hardy + ,
D . Hogg +
S. Hughes —
A . Kirkwood +
P. Mills -





Appendix 4.7: Round One Interviewees.
Private Interest Groups
British Agrochemicals Association
Director (2 formal interviews and many informal)
Industry Executive (informal interview)
National Farmers Union HQ
Technical Officer servicing Parliamentary and Technical Machinery Committees 
(formal interview)
British Agrochemicals Standards Inspection Scheme 
Chief Executive (formal interview)
British Wood Preserving Association 
Director (formal interview)
British Pest Control Association 
Executive Director (formal interview)
United Kingdom Agricultural Supply Trade Association 
Agrochemicals Executive (1) (formal interview)
Agrochemicals Executive (2) (informal interview)
National Association o f Agricultural Contractors 
Secretary (formal interview)
Agricultural Engineers Association 
Technical Director (formal interview)
PubUc Health and Industrial Pesticides Council 
Chairman (informal interview)
Agricultural and Allied Workers National Trade Group o f the TGWU 
Head of Legal and Health and Safety Section (fonnal and informai interviews)
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Public Interest Groups 
Green Alliance
Pailiamentaiy Officer (formal interview)
Soil Association
Pesticides Researcher and Campaigner (formal and informal interviews)
Consumer's Association
Manager of Campaign Unit (formal interview)
Parliamentary Advisor of Campaign Unit (formal interview)
National Society for Clear Air
Editor/Information Officer, Public Relations (formal interview)
Wildlife Unk
Secretary (formal interview)
Fauna and Flora Preservation Society 
Bat Conservation Officer (informal interview)
Royal Society for Nature Conservation 
Conservation Officer 0nformal interview)
OXFAM
Public Affairs Officer (many informal interviews)
Friends o f the Earth
Countryside (Pesticides) Campaigner (many informal interviews)
Campaign for Freedom of Irformation
Director of Campaign Management Committee informal interview)
London Food Commission 
Campaigner (informal interview)
Royal Society for the Protection o f Birds
Advisors in Conservation Management Advisory Unit (informal interviews)
2 2 1
MPs
Dale Campbell-Savouis MP (Labour; Workington) (formal interview)
Joan Maynard MP (Labour, Sheffield - Biigbtside) (formal interview)
Peter Lloyd MP (Conservative; Fareham) (formal interview)
Research Assistant to Brynmor John MP (Labour, Pontypridd) (informal interview) 
Other
SaUngbury Casey Lrd.(Govemment affairs consultants)
Advisor to the BAA (informal interviews)
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Appendix 4.8: Round One Interview Guidelines.




2 Involvement With FEPA (semi-structured)
2.1 Timescale and History Of Legislation
2.3 First Involvement
2.4 Development Of Issues
2.5 Specific Involvement
2.6 Priority Of Issues/ Legislation
3 Interactions (open discussion)
3.1 Extent Of Interaction With Others
3.2 Extent Of Cooperation
3.4 Effectiveness Of Organisations
4 MAFF (open discussion)
4.1 Policy Objectives in Legislation
4.2 Positive and Negative Features Of Legislation
4.2 Achievement of Aims
4.3 Effectiveness
5 Evidence (open discussion)




Appendix 4.9: First Approach Letter to Heads of Departments.
It is DOW some time since I last contacted you in connection with my PhD research on 
the Food and Environment Protection Act (1985) and the Control of Pesticides 
Regulations (1986).
I would appreciate it if we could now meet again, and also would like to ask your 
help with my plans to interview some others in your Division. I propose writing to the 
following: [NAMES]. A copy of this standard letter is enclosed. I would be grateful if 
you could indicate su^^rt for these interviews to the appropriate people.
The interviews should take s^roximately one and a half hours each. The subject is foe 
pesticides section of the FEPA(1985) from the initiation of foe legislation to the 
publication of the main set of Regulations in 1986.
The iitierviews will be confidential, and iiulividuals will not be quoted by name 
without permission The material gathered will be used solely by myself in foe 
preparation of my PhD thesis. The interviews are not part of a statistical survey.
I would be grateful if you would consider a date between [DATES], and I will 
telephone soon to see if we can arrange a meeting.
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Appendix 4.10: Letter to Round Two Interviewees.
I am a postgraduate student in the Technology Faculty at the Open University, 
studying the Food and Environment Protection Act (1985) and the Control of 
Pesticides Regulations (1986). My interest is in the pesticides part of the Act, from the 
initiation of the legislation in 1984 to the publication of the regulations in 1986.
MifNAME] has suggested that I talk to you in your role as [ROLE]. I would like to 
talk to you about your contribution to decisions made during this time. The interview 
will be confidential, and you will not be quoted by name wifiiout permission. The 
material gathered will be used solely by myself in preparing my PhD thesis.
The interview should take approximately one and a half hours. I would be grateful if 
you could find a date, preferably between [DATES], and I will telephone you soon to 
see if we can arrange a meeting
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Appendix 4.11: Round Two Interviewees.
Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF).
Headquarters: Pesticides and Infestation Control Division (PICD) (Policy)
Head of Division (Grade 5 - Assistant Secretary)
Policy on all aspects of pesticides control Special knowledge of Parliament 
(Formal Interview)
Head of Branch A (Principal)
Responsible for co-ordinating the replacement of the voluntary with the statutory 
scheme for approvals in the preparation of the legislation and regulations. Secretariat to 
the AGP. On MAFF consultation team.
(Formal Interview)
Head of Branch B (Principal)
Responsible for co-ordinating consultations and preparation of regulations. Coordinated 
"Bill Team". Policy on residues in the preparation of the regulations. On MAFF 
consultation team. AGP assessor.
(Formal Interview)
Branch B SEO
(On advice, did not follow up)
Branch B HEO
(On advice, did not follow up)
Head o f Branch C (SEO)
Responsible for policy in relation to application and use of pesticides in the 
preparation of the regulations. Then policy on post approval items: wholesale, 
distribution storage and training. On M A If consultation team.
(Formal Interview)
ADAS R&D: Harnenden Laboratory (Science)
Director ofHarpenden Laboratory
Responsible for technical advice to PICD and pesticides surveillance and registration 
functions. Chairman of the Environmental Panel of the SSC. Member of the SSC. 
(Formal Interview)
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Pesticides Registration and Surveillance Department (PRSD)
Ex~Head c f PRSD (Grade 6)
Responsible for pesticide registration functions of risk and efficacy evaluations. AGP 
assessor.
(Fonnal Interview)
Head o f PRSD (Grade 6)
Responsible for pesticide registration functions of risk and efficacy evaluations. On 
MAFF’s "Shadow Bill Team". On MAFF's consultation team. AGP assessor.
(Fonnal Interview)
Head o f Risk Evaluation Branch A (Grade 7)
Responsible for Applications for approvals; reviews of approvals; liaison with the AGP 
and SSC. Liaison with companies. On MAFF’s "Shadow Bill Team". On MAFF’s 
consultation team.
(Formal Interview)
Head o f Technical Services Branch (Grade 7)
(Moved fiom Country - not followed up)
ADAS R&D: "Slough Laboratories" including Slough, Tolworth and Worplesdon 
Labs)
Director o f Slough Laboratories
Responsible for R&D on pesticides: storage; environmental effects; vertebrate pest 
control Member of SSC; Environmental Panel. Chairman of tire Working Party on 
Pesticides Residues. On MAFF’s "Shadow Bill Team". On MAFF’s consultation team. 
(Formal Interview)
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Department of the Environment (DoE)
Headquarters: Central Directorate of Environmental Protection: Toxic Substances 
Division
Ex-Head o f Toxic Substances Division
Involved in the development of the legislation. ACP assessor. Member of 
Environmental Panel.
(Formal Interview)
Head of Toxic Substances Division and Ex-Head o f Chemicals Branch (Grade 6) 
involved in the development of the legislation and regulations. ACP assessor.
(Formal Interview)
Head of Pesticides Unit (Grade 7)
Involved in foe development of the regulations. On MAFF’s "Shadow Bill Team”. On 
MAFF’s consultation team.
(Formal Interview)
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS)
Medical Toxicoloev and Environmental Protection Division Senior Medical Officer 
(Grade 5)
Involved in the development of the legislation. ACP assessor. On MAFF’s "Shadow 
Bill Team". Member of SSC; Working Party on Pesticides Residues.
(Formal Interview)
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Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
Headquarters: Industry Sponsorship Department
Chemicals, Textiles, Paper, Timber, and Miscellaneous Mamrfacturing and Service 
Industries Division
Head o f Chemicals Branch (Principal)
Responsible for representing manufacturers interests in Government Pesticides exports. 
ACP assessor.
(Formal Interview)
Advisory Committee on Pesticides (ACP)
Chairman o f the ACP 
(Formal Interview)
Scientific Subcommittee to the ACP (SSC!)
Chairman o f die SSC 
(Formal Interview)
Nature Conservancy Coundl(NCQ ,
C3nef Scientist’s Directorate 
Pesticides Specialist
Responsible for advising Government on issues related to pesticides and nature 




BAA Advisor from Round One
(Interviewed in role as Government affairs Consultant in Round 2)
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Appendix 4.12: Worldview Template.
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Appendix 5.1: Pesticides Recommendations of the 1979 RCEP Report
Pesticides Usage
Data on the quantities of active ingredients manufactured and sold should be made 
fredy available.
The principal oiganisations involved should meet with a view to improving the 
arrangements for collecting and using data on pesticide usage. MAFF should take the 
initiative in this matter and the results should be published.
The ACP should keep in close touch with the US Environmental Protection Agency on 
the possible risks posed by the herbicide 2,4,5-T.
The ACP should review the total (agricultural and horticultural) usage of 
organochlorine pesticides.
Pesticide Resistance.
Resistance to insecticides and fungicides is a matter of serious concern: strategies 
should be developed to delay the onset of resistance.
Aerial Spraying Of Pesticides.
Advance warning of spraying to occupiers of adjacent land should be mandatory; 
where this would be impracticable because of the numbers of people involved, aerial 
spraying should not be used.
The adequacy of present inspection arrangements should be reviewed; consideration 
should be given to experts from Agricultural Dq)artments taking part in inspections.
The arrangements for advance notification of aerial spraying should be extended to 
cover Bivironmental Health Officers of local authorities and the appropriate regional 
ADAS office (with corresponding arrangements in Scotland and Northern Ireland).
The presence of a "groundmarker" during aerial spraying should be mandatory.
Consideration should be given to the introduction of arrangements for the special 
assessment, through the PSPS, of large-scale aerial spraying operations.
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Policy For Pesticide Use.
It should be a declared policy aim to reduce pesticide usage to a m inim um  consistent 
with efficient food production.
Hiere should be increased emphasis on ADAS activities designed to improve tire basis 
on whidi farmers decide their pest control strategies.
An investigation should be undertaken on the effect that present requirements for food 
quality have on pesticide usage.
Subsection 3(3) of the Food and Drugs Act should be amended with the aim of 
reducing the pressures on food processors to produce absolutely pest-fnee products.
Control Arrangements.
The present schemes for assessing the safety and efficacy of pesticides (PSPS and 
ACAS) should be combined.
The combined control scheme should be given statutory recognition.
The form and content of the book "Approved Products For Farmers and Growers" 
should be reviewed with the aim of assisting farmers to choose chemicals that will 
minimise the envirorunental impact of pesticides.
The relevant organisations should review the extent to which the booklet reaches 
farmers and growers; future editions of the book should be provided 6ee to farmers on 
request
There is a need for a more organised approach to tire assessment of rrew techniques for 
pesticide application Arrangements should be introduced for official efficacy testing of 
such equipment which should also cover environmental considerations.
Considerably greater effort should be applied to the development of ULV/CDA 
techniques which offer the prospect of substantial reductions in the amounts of active 
ingredients used; an integrated approach is required involving Government and 
industry.
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The arrangements concerning confidentiality of data relating to the effects of pesticides 
should be reviewed; information should not be unnecessarily withheld, especially from 
those engaged in research in fire field.
The role of the Advisory Committee on Pesticides (ACP) should be extended. The 
ACP ^ u ld  publish periodic reports on its work and should be empowered to advise 
on researdi rreeds in the pesticides field. Consideration should be given to the 
introduction of a system for reporting on fire effects of rrew pesticides analogous to the 
"yellow card" system used by doctors.
The DES should review the implications of these proposals for the resources required 
by the ACP, in consultation with Agricultural and Environmental Departments.
There is a rreed to develop a professional approach to pesticide î^ )plicatiorL A licensing 
and training system should be introduced for persons s^lying pesticides corrunercially 
in agriculture. The implications of such a scheme for operators igrplying pesticides in 
non-agricultural sectors would need to be separately considered.
Monitoring surveys should be designed to test the observance of harvest intervals; the 
use of "spot check" surveys should be considered.
A study should be undertaken with tire aim of exposing to public debate the issues 
involved in tire momtormg of pesticide residues and in the contrasting approaches 
taken on this matter in the UK and otirer Member States of the European Community.
Research.
Greater emphasis should be placed on the development of rrew techniques to improve 
the efficiency of pesticide application.
There should be an expansion of basic researdi on tire factors determining the 
incidaice of diseases and pests and on the measurenient of economic threshold levels.
Work on the development of strategies to delay the onset of resistance should be 
strengthened.
There should be a strong commitment to applying the concepts of integrated control.
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Appendix 8.1a: Identical Products Applications Procedure (from Draft Data
Requirements).
35. The system for the rapid approval of identical products imported to the UK from 
the European (Community was introduced to assist those wifoing to import crop 
protection products dtirer for tiieir own use or for distribution to ofoers. The procedure 
sa lies to imported formulations of crop protection products as packaged and sold 
overseas, it does not cover bulk imports of unfbrmulated active ingredients.
36. For the purpose of this procedure an imported product is considered to be identical 
to one already approved under the Crintrol of Pesticides Regulations if:
(a) the active ingredient in the imported product is produced by the same company as 
the material used in the product already s^jproved (or by a directly associated 
undertaking) and is the same within variations accepted by the UK Pesticides 
Registration Department when aj^roving the product; and
(b) the formulations of each are produced by the same company (or directly associated 
undertaking) and any differences in the formulations as regards nature, quality and 
quantity of the components are determined by the Ministers to have no material effect 
on safety of humans, domestic animals, livestock, wildlife or the environment 
generally.
37. For rapid approval of an identical product proof is therefore required that the 
product eitiier originated from the company which made the original aRilication, or, 
from a directly associated company (eg a product marketed in this country by 
"Agrochenticals UK" may be marketed abroad by "Agrochemicals International 
(France)" - both ccxnpanies being part of the same international company group). 
Evidence which should include details of the packaging, must be provided. Guidance 
on the provision of this information is at Appendix 3.
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38. Infbnnation supplied will be verified in part from Registration Department records. 
However, only the appropriate UK marketing company wiU be able to provide the 
Registration Department at Harpenden with tire information whidi will confirm 
identicality, and to achieve this, some information supplied in the application will have 
to be disclosed to the UK marketing company. Applicants can be assured tiiat only 
minimal information will be transmitted to UK CMnpanies Qe product name, active 
ingredient, country from which it is to be purchased and batch number). Details of the 
sqjplicant and all other information on the form will be treated as confidential and not 
disclosed outside of Government Departments without tire î^ lican t’s permission. It is 
important to note that tire supply of all this information and tire checks made by the 
Registration D^artment may in some cases fail to confirm identicality or may indeed 
establish that the product is not identical, hi such instances, approval would have to be 
refused, ^rplicants, if they wished, would have to re-apply according to the normal 
approval procedures which a^ ly  to non-identical products, supplying the supporting 
data necessary under those procedures.
39. Those wishing to import an identical agrochemical for their own use should submit 
their completed application form to Pesticides Branch, Great Westminster House, 
Horseferry Road, London SWIP 2AE.
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A. DETAILS OF PRODUCT
1. Name of Product
2. Active ingredient(s) and concentration in formulation
3. Physical condition and nature of formulation (eg solid, liquid, etc)
4. Name of manufacturer
5. Product batch number(s) Qf known)
6. Is the product officially registered for commercial use in the country in which it was 
bought?
7. Registration number in that country Qf known)
8. Please enclose a specimen copy of the label from the imported product or 
alternatively the manufacturers instmctions/tecommendations.
9. Name and address of supplier (please attach a copy of your invoice).
10. (Quantity of product (please specify weight or volume)
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B. DETAILS OF PACKAGING AND LABELLING
1. For Distribution
(a) Please attach 5 copies of foe label, in English, to be used with the imported 
product
(b) In lAfoat type of packaging is the product being imported? (eg plastic drum, 
carton...)
(c) What size are the individual packages?
(d) In what type of packaging will foe product be distributed in the UK?
(e) What size will foe individual package be?
(f) Address of premises where products are or will be stored?
2. For Own Use
(a) Please attach a copy or a draft of the instructions, in English, to be used with foe 
imported product
(b) What type of packaging is the product in? (eg plastic drum, carton...)
(c) What size are the individual packages?
(d) Address of premises where products are or will be stored?
C. DETAILS OF IDENTICAL UK APPROVED PRODUCT
1. UK name of product
2. Name of UK manufacturer
3. UK registration number (if known)
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D. DECLARATION
I, the above named, hereby apply for approval under the Control of Pesticides 
Regulations 1986 for the product detailed at A and C above. These details are correct 
to the best of my knowledge.
\
Signature......................... Date...........................
E. DECLARATION - TO BE SIGNED IN ADDITION TO D ABOVE BY THOSE 
IMPORTING FOR OWN USE
I, the above named, hereby declare that the product detailed is intended for use by 
myself or my employees on land or premises in my ownership or possession and I will 
not supply it to any odier paity.
Signature..........................Date.
FOR OWN USE The completed fonn should be returned to: Pesticides Branch, The 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Room 681, Great Westminster House, 
Horseferry Road, London SWIP 2AE.
FOR DISTRIBUTION The competed form should be returned to: Pesticides 
Registration Department, Harpenden Laboratory, Hatching Green, Harpenden AL5 
2BD.
THE ABOVE PRODUCT SHOULD NOT BE USED OR SOLD UNTIL APPROVAL 
HAS BEEN GRANTED. THERE CAN BE NO GUARANTEE OF A QUICK 
APPROVAL IN THE ABSENCE OF THE lOTORMATION ABOVE.
IMPORTANT: Approval will not be granted by these procedures if it cannot be 
demonstrated that the product is identical or if the information supplied demonstrates 
that it is not identical.
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Appendix 8 J: PSPS Safety Data Guidance (1979).
THIS SECTION IS NOT INTENDED TO BE A CHECKLIST WITH THE NOTIFIER 
EXPECTED TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER UNDER EVERY HEADING
NOTBFIERS SHOULD DISCUSS WITH THE TECHNICAL SECRETLY THE 
TYPE OF INFORMATION THAT WILL BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO MAKING A 
NOTinCATION
All available supporting infonnation published and unpublished should be supplied in 
the fonn of a summary data sheet, laid out following the general pattern below. 
Qeaiiy there will be occasions whoi no entry can be made under some of the 
headings. For example, for certain industrial s^lications (eg wood preservation etc) it 
would not normally be necessary to provide information under all foe headings 
necessary when a product is applied to edible crops. References (using World List or 
Chemical Abstracts abbreviations) should be given against each summary of published 
information. Copies of the original reports of summarised unpublished information 
should be provided, together with the authority for their use by the Technical 
Secretariat if they originate other foan finom the notifier.
1. IDENTITY OF THE ACTIVE INGREDIENT
1.1 Chemical name (preferably according to lUPAC nomenclature) and CAS number. 
12 Fbrmula (empirical and stmctural), molecular weight
1.3 Common name, preferably ISO, BSI or others, eg. AFNOR, WSA (Weed Society 
of America), etc, acronyms.
1.4 Composition of the technical product (purity in percentage, nature and percentage 
of impurities, isomers).
2. PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF ACTIVE INGREDIENTS(S)
2.1 Melting point boiling point specific gravity, refractive index.
22  Vapour pressure in mm Hg at 20oC, volatility.
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2.3 Solubility in water of pure active ingredient and technical product Solubility in 
other solvents of pure active ingredient and technical product Distribution coefBcioit 
between water and an immiscible organic solvent such as octan-l-ol.
3. CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF THE ACTIVE INGREDIENT(S)
3.1 Stability in air, effect of light rate of decomposition, identity of breakdown 
products, flanunability, flash point composition of ejqplosive mixtures, corrosive nature, 
thermal degradation, etc.
3.2 Stability in organic solvents used in the formulation(s).
3.3 Stability in water, hydrolysis rate, identity of breakdown product(s).
3.4 Information on other chemical reactions of the active ingredient(s) or foe technical 
product Reactivity towards container materials.
4. INFORMATION ON THE FORMULATED PROPRIETARY PRODUCT
4.1 Proprietary name of the product or proposed name.
42  Physical conditions and nature of the formulation, eg. emulsifiable liquid, emulsion, 
solution, paste, soluble powder, dispersible powder, dust granules, size or particles, 
flanunability.
4.3 Detailed information and composition of the technical product in percentage of 
weight (liquid formulations g/l). Active ingredient(s), solvents, fillers and stickers, 
emulsifiers and dispersing agents, dyestuffs, wetting agents.
4.4 Stability of formulated product effects of air, light temperature, water, container 
etc, stability in proposed padcage.
4.5 Suspensibility and emulsifying characteristics.
4.6 Physical compatibility of formulated product with other products with which its use 
is to be recommended on the label.
241
5. FORMULATION ANALYSIS (INCLUDING METHODS FOR THE TECHNICAL 
PRODUCT)
6. APPLICATION
6.1 Field of use:









6.2 Functiori, eg. fungicide, herbicide, insecticide, etc.
6.3 Effects on pests, eg, contact, inhalation poison, stomach poison, fimgitoxic or 
fungistatic etc., whether systemic in plants.
6.4 Pests controlled and crops or materials protected or treated, and a description of 
how control^rotection is achieved togefoer with a note on any foreseen safety 
advantages over other products.
*6.5 Formulation suitable for the intended use.
*6.6 Concentration of the active ingredient in the material as used (eg. percentage 
concentration in the diluted spray). Rate of p lica tio n  (eg. in kg/ha of active 
ingredient).
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*6.7 Number and timing of applications (period of growth or season).
*6.8 Method(s) of application (eg. high or low volume spraying etc.)
6.9 Specific phytotoxicity: necessary waiting periods to avoid phytotoxic effects with 
soil fiimigant, persistent herbiddes.
* NOTE: For TRIALS notification the information given may be very preliminary and 
quite different from that given on the eventual label.
7. RESIDUES
7.1 Method of Residue Analysis.
Brief account of residue chemistry, eg. statement of principal residues, including 
breakdown products. Methods for identification and determination of the above 
residues; spedfidty and limits of determination of the method(s). Reagents and 
apparatus for extraction, clean-up and measurement Calculation of the result 
Information on foodstuff constituents interfering with fiie methods. Information on the 
analytical and sample blank values and their variations (Standard Deviation). Recovery 
data at levels corresponding with those found in practice. The lower limit of 
determination:
7.1.1 In foodstuffs induding plant materials, meat, milk and other animal products;
7.1.2 In water, soil and air,
7.1.3 In wildlife;
7.1.4 In wood, textiles or other treated materials.
12  Data on residues in foodstuffs, meat, milk, other animal products, crops and other 
treated materials:
7.2.1 Treated crop/animal/material;
7.2.2 Environmental conditions of the experiment (eg. soil type, husbandry practice);
7.2.3 Climatic conditions during the application and in the period between jqyplication 
and sampling;
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I I A  Fonniilation used, method of p lication , £q>plication rates, number and dates of 
application (pre- and post-harvest treatment);
7.2.5 Infonnation on the growth of crop/animal, eg. increase of weight of the sampled 
product betweoi application and each sampling date;
7.2.6 Sampling; storage of sample, pre-analysis treatment of the sample eg washing 
etc;
12.1 Amount of initial residue, residue dis%earance curve;
7.2.8 The residue figures presented have been/not been corrected for analytical and 
sample blanks or recoveries or for both.
7.3 Effects of industrial processes and/or cooking on residues.
7.4 Taint due to normal residues on or in fbodstufik, fresh or after processing, or in 
water.
15  Other residues data, eg. in wildlife, air, water, soil, roof spaces, industrial sites etc. 
Persistence data in soil and water including dissqjpearance curves.
8. EXPERIMENTAL DATA ON TOXICITY IN ANIMALS
8.1 Aoite toxicity in mammals (species and laboratory strain must be stated); brief 
statement of mode of action eg. uncoupler, inhibition of chlorinesterase etc:
8.1.1 Oral single dose toxicity LD50;
8.1.2 Percutaneous toxicity;
8.1.3 Inhalation toxicity;
8.1.4 Delayed effects in animals which have recovered from a near lethal dose;
8.1.5 Other routes eg. intra-peritoneal, intravenous, ocular etc;
8.1.6 Skin ar^ eye irritation.
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8.2 Short Term Toxidty:




8.3 Supplementary Toxicological Studies:
8.3.1 Toxic effects of metabolites from treated plants and of impurities;
8.3.2 Metabolic studies;
8.3.3 Accumulation of compound in tissue and cumulative effects;
8.3.4 Neurotoxicity;
8.3.5 Mutagenicity;
8.3.6 Reproduction studies including the effect on fertility etc. Teratogenicity and 
embryotoxic effects;
8.3.7 Long term toxicity and/or carcinogenicity;
8.3.8 Potentiation;
8.3.9 Effects on livestock, poultry etc.
8.4 Toxicity Classification:
8.4.1 Adequate toxicity data to enable classification of the product (see Appendix E 
W DEl)
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9. HUMAN TOXICOLOGY AND MEDICAL ASPECTS
9.1 Human Toxicology:
9.1.1 Mode of action in man;
9.1.2 Health records of occupationally exposed workers, in botii industry and 
agriculture;
9.1.3 Accidental, suicidal etc poisoning cases;
9.1.4 Observations on exposure of the general population;
9.1.5 Experiments with volunteers.
92 Diagnosis and Treatment:
92.1 Symptoms, specific signs of poisoning;
9.2.2 Laboratory findings, clinical tests, forensic methods;
92.3 Proposed treatment: first aid measures, antidotes, medical treatment;
92.4 Prognosis;
92.5 Information on previously reported cases.
10. INFORMATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND WILDLIFE HAZARDS
10.1 Toxicity to birds:
10.1.1 Acute toxicity;
10.1.2 Other information on harm to avian species eg. population studies, impaired 
fertility, residues in tissues of dead or living birds or their eggs.
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102 Toxidty to fidi:
102.1 Acute toxicity;
10.2.2 Other information on direct barm to fish, eg fish kills, population studies, 
residue studies;
10.2.3 Effects on water quality, fish food and other aquatic organisms.
10.3 Harmful effects on other wildlife, mammals, amphibia, reptiles.
10.4 Toxidty to honey bees.
10.5 Toxidty to benefidal insects, etc.
10.6 Reid trials and observations.
10.7 Toxidty to earfiiworms and other soil invertebrates, changes in soil ecology, 
microorganisms etc.
11 INFORMATION ON EXISTING CLEARANCES
11.1 In other countries
11.2 Tolerances.
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Appendix S3: Suggested Humaneness Data Requirements (from Consultative 
Document).
1. Time to unconsciousness
2. Degree of activity prior to unconsciousness eg hyperactive^nactive, stereotyped 
behaviour/ abnormal startle response.
3. Muscular control eg severe convulsions/total/partial paralysis.
4. Nervous control eg co-ordinated/unco-ordinated.
5. Respiration eg rapidAntermittent
6. Vocalization eg distressed/silent
7. Pelage eg "spiky" fur, ruffled feathers.
8. Abnormal posture eg hunched up, prostrate.
9. Defaecation - excretion and urination.
10. Vomit and nature of vomitus.
11. External discharge eg pus, blood.
12. Irritancy eg scratching, grooming, licking.
13. Response to food/water eg anorexia, thirst, inability to feed or drink.
14. Post-mortem examinatiotL
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Data submitted will be based on a minimum number of observations of these and 
perhaps other aspects of behaviour and there will have to be some form of "rating" of 
observations related to the severity of different reactions. Any rating system will of 
course need to reflect the latest informed opinion but it will need to be related to 
factors such as the ideal time to unconsciousness and the proportion of animals having 
achieved this ideal and acceptable degree of adverse symptoms observed. The 
minimum number of observations will need to be determined on the basis of providing 
sufficient data from which reasonable conclusions on the humaneness of a product 
could be drawrL The number of observations will also need to be related to other 
laboratory data submitted, but a specific minimum amount of humaneness data will be 
required. Any system eventually agreed will be applied to all new product approvals 
and those existing ^)provals to be reviewed in the future.
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Appendix 8.4: Possible Efficacy Data Requirements (from Consultative
Document).
0) The level, duration and consistency of protection or other intended effea(s) 
appropriate to the desired objective(s) of treatment in the recommended manner and at 
the recommoided time, including the effects upon the activity of the product of normal 
variation (see viii, below);
(ii) any deleterious effects on the surface/substrate/animals/crops to be treated;
(iii) the yield and/or quality of treated plants or plant products and/or suitability of 
treated products/jpremises for their intended uses;
Ov) the cmnpatibility with different cultural, storage or other appropriate practices and 
other preservation, crop protection, pest control or animal husbandry measures under 
the conditions of use envisaged;
(v) advantages of the product or its manner of use which may compensate for any 
deficiencies in level, duration or consistency of the intended effects (eg control of 
strains resistant to other pesticides);
(vi) unintoided effects, eg on non-target organisms, on succeeding crops, other plants 
and parts of treated plants used for propagation purposes (eg seeds, cuttings, runners 
etc), on organoleptic properties of plant products or food, on materials, crops or plant 
products iri adjacent or nearby areas;
(vii) suitability of the physical properties of the product for the uses for which it is 
intended, including the retention of these properties and stability of the active 
ingredient after storage (normally for 2 years);
(viii) the effect on aU of the above of q)propriate variables, such as climate, 
temperature, humidity, nature of treated surfaces, porosity and pH of substrate(s), 
cultivar(s), crop growth state and vigour, stage of development and strain of pest, soil 
type and condition etc and, in the case of baits, acceptability/attractiveness to the pest 
organism;
^ )  the effect which use of a particular product is likely to have upon general 
resistance levels;
(x) any other relevant factors.
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Appendix &5: BAA s Information Disclosure Proposal.
Introduction Full commercial clearance has been granted to (company) for their 
insecticidal/herbicidal/fungicidal product, (name of product). The product contains X 
gms/Iitre in an emulsifiable concentrate of (chemical name) and is cleared for the 
control of (pest/weed/disease) in (crop(s).
Common name • 
Chemical name
Physical and Chemical Properties-------------------
physical state 
purity
molecular weight, vapour pressure, boiling point, solubility, hydrolytic staWlity, etc.
Toxicity - Technical Material - acute orals, s^nite dermals, acute inhalational, primary 
eye irritation, primary skin irritation, dermal sensitization, chronic toxicity - e.g. "In a 
6-month dog-feeding study, the no-effect level was 120ppsn. Where rats and mice were 
fed a diet containing (chemical name) for two years, the no-effect level was 120ppm 
for mice and 360ppm for rats. In studies conducted in rats up to levels of 250mg/kg 
and in rabbits up to levels of 160 mgAg teratogenic effects were not observed. In 
various studies with this compound in rats and mice, rx> mutagenic or oncogenic effect 
was observed."
Formulated product - acute oral, acute dermal, primary eye irritation, primary skin 
irritation.
Environmental data e.g. acute oral LD50 mallard duck, 8-day dietary LC50 (96 hour) 
bluegill sunfish and rambow trout, LC50 (48 hour) Daphnia. e.g. "The chemical has 
short persistence in the environment. Under laboratory studies, it has shown a half life 
of 12 days in moist loam and 26 days in heavy day soil. Under various field 
conditions, no residues were detectable 120 days after treatment Due to rapid 
hydrolysis and photolysis, persistence in water is not a problem."
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Residues and metabolism e.g. "Residues in the crops were tested below the level of 
detection of O.Q5ppm. Rats fed radio-labelled compound excreted 97% of the 
administered radioactivity in the urine and faeces in two days. In lacerating goats aU 
the administered radioactivity was excreted in urine and faeces one day after the 
administration of the final dose."
Registered uses incL crops, time of application, use of adjuvants, dosage rates.
Appraisal: Operators - e.g. "The Xgm/litre formulation of --------- notified is
considered harmful if swallowed and irritating to eyes and skim The label requires the 
use of protective gloves and face shield when handling the concentrate. It is also
recommended th a t is scheduled under the relevant regulations as a Part in
substance. A possible problem is that the spray strength dilution is a wild eye irritant 
which causes severe initial pain, which can be obviated by the use of a face shield 
when spraying."
Consumers -----------  has been notified for p lica tio n  to ------  and  —.
Application is at x gms ai/ha with a 14-day pre-harvest interval. The indications are 
that residues will be 0.1 mg/kg or less at harvest
Precautions - keep out of reach of childrem May cause initatim  of eyes and skim 
Avoid contact with eyes and dun. Do not take internally. Avoid inhalation of v ^ u rs  
or spray m ist Wash thoroughly after handling.
First Aid This product contains a petroleum distillate; therefore if swallowed, do not 
induce vomiting. Get medical attention immediately, if patient is unconscious, give aid. 
In case of eye contact wash witii dean water for 15 minutes and get medical 
attentiom In case of skin contact wash with soap and water.
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Appendix 8.6: Information Disclosure Procedure (PICD Note).
INFORMATION TO BE MADE AVAILABLE UNDER REGULATIONS
3. Our intention is to make available, under safeguards, evaluations based on those 
prepared by the MAFF’s Pesticide Registration and Surveillance Department and the 
Health and Safety Executive's Employment Medical Advisory Service for the Scientific 
Sub-Committee (SSQ and the Advisory Committee on Pesticides (ACP). The aim is 
that these evaluations should be sufficiently detailed to satisfy the great majority of 
enquirers without recourse to study reports, while still protecting commercially 
sensitive information.
PREPARATION OF EVALUATIONS
In preparing evaluations for scmtiny by interested members of the public it will be 
necessary to avoid speculative comments, misleading phraseology and sensitive 
conunercial information sudi as formulation details. In order to edit the evaluations in 
this way, the following procedures will be followed:
0) It will be open to notifiers to sidelirre, in their summary data sheets, information 
which they regard as particularly sensitive;
(ii) in drafting evsduations for the SSC the secretariats will do their utmost to ensure 
that formulation details, speculative discussion and any obviously commercially 
valuable data is relegated to detachable annexes to the main evaluation; but will ensure 
nonetheless that foe description of the main document is complete in its essentials;
(iii) as a part of their normal scrutiny of the documents the SSC, and later the ACP, 
will ensure that the evaluation does not contain any statements with which they are not 
satisfied professionally;
Qv) when Ministers agree to grant a provisional or full s^roval the notifier will be 
informed of the terms of the approval and will receive a copy of fiie evaluation text 
intended for release (ie with any SSC/ACP amendments but minus any sensitive 
annexes). The notifier will be invited to comment within three weeks if he wishes to 
make a case for removing data frmn foe text The cq>proval will only become effective 
once the evaluation is agreed.
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SAFEGUARDS ON AVAILABILITY OF EVALUATIONS
5. Persons wishing to see an evaluation will have to îç)ply to MAFF/HSE in writing 
stating;
0) their name, address and occupation;
01) the product or active ingredient of interest;
6. They will also have to sign an undertaking to the effect that
0) they will not make any commercial use of the evaluation eifoer in the UK or 
overseas;
(ii) they will not publish any part of the evaluation without the written permission of 
Ministers; or pass the document on to any other person;
Oii) they understand that any breach of these conditicms would be a criminal offence 
under the Act
Departments will keep publicly available a register of names and addresses of 
successful 2q)plicants for evaluations, and foe documents issued.
ACCESS TO STUDY REPORTS
7. In foe event of an individual wishing to obtain access to study reports he will need 
to satisfy the SSC (on appeal the AGP and then Ministers) of the scientific justification 
for his request In order to do fiiat he will need to complete a form giving the 
following information set out below:
Personal Background.
(i) Name;
^ )  brief details of scientific qualifications and current employment including name of 
employer,
Gii) source(s) of any funding for any research project on which engaged;
(iv) details of any commercial interests;
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Information Requested.
(v) product or active ingredient of interest;
(vi) nature of data requested eg which study report?
Justification For Request.
(vii) enquiry or research project being followed and its aim;
(viii) statement of data sources already e?q)lored;
(ix) explanation of why the summary evaluation is insufficient and what the enquirer 
hopes to achieve by reading a study report;
(x) whether the enquirer has approadied the company, or has any objection to his or 
her request being made known to them.
The SSC will assess the request based on this information and undertakings and will 
make a recommendation to Ministers accordingly.
8. In the event of the recommendation being in favour of access, the enquirer would 
be given access to the study report he has identified, and only to that iqwit, Fw 
example, if he is interested in the teratogenicity of a compound, he will not gain 
access to ofiier toxicity data or environmental data. Access will be provided by a 
reading room facility at MAFF/HSE, with note-taking allowed but no copying. 
MAFF/HSE will not use their powers to provide copies without further discussion with 
notifiers* representatives.
9. In all cases where access is provided to a study rqwrt the reader will be required to 
sign the undertakings set out in para 6. Departments will keep publicly available a 




10. A breach of the prohibition on commercial use and publication of evaluations and 
study reports by their recipients will be a dear breach of Regulation 8(4), and thus an 
offence under Section 16(12) of the Food and Environment Protection Act Under 
Section 21(3) of the same Act an offender is liable to a maximum penalty of £2000 if 
convicted by a lower court, but an unlimited fine if convicted on indictment in a 
higher court Under the terms of Section 16(12) an offeider is one who contravenes, 
"or causes or permits any other person", to contravoie the provisions of the regulation. 
Section 21(6) makes provision for the penalties to attach personally to officers of 
bodies corporate, as well as to the body corporate itsdf.
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Appendix 8.7: Possible Off-Label Applications Information Requirements (A'om
Consultative Document).
It should be noted that this is not a check list of information which would be required 
for all products. For instance, in the case of items 6-9 it would be acceptable for an 
applicant to refer to the conditions applicable to a similar crop; eg if approval was 
sought for use on cane fruits of a product approved and recommended on the label for 
use on raspberries, it would be sufficient to state "as for raspberries". Obviously not all 
cases would be this straight forward but an application under this procedure would not 
necessarily fail because all questions had not been answered. However foe more 
information provided, the easier it is likely to be for foe safety and efficacy of the 
proposed use to be assessed.




1.4 Formulation Type (eg granule, wettable powder, liquid)
I
1.5 Whether Regulated under the Poisonous Substances in Agriculture Regulations
2. PURPOSE OF PROPOSED USE
Eg Pest(s), disease(s), weed(s) to be controlled. If herbicide state whether for general 
weed control or for control of specific problem weeds.
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3. REASON FOR THINKING PRODUCT WILL BE EFFECTIVE FOR THIS 
PURPOSE
eg Recommended for same or similar pest on another crop, some evidence for 
experimental work/observation.
4. CROP DETAILS
4.1 Identity of crop
Identify individual crops if edible, if non-edible either (if few) state individual crops or 
(if many) give general description, eg turf, bedding plants, pot plants, cut flower crops, 
herbaceous perennials, ornamental shrubs, hedges, ornamental or forest trees etc.
42 Situation of crop
ie outdoors, protected-glasshouse or walk-in tunnels, protected-clOches or low tunnels, 
other (specify).
4.3 Height of target
If product may at least sometimes be applied wifli knapsack/handheld applicator state 
whether target wUl be
(a) Entirely below operators waist level
(b) Partly or wholly above operators waist leveL
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5. PROPOSED APPLICATION METHOD(S)
Indicate dearly if any of the proposed methods are already recommended on the 
product label for use on other crops in similar situations. If the proposed method(s) 
is/are not already recommended on the product label give full details.
Examples of descriptions of methods:-
0) Tractor mountedfoand held granule applicator
01) tractor mounted/knapsack/hand held sprayer
(a) hydraulic nozzles - fine/medium/coarse spray
(b) spinning disc (state details)
(c) air assisted sprayer (state details)
(d) electrostatic (specify)
(e) other (describe in detail)
For soil applied chemicals indicate whether application is to be followed by 
incorporation into the soil and if so state method(s) to be used.
6. APPUCATION RATE
Should be e)q)ressed as, (as appropriate) either
(a) Application rate of product per unit area and volume of spray per unit area. (State 
if dilutent used is not water or if product is not diluted).
or
(b) Dilution rate of product (g/kg/inl/Iitres product per 10/100/100 litres of water), 
or
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(c) both (a) and (b) 
or
(d) other appropriate units.
7. APPLICATION TIMIMG AND MAXIMUM FREQUENCY
(Days from sowing or planting/date(s)/growth stage(s) etc, as ^ropriate). Give details 
for each crop if there are differences.
8. USE IN MIXTURES
State if it is proposed to add wetters/oilVother spray additives or if it is proposed to 
use the product as a mixture with (an)other pesticide(s).
9. MINIMUM INTERVAL BETWEEN APPLICATION AND EXPOSURE OF THE 
PUBLIC
(a) Edible Crops.
State what would normally be the minimum interval between last application and
hiuvest if the product was applied in accordance with the details of timing and
frequency proposed under Section 7, above.
(b) Non-edible crops
State what would normally be the minimum interval between last application and
putting plants on display/sale, allowing public access to treated areas, etc (as
appropriate) if the product was applied in accordance with the details of timing and 
frequency proposed under Section 7, above.
10. ANY OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION
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Appendix &8: Proposed Training Requirements (from Draft Code of Practice). 
Whatever the source of the instruction and guidance it must enable the user to:
(a) identify those aspects of legislation which apply to the use of pesticides, in 
particular foeir responsibilities under foe Control of Pesticides Regulations 1986 and 
the Poisonous Substances in Agriculture Regulations 1984;
(b) use the information on container labels and elsewhere to determine the s^roved 
uses, the potential hazards to human safety, ofoer crops or the environment of a 
particular product and the precautions necessary to use it safely;
(c) identify the necessary protective clothing for use with a particular product;
(d) carry out correct procedures for handling, mixing and storing pesticides and the 
disposal of empty pesticide containers and surplus pesticide;
(e) take any necessary emergency action to de-contaminate persons and obtain 
specialised assistance in foe event of accidental poisoning;
(f) prepare appropriate application equipment for work, calibrate and operate it to 
ensure the correct application (dose) rate;
(g) identify safe procedures for protecting the puUic and environment from potential 
hazard before, during and after application and to recognise conditions where pesticide 
use would pose a risk to people or the envircmment including water and wildlife and 
avoid use in sucfo circumstances (eg conditions which may result in spray drift, failure 
to incorporate pesticides adequately in the soil, inappropriate laying of pest control 
products or multiple treatments of stored grain);
(h) carry out foe correct procedure for cleaning clothing and application equipment 
which may be contaminated with pesticide;
0) complete the records necessary to meet any use obligations under the Control of 
Pesticides Regulations 1986.
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Appendix 8.9: Consultative Document Circulation List.
Agricultural and Food Research Council 
Agricultural Engineers Association Limited 
Agricultural Training Board 
Anglers Co-operative Association (Scotland)
Apple and Pear Development Council
Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry
Association of County Councils
Association of District Councils
Association of Independent Crop Consultants
Association of Local Authorities of Northern Ireland
Association of Metropolitan Authorities
Association of Public Analysts
Association of Parish Councils
Association of Scottish District Salmon Hshery Boards
Association of Sea And Air Port Authorities
British Bee Farmers Association
Brewers Society
British Aerosol Manufacturers Association
British Agricultural Machinery Manufacturers Association
British Agrochemicals Association
British Agrochemicals Supply Industry Scheme
British Association of Landscape Industries
British Association of Chemical Specialists
British Association of Plant Breeders
British Bee Keepers Associatiori
British Chemical Distributors and Trades Association
British Crop Protection Council
British Distributors of Animal Medicines Association
British Institute of Agricultural Consultants
British Institute of Agricultural Contractors
British Medical Association
British Pest Control Association
British Railways Board
British Retailers Association
British Trust for Ornithology
British Waterways Board
British Wood Preservers Association




Committee for Infonnation on Animal Research
Confederation of British Industries
Consumers Association
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities
Co-operative Union Limited
Council for the Protection of Rural England
Council of Scottish Agricultural Colleges
Country Landowners Association
Country Landowners Association (Wales)
Countryside Commission 
Countryside Commission for Scotland 
Crofters Commission for Scotland 
Earfo Resources Research Limited
Environment Protection Equipment Manufacturers Association
Faculty of Community Medicine
Farmers Union of Wales
Fertilizer Manufacturers Association
Food and Drink Federation
Fbod Manufacturers Federation
Forestry Commission
Friends of die Earth
Game Conservancy
General Municipal and Boilermakers Union 
Greerpeace
Horticultural Trades Association
Industrial Safety (Protective Equipment) Manufacturers Association
Institute of Eurtpean Environmental Policy
Institute of Food Science and Technology
Institute of Trading Standards Administration
Institution of Environmental Health Officers
Local Authorities Co-ordinating Body on Trading Standards
Local Government Training Board
London Food Commission
Mammal Society
Meat and Livestock Commission
Medical Research Council
National Association of Agricultural Contractors
National Association of Local Councils
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National Fanners Union 
National Fanners Union (Wales)
National Federation of Fruit and Potato Trades
National Institute of Agricultural Engineers
National Proficiency Tests Council
National Turfgiass Council




Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain
Public Health and Industrial Pesticides Council
Royal Cmnmission on Environmoilal Pollution
Royal Environmental Health Institute of Scotland
Royal Society for Nature Conservation
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
Royal Society of Cherhistry
Salmon and Trout Association
Salmon Net Fishing Association of Scotland
Scottish Association of Directors of Water and Sewage Services
Scottish Consumers Council
Scottish Co-operatve Food Trade Association
Scottish Institute of Agricultural Engineers
Scottish Landowners Association
Scottish National Farmers Union
Scottish Retail Federation
Scottish River Purification Boards Assodation
Scottish Trades Union Congress
Society of Chemical Industry
Society of Directors of Trading Standards in Scotland




The Royal Horticultural Society
The Society of Scottish Directors of Consumer Protection
Timber Growers Association
Timber Growers Association (Scotland)
Trades Union-Congress
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Transport and General Workers Union 
Ulster Fanners Union
United Kingdom Agricultural Supply Trade Association Limited
Water Authorities Association
Water Research Centre




Appendix 8.10: ACP Membership by Expertise (all affiliations non-Government 
and non commercial).
1. General Medicine, Clinical Phannacology
2. ainical Histopathology, Cytopathology, Carcinogenicity, Teratogenicity.
3. Clinical And Experimental Pathology, Carcinogenicity
4. Analytical Chemistry
5. Wood Preservation, Mycology
6. Epidemiology, Community Medicine
7. Occupational Health and Hygiene
8. Clinical Toxicology
9. Plant Physiology, Experimental Ecology,. Experimental Horticulture, Biology of 
Weeds
10. Agriculture, Crop Production
11. Bitomology
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Appendix 8.11: SSC Membership by Expertise (and Affiliation).
1. Caicinogenicity, Teratogenicity, Cytopathology, Clinical Histopathology; 
(Independent)
2. Pesticide Residues and Analysis; (Independent)
3. Agronomy; (MAFF)
4. Pesticides Control and Residues; (MAFF)
5. Clinical Toxicology; (Independent)
6. Entomology; (Glasshouse Crops Research Institute)
7. Vertebrate Toxicology; (Nature Conservancy Council)
8. Entomology; (MAFF)
9. Plant Pathology; (MAFF)
10. Soil Science; (Long Ashton Research Station, AFRÇ)
11. Timber Preservation; (DoE)
12. Bio Control (eg virus based materials); (Independent)
13. Reproductive Toxicology; (Independent)
14. Operator Safety; (HSE)
15. Environmental Toxicology; (MAFF)
16. Acute Toxicology; (MAFF)
17. Carcinogenicity and Histopathology; (Independent)
18. Clinical Pharmacology and Epidemiology; (Independent)
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Appendix 8.12: Environmental Panel Membership by Expertise (and Affiliation).
1. Entomology; (MAFF)
2. Bird and Amphibia Toxicology; (NCQ
3. hCcrobiology; (Long Ashton Research Station AFRQ
4. Ecology and Toxicology; (MAFF)
5. Vertebrate and Invertebrate Pest Control; (MAFF)
6. Vertebrate Ecology; (MAFF)
7. Hsh Toxicology; (MAFF)
8. Environmental Aspects of Pesticide Control; (DoE)
9. Toxicology; (MAFF)
10. Environmental Aspects of Water Problems (Anglian Water Authority)
11. Wildlife; (DAFS)
12. Environmental Toxicology; (MAFF)
13. Entomology; (Rothampsted Experimental Station)
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